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604ScienceofMassDestruction:HowBiosecurityBecameanIssueforAcademiesofScienceKoosvanderBruggenIntroductionThegrowinginterestinbiosecurityoutlinedinotherchaptersinthisvolumehasreachedtheinternationalacademicarena.
Manynationalandinternationalscienticorganisationsareinvolvedintheseissuesinawaytheywerenotinthepast;includingnationalacademiesofsciences.
ThischapterconcentratesontheroleoftheInterAcademyPanel(IAP)onInternationalAffairsandonthedebatesanddiscussionsintheNetherlandswheretheRoyalNetherlandsAcademyofArtsandSciences(KNAW)developedanationalCodeofConductforBiosecurity.
Theinitialbackgroundintherstpartofthechapterwillserveasaspringboardforaddressingtwoquestionsinthesecondpart:Istheinterestfromgrowingpartsofthelifesciencecommunityinbiosecurityfuelledbyagrowingriskofmisuseoflifesciencesormorebyagrowingpoliticalandsocietalconcernson(bio)securityHowarerelevantpoliticalandmilitarydevelopmentsincorporatedinthelifesciencesdiscussionsonbiosecurityThechapterconcludeswithsomerecommendationsforthefutureinvolvementofscientistsandtheirorganisationsinthedebateaboutbiosecurity.
TheInterAcademyPanelandbiosecurityTheInterAcademyPanelonInternationalAffairswaslaunchedin1993asaglobalnetworkofscienceacademies.
Itsprimarygoalis'tohelpmemberacademiesworktogethertoadvisecitizensandpublicofcialsB.
Rappertetal.
(eds.
),BiosecurityPalgraveMacmillan,adivisionofMacmillanPublishersLimited2009onthescienticaspectsofcriticalglobalissues'.
1Sinceitsinception,IAPhasissuedstatementsonurgentsocialandscienticissuessuchaspopulationgrowth(1994),sustainability(2000)andhumanreproduc-tivecloning(2003).
Byissuingthesestatementsandotheractivities,IAPhastheintentiontohelpacademiestodevelop'thetoolstheyneedtoparticipateinsciencepolicydiscussionstakingplacebeyonduniversityclassroomsandresearchlaboratories'.
Thesetoolswillhelp'toraiseboththeirpublicproleamongcitizensandtheirinuenceamongpolicymakers'.
2Since2004,IAPhasbeenactiveontheissueoftherelationbetweensecurityandlifescienceresearch.
InthatyearaBiosecurityWorkingGroup(BWG)wasestablishedwiththeAcademiesofChina,Cuba,Nigeria,theNetherlands,theUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStates.
ThisBWGwasinspiredbyactivitiesontheeldofbiosecuritythathadalreadybeendevelopedintheUnitedStatesandthatresultedinthenowfamous'FinkReport'orBiotechnologyResearchinanAgeofTerrorism(NRC2004).
TheBWGhasdevelopedaseriesofactivitiestostimulatediscussion.
In2005(20–22March),IAPwasoneoftheorganisingpartiesofan'InternationalForumonBiosecurity'inComo,Italy.
TogetherwiththeInternationalCouncilforScience(ICSU),theInterAcademyMedicalPanel(IAMP)andTheNationalAcademiesoftheUnitedStates,IAPhostedtheForum.
Oneofitspurposeswastoserveasamajorconven-ingandcoordinatingmechanismtoshareinformationaboutactivitiesthatwereunderwayorplannedtoaddressthebiosecurityissue.
ThesedeliberationscontributedtotheMeetingsofExpertsandStatesPartiestotheBiologicalWeaponsConvention(BWC)inthesummerandfallof2005.
InDecember2005,IAPissuedaStatementonBiosecurity(seeAppendix4.
1).
ThisstatementrespondedtothecallfromStatesPartiestotheBWCduringtheirfthreviewconferencein2002to'promotecommonunder-standingandeffectiveaction(…)onthecontent,promulgation,andadoptionofcodesofconductforscientists'(seethechapterbyRevillandDandoforfurtherbackground).
3Asanorganisationconsistingofmemberorganisations,itwasinitiallyseenasusefulforIAPtodevelopacodeofconductforitsmembers.
EventuallythoughIAPtookthedecisiontoproduceastatementthatcontainedveguidingprinciplesthatcouldthenbe'translated'incodesofconductbyitsmemberorganisations.
ThisStatementonBiosecurity,endorsedby69IAPmemberacademiesin2005,waspresentedatthe2005BWCmeetingsandhascontinuedtobereferredto(Kellman2007;Guthrie2007).
KoosvanderBruggen61Sincethisdeclaration,biosecurityhasstayedontheagendaofthePanel.
TheBWGenabledtheIAPanditsmemberacademiestobecomeinternationallyrecognisedvoicesfortheinter-sectionofsecurityandbio-logicalsciences.
ThememberacademiesoftheWorkingGroup,aswellasothers,havebeenimportantsourcesofadvicetotheirowngovernmentsonnationalpolicy.
Moreover,IAPisincreasinglyrecognisedasanimpor-tantrepresentativeonbiosecurityissuesfortheinternationalscienticcommunity.
Asasignofthis,itwasinvitedtotheBWCMeetingofExpertsinGenevaduringAugust2008.
Inthespringof2008,IAPagainwasoneofthecoorganisingpartiesforthe2ndInternationalForumonBiosecurityinBudapestreferredtoinChapter1.
Theworkinggroupsatthe2ndForumproducedanumberofideasforfutureactivities,bothfortheBWGaswellasforcollaborativeactivitieswithotherscienticorgan-isations.
Forexample,oneworkinggrouprecommendedthatIAPestab-lishataskforcetodevelopaclearinghouseforeducationalmaterialsonbiosecurity.
AnotherrecommendeddevelopinganIAPstatementonappropriatemodelsforoversightofdual-useresearch.
4AnotherstrandofactivityconductedorpreparedbytheBWGhasbeeninternationalworkshopsonbiosecurity.
AworkshopinChina,organisedbytheChineseAcademyofSciences,tookplaceinDecember2008.
AnAfricanworkshopplannedfor2008hadtobepostponedfororganisationalreasons.
Moreover,IAPhasconductedtwosurveysofitsmemberacademies.
Thesesurveysaskedmemberstoprovidedetailsofactivitiesundertakenintheeldofbiosecurity.
Whilemostrespondingacademieshadundertakensomeinitiatives,thiswasmostcommonlylimitedtopublishingtheStatementonBiosecuritytotheirwebsite.
Thedevelopmentofa(national)codeofconductonbiosecuritywasinfactonlytakenupbytheNetherlands.
ForasummaryoftheanswersonthesecondquestionnaireseeAppendix4.
3.
Aworkshopwasplannedformid-2009tobeorganisedbyIAPincooperationwithotherinternationalscienticgroups.
Itspurposewastodeveloprecommendationsforthemosteffectiveapproachestoedu-catinglifescientistsinternationallyondual-useissues.
Theintentionwasfortheworkshopto:surveystrategiesandresourcesavailableinternationallyforedu-cationondual-useissuesandidentifygaps;considerideasforllingthegaps,includingdevelopmentofneweducationalmaterialsandimplementationofeffectiveteachingmethods;anddiscussapproachesforincludingeducationondual-useissuesinthetrainingoflifescientists.
62BiosecurityBiosecuritypolicyintheNetherlands:TheroleoftheRoyalNetherlandsAcademyofArtsandSciencesBiologicalweapons–andmorespecicallybioterrorism–attractedconsiderableattentionaftertheattacksofSeptember11,2001.
Lesswellknownisthatbefore2001,theDutchauthoritieshadalreadypaidattentiontothepossiblethreatsofthedual-useofbiologicalagents.
TheNetherlandsdoesnothaveahistoryofdevelopingorusingbio-logicalweapons.
Indeed,asfarascanbeascertained,therehavebeennoattemptstodevelopsuchweaponsbyanyDutchgovernment.
TheNetherlandshasbeenaStatePartytotheGenevaProtocol(1925)aswellasintheBWC(1972)sincetheirinceptions.
Pre-2001,mostoftheattentiontobiologicalweaponsintheNether-landswaslinkedtothebroaderissuesofChemical,Biological,Radio-logicalandNuclear(CBRN)weapons.
Inacommonletterof17October1997,theMinistersofDefenceandofSciencealreadystated:Inthepasttwentyyearsthethreatofwarfarewithbiologicalweaponshasgrownworldwide.
TheBiologicalWeaponsConventionof1972,thatprohibitsthedevelopment,productionandpossessionofbio-logicalandtoxinweapons,hasnotbeensignedbyagreatnumberofcountries.
Agrowingnumberofcountrieshavethedispositionofbiologicalweaponsforoffensiveuse.
Moreover,theseweaponscanbeproducedmoreeasilybecauseofmoderntechnology,whileplaceandtimeofproductionhardlycanbediscovered.
TheministersconcludedthattheNetherlandshadalaginthedevelop-mentofmeansthatcouldprovideeffectiveprotectionagainstbio-logicalweapons.
Becauseofthisaresearchprogrammewasstartedfordevelopingsuchmeansofprotection(TweedeKamer1997).
Withhindsightitisremarkablethatalltheattentioninthelate1990swasdevotedtothepossiblethreatsofstatesthatwerenotthenpartytotheBWC.
Aterroristthreatisnotspokenof.
Afewyearslater,theconcernwithaterroristthreatwasexplicitintheJune2001reportVerdedigingtegenbioterrorisme(Defenseagainstbioterrorism),publishedbytheDutchHealthCouncil(HealthCouncil2001).
TheHealthCouncilissuedtheworkatarequestoftheMinistryofHealthin1999.
Thereportgavealistofrecommendationsintendedtobettercoordinateexistingpreventiveandprecautionmeasuresaswellastomakeresearchersandmedicaldoctorsmoreawareofthepossibilityoftheintentionalspreadofpathogenicorganisms.
Theideawastoeditahandbookthatwouldprovidetoolsandrulesforactinginthecaseofbioterrorism.
KoosvanderBruggen63Afterthe9-11attacksandtheanthraxletters,acomplementaryreportwasproducedin2002whereintheJune2001recommendationswereelaboratedfurther(HealthCouncil2002).
GiventheremitoftheHealthCouncil,bothreportsconcentrateonthemedicalaspects;speci-callytheprevention,developmentofvaccinesandinsightintodiseasesymptoms.
LegalandpoliticalaspectsofbiothreatsintheNetherlandsarehandledbytheintelligenceservicesandtheofceoftheNationalCoordinatoronTerrorism.
Theyundertakeanalysesofawidespectrumofthreats.
Theoverallconclusionfromtheseassessmentsisthatthelikelihoodofanattackwithbiologicalweaponsisverylimited,eitherintheNetherlandsormoregenerally.
5Oneofthereasonsforthisisthattheproductionofpathogenicagentsrequiressophisticatedbiologicalandmedicalknowledge.
Assuch,horrorstoriesthatsuggestthateveryhighschoolstudentcoulddownloadrecipesforbiologicalweaponsfromtheInternetthatcausemasscasualtiesarehighlyexaggerated(KNAW2007,p.
21).
Buteveniftherisksareverysmall,itshouldstillbeacknowledgedthatthepossibleconsequencesofabioterroristattackcouldbeimmense.
Smallpoxoranthraxepidemicscouldtaketensofthousandsofvictims.
Inaddition,theaffectofdeliberatediseaseonagricultureoranimalhus-bandrycouldbehuge;hasbeenillustratedbyrecentoutbreaksofanimaldiseases.
Eveniftheeffectsarelimitedintermsofthenumberofvictims,politicalandeconomicdamagecannotbediscounted.
Thepanicaftertheanthraxlettersaffairwasenormous,andnotonlyintheUnitedStates.
6TheNetherlandsmayhaveacleanrecordasfarasbiologicalweaponsdevelopmentanduseisconcerned,butthestoryisdifferentregardingnuclearweapons.
ThenotoriousPakistaninuclearscientist,Dr.
AQKhanworkedforDutchuniversitiesandDutchcompaniesearlyinhiscareerduringthe1970s.
Hewasinvolvedinaprojecttoenrichuranium.
In1975KhanreturnedhometoPakistan.
AfewyearslateritbecameclearthatwithtechnologytakenfromtheDutchcompanyURENCO,Pakistanwasdevelopingitsownnuclearweapon.
Becauseofthispainfulhistory,theDutchgovernmentandDutchscienticworldhasbecomealerttothepossibledestructiveapplicationofscienticknowledge.
ArecentexampleistheprohibitiononstudentsandresearchersfromIranenter-ingsomelaboratoriesfornuclearresearchorfollowingcertain'highrisk'courses.
ThisdecisionwasbasedonResolution1737oftheSecurityCounciloftheUnitedNations(2006).
Inpractice,itshouldbenotedthattheeffectofthemeasureisnegligible.
Untiltheendof2008noIranianstudentwasaffected.
Neverthelessthescienticcommunityexpressed64Biosecurityunhappinessaboutthemeasure.
InaletterdatedJanuary2009,presidentoftheKNAW,RobbertDijkgraaf,askedthegovernmenttowithdrawtherestriction.
7Intheeldofbiosecurity,comparablemeasureswerenottakenuntilthelastfewyears.
Twokindsofpoliciesweredeveloped:Incoop-erationwiththeofceoftheNationalCoordinatorforCounterterrorism,newphysicalsecuritymeasureswereintroduced.
ThepotentialweakspotsinDutchlaboratoriesandresearchinstituteswereassessedand,wherenecessary,supplementarysecuritymeasureswereimplementedtominimisetheriskthatthelaboratoriescouldunwittinglyprovidemate-rialsthatcouldbeusedinabioterroristattack.
Thesemeasuresvariedfromimprovedphysicalsecurity,tocontrolovertheimportandexportofbiologicalagents,toscreeningactivities.
Thesecondpolicymeasurewasdirectedatraisingawarenessinthescienticcommunityofbiosecurityissues.
Asafollow-upoftheIAPDeclarationonBiosecurityandthedis-cussionsduringthe2005meetingsoftheBWC,theDutchgovernmentaskedKNAWtodevelopa'CodeofConductonBiosecurity'.
TheKNAWestablishedaworkinggrouptoperformthistask.
Thepresumptionunder-lyingtheinitiationofthisactivitywasthatifaCodeofConductwastohaveitsintendedeffect,thecontenthadtolink-upwithrelevantscientic,socialandpoliticaldevelopmentsandwiththedailypracticeofscientistsandtheirorganisations.
Forthatreasonrelevantactorsfromscience,industryandgovernmentwereinvolvedinthedevelopmentofthecodefromtheoutset.
Afocusgroupofadvisorswasestablishedtomakepracticalcommentsandsuggestionsbasedontheirexperienceasresearchersandpolicymakers.
Formostmembersofthefocusgrouptheissueofintentionalmisuseoflifescienceswasnew,althoughtheywerefamiliarwithquestionsofbiosafety.
Thereactionsandresponsesofthemembersofthefocusgroupwerecomparablewithreactionselsewhereintheworld:8theywerenotfamiliarwiththerisksrelatedtotheintentionalmisuseofbiologicalagents;theywereworriedthatnewmeasureswouldhampertheprogressofresearch;andwereconcernedthatnewmeasurescouldaffectthefreedomtopublishresultsofscienticresearch.
Therewasalsoconcernaboutthefurtherbureaucratisationofscienceandthepossibilitythattheimportorexportofbiologicalagentsfromortocolleaguesinothercountrieswouldbehampered.
TheKNAWworkinggroupaimedtoconvincethemembersofitsfocusgroupthatacodeofconductwasnotintendedtoprescribenewrules,letalonetohamperscienticprogress.
Themainpurposeofacodewastoraiseawareness.
ThedebatesthatledtotheCodeofConductdidKoosvanderBruggen65begintofosterawareness,albeitstillinarathersmallcircleofscien-tists.
Someofthefocusgroupmembersorganisedmeetingsintheirinstitutesordiscussedtheissuewithcolleagues.
Withthehelpoftheinsightsthatweredevelopedbythestakeholders'suggestions,ideaswereidentiedandthentranslatedintoissuesforinclusionintheCodeofConduct.
Inlinewiththedesignofothercodesofconductintheareaofbiosecurity,itwasdecidedthattheKNAWcodeshouldbeaconcisedocument,whichshouldconcentrateonthemainissuesrelatedtothepossibledualuseoflifesciencesresearch.
ThustheCodebeginswiththestatementthat:Theaimofthiscodeofconductistopreventlifesciencesresearchoritsapplicationfromdirectlyorindirectlycontributingtothedevelopment,productionorstockpilingofbiologicalweapons,asdescribedintheBiologicalandToxinWeaponsConvention(BWC),ortoanyothermisuseofbiologicalagentsandtoxins.
Thecodeofconductoffersrulesofconductandresponsibilitiesofscientists,andgivessuggestionsforregulationandsanctionsonthefollowingissues:awarenessraising,researchandpublicationpolicy,accountabilityandoversight,internalandexternalcommunication,accessibility,shipmentandtransport.
Itwasconsideredimportantthattheseissuesshouldbeelaboratedonandappliedinlaboratories,universitiesandotherrelevantinstitutions.
(SeeAppendix4.
2forfurtherdetails).
TheKNAWstressedthatthecodeofconductisnotagoalinitselfandshouldnotbetextthatdisappearsintodeskdrawersorlingcabi-nets.
AfterpublicationoftheCodeofConduct,aseriesofawarenessraisingactivitieswereorganisedbytheKNAWincollaborationwiththeMinistryofScience.
Anumberofdebatesandworkshopsbroughttogetherscientistsandotherinvolvedparties,suchasfundingorgan-isationsandindustry,whowereinvolvedinsuchdiscussionsforthersttime.
Presentationsandpublicationsweredeliveredtoparticipantsonrequestandaudiovisualmaterialswereprepared.
Theseactivitieswereintendedtoensurethatbiosecurityissuesbecameapartoftheindividualandcollectiveawarenessoflifescientists,inthesamewayasbiosafetyisintheNetherlands.
Itwasalsohopedthatthecooperationthatwassoughtwiththenationalcoordinationgroupofbiosafetyof-cialswouldhelptotranslateandapplythecodeofconductinthedailypracticeoflaboratories,researchinstitutesandsoon.
66BiosecurityBiosecurityanddealingwithsecurityrisksItwouldbenavetobelievethatacodeofconductwouldmakeabuseofthelifesciencesimpossible.
Aswassaidduringa2007conferenceoftheNationalScienceAdvisoryBoardonBiosecurity(NSABB):'Acodeofconductcanmakegoodpeoplebetter,butprobablyhasnegligibleimpactonintentionallymaliciousbehaviour.
'9Theattentiontomiti-gatingtherisksofaterroristattackwithbiologicalweaponsisunder-standableinthelightoftheterroristassaultsintheUnitedStates,Spain,GreatBritain,and–morerecently–India.
However,itisimpor-tanttoseetheproblemsinperspective.
Thechanceofanattackwithbiologicalweaponsisverylimited.
RecentresearchintheNetherlandsledtothequalicationofbiologicalweaponsuseasa'lowlikelihood,highimpactrisk'(Bakker2008,pp.
143–4).
Inthatcontextacodeofconductmaybemoreeffectivethanmorerigorousmeasuresthatmayhamperthecontinuationandfreedomofscienticresearch.
Ingeneral,themoreimminentorprobableathreatisperceivedtobe,themorewillingthepublicwillbetoacceptfarreachingsecuritymea-surestocounterit.
Anyconsiderationofwhethersuchmeasuresarenecessaryshouldstartbyaskingthequestions:WhatarethethreatsWhatisthechancethatthethreatswillberealisedArethesamemeasuresnecessaryforallkindsofthreatsWhatarepossibleside-effectsofsecuritymeasuresSincethesequestionsdonotalwaysgettheatten-tiontheydeserve,Iconsiderbelowpossiblepitfallsindealingwiththeissuesofbiosecurity.
Theseareintendedasamoreorlessprovocativemixofempiricalandnormativeconsiderationswiththeintentiontostimulatefurtherdebate.
TunnelvisionOverthepastfewyearstheNetherlandshaveexperiencedexamplesofcriminalcasesinwhichprosecutorsandpolicemadeseriousmistakesasaresultofwhatcanbetermed'tunnelvision'.
Inthesecasestheinformationgatheredbypolicewasinterpretedinsuchawaythatitstrengthenedthebeliefintheguiltofthesuspectedoffender.
Informationthatcontradictedthisconvictionwasneglected.
Theresultwasthatinseveralcasesinnocentpeoplewereimprisonedforyears(Wagenaar2002).
WhatistheriskthatsuchtunnelvisionoccursinsecuritypolicyItisconceivablethatafocusonsecurityissuescanleadtopolicyissuesbeingsubordinatedtosecurityissues,orjudgedonlyintheirrelationtothem.
10Togiveactitious,butnotunrealisticexampleKoosvanderBruggen67fromthelifesciences,itmaybequestionedwhyastudentfromaMiddleEasterncountrymaywishtocometoaEuropeanlaboratoryforhisPhDresearch.
Theideathatthispersonmayjustwishtobecomeagoodscientistinordertohelphis/hercountrytoghtingseriousdis-easesmaybesetasidebythetunnelvisiondrivenviewthatheorshecouldbeapotentialterroristorwishestostealmaterials.
ItispossiblethatthemeasurestakenbyDutchgovernmentwithregardtoprevent-ingIranianstudentsfromstudyingfreelyintheNetherlandsmaybeanexampleofsuchatunnelvision.
Whileawarenessofthepotentialforthemisuseofthematerialsorresultsoflifescienceresearchisimportant,thisawarenessshouldnotleadtodistrustbeingthedefaultattitudeinalaboratory.
Anticipateddecisionregret'Anticipateddecisionregret'isanattitudewhichleadsindividualstotakeactionsthataredirectedatpreventingpossiblefutureincidents.
Itisexpressedas'ifItakethispreventivemeasurenow,itwillmeanthatIdonothavetoblamemyself(orgetblamedbyothers)fornothavingdoneeverythingtopreventthatincidentfromhappening'.
Thisattitudecanbeseeninhealthcare.
Increasingnumbersofpreventivescreeningtestsareofferedthatprovideinformationaboutthechanceofdevelopingsomekindofdisease,eventhoughthechanceofcontractingthediseasemayinrealitybeverysmall.
Itisalsopossiblethatthemeasurestakentopreventthediseasenegativelyinuencethelifestyleoftheindividualinvolved.
DutchmedicalsociologistTjeerdTijmstra(2001)providessome–oftenhilarious–examplesofanticipateddecisionregret:ifapregnantwomenisofferedascreeningtestforadiseaseforwhichtheriskis1at90,000,sheislikelytoagreetothetest–evenifherdoctorexplainedtoherthatherchanceofhavingacaraccidentwhiledrivingtotheclinicwasequiv-alenttothechildhavingthedisease.
Hermotivationwouldbethatshecouldnotforgiveherselfifthechilddidhavethediseaseandshehadnotdoneeverythinginherpowertoaddressit.
Therearesignalsthat'anticipateddecisionregret'hasbecomeapre-valentattitudeinsecurityissues.
After9/11securitymeasurestocounterpotentialterroristattacksweregivenhighpriority.
Itappearedasthoughsomegovernmentswerewillingtoinvestalotofenergyinminimisingtheriskofterroristattacksbecausetheydidnotwanttotaketheriskthattheyhadnotdoneeverythingtheycouldtopreventanassault.
Thisatti-tudecouldbetheresultofpastexperience.
Forexample,ofcialsoftheDutchgovernmentwerereproachedfornotdoingenoughtopreventthemurderoflmdirectorTheovanGoghin2004.
Thesereproachesledtodecisionsdirectedatminimisingthechanceofnewattacks.
The68BiosecuritycreationofaNationalCoordinationCenterforanti-terrorismisanexample.
Agooddealofmoneyandalotofenergyaredevotedtothisissue.
MostDutchcitizensfoundthisacceptable,ifnotdesirable.
Itisnotfarfetchedtosupposethatthisisoneoftheeffectsof'anticipateddecisionregret'.
Yetitiseasytoforgetthatthechanceofbecomingavictimofaterroristattackisstillmanytimessmallerthanthechanceofbeingkilledinacaraccident.
Thechancethataterroristwouldusebiologicalagentsintheattackisevenlesslikely.
StigmatisationTheconceptofstigmatisationreferstothepsychologicalphenomenoninwhichthe(potential)enemyisoftendepictedinawaythatdoesnot,oronlypartially,coincideswithreality:stronger,moreevil,unreliable,morenumerous.
Oftencharacteristicsareattributedtoagreatergrouportoatotalcountry:theRussians,theMuslims,thecommunists.
Theevilattributionsserveaslegitimationfor(counter)measuresagainsttheenemy.
Ifyouradver-saryindeedissobad,pervertedandwicked,theuseofviolenceagainstanindividualorgrouppresentingthethreatisbotheasilyunderstandableandjustiable.
Iftheenemyismadeupofordinarycitizenswhowishforadecentandsecurelife,thisonlybecomesvisibleaftertheconicthasended.
InEurope,andelsewhere,thiswasalessonlearnedaftertheColdWarwhenitwasdiscoveredthatRussianswerenotverydifferentfromus.
After9/11thisstigmaappearedtohavebeentransferredtotheMuslimcommunity.
Insuchacontextcrimesandactsofterrorbyasmallgroupbecomeexamplesofageneralisingstereotype.
ThedecisionoftheDutchgovernmenttobanallIraniansfromnuclearresearchcanbeseenasanexampleofthiswayofthinking.
Lifesciences,politicsandsecurityWhatrelationdotheseconceptsfromtheworldofsecurityandpoliticshavewiththelifesciencescommunityUntilafewyearsagotheseweretwoalmostcompletelyseparatedworlds.
Historically,ingeneralbiologistsandotherlifescientistshavenotbeeninvolvedinsecuritypolitics.
Theexceptionhasbeenarelativelylimitedgroupofbiologistsandotherlifescientistswhoworkinbiodefenceorwhotookpartinbiologicalweaponsprogrammes.
Mostoftheselifescientistsdidnottakepartinpublicdebatesonbiologicalweaponsorweaponsofmassdestructionmoregenerally.
Thisisunlikephysicistswhoplayedapartinthedebateaboutnuclearweaponsfromthebeginning.
Althoughlifescientistshavealonghistoryofinvolvementinstatebiologicalweaponsprogrammes–bothrunningandstartingthemKoosvanderBruggen69–therehasbeenrelativelylittledebatewithinthelifesciencescommunityabouttheroleofscientistsinpreventingbiologicalweaponsdevelopment.
Itisclearthatinrelationtotheinternationaldiscussionsaboutbiosecu-rity,itwasthepoliticalandsecuritycommunitieswhotooktheinitiativetoinvolvelifescientists,aswasthecasewiththeinitiativeoftheDutchgovernmenttoaskforacodeofconductonbiosecurity.
Thisabsencefromtheeldofbiologicalweaponspreventionandrelatedsecuritypoliticsdoesnotmeanthatlifescientistsdonothaveanyregardforthesocialandpoliticalaspectsoftheiractivities.
Onthecontrary,sincethebeginningoftheeraofgeneticmodi-cation,lifescientistshavebeencentraltosocialandethicaldiscus-sionsabouttheimplicationsoftheirwork.
WellknowninthisregardistheAsilomarConferenceof1975,wherethelifescientistsdecidedtomaintainamoratoriumofsomeaspectsofrecombinantDNAresearchbecausetheycouldnotyetguaranteethatthisresearchwouldnotbedangerous.
Inspiteofthetemporarylimitationsonresearch,biologyandbiotechnologydevelopedrapidlyafterthe1970s.
Thisbroughtlifesci-encestothecentreofsocietalandpoliticaldebates,althoughnotalwayswillingly.
Initiallybiologistswereinclinedtoconcentratetheircontributionstothepublicdebateonwhattheysawastheadvantagesofthenewdevelopments:newmedicines,moreeffectivewaysofpro-ducingfoodandsoon.
Indoingsotheyneglectedthefearsofmanypeopleabouttheresultsofgeneticengineering.
Theconsequencewasthattheywereveryoftensurprisedbythenegativereactionsofthepublictogeneticallymodiedfoods.
Lifescientistslearnedfastfromthisexperience.
Somebecamewellknowninthemedia,andeloquentlypresentedthecaseofthelifesciencesinsometimescomplicatedanddifcultdebatesaboutgenetics,cloningandstemcellresearch.
Fewinthelifesciencecommunitywerefamiliarwiththerisksofbioterrorismpriortotheanthraxattacksof2001.
Mostshockingwasthatthedangercouldcomefromwithin.
ThiswashighlightedbytheallegedinvolvementofBruceIvins–awellrespectedscientistoftheUnitedStatesArmyMedicalResearchInstituteofInfectiousDiseases(USAMRID)whowassuspectedbytheFBIofbeingbehindtheanthraxlettersofOctober2001.
IntheUnitedStatestheIvinscaseledto(renewed)attentiononwhathasbeenreferredtoas'biosurety':aware-nessofthethreatsthatcancomefromwithin.
11Inclosingitisworthreectingonwhylifescientistsandtheirorgan-isationshavebecomeinvolvedinsecurityissuesinrecentyears.
Whyhasbiosecuritygainedsuchsignicance70BiosecurityQuiteclearlytheeventsof11September2001andtheanthraxlettersinthesameperiodhadagreatdealtodowiththeelevationoftheperceptionofthreat.
Theseeventsraisedthepossibilitythatthoseinthelifesciencescouldbeaperpetuatorofterroristattacks.
Asecondreason,(alreadyreferredtoabove)istheinitiativeoftheBWCStatePartiesin2005tostimulatethedevelopmentofcodesofconduct.
ThechoiceofthisasatopicfortheinterimprocessarosefromtheeffortsofBWCStatePartiestoproposearangeofactivitiesinordertopreventatotalcrisisforBWCafterthefailuretonegotiatevericationmeasuresin2001.
(SeeRevillandDandointhisvolume).
Anotherimportantfactoristheoccurrenceofnewinfectiousdiseasesthatthreatenhumansandanimals:HIV/AIDS,SARSandAvianinuenzaaresomeofthemostwellknownexamples.
AsnotedintheIntroduction,someauthors–suchasFidlerandGostin(2008:2)–havereferredtonaturallyoccurringinfectiousdiseasesasabiosecurityissue.
Theyseethisbroadeningoftheconceptofsecurityasawaytoreleaseitfromthe'traditionalstatecentredmilitary-biasedperspective'(FidlerandGostin2008:6).
Theydrawontherecentlydevelopedconceptof'humansecurity'todefendthisview(HumanSecurityCentre2005).
Increasingawarenessamongscientiststhattheirworkisinuencedbyglobalisation,isanadditionalfactor.
Growinginternationalpersonalandcommercialcontactsareoneofthereasonsthatvirusescanspreadrapidlyacrosstheworld.
Globalisationhasanotherconsequence:thatterroristactivitiesarenolongerlimitedtoregionalandlocalconicts.
Notes1http://www.
interacademies.
net/CMS/About.
aspx2http://www.
interacademies.
net/Object.
File/Master/7/952/IAP%20Panel2008.
pdf3AsintheFinaldocumentoftheFifthReviewConferenceoftheStatePartiestotheConventiononBWC(UN2002).
4ThisrecommendationistakenseriouslybytheIAPBiosecurityWorkingGroup,butgivenitslimitedpossibilitiesitwasnot(yet)possibletotakeaction.
5http://english.
nctb.
nl/Diverse_vragen_en_antwoorden/CBRN_terrorisme/FAQ_3.
aspx6Togiveanexampleofanirrationalreaction:inTheNetherlandsthestorygoesthatfenceswereputbeforetheentranceoftheDutchForeignMinistry.
Becauseasiswellknown,virusesarestoppedbyfences!
7http://www.
knaw.
nl/pdf/KNAW_letter_Iranian_students.
pdf(January2009)8AsintheseminarsheldbyMalcolmDandoandBrianRappertinseveralcoun-tries.
SeeRappert(2007).
9InternationalRoundtableconferenceNSABB(25–27February2007).
Seehttp://oba.
od.
nih.
gov/biosecurity/biosecurity.
html10TogiveanexamplefromGreatBritain,whereGordonBrownqualiedgoodeducation"thebestweaponagainstterrorism"TheGuardian,1January2007.
KoosvanderBruggen71Ofcoursethisisnotnecessarilytheproofofatunnelvision,butitcanleadtoit,ifnolongereducation,butghtingterrorismisthecentralissue.
11TheconceptofbiosuretywasintroducedindebatesduringaninternationalNSABBRoundtableonbiosecurityissues:November2008(Bethesda.
ML).
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72BiosecurityAppendix4.
1IAPStatementonBiosecurity(December2005)Knowledgewithoutconscienceissimplytheruinofthesoul.
F.
Rabelais,153219Inrecentdecadesscienticresearchhascreatednewandunexpectedknowledgeandtechnologiesthatgiveunprecedentedopportunitiestoimprovehumanandanimalhealthandtheconditionsoftheenviron-ment.
Butsomescienceandtechnologyresearchcanbeusedfordestruc-tivepurposesaswellasforconstructivepurposes.
Scientistshaveaspecialresponsibilitywhenitcomestoproblemsof'dual-use'andthemisuseofscienceandtechnology.
The1972BiologicalandToxinWeaponsConventionreinforcedtheinternationalnormprohibitingbiologicalweapons,statinginitspro-visionsthat'eachstatepartytothisConventionundertakesneverinanycircumstancestodevelopproduce,stockpileorotherwiseacquireorretain:micro-bialorotherbiologicalagents,ortoxinswhatevertheiroriginormethodofpro-duction,oftypesandinquantitiesthathavenojusticationforprophylacticorotherpeacefulpurposes.
'Nevertheless,thethreatfrombiologicalweaponsisagainaliveissue.
Thisdocumentpresentsprinciplestoguideindividualscientistsandlocalscienticcommunitieswhomaywishtodeneacodeofconductfortheirownuse.
Theseprinciplesrepresentfundamentalissuesthatshouldbetakenintoaccountwhenformulatingcodesofconduct.
Theyarenotintendedtobeacomprehensivelistofconsiderations.
TheseprincipleshavebeenendorsedbythenationalAcademiesofscience,workingthroughtheInterAcademyPanel,whosenamesappearbelow.
1.
Awareness.
Scientistshavetheobligationtodonoharm.
Theyshouldalwaystakeintoconsiderationthereasonablyforeseeableconse-quencesoftheirownactivities.
Theyshouldtherefore:–alwaysbearinmindthepotentialconsequences–possiblyharmful–oftheirresearchandrecognizethatindividualgoodconsciencedoesnotjustifyignoringthepossiblemisuseoftheirscienticendeavor;–refusetoundertakeresearchthathasonlyharmfulconsequencesforhumankind.
2.
SafetyandSecurity.
Scientistsworkingwithagentssuchaspatho-genicorganismsordangeroustoxinshavearesponsibilitytousegood,KoosvanderBruggen73safeandsecurelaboratoryprocedures,whethercodiedbylaworbycommonpractice.
3.
EducationandInformation.
Scientistsshouldbeawareof,dissem-inateandteachthenationalandinternationallawandregulations,aswellaspoliciesandprinciplesaimedatpreventingthemisuseofbio-logicalresearch.
4.
Accountability.
ScientistswhobecomeawareofactivitiesthatviolatetheBiologicalandToxinWeaponsConventionorinternationalcustom-arylawshouldraisetheirconcernswithappropriatepeople,authoritiesandagencies.
5.
Oversight.
Scientistswithresponsibilityforoversightofresearchorforevaluationofprojectsorpublicationsshouldpromoteadher-encetotheseprinciplesbythoseundertheircontrol,supervisionorevaluation.
74BiosecurityAppendix4.
2CodeofconductonbiosecurityinTheNetherlandsBASICPRINCIPLESTheaimofthiscodeofconductistopreventlifesciencesresearchoritsapplicationfromdirectlyorindirectlycontributingtothedevelop-ment,productionorstockpilingofbiologicalweapons,asdescribedintheBiologicalandToxinWeaponsConvention(BWC),ortoanyothermisuseofbiologicalagentsandtoxins.
TARGETGROUPTheBiosecurityCodeofConductisintendedfor:1.
professionalsengagedintheperformanceofbiological,biomedical,biotechnologicalandotherlifesciencesresearch;2.
organisations,institutionsandcompaniesthatconductlifesciencesresearch;3.
organisations,institutionsandcompaniesthatprovideeducationandtraininginlifesciences;4.
organisationsandinstitutionsthatissuepermitsforlifesciencesresearchorwhichsubsidizefacilitateandmonitororevaluatethatresearch;5.
scienticorganisations,professionalassociationsandorganisationsofemployersandemployeesintheeldoflifesciences;6.
organisations,institutionsandcompanieswhererelevantbiologicalmaterialsortoxinsaremanaged,stored,stockpiledorshipped;7.
authors,editorsandpublishersoflifesciencespublicationsandadministratorsofwebsitesdedicatedtolifesciences.
RulesofconductRAISINGAWARENESSDevotespecicattentionintheeducationandfurthertrainingofpro-fessionalsinthelifesciencestotherisksofmisuseofbiological,bio-medical,biotechnologicalandotherlifesciencesresearchandtheconstraintsimposedbytheBWCandotherregulationsinthatcontext.
Devoteregularattentiontothethemeofbiosecurityinprofessionaljournalsandonwebsites.
RESEARCHANDPUBLICATIONPOLICYScreenforpossibledual-useaspectsduringtheapplicationandassessmentprocedureandduringtheexecutionofresearchprojects.
KoosvanderBruggen75Weightheanticipatedresultsagainsttherisksoftheresearchifposs-ibledual-useaspectsareidentied.
Reducetheriskthatthepublicationoftheresultsofpotentialdual-uselifesciencesresearchinscienticpublicationswillunintention-allycontributetomisuseofthatknowledge.
ACCOUNTABILITYANDOVERSIGHTReportanyndingorsuspicionofmisuseofdual-usetechnologydirectlytothecompetentpersonsorcommissions.
Takewhistleblowersseriouslyandensurethattheydonotsufferanyadverseeffectsfromtheiractions.
INTERNALANDEXTERNALCOMMUNICATIONProvide(additional)securityforinternalandexternale-mails,post,telephonecallsanddatastorageconcerninginformationaboutpoten-tialdual-useresearchorpotentialdual-usematerials.
ACCESSIBILITYCarryout(additional)screeningwithattentiontobiosecurityaspectsofstaffandvisitorstoinstitutionsandcompanieswherepotentialdual-uselifesciencesresearchisperformedorpotentialdual-usebio-logicalmaterialsarestored.
SHIPMENTANDTRANSPORTCarryout(additional)screeningwithattentiontobiosecurityaspectsoftransportersandrecipientsofpotentialdual-usebiologicalmaterials,inconsultationwiththecompetentauthoritiesandotherparties.
76BiosecurityAppendix4.
3SummaryofRepliestotheFollow-UpBiosecurityQuestionnaire30January2008InordertogaininsightaboutfurtheractivitiesdonebyacademiesontheissueofBiosecurity,the2006BiosecurityInitiativeQuestionnairehasbeenrepeatedafterayear.
Again,thelistofquestionswassenttoallmemberacademiesofIAP,thistimedividedintotwogroups:thosewhorespondedtotherstquestionnaireandthosewhodidnot.
Ofthe94membersofIAPwereceived21repliestothequestionnaire,11ofwhichwerenewrespondents.
Therewere69signatoriestotheBiosecurityStatement.
PartofthereasonforrepeatingthequestionnairewastourgeacademiesthathadnotyetsignedtheStatement,toreconsiderdoingso.
Asaresultofthisreminder,2memberacademieshavedecidedtosignthestatement.
FollowingisalistofsomeactivitiesacademieshaveundertakenintheeldofBiosecuritythispastyearorareplanningforthecomingmonths:AcademyofSciencesofAlbania:–NationalScienticConferenceofGMO'sAcademyofSciencesofCuba:–CubanstandardonBiosecurityindevelopmentIsraelAcademyofSciencesandHumanities–inpreparation:legislationconcerningcontrolofdangerousbiologicalagents–inpreparation:reportontheissueofBiotechnologicalResearchintheAgeofTerrorismPolishAcademyofSciences–organizedconferenceondualuseAcadémieNationaledesSciencesetTechniquesduSénégal–nationalcodeinpreparation–seminarBiosecurityandNationalCapacityBuildingintheUmmah,DakkarMarch2008KoosvanderBruggen77ZimbabweAcademyofSciences–codeofconductdevelopedThefollowingaresomeobservationsmadebyrespondentsthatmightbeinterestingtodiscussfurther:–mostAfricancountriesdonotgivehighrankingtoapossiblethreat,astheyarenotinvolvedinmakingbiologicalandtoxinweapons–internationalcoordinationofactivitiesinthisareawillbeextremelyvaluable–collaborationandtechnologytransferbetweenscientistsindevelop-inganddevelopedcountriesmighthelpdevelopingcountriestogetmoreinvolvedandraisetheawareness–moreseminars,bothnationalandinternational,shouldbeencour-agedandinitiated–restrictionsonsharinginformationcanpotentiallyaffectsomepos-itivedevelopmentsforalleviatingbiosecurityissues78Biosecurity