Win10盗版win8.1升级win10
盗版win8.1升级win10 时间:2021-01-20 阅读:()
1WindowsCredentialsAttackMitigationDefenseChadTilbury@chadtilburySeniorInstructorandCo-Author:FOR500:WindowsForensicsFOR508:AdvancedForensicsandIncidentResponseE-mail:chad.
tilbury@crowdstrike.
comLinkedIn:ChadTilburyTwitter:@chadtilburyComputerCrimeInvestigationsCrowdStrikeMandiantUSAirForceOSISpecialAgentCHADTILBURYTECHNICALADVISORCROWDSTRIKESERVICESSANSINSTITUTECONNECT15+YEARSPriority#1post-exploitationDomainadminisultimategoalNearlyeverythinginWindowsistiedtoanaccountDifficulttomovewithoutoneEasyandrelativelystealthymeanstotraversethenetworkAccountlimitationsarerare"Sleeper"credentialscanprovideaccessafterremediationCompromisingCredentials3PillageAchieveDomainAdminDumpMoarCredentials_MoveLaterallyDumpCredentialsGainFootholdUserAccessControl(UAC)ManagedServiceAccountsKB2871997SSPplaintextpasswordmitigationsLocaladminremotelogonrestrictionsProtectedProcessesRestrictedAdminDomainProtectedUsersSecurityGroupLSACachecleanupGroupManagedServiceAccountsCredentialGuardRemoteCredentialGuardDeviceGuard(preventexecutionofuntrustedcode)EvolutionofCredentialAttackMitigation4CompromisingCredentials:HashesThepasswordforeachuseraccountinWindowsisstoredinmultipleformats:LMandNThashesaremostwellknown.
TsPkg,WDigest,andLiveSSPcanbedecryptedtoprovideplaintextpasswords(priortoWin8.
1)HowaretheyacquiredandusedHashesareavailableintheLSASSprocessandcanbeextractedwithadminprivileges.
Oncedumped,hashescanbecrackedorusedimmediatelyinaPasstheHashattack.
Commontools:MimikatzfgdumpgsecdumpMetasploitSMBshellPWDumpXcreddumpWCEHashesTokensCachedCredentialsLSASecretsTicketsNTDS.
DIT5AdminActionLogonTypeCredentialsonTargetNotesConsolelogon2Yes**ExceptwhenCredentialGuardisenabledRunas2Yes**ExceptwhenCredentialGuardisenabledRemoteDesktop10Yes**ExceptforenabledRemoteCredentialGuardNetUse3NoIncluding/u:parameterPowerShellRemoting3NoInvoke-Command;Enter-PSSessionPsExecalternatecreds3+2Yes-u-pmicrosoft.
com/en-us/windows-server-docs/security/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-materialHashDumping(Gsecdump)8PasstheHash(Mimikatz)10PreventadminaccountcompromiseStopremoteinteractivesessionswithhighlyprivilegedaccountsProperterminationofRDPsessionsWin8.
1+forcetheuseofRestrictedAdminWin10deployRemoteCredentialGuardUpgradetoWindows10CredentialGuardTsPkg,WDigest,etc.
--SSOcredsobsolescenceDomainProtectedUsersGroup(PtHmitigation)DefendingCredentials:Hashes12CompromisingCredentials:TokensDelegatetokensarepowerfulauthenticationresourcesusedforSSO.
Theyallowattackerstoimpersonateauser'ssecuritycontext,includingoverthenetwork.
HowaretheyacquiredandusedTheSeImpersonateprivilegeletstokensbecopiedfromprocesses.
Thenewtokencanthenbeusedtoauthenticateasthenewuser.
Atargetuserorservicemustbeloggedonorhaverunningprocesses.
Commontools:IncognitoMetasploitPowerShellMimikatzHashesTokensCachedCredentialsLSASecretsTicketsNTDS.
DIT13TokenStealing(Mimikatz)14PreventadminaccountcompromiseStopremoteinteractivesessionswithhighlyprivilegedaccountsProperterminationofRDPsessionsWin8.
1+forcetheuseofRestrictedAdminModeWin10deployRemoteCredentialGuardAccountdesignationof"AccountisSensitiveandCannotbeDelegated"inActiveDirectoryDomainProtectedUserssecuritygroupaccountsdonotcreatedelegatetokensDefendingCredentials:Tokens16CompromisingCredentials:CachedCredentialsStoreddomaincredentialstoallowlogonswhendomaincontrolleraccessisunavailable.
Mostsystemscachethelast10logonhashesbydefault.
HowaretheyacquiredandusedCachedcredentialsmustbecracked.
Hashesaresaltedandcase-sensitive,makingdecryptionveryslow.
ThesehashescannotbeusedforPasstheHashattacks.
Commontools:cachedumpMetasploitPWDumpXcreddumpHashesTokensCachedCredentialsLSASecretsTicketsNTDS.
DIT17Thecreddumputilitiescanextracthashes,cachedcredentialsandLSASecretsfromofflineregistryhives:github.
com/Neohapsis/creddump7OfflineCachedCredentialsExtraction(Creddump)18LocalNTHashesCachedHashesPreventadminaccountcompromiseLimitnumberofcachedlogonaccountsSOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon(cachedlogonscountvalue)AcachedlogonscountofzerooroneisnotalwaystherightanswerEnforcepasswordlengthandcomplexityrulesBruteforcecrackingisrequiredforthisattackDomainProtectedUserssecuritygroupaccountsdonotcachecredentialsDefendingCredentials:CachedCredentials20CompromisingCredentials:LSASecretsCredentialsstoredintheregistrytoallowservicesortaskstoberunwithuserprivileges.
Inadditiontoserviceaccounts,mayalsoholdapplicationpasswordslikeVPNorauto-logoncredentials.
HowaretheyacquiredandusedAdministratorprivilegesallowaccesstoencryptedregistrydataandthekeysnecessarytodecrypt.
PasswordsareplaintextCommontools:CainMetasploitMimikatzgsecdumpPWDumpXcreddumpPowerShellHashesTokensCachedCredentialsLSASecretsTicketsNTDS.
DIT21Get-LsaSecret.
ps1fromtheNishangPowerShellpentestframeworkusedtodump(anddecrypt)LSASecretshttps://github.
com/samratashok/nishangDecryptingLSASecrets(Nishang)22PreventadminaccountcompromiseDonotemployservicesorscheduletasksrequiringprivilegedaccountsonlowtrustsystemsReducenumberofservicesthatrequiredomainaccountstoexecuteHeavilyauditanyaccountsthatmustbeused(Group)ManagedServiceAccountsDefendingCredentials:LSASecrets23CompromisingCredentials:TicketsKerberosissuesticketstoauthenticatedusersthatcanbereusedwithoutadditionalauthentication.
Ticketsarecachedinmemoryandarevalidfor10hours.
HowaretheyacquiredandusedTicketscanbestolenfrommemoryandusedtoauthenticateelsewhere(PasstheTicket).
Further,accesstotheDCallowsticketstobecreatedforanyuserwithnoexpiration(GoldenTicket).
Serviceaccountticketscanberequestedandforged,includingofflinecrackingofserviceaccounthashes(Kerberoasting).
Commontools:MimikatzWCEkerberoastHashesTokensCachedCredentialsLSASecretsTicketsNTDS.
DIT24PasstheTicket(Mimikatz)25KerberosAttacks27PasstheTicketStealticketfrommemoryandpassorimportonothersystemsOverpasstheHashUseNThashtorequestaserviceticketforthesameaccountKerberoastingRequestserviceticketforhighlyprivilegedservice&crackNThashGoldenTicketKerberosTGTforanyaccountwithnoexpiration.
SurvivesfullpasswordresetSilverTicketAll-accesspassforasingleserviceorcomputerSkeletonKeyPatchLSASSondomaincontrollertoaddbackdoorpasswordthatworksforanydomainaccountCredentialGuard(Win10+)DomainProtectedUsersGroup(Win8+)–SomeattacksRemoteCredentialGuard(Win10+)RestrictedAdmin(Win8+)Long&complexpasswordsonserviceaccounts(topreventKerberoasting)ChangeserviceaccountpasswordsregularlyGroupManagedServiceAccountsareagreatmitigationAuditserviceaccountsforunusualactivityChangeKRBTGTpasswordregularly(yearly)DefendingCredentials:Tickets28AttackTypeDescriptionMitigationPasstheTicketStealticketfrommemoryandpassorimportonothersystemsCredentialGuard;RemoteCredentialGuardOverpasstheHashUseNThashtorequestaserviceticketforthesameaccountCredentialGuard;ProtectedUsersGroup;DisableRC4authenticationKerberoastingRequestserviceticketforhighlyprivilegedservice&crackNThashLongandcomplexserviceaccountpasswords;ManagedServiceAccountsGoldenTicketKerberosTGTforanyaccountwithnoexpiration.
SurvivesfullpasswordresetProtectdomainadminaccounts;ChangeKRBTGTpasswordregularlySilverTicketAll-accesspassforasingleserviceorcomputerRegularcomputeraccountpasswordupdatesSkeletonKeyPatchLSASSondomaincontrollertoaddbackdoorpasswordtoanyaccountProtectdomainadminaccounts;SmartcardusageforprivilegedaccountsKerberosAttackMitigations29CompromisingCredentials:NTDS.
DITHashesTokensCachedCredentialsLSASecretsTicketsNTDS.
DITActiveDirectoryDomainServices(ADDS)databaseholdsalluserandcomputeraccounthashes(LM/NT)inthedomain.
Encrypted,butalgorithmiswellknownandeasytodefeat.
HowisitacquiredandusedLocatedinthe\Windows\NTDSfolderonthedomaincontroller.
Thefileislocked,soadminaccessisrequiredtoloadadrivertoaccessrawdisk,orusetheVolumeShadowCopyService.
Commontools:ntdsutilVSSAdminNTDSXtractVSSOwn.
vbsPowerShellntdsdump30CommandProcess:conhost.
exePid:141716CommandHistory:0x1b8f80Application:cmd.
exeFlags:Allocated,ResetCommandCount:12LastAdded:11LastDisplayed:11FirstCommand:0CommandCountMax:50ProcessHandle:0x60Cmd#0@0x196970:vssadminlistshadowsCmd#1@0x1bd240:cd\Cmd#2@0x1b9290:dirCmd#3@0x1bd260:cdtempCmd#4@0x1b92b0:dirCmd#5@0x19c6a0:copy\\\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy49\windows\system32\config\SYSTEM.
Cmd#6@0x19c760:dirCmd#7@0x19c780:copy\\\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy49\windows\system32\config\SAM.
Cmd#8@0x19c830:copy\\\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy49\windows\ntds\ntds.
dit.
Cmd#9@0x1c1ab0:dirStealingNTDS.
DIT31Don'tallowDomainAdminaccountstobecompromised.
DefendingCredentials:NTDS.
DIT32CredentialAttackDetection33"Asanypass-the-ticketattack,theattackerreplaysthegoldenticketinastandardKerberosprotocol.
Therefore,thereisnoclearindicationofsuchattackinWindowslogs.
"34"GoldenTicketeventsmayhaveoneoftheseissues:TheAccountDomainfieldisblankwhenitshouldbeDOMAINTheAccountDomainfieldisDOMAINFQDNwhenitshouldbeDOMAIN.
"–SeanMetcalf,adsecurity.
org3536Asanexample…KerberoastingusesRC4encryptiondowngrade(butalmostnoonelogstheseevents)AuthenticationAuditingMappingAdmin$SharesPsExecScheduledTasksVSSAdminRDP/VPNactivityToolArtifactsNewServicesRandomFile/HostnamesCodeInjectionCrashesandSecurityAlertsBehavioralAnalysisLocalAdminAccountUseDomainAdminAnomaliesServiceAccountAnomaliesWorkstation-to-workstationconnectionsCredentialAttackDetection38EventlogsarecriticalfordetectionAuthenticationevents(EID4624,4762,4648,4720,etc.
)Newservices(EID7045)ApplicationandProcessCrashesFailedandanomalousSMBactivity(EID5140)AV/SecuritylogsDomainProtectedUsersecuritygrouplogsApplicationsandServicesLogs\Microsoft\Windows\Microsoft\AuthenticationProcesstrackingCommandlinecapturesPowerShellauditingCredentialAttackDetection39CredentialAttackDetection:PasstheHash40CredentialAttackDetection:PsExecandfgdumpInitiationoftwonear-simultaneousservicesbyhelpdeskaccount42CredentialAttackDetection:LSASSCrashSystemEventLogApplicationEventLog**ReviewandcorrelateyourAnti-Viruslogs**44CredentialAttackDetection:CapturingCommandLines46RegistrychangesDisabledcomputeraccountpwdupdates(SilverTickets)SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\ParametersDisablePasswordChange=1EnabledWDigestcredentials(postWin8.
1)SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WdigestUseLogonCredential=1MemoryAnalysisProcessinjectionLoadeddriversKernel-levelsecurityagentdetectionsBehavioralAnalyticsCredentialAttackDetection:OtherDataSources48CredentialBestPractices49RestrictandProtectPrivilegedDomainAccountsReducethenumberofDomain/EnterpriseAdminsEnforcemulti-factorauthentication(MFA)forallnetworkandcloudadminaccountsSeparateadministrativeaccountsfromuseraccountsforadministrativepersonnelCreatespecificadministrativeworkstationhostsforadministratorsUsetheDomainProtectedUserssecuritygroup!
BestPractices:ControlYourAdminAccounts50LimitLocalAdminAccountsDon'tgiveusersadminUniqueandcomplexpasswordsforlocaladmin(LAPS)DenynetworklogonsforlocalaccountsAuditaccountusageandmonitorforanomaliesBestPractices:ControlYourAdminAccounts(2)51Imagesource:LocalAdministratorPasswordSolutionhttps://technet.
microsoft.
com/en-us/mt227395.
aspxUseaTieredAdministrativeAccessModelAdministrationofADServersandApplicationsWorkstationsandDevicesBestPractices:ControlYourAdminAccounts(3)52Imagesource:SecuringPrivilegedAccessReferenceMaterialbyCoreyPlett(Microsoft)AuditandlimitthenumberofservicesrunningassystemanddomainaccountsUtilizeGroupManagedServiceAccounts…orregularlychangeanduselong&complexpasswordsUpgradetoWindows10/Server2016EnableCredentialGuard&RemoteCredentialGuardForceLSASSasprotectedprocessonlegacyWin8.
1EstablishremoteconnectionsusingnetworklogoninsteadofinteractivelogonwhenpossibleBestPractices:ReducetheCredentialAttackSurface53LimitworkstationtoworkstationcommunicationRestrictinboundNetBIOS,SMBtrafficusingtheWindowsFirewall…orVLANsegmentationofworkstationsSomanyhacktoolsleverageSMBauthenticationIsworkstationtoworkstationRDPreallynecessaryEnablestricterKerberossecurityDisableLM&NTLM(forceKerberos)ShortvalidityforticketsNoaccountdelegationBestPractices:ReducetheCredentialAttackSurface(2)54ChartbyBenjaminDelpy:https://goo.
gl/1K3AC7IncreaseAwarenessofNewAttacks5556Materialsfrom:http://dfir.
to/FOR508
tilbury@crowdstrike.
comLinkedIn:ChadTilburyTwitter:@chadtilburyComputerCrimeInvestigationsCrowdStrikeMandiantUSAirForceOSISpecialAgentCHADTILBURYTECHNICALADVISORCROWDSTRIKESERVICESSANSINSTITUTECONNECT15+YEARSPriority#1post-exploitationDomainadminisultimategoalNearlyeverythinginWindowsistiedtoanaccountDifficulttomovewithoutoneEasyandrelativelystealthymeanstotraversethenetworkAccountlimitationsarerare"Sleeper"credentialscanprovideaccessafterremediationCompromisingCredentials3PillageAchieveDomainAdminDumpMoarCredentials_MoveLaterallyDumpCredentialsGainFootholdUserAccessControl(UAC)ManagedServiceAccountsKB2871997SSPplaintextpasswordmitigationsLocaladminremotelogonrestrictionsProtectedProcessesRestrictedAdminDomainProtectedUsersSecurityGroupLSACachecleanupGroupManagedServiceAccountsCredentialGuardRemoteCredentialGuardDeviceGuard(preventexecutionofuntrustedcode)EvolutionofCredentialAttackMitigation4CompromisingCredentials:HashesThepasswordforeachuseraccountinWindowsisstoredinmultipleformats:LMandNThashesaremostwellknown.
TsPkg,WDigest,andLiveSSPcanbedecryptedtoprovideplaintextpasswords(priortoWin8.
1)HowaretheyacquiredandusedHashesareavailableintheLSASSprocessandcanbeextractedwithadminprivileges.
Oncedumped,hashescanbecrackedorusedimmediatelyinaPasstheHashattack.
Commontools:MimikatzfgdumpgsecdumpMetasploitSMBshellPWDumpXcreddumpWCEHashesTokensCachedCredentialsLSASecretsTicketsNTDS.
DIT5AdminActionLogonTypeCredentialsonTargetNotesConsolelogon2Yes**ExceptwhenCredentialGuardisenabledRunas2Yes**ExceptwhenCredentialGuardisenabledRemoteDesktop10Yes**ExceptforenabledRemoteCredentialGuardNetUse3NoIncluding/u:parameterPowerShellRemoting3NoInvoke-Command;Enter-PSSessionPsExecalternatecreds3+2Yes-u-p
com/en-us/windows-server-docs/security/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-materialHashDumping(Gsecdump)8PasstheHash(Mimikatz)10PreventadminaccountcompromiseStopremoteinteractivesessionswithhighlyprivilegedaccountsProperterminationofRDPsessionsWin8.
1+forcetheuseofRestrictedAdminWin10deployRemoteCredentialGuardUpgradetoWindows10CredentialGuardTsPkg,WDigest,etc.
--SSOcredsobsolescenceDomainProtectedUsersGroup(PtHmitigation)DefendingCredentials:Hashes12CompromisingCredentials:TokensDelegatetokensarepowerfulauthenticationresourcesusedforSSO.
Theyallowattackerstoimpersonateauser'ssecuritycontext,includingoverthenetwork.
HowaretheyacquiredandusedTheSeImpersonateprivilegeletstokensbecopiedfromprocesses.
Thenewtokencanthenbeusedtoauthenticateasthenewuser.
Atargetuserorservicemustbeloggedonorhaverunningprocesses.
Commontools:IncognitoMetasploitPowerShellMimikatzHashesTokensCachedCredentialsLSASecretsTicketsNTDS.
DIT13TokenStealing(Mimikatz)14PreventadminaccountcompromiseStopremoteinteractivesessionswithhighlyprivilegedaccountsProperterminationofRDPsessionsWin8.
1+forcetheuseofRestrictedAdminModeWin10deployRemoteCredentialGuardAccountdesignationof"AccountisSensitiveandCannotbeDelegated"inActiveDirectoryDomainProtectedUserssecuritygroupaccountsdonotcreatedelegatetokensDefendingCredentials:Tokens16CompromisingCredentials:CachedCredentialsStoreddomaincredentialstoallowlogonswhendomaincontrolleraccessisunavailable.
Mostsystemscachethelast10logonhashesbydefault.
HowaretheyacquiredandusedCachedcredentialsmustbecracked.
Hashesaresaltedandcase-sensitive,makingdecryptionveryslow.
ThesehashescannotbeusedforPasstheHashattacks.
Commontools:cachedumpMetasploitPWDumpXcreddumpHashesTokensCachedCredentialsLSASecretsTicketsNTDS.
DIT17Thecreddumputilitiescanextracthashes,cachedcredentialsandLSASecretsfromofflineregistryhives:github.
com/Neohapsis/creddump7OfflineCachedCredentialsExtraction(Creddump)18LocalNTHashesCachedHashesPreventadminaccountcompromiseLimitnumberofcachedlogonaccountsSOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon(cachedlogonscountvalue)AcachedlogonscountofzerooroneisnotalwaystherightanswerEnforcepasswordlengthandcomplexityrulesBruteforcecrackingisrequiredforthisattackDomainProtectedUserssecuritygroupaccountsdonotcachecredentialsDefendingCredentials:CachedCredentials20CompromisingCredentials:LSASecretsCredentialsstoredintheregistrytoallowservicesortaskstoberunwithuserprivileges.
Inadditiontoserviceaccounts,mayalsoholdapplicationpasswordslikeVPNorauto-logoncredentials.
HowaretheyacquiredandusedAdministratorprivilegesallowaccesstoencryptedregistrydataandthekeysnecessarytodecrypt.
PasswordsareplaintextCommontools:CainMetasploitMimikatzgsecdumpPWDumpXcreddumpPowerShellHashesTokensCachedCredentialsLSASecretsTicketsNTDS.
DIT21Get-LsaSecret.
ps1fromtheNishangPowerShellpentestframeworkusedtodump(anddecrypt)LSASecretshttps://github.
com/samratashok/nishangDecryptingLSASecrets(Nishang)22PreventadminaccountcompromiseDonotemployservicesorscheduletasksrequiringprivilegedaccountsonlowtrustsystemsReducenumberofservicesthatrequiredomainaccountstoexecuteHeavilyauditanyaccountsthatmustbeused(Group)ManagedServiceAccountsDefendingCredentials:LSASecrets23CompromisingCredentials:TicketsKerberosissuesticketstoauthenticatedusersthatcanbereusedwithoutadditionalauthentication.
Ticketsarecachedinmemoryandarevalidfor10hours.
HowaretheyacquiredandusedTicketscanbestolenfrommemoryandusedtoauthenticateelsewhere(PasstheTicket).
Further,accesstotheDCallowsticketstobecreatedforanyuserwithnoexpiration(GoldenTicket).
Serviceaccountticketscanberequestedandforged,includingofflinecrackingofserviceaccounthashes(Kerberoasting).
Commontools:MimikatzWCEkerberoastHashesTokensCachedCredentialsLSASecretsTicketsNTDS.
DIT24PasstheTicket(Mimikatz)25KerberosAttacks27PasstheTicketStealticketfrommemoryandpassorimportonothersystemsOverpasstheHashUseNThashtorequestaserviceticketforthesameaccountKerberoastingRequestserviceticketforhighlyprivilegedservice&crackNThashGoldenTicketKerberosTGTforanyaccountwithnoexpiration.
SurvivesfullpasswordresetSilverTicketAll-accesspassforasingleserviceorcomputerSkeletonKeyPatchLSASSondomaincontrollertoaddbackdoorpasswordthatworksforanydomainaccountCredentialGuard(Win10+)DomainProtectedUsersGroup(Win8+)–SomeattacksRemoteCredentialGuard(Win10+)RestrictedAdmin(Win8+)Long&complexpasswordsonserviceaccounts(topreventKerberoasting)ChangeserviceaccountpasswordsregularlyGroupManagedServiceAccountsareagreatmitigationAuditserviceaccountsforunusualactivityChangeKRBTGTpasswordregularly(yearly)DefendingCredentials:Tickets28AttackTypeDescriptionMitigationPasstheTicketStealticketfrommemoryandpassorimportonothersystemsCredentialGuard;RemoteCredentialGuardOverpasstheHashUseNThashtorequestaserviceticketforthesameaccountCredentialGuard;ProtectedUsersGroup;DisableRC4authenticationKerberoastingRequestserviceticketforhighlyprivilegedservice&crackNThashLongandcomplexserviceaccountpasswords;ManagedServiceAccountsGoldenTicketKerberosTGTforanyaccountwithnoexpiration.
SurvivesfullpasswordresetProtectdomainadminaccounts;ChangeKRBTGTpasswordregularlySilverTicketAll-accesspassforasingleserviceorcomputerRegularcomputeraccountpasswordupdatesSkeletonKeyPatchLSASSondomaincontrollertoaddbackdoorpasswordtoanyaccountProtectdomainadminaccounts;SmartcardusageforprivilegedaccountsKerberosAttackMitigations29CompromisingCredentials:NTDS.
DITHashesTokensCachedCredentialsLSASecretsTicketsNTDS.
DITActiveDirectoryDomainServices(ADDS)databaseholdsalluserandcomputeraccounthashes(LM/NT)inthedomain.
Encrypted,butalgorithmiswellknownandeasytodefeat.
HowisitacquiredandusedLocatedinthe\Windows\NTDSfolderonthedomaincontroller.
Thefileislocked,soadminaccessisrequiredtoloadadrivertoaccessrawdisk,orusetheVolumeShadowCopyService.
Commontools:ntdsutilVSSAdminNTDSXtractVSSOwn.
vbsPowerShellntdsdump30CommandProcess:conhost.
exePid:141716CommandHistory:0x1b8f80Application:cmd.
exeFlags:Allocated,ResetCommandCount:12LastAdded:11LastDisplayed:11FirstCommand:0CommandCountMax:50ProcessHandle:0x60Cmd#0@0x196970:vssadminlistshadowsCmd#1@0x1bd240:cd\Cmd#2@0x1b9290:dirCmd#3@0x1bd260:cdtempCmd#4@0x1b92b0:dirCmd#5@0x19c6a0:copy\\\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy49\windows\system32\config\SYSTEM.
Cmd#6@0x19c760:dirCmd#7@0x19c780:copy\\\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy49\windows\system32\config\SAM.
Cmd#8@0x19c830:copy\\\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy49\windows\ntds\ntds.
dit.
Cmd#9@0x1c1ab0:dirStealingNTDS.
DIT31Don'tallowDomainAdminaccountstobecompromised.
DefendingCredentials:NTDS.
DIT32CredentialAttackDetection33"Asanypass-the-ticketattack,theattackerreplaysthegoldenticketinastandardKerberosprotocol.
Therefore,thereisnoclearindicationofsuchattackinWindowslogs.
"34"GoldenTicketeventsmayhaveoneoftheseissues:TheAccountDomainfieldisblankwhenitshouldbeDOMAINTheAccountDomainfieldisDOMAINFQDNwhenitshouldbeDOMAIN.
"–SeanMetcalf,adsecurity.
org3536Asanexample…KerberoastingusesRC4encryptiondowngrade(butalmostnoonelogstheseevents)AuthenticationAuditingMappingAdmin$SharesPsExecScheduledTasksVSSAdminRDP/VPNactivityToolArtifactsNewServicesRandomFile/HostnamesCodeInjectionCrashesandSecurityAlertsBehavioralAnalysisLocalAdminAccountUseDomainAdminAnomaliesServiceAccountAnomaliesWorkstation-to-workstationconnectionsCredentialAttackDetection38EventlogsarecriticalfordetectionAuthenticationevents(EID4624,4762,4648,4720,etc.
)Newservices(EID7045)ApplicationandProcessCrashesFailedandanomalousSMBactivity(EID5140)AV/SecuritylogsDomainProtectedUsersecuritygrouplogsApplicationsandServicesLogs\Microsoft\Windows\Microsoft\AuthenticationProcesstrackingCommandlinecapturesPowerShellauditingCredentialAttackDetection39CredentialAttackDetection:PasstheHash40CredentialAttackDetection:PsExecandfgdumpInitiationoftwonear-simultaneousservicesbyhelpdeskaccount42CredentialAttackDetection:LSASSCrashSystemEventLogApplicationEventLog**ReviewandcorrelateyourAnti-Viruslogs**44CredentialAttackDetection:CapturingCommandLines46RegistrychangesDisabledcomputeraccountpwdupdates(SilverTickets)SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\ParametersDisablePasswordChange=1EnabledWDigestcredentials(postWin8.
1)SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WdigestUseLogonCredential=1MemoryAnalysisProcessinjectionLoadeddriversKernel-levelsecurityagentdetectionsBehavioralAnalyticsCredentialAttackDetection:OtherDataSources48CredentialBestPractices49RestrictandProtectPrivilegedDomainAccountsReducethenumberofDomain/EnterpriseAdminsEnforcemulti-factorauthentication(MFA)forallnetworkandcloudadminaccountsSeparateadministrativeaccountsfromuseraccountsforadministrativepersonnelCreatespecificadministrativeworkstationhostsforadministratorsUsetheDomainProtectedUserssecuritygroup!
BestPractices:ControlYourAdminAccounts50LimitLocalAdminAccountsDon'tgiveusersadminUniqueandcomplexpasswordsforlocaladmin(LAPS)DenynetworklogonsforlocalaccountsAuditaccountusageandmonitorforanomaliesBestPractices:ControlYourAdminAccounts(2)51Imagesource:LocalAdministratorPasswordSolutionhttps://technet.
microsoft.
com/en-us/mt227395.
aspxUseaTieredAdministrativeAccessModelAdministrationofADServersandApplicationsWorkstationsandDevicesBestPractices:ControlYourAdminAccounts(3)52Imagesource:SecuringPrivilegedAccessReferenceMaterialbyCoreyPlett(Microsoft)AuditandlimitthenumberofservicesrunningassystemanddomainaccountsUtilizeGroupManagedServiceAccounts…orregularlychangeanduselong&complexpasswordsUpgradetoWindows10/Server2016EnableCredentialGuard&RemoteCredentialGuardForceLSASSasprotectedprocessonlegacyWin8.
1EstablishremoteconnectionsusingnetworklogoninsteadofinteractivelogonwhenpossibleBestPractices:ReducetheCredentialAttackSurface53LimitworkstationtoworkstationcommunicationRestrictinboundNetBIOS,SMBtrafficusingtheWindowsFirewall…orVLANsegmentationofworkstationsSomanyhacktoolsleverageSMBauthenticationIsworkstationtoworkstationRDPreallynecessaryEnablestricterKerberossecurityDisableLM&NTLM(forceKerberos)ShortvalidityforticketsNoaccountdelegationBestPractices:ReducetheCredentialAttackSurface(2)54ChartbyBenjaminDelpy:https://goo.
gl/1K3AC7IncreaseAwarenessofNewAttacks5556Materialsfrom:http://dfir.
to/FOR508
- Win10盗版win8.1升级win10相关文档
- 项目编号:宣公共采【2017】57号
- 惠普盗版win8.1升级win10
- Brownian盗版win8.1升级win10
- 投标人盗版win8.1升级win10
- 互联网网络安全信息通报
- 广州盗版win8.1升级win10
香港服务器多少钱一个月?香港云服务器最便宜价格
香港服务器多少钱一个月?香港服务器租用配置价格一个月多少，现在很多中小型企业在建站时都会租用香港服务器，租用香港服务器可以使网站访问更流畅、稳定性更好，安全性会更高等等。香港服务器的租用和其他地区的服务器租用配置元素都是一样的，那么为什么香港服务器那么受欢迎呢，香港云服务器最便宜价格多少钱一个月呢?阿里云轻量应用服务器最便宜的是1核1G峰值带宽30Mbps，24元/月，288元/年。不过我们一般选...
HostWebis：美国/法国便宜服务器,100Mbps不限流量,高配置大硬盘,$44/月起
hostwebis怎么样?hostwebis昨天在webhosting发布了几款美国高配置大硬盘机器，但报价需要联系客服。看了下该商家的其它产品，发现几款美国服务器、法国服务器还比较实惠，100Mbps不限流量，高配置大硬盘，$44/月起，有兴趣的可以关注一下。HostWebis是一家国外主机品牌，官网宣称1998年就成立了，根据目标市场的不同，以不同品牌名称提供网络托管服务。2003年，通过与W...
【IT狗】在线ping，在线tcping，路由追踪
IT狗为用户提供 在线ping、在线tcping、在线路由追踪、域名被墙检测、域名被污染检测 等实用工具。【工具地址】https://www.itdog.cn/【工具特色】1、目前同类网站中，在线ping 仅支持1次或少量次数的测试，无法客观的展现目标服务器一段时间的网络状况，IT狗Ping工具可持续的进行一段时间的ping测试，并生成更为直观的网络质量柱状图，让用户更容易掌握服务器在各地区、各线...
盗版win8.1升级win10为你推荐
-
ps软件哪个好哪个PS软件最好用（适合初学者用）？等额本息等额本金哪个好等额本金和等额本息哪个划算？如果想在5-10年内还清贷款哪类更划算一些？车险哪个好购买车险哪家好yy空间登录yy空间怎么上传照片?google广告申请申请Google广告要多长时间呢首选dns服务器地址首选DNS服务器是什么意思什么叫dns服务器DNS服务器是什么东东？360云盘同步版360云盘和360云盘同步版有甚么区分同步版占用电脑空间？360云盘企业版怎么把360云盘文件导入360企业云盘360云u盘360云U盘自动备份有什么用