Cordestrustview

PROPERTYRIGHTS:APRIMERBUL834(Revised)Supportforthisprojectwasgenerouslyprovidedbythefollowingorganizations:WesternRuralDevelopmentCenterFarmFoundationMoreinformationontheWesternRuralDevelopmentCentercanbefoundathttp://extension.
usu.
edu/WRDC/ThepurposeoftheWesternRuralDevelopmentCenter(WRDC)istostrengthenruralfamilies,communities,andbusinessesbyfacilitatingruraldevelopmentresearchandextension(outreach)projectscooperativelywithuniversitiesandcommunitiesthroughouttheWest.
MoreinformationontheFarmFoundationcanbefoundathttp://www.
farmfoundation.
org/TheFarmFoundationfocusesitsprogrammingonsixpriorityareas:globalization,environ-mentalandnaturalresourceissues,consumerissues,roleofagriculturalinstitutions,ruralcom-munityviability,andnewtechnologies.
TechnicalEditor:KathleenPainterPropertyRights:APrimerTableofContentsPageIntroductiontoPropertyRights4NeilMeyer,UniversityofIdahoPropertyandPropertyRights6AlanSchroeder,TheUniversityofWyomingWhyPropertyRights7LarryLibby,TheOhioStateUniversityWhyPropertyRightsMatter!
9GeorgeMcDowell,VirginiaInstituteofTechnologyPropertyRightsInHistoricalPerspective11JerryL.
Anderson,DrakeUniversityLawSchoolCommonPropertyandNaturalResourceManagement.
.
.
.
13RobertGorman,UniversityofAlaska,FairbanksEconomicsofPropertyRights17SteveMedema,UniversityofColoradoStateProperty:Wildlife,Lands,AndOpenSpacesInColorado20AndrewSeidl,ColoradoStateUniversityPropertyRights:APhilosophicalPerspective22PaulB.
Thompson,PurdueUniversityEditedbyNeilMeyer4PropertyRights:APrimerWeallhaveopinionsaboutpropertyrights.
Manyofusaresurprisedwhenwemeetsomeonewithadifferentpointofviewaboutpropertyrights.
Certainlythereisnotone,universalviewofprop-ertyrightstoday.
Propertyactuallyreferstotherighttoastreamofbenefitsfromagivensetofresources.
IntheU.
S.
,accesstothosebenefitsiscontrolledinfourbasicways:privateownershipplusthreeformsofpublicownership—openaccess,closedaccess,andstate.
WheredopropertyrightscomefromPropertyrightscomefromcultureandcommunity.
Apersonlivingtotallyapartfromothers,onaremoteisland,forinstance,orintheAmericanWestoftheearlynineteenthcentury,doesnotneedtoworryaboutpropertyrights.
Whenpeoplecometogether,however,theneedforspecificarrangementsaboutpropertyownershipbecomesapparent.
Thisgrouporcommunitythendefinesandenforcesrulesofaccesstothebene-fitsthatcomefromowninglandorotherproperty.
Whoreallyownsmyproperty"Thislandismine,minetouseandenjoy,minetotreatasIwish,"isacom-monsentimentamongmanyownersconcerningtheirrightstoland.
Thisiscalledthe"humanterritorialimpera-tive.
"Landownersobviouslypossessmanyrightsinthepropertiestheyhold,butdotheyreallyhavealltherightstheyclaimVariousactionsbygovern-mentsandcourtsinrecentyearssuggestthatprivateowners'propertyrightsaresharedwiththepublic,andthattheserightsarelimitedandcanchangeovertime.
Weareallpartofasocietythatdefinesourrightsandhasthepowertoredefinethemovertime.
WhatarepropertyrightsPropertyrightsestablishrelationshipsamongparticipantsinanysocialandeconomicsystem.
"Property"isactual-lythestreamofbenefitsfromapartic-ularresource.
The"right"tothatstreamofbenefitsisanexpressionoftherelativepowerofthebearer.
Ownershipofapropertyrightcom-mandscertainresponsesfromotherpeoplethatareenforcedbythegov-ernmentandculture.
Producerswhoownahundredacresofcroplandareentitledtothereturnsfromtheirproperty,managementskills,andgoodsense.
Theyarepro-tectedfromtrespassbytheirneighborsandbyagentsofthestate.
Thepro-ductionfromtheirland,orstreamofbenefits,istheirstosellorgiveawayastheyseefit.
Propertyrightsareafunctionofwhatothersarewillingtoacknowledge.
Apropertyowner'sactionsarelimitedbytheexpectationsandrightsofotherpeople,asformallysanctionedandsustainedinlaw.
Theboundarybetweenanobligationandarightvaries.
Patternsofrightsandobligationsreflectprevailingjudgmentsaboutfairness,basedonpeople'svalues.
Governmenthastheoverallresponsibilitytoprotectpublichealthandsafety,andtopromotegeneralwelfarethroughselectiveexerciseofdiscretionthatsustainsqualityoflife(Libby,1994,p.
1000).
Propertyrightscanbelikenedtoabundleofsticks,witheachstickrepre-sentingaright,orastreamofbenefits(Fig.
1).
Thebundleexpandsassticksareaddedanditcontractsastheyaretakenaway.
Importantsticks,forexample,maybetherighttosell,tomortgage,tosubdivide,tolease,andtogranteasements.
Thecultureorcommunitythatgrantstherightsalsoreservesanumberofsticksforitsownuse.
Themostcom-monrightsreservedbythecommunityasawholearetherighttotax,therighttoclaimpropertyforpublicuse,therighttocontrolthetypeofprivateuse,andtherighttodisposeofthepropertyincaseofdeath.
Morerecently,issuessuchaswaterqualityprotection,speciespreservation,andeventhepreservationofvisuallandscapehavealsobeenwith-drawnfromtheindividualowner'sprop-ertyrightsbundle.
Governments,actingforthepublicandforsocietyasawhole,havelongexercisedthepowertotaxprivateprop-erties.
Theyalsohavethetime-honoredrighttotakepropertyforpublicuseundereminentdomain,withjustcom-pensation.
Policepowerscanbeusedinmakingandenforcingregulationsthataffectownersandtheiruseofland(Barlowe,R.
,1990,SouthernRuralDevelopmentCenter).
Inadditiontotheformalrightsofgovernment,communitiescanuseotherpowerstoinfluenceprivatepropertyowners.
Theseotherpowersincludepublicspending,publicownershippower,andpublicopinion.
Historyshowsthatconceptsofprop-ertythatwereacceptedinthepastchangewithnewconditionsandthepassingoftime.
Earlycommunitiestreatedlandandothernaturalresourcesasacommunalresourceheldinjointownership.
Underfeudalism,everyper-son'sstatusinsocietywasdirectlyrelat-edtotherightsthatpersonheldinland.
Thedistributionofthoserightsdifferedgreatlyfromtheoneswehavetoday,buttheyareimportantbecausetheyprovidethebasisforourpresentconceptofpropertyrights.
HowarepropertyrightsdefinedFivelegaltermscomedowntousfromthefeudalera.
Theseterms—prop-erty,fee,estate,interest,andright—havesimilarmeaningsandcangenerallybeusedassubstitutesforeachother.
"Feesimple"ownershipsignifiesthattheownerenjoysalltherightsonecanholdinproperty.
Manycitizensstillcherishtheindi-vidualisticviewsthatwerepopularontheAmericanFrontier.
However,reviewofthemanyprogramsadoptedbylocal,state,andfederalgovernmentsinrecentdecadesindicatesthat,asasociety,wehavemovedtowardsacceptanceofalargerroleforgovernment.
Thereasonsforthischangeoverthepast200yearsincludeincreasingpopulation,risingincomesandstandardsofliving,morecompetitionforavailableresources,ris-ingliteracyrates,widersuffrage(womenandminoritieshavetherighttovote),andconservationandenvironmentalconcerns.
Fromahistoricalpointofview,itappearsthattherightsweholdinprop-ertyspringfromsociety.
IndividualsmaybelievethattheirrightsareGod-givenorendowedbynaturallaw,butinprac-tice,thenatureofone'srightsdependsupontheinterpretationsacceptedbythesocietyinwhichwelive.
Rightsarerealonlywhenthesovereignpowerorgovernment,whichactsastheagentofsociety,recognizesthemandiswillingtodefendandenforcethem.
Subtractionsfromfeesimpleowner-IntroductiontoPropertyRightsbyNeilMeyerDepartmentofAgriculturalEconomics&RuralSociology,UniversityofIdahoshipdonotnecessarilymeanthatprop-ertyhaslessvalue,orthatitprovidesfewersatisfactionstoitsowners.
Residentialeasementsthatdeliverpowerandwaterwhileputtingutilityunder-groundusuallyenhancepropertyvalues.
Thesamecanbesaidforcovenantsandzoningrulesthatprotectlandscapeviews,controlnoiselevels,oraffectarchitecture.
Morerecently,therighttopolluteairandwaterhasbeentakenawayfromindividualowners.
WhyarepropertyrightsimportantBecausepropertyrightsareculturallydefinedandenforcedandbecausediffer-entgroupsgainandlosepower,noonecanbecertainhowfarthecurrentmovementwillgotobroadenpublicpowersoverprivateproperty.
Theinter-estsofdifferentgroupsvarygreatly.
Thoseseeingprivateownershipasanopportunityformakingmoneyandacquiringwealthhaveobviousreasonsfortryingtostoporreversethetrendtowardmorepublicpower.
Others,whoviewlandasascarceandfragileresource,theuseofwhichiscloselyintertwinedwithcommunityconcerns,argueforevenmorepublicsupervision.
MostAmericans'attitudesliebetweenthesetwopoints.
Withtheprospectofstrongerdemandsandpressuresforpublicpro-gramstodirectlanduse,individualownersmayverywellfearthatattitudechangeswillstripthemofcertainrights.
Agrowingsentimentforwideracceptanceofapublictrustviewofrightscallsforrecognitionthattherightsenjoyedbyownersofprivatepropertyarebalancedbytheirresponsi-bilities.
Itistosociety'sadvantagethatownersuselandforproductivepurposes.
Ownershavetheresponsibilitytouseland,orotherstreamsofbenefits,inwaysthatdonotcauseinjuryorlossofbenefitstoothersorworkagainstthebasicinterestsofothersinthecommu-nity.
WhatiscommonpropertyCommonpropertyisjointownershipofastreamofbenefits.
Managementofcommonpropertycasesismorecompli-catedandoftenbecomescontroversialbecausegroupsandindividualshavedif-ferentvaluesandopinionsabouthowtomanageagivenresource.
Manypropertyrightsconflictstodayconcernmanage-mentofcommonlyownedresources.
WhatarethedifferenttypesofcommonpropertyOwnershipandmanagementareoftenconfusedwhenthetermcommonpropertyisused.
Everyoneisfamiliarwiththeconceptofprivateproperty.
Othertypesofpropertyregimesincludeopenaccess,communal,andstateorgovernmental.
Openaccesspropertyhasnogover-nance,andeveryonecanuseandtakepartofthebenefitstream.
Thissituationofuncontrolleduseoftenresultsindete-riorationoftheresource.
Fishingontheopenseasisanexampleofthismanage-mentregime.
Communalmanagementofpropertymeansitisjointlyownedbuttherearelimitstoaccessanduseofthebenefitstream.
Thosewhojointlyowntheresourceexercisecontroloveruseofthebenefitstream.
ManyNewEnglandlob-sterfisheriesaremanagedinthisman-ner.
Governmentalmanagersmakedeci-sionsandrulesforaccessanduseofben-efitstreamstostate-ownedproperty.
Rulesforuseandallocationofthebene-fitsfrompubliclyownedpropertyoftenbecomecontroversial,forexample,graz-ingandloggingonpubliclandsinthewesternU.
S.
Thesameistrueforpub-licparksinallareasoftheU.
S.
FinalpointsPropertyisabenefitthatasocietyandacultureagreetoprotect.
Apropertyrightisaclaimtotheben-efitsorstreamofbenefitsderivedfromtheproperty.
References:Barlow,Raleigh.
1990.
WhoOwnsYourLandSouthernRuralDevelopmentCenter,MississippiStateUniversity,Starkville.
Libby,LawrenceW.
1994.
ConflictontheCommons:Naturalresourceentitlements,thepublicinterest,andagriculturaleconomics.
AmericanJournalofAgriculturalEconomics,76(5):997-1009.
MortgageSubdivideDeviseGrantEasementsSellLeaseTaxTakeForPublicUseControlUseOfEscheatTheBundleofRightsinLandLandownerRightsPublicRights5PropertyRights:APrimerTable1.
CharacteristicsofdifferentpropertyrightsTypeofpropertyOwnershipManagementAccessEnforcementPrivateIndividualIndividualClosedSociety/LawPublicOpenaccessAllmembersNooneAllmembersNooneClosedaccessGroupmembersGroupmembersGroupmembersGroupmembersGovernmentGovernmentGovernmentAllGovernmentFigure1.
BundleofpropertyrightsTheBundleofRightsinLand6PropertyRights:APrimerIntroductionStoriesofpropertyrightsconflictsareregularlyonthefrontpageoflocalnewspapers—landownerscriticizingthegovernmentforexcessiveregulations;neighborscomplainingaboutenviron-mentalorhealthproblemscreatedbyadjoininglanduses;environmentalistandothersberatingbothgovernmentandindustryforlossesofprimeagricul-turalland,wildernessareas,wildlifehabitat,andscenicrivers.
Inthepast,partieshavegonetocourt,seekingalegalrulingthatsomeprivatepropertyrightorimportantpublicinterestwasbeingthreatened.
Theresultingrulingsfrequentlysatisfiedneitherthedis-putantsnorthepublicingeneral.
InthewesternUnitedStates,theseconflictsoftenfocusonpubliclyheldlands.
FederallandsrepresentmorethanfortypercentoflandownershipinAlaska,Arizona,California,Oregon,Idaho,Nevada,Utah,andWyoming.
Mining,forestry,grazing,recreation,andenvironmentalinterestsoftenclashregardinghowwellpublicly-heldresources(e.
g.
,waters,lands,wildlife)arefaring,whoshouldparticipateinthemanagementdecisions,andwhat(ifany)privateorcollectivepropertyrightsexistintheseresources.
Somepoliti-ciansandsocialcommentatorssuggestthattheseresourcesmightbebettermanagediflegaltitlewastransferredintoprivatehands(privatization).
Othershavechallengedthesecon-tentions.
Itiseasytodismisstheseverypublicandsometimesrancorousdisputes.
Thesedisputesareoftenclothedinwordsandphrasessuchas"privateprop-ertyrights,""takings,""publichealthandsafety,""sustainability,""publictrust"and"protectionoffuturegenera-tions.
"Thesetermsareoftensimplydis-missedasinterestgroupsmanipulatinglanguageinanattempttocapturepub-licopinionfortheirownpurposes.
Todosoisamistake,however,becauseitseemsclearthatprinciplesbeyondself-interestmotivatemanyofthedis-putants.
IndeedtheexpendituresandpersonalrisksmadebyMr.
HedgeandothersparticipatinginthesagebrushrebellionintheWestseemtoonlymakesenseifweacceptthepremisethattheyaremotivatedbyprinciplesotherthanorinadditiontoself-inter-est,narrowlydefined.
Thesamecanbesaidaboutmanyagency,environmental,andindustryrepresentatives.
Wewillexplorethispointinevengreaterdetailinsubsequentpapers.
Itisprobablymoreaccuratetosaythatmanyofthesedisputesturnonfun-damentalconfusionregardingthreethings:1)whatprinciplesshouldmoti-vategovernmentpolicyregardingnatu-ralresources;2)whatpropertyrightsexistindisputedresources;and3)howeffectivearedifferentprivateandpublicpropertymanagementsystemsinachievingtheseends.
First,evenprofessionalsdisagreeonthecontentandmeaningofspecifictypesofpropertyrights.
Forexample,someeconomistsrefertoresources,notsubjecttoanyownershiporcontrol,as"commonproperty;"otherscallthesamethings"openaccess"resourcesandusetheterm"commonpropertyresource"torefertopropertythatisjointlyownedand/ormanagedbymorethanonepersonororganization.
Second,interestgroupmembersdonotnecessarilyagreeamongthemselvesontheprinciplesorsolutionsthatshouldbeappliedinparticulardisputes.
Booksandarticlesdiscussingpubliclandsandthesagebrushrebellionpointoutthatsomepermitteesandpolicymakersfavoredprivatizingpublicly-heldlands,claimingsuchamovewouldmaximizepublicwelfare.
Othersfavoredprivatization,notbecauseofitssocialwelfareimpactbutratherbecauseitwouldformallyrecognizewhattheysawas"rights"alreadyheldbytheuser(arights-basedjustification).
Intheend,SecretaryWattsrejectedprivatizationandadopteda"goodneighborpolicy"underwhichtitlewasretainedbythefederalgovernmentbutgreatermanage-mentcontrolwastransferredtopermit-tees.
Commentatorssuggestthispolicywasjustifiedusingbothefficiencyandrights-basedprinciples.
Third,asweindicatedabove,dis-putantsoftenmakebroadgeneraliza-tions—bothfavorableandunfavor-able—regardingtheeffectivenessofpublicandprivatemanagementofnatu-ralresources.
Abetterunderstandingoftheeffectivenessofparticularpropertyandmanagementregimesmightgoalongwayinresolvingsomeofthesedis-putes.
Theobjectiveofthisseriesofpapersistofacilitatepublicdialoguebyidenti-fyingandclarifyingtheunderlyingterms,principles,andpositionsreadersmayencounterinthecurrentnaturalresourceandpropertydebate.
Wheneverpossible,readerswillbepre-sentedwithresearchexploringtheeffec-tivenessofparticularpropertyandman-agementregimesindealingwithspecificresources.
Thoughsomeclaimsmaybeshowntobeunsupportedbycurrentdataorlegalreasoning,ourprimarypur-poseisnottoactasjudges.
Thisseriesisorganizedinthefollow-ingfashion.
Inthis,thefirstpaper,wewillbrieflydescribesometheprinciplesandtermsfoundinthecurrentpropertydebate.
Intheremainingpapersthewriterswillillustratehowtheseprinci-plesandtermscanbeusedtounder-standandcriticallyexaminepublicpoli-cydebatesinsuchareasas:PropertyrightsandlanduseplanningPropertyrightsandenvironmentallawPropertyrightsandpubliclandsPropertyrightsandaboriginallandsTherearesomelimitationstoourapproach.
Webelieveestablishingacommonvocabularyiscrucialtofacili-tatedialogue.
Nevertheless,asweindi-catedabove,thereisnocommonagree-mentamongprofessionals.
Readersshouldbeawareofthisfactwhenreviewingthebibliography.
Wemustalsoreiteratethatwewilldrawnocon-clusionsregardingwhichpropertyregimeormanagementsystemisbest.
Ourprimarypurposeistofacilitateunderstanding,notactasjudges.
Moreover,manyofourstatementswillbegeneralizations.
Inaseriesofshortpapersitisimpossibletofullysummarizetherichandvariedbackgroundsandprinciplesunderlyingeachinterestgroup'sposition.
Wehopethebibliogra-phyattachedtoeachpaperwillallowreaderstodelvemoredeeplyintotheconflictingviews.
Recognizingtheseproblems,weaskreaderstosuspendjudgmentuntileachargumentispresented.
Inthiswayread-erscanbetterunderstandwhatmoti-vatesthosewithwhomtheymightagreeordisagree.
Sometimesaconclusionthatanopponent'sargument"doesnotmakesense"maysimplymeanweareusingadifferentmeasureof"sense"thanthey.
WealsoaskreaderstothinkAlanSchroeder,AssociateProfessorDepartmentofAgriculturalEconomics,TheUniversityofWyomingPropertyandPropertyRights7PropertyRights:APrimeraboutotherpossibleprinciples,argu-ments,andsolutionswemayhavemissedinourbriefsummaries.
Indoingso,readersmayfindmutuallyacceptablesolutionstosimilarproblemsintheircommunity.
Illustratingthelanguageof"property"and"propertyrights"conflictsInafamousearlyAmericancase,Piersonv.
Post,3Gaine175(N.
Y.
1805),theplaintiff,Post,claimed:"[B]einginpossessionofcertaindogsandhoundsunderhiscommand,did,'uponacertainwild,anduninhabited,unpossessedandwasteland,calledthebeach,findandstartoneofthosenox-iousbeingscalledafox,'andwhilsttherehunting,chasingandpursuingthesamewithhisdogsandhounds,andwheninviewthereof,Pierson,wellknowingthefoxwassohuntedandpur-sued,didinthesightofPost,topreventhiscatchingthesame,killandcarryitoff.
"PostsuedPierson,claimingaprop-ertyrightinthefox.
HowshouldthecourthaveruledDefinitionsof"property"and"propertyrights"Black'sLawDictionarydefinesprop-ertyas:"Thatwhichispeculiarorprop-ertooneperson;thatwhichbelongsexclusivelytoone.
Inastrictlegalsense,anaggregateofrightswhichareguaranteedandprotectedbygovern-ment.
"Similarly,Webster'sNinthNewCollegiateDictionaryprovidesuswithafewdefinitions:"property.
.
.
2a:some-thingownedorpossessed,specif.
:apieceofrealestate;b:theexclusiverighttopossess,enjoy,anddisposeofathing:OWNERSHIP;c:somethingtowhichapersonhasalegaltitle;d:one(asaperformer)undercontractwhoseworkisesp.
valuable.
.
.
"and"propertyright…alegalrightorinterestinoragainstspecificproperty.
"Theterms"property"and"propertyrights"underthesedefinitionsrefernottoa"thing"—thefoxintheaboveexample—butrathertotherealrela-tionshipamongpeopleregardingthething.
ThustheissueinPostis"DidPosthavearightenforceablebyacourttotakethefoxanddidPiersonhaveanequivalentdutytonotinterferewithPost'shunting"Whatdoesitmeanwhenwesayaper-sonhas"propertyrights"Legalandeconomiccommentatorsfrequentlyindicatethatpropertycon-sistsnotofasingIerightbutrather—asthedefinitionsabovesuggest—anaggre-gationorbundleofrights.
Unfortunately,thesamecommentatorsoftenmeandifferentthingswhentheyrefertothisbundleofrights.
Thepropertyestate:the"bundleofrights"asaspecialconceptTheterm"bundleofrights"issome-timesusedinaspecialorphysicalsense,particularlywhenreferringtorealprop-erty.
Forexample,differentpersonsmayhavelegaltitletothemineral,air,water,and/orsurfacerightsassociatedwithlandataparticularlocation.
Thatis,aproperty"owner"mayhavearighttobuildonorcultivatetheland(thesurfaceestate)butnottoremoveitsrock,oilandgas,orcoalwithoutfirstobtainingpermissionfromthemineralestate"owner.
"Thissamespecialconceptcanbeemployedinothercontexts.
Forexam-ple,thecourtinPostheldthatPostwouldhavea"propertyright"inthefoxifhehadphysicalcustodyofit.
Similarly,somestateshaveheldthatapropertyrightattachestooilandgas,water,andothermovable(sometimescalled"fugitive")resourceswhentheyareinpossessionofaparticularparty.
TheownershipinterestRecentlysomecommentatorshavesoughttoseparatetheownershipinter-estintoitscomponentparts.
Forexam-ple,McCaydividesownershipinterestintotwoparts:Title:Whohaslegaltitletotheprop-erty.
Management:Whodetermineshowthepropertymaybeused.
McCayisnotentirelyclearastowhatparticularrightsarecontainedineachofthesetwocategories.
Forexam-ple,wemightfurthersubdividethe"titleinterest"(ourlabel)intotherightstoexcludeothers,useorreceivebenefitsfromitsuse,and/ortransferlegaltitletoanother.
ReferencesMcCay,Bonnie.
1996.
Formsofproper-tyrightsandtheimpactofchangingownership.
IncreasingUnderstandingofPublicProblemsandPolicies,Proceedings,FarmFoundationNationalPublicPolicyEducationConference,Providence,RI,p.
127.
Propertyrightsareessentialtotheexchangeprocessbecausetheydefinetheopportunitiesavailabletopeoplewithinaneconomicsystem.
Peoplemustclearlyunderstandwhattheyarebuyingorselling,whattheproductorserviceis,andtheflowofrightsandopportunitiesthatgowithatangibleexchange.
Propertyisnotthetangiblethingbeingboughtorsold.
Whatisexchangedistherighttouseastreamofbenefitsfromthatpropertyorobjectinsomeway,andtherearealwayslimitstothoserights.
Youhavetheright,forexample,tosliceupatomatoandputitinasand-wichbutnottothrowthetomatoatsomebodywithwhomyouhappentodisagree.
Similarly,theownerofapieceofrealestatemayowntherighttodosomethingsonandwiththatland,butnottodootherthings.
Whilethenotionofpropertyrightsisessentialtotransactionsinanykindofamarketcontext,thoserightsareseparateanddefined,andtheymaydifferfromonetransactiontoanother.
RightsassocialagreementArightexistsonlyifyouandothersinsociety,collectivelyandreinforcedbythestate,accept,acknowledge,andagreetoitsexistence.
UniversityofWisconsinagriculturaleconomistDanBromleyhassaid,"Rightsarenotrela-tionshipsbetweenmeandanobject,butbetweenmeandotherswithrespecttothatobject.
"Rightstoproperty,then,existonlyinapubliclysanctionedcontextwithinthesocialsysteminwhichthereisgen-eralacceptanceoftherightbeingexer-cised.
Oncesocialacceptanceisaccom-plished,thestatereinforcesandensurestherelationshipbetweenownershipandexerciseoftheassociatedrights.
Withoutenforcement,rightshaveverylittlesubstanceandessentiallycannotbeexercised.
Rightsarelimitedbywhatyouandotherswillagreeisacceptable.
Myrighttodosomethingisafunctionofwhatyou'regoingtoletmegetawaywith,bothinaformalsenseandinalessfor-malsense.
PropertyrightsaretransferableInorderforamarkettofunction,rightstotheflowofbenefitsassociatedwithatangibleobjectmustbetransfer-ablefromonepersontoanother.
TheyWhyPropertyRightsLarryLibby,C.
WilliamSwankProfessorofRural-UrbanPolicyTheOhioStateUniversity8PropertyRights:APrimermaybetransferredcollectivelyorsepa-rately.
Mineralrightsmaynotincludesurfacerights.
Yourrightstousewateradjacenttoyourlandarelimitedbytheimpactyouractionsmayhaveonotherpeoplewhoarealsodependentonthatwater.
RightsdifferaccordingtocircumstanceThepropertyrightsmovementmostfamiliartopeopleintheUnitedStatestodayrelatestorealproperty(land)andtotheflowofservicesthatcomesfromlandownership.
Alandownerhascertainexclusiverightsthatotherscannotexercise.
Theserightsarenotabsolute,however.
Membersofthegeneralpublicmayhaveintereststhatimposelimitsonapropertyowner'srights.
Theinterestofnon-ownersisreflectedintheinstitu-tionsandpoliciesthatevolvearoundtheflowofservices,theflowofgoods,andtheflowofopportunitiesfromapieceoflandthatarenotnecessarilylimitedtothepersonwhoholdsthelandtitle.
Whenapropertyowner'sincomefromapieceoflandiscompromisedbypublicactionsofsomekind,forexam-ple,byanewlaw,doestheownerhavearighttocompensationbecausethegovernmenthastakenawayalanduseopportunityOristhegovernmentreclaimingrightsthatweregrantedtotheownerwhendemandforlandservic-esweredifferentRangepolicyinthewesternUnitedStatesisagoodexampleoftheseques-tions.
Rightsinrangelandweregrantedatatimewhenitwasclearlyinthepub-licinterestforprivateindividualstoinvestinandoperatethoseresourcesfortheincomegeneratedbyraisingbeeforwool.
Morerecently,thereisinterestinresourceservicesotherthanthecom-modityvaluesassociatedwithcattleorsheep.
Governmentissaying,"We'regoingtotakebackfromyoutherightthatwegaveyouyearsago.
"Debatesover"thepublicinterest"frequentlycallforareallocation,orarethinkingofthedistributionofrightsinrealproperty.
Whetherachangeofpropertyrightsisacostorabenefitreal-lydependsonone'spointofviewandtheexistingallocationofpropertyrights.
Twobasiclinesofargumentexistonthisquestion.
Firstisthenaturalrightstheory,whichassertsthatownershiparisesfromthenaturalorderofthingsandisnotsubjecttothewhimsofgov-ernment.
Thatis,landbecomesproper-tythroughtheeffortofanindividualtomakethatlandgenerateincomeandproducesomethingofmonetaryvalue.
Accordingtothisargument,theownerhasaninherentrighttothatlandbecauseoftheeffortsthatturnedthebasicresourceintoaflowofservices,withvalueassociatedtothem.
Thisisaprominenttheoryofpropertyrightsinmanycurrentdiscussions.
Thesecondargumentregardsowner-shipandpropertyasasocialconven-tion,somethingcreatedbypeopletoaccomplishcommunitypurposes.
Accordingtothisview,propertyowner-shipisafunctionofhumaninstitutionsthatestablishsetsoflandservicesforsociety.
Nosetofrightsisnaturalorper-manent.
Allarerelativetoprevailingviewsaboutnaturalresourcesandlandservicesthatcomefromthoseresources.
CommonpropertyRightstopropertyarecomplicatedinsomecasesbythecharacteroftheprocessthatcreatesthoserights.
WhatGarretHardinhasfamouslycalledthe"tragedyofthecommons,"reallydescribesopenaccesstoasetofresources.
Thereisanimportantdistinc-tionbetweencommonpropertyresourcesandopenaccessresources.
Hardinoverlookstherealitythatbothformalandinformalrulesgoverntheuseofpropertythatisheldincommonbyagroupoflike-mindedindividuals.
Theserulesencouragestewardshipofthelandorresourceanddiscourageexploitation.
ThelobsterfisheryalongthecoastofMaineisoneexampleofcommonprop-erty.
Asetofformalrulesexistsaboutthesizeoflobstersthatcanbetaken,buttherealgovernanceofthatlobsterfisheryistheinformalwaythatlobsterfishersthemselveskeeptrackofeachother.
Itwouldbeimpossibleforme,assomeonefrom"away,"tocometoWinterHarbor,Maine,putoutastringoflobstertraps,andexpecttogetany-thingoutofit.
Icouldgetthelicense,buttheotherlobsterfishersinthattownwouldnottakekindlytoaninter-loper;eventuallymytrapswoulddisap-pear.
MyabilitytomakeanincomewouldbecompromisedbecauseIamnotpartofthecommunitythatisattempt-ingtogainalivingfromthoseresources.
Withinthecoastallobsterfishery,peopleknowthattheirfishingisrestrictedtoacertainpartofthecoast-line.
Noonegoesfromoneharbortothenext.
Theboatnumbersareknown,asarethecolorofthetraps.
Thereisastrong,informalsystemgoverningthatfishery,whichhassustaineditforalongtime,andthereisaclearincentiveforstewardship.
Everyoneinthecommuni-tywithalicensetofishgains,eventhoughtheirrightsareinterspersed.
OpenaccessGarrettHardin,infact,describedopenaccessresources.
Whenrightstoaresourcearethrownwideopenwithoutformalorinformalrestrictions,itisdiffi-culttoseparateoneuserfromanother,toavoidoveruse,ortoencouragestew-ardship.
Unrestrictedaccessmaycauselossofquality.
PubliclyownedPubliclyownedresourcesareanothercategory.
Governmentcanacquireprop-ertyrights,oropportunities,fromindi-vidualseitherthroughmarkettransac-tion,eminentdomain,orsomeotherway.
Thegovernmentthenmanagestheresourceforthepublicatlargeanddecidesthemixofservicestobegener-ated.
PublictrustThepublictrustisaparticularlyinterestingdoctrineinlawthatassertstherightofgovernmenttoprotecttheunorganizedpublicfromactionstakenbyindividualsintheprivatesector,orfromthearbitraryactionsofothergov-ernments.
Inotherwords,accordingtothedoctrineofpublictrust,itistheresponsibilityofgovernmenttoprotectthequalityoftheGreatLakes,thequal-ityoftheoceans,andthequalityofotherwaterresourcesbecausethoseresourcesarefundamentaltothepublicgood.
Thesamecanbesaidforairquali-tyandpublichealth.
Theresourcesareusedbyindividu-als,butultimatelytherearesafeguardsthatallowgovernmenttostepinandmonitorthewaytheyareused,topro-tectthepublictrust.
InCalifornia,actionsondevelopmentwererestrictednearMonoLaketoprotectthequalityofthelandandwatermakingupthatresource.
Actinginthepublictrust,governmentsteppedintoprotectthebasicenvironmentalandscenicqualityofthelakeandadjacentlands.
Perhapsthepublictrustdoctrinecouldbeappliedtoprotectionofthebasicproductivityoffarmland,requiringthatitbepreservednotonlyforthenextgeneration,thenextten,twenty,oreventhirtyyears,butforallfuturegenerations.
Perhapsthereissomeover-riding,compellingobligationofgovern-menttoshepherdthatresource.
Thepublictrustisanimportantconcepttoexploreinresourcepolicy.
CurrentstatusNosetofpropertyrightsisperma-nent.
Thedistributionofrightsreflects9PropertyRights:APrimertheinterestofnon-ownersasdevelopedthroughpublicpoliciesofvariouskinds,andthesepolicieschangewithtime.
Certainly,nosetofpropertyrightsisabsolute.
Itisfairtosay,however,thatthecurrentdistributionofopportunityandrightsissanctionedandprotectedbythegovernment.
Propertyrightsprotectionstatutesarebeingdiscussedaroundthecountry,withcitizenscallingforastatutoryapproachthatwouldrequireanydepri-vationinvaluebecompensated.
OnlyFloridaandTexashavemandatorycom-pensationwhenprivaterightsarecom-promisedbypublicaction.
Oftheoth-ers,eighteenorsorequirethatgovern-mentsweighthepropertyrightsconse-quencesbeforeenactingnewlaws.
UndertheU.
S.
andstateconstitutions,ownerscannotbedeprivedofpropertywithoutdueprocessandjustcompensa-tion.
Theexistingstructurehassomesanctionsandisprotectedinlaw.
ReferencesBecker,JohnC.
1996.
Exercisingprop-ertyrights:Forindividualorcommu-nitybenefitFarmEconomics,PennStateCooperativeExtension.
Bromley,DanielW.
1993.
Regulatorytakings:CoherentconceptorlogicalcontradictionVermontLawReview17(3)647-682.
Cordes,MarkW.
1997.
Leapfroggingtheconstitution:Theriseofstatetakingslegislation.
EcologyLawQuarterly24:187-242.
Dragun,AndrewK.
1983.
Externalities,propertyrights,andpower.
JournalofEconomicIssues.
17(3)667-680.
Schmid,A.
A.
1987.
Propertyinasocialcontext.
Chapter2inProperty,Power,andPublicChoice,NewYork:Praeger.
Forpurposesofthisdiscussion,prop-ertyrightsareallofthelaws,rules,cus-toms,conventions,andpresumptionsthatinfluencethesocialandeconomicbehaviorofindividualsorgroupsastheyactinsociety.
Nodistinctionismadebetweenpropertyrightsandinstitutions;theyaresynonymousandthewordsareinterchangeable.
Theemphasisisonexchange.
Themarketisnotanexchangeofgoodsbutratheranexchangeofclaims.
Thefuturesmarketmakesthatclear.
Onewishestopossessonlytheclaimstowheatorporkbellies—thepropertyrights—nottheboxcarsofcommodities.
Ifallexchangeiswithrespecttoprop-ertyclaims,wheredoesthepropertycomefrom"It'smine,IcandowhatIwantwithit!
"isacommoncryofchil-drenatplay.
It'salsothecryofthelandownerwhosefarmhasbeeninthefamilyforgenerationsandwhonowwantstoestablishanintensivehogoper-ationwithoutcommunityinterference.
Butwhatmakesit"mine"OriginsofpropertyAccordingtoJohnLocke,propertycomesfromtheincorporationoflaborintosomethingthatcreatesvalue.
Forexample,arguesLocke,thevalueincor-poratedintonutsbytheeffortputforthtogatherthemfromtheforestfloormakesthosenutsthepropertyofthegatherer.
However,bythesamelogic,thepersonwhosnatchesthebundleofnutsfromthegathererandfleesthescenebecomestheproperownerofthenuts.
Thethiefincorporatessuperiorguileandswiftnessintothevalueofthenuts.
Wearealsoquicktoassertthatprop-ertyisestablishedbylaw,butaccordingtoJ.
F.
A.
Taylor,thelawandpoliceonlypreserveproperty,theycannotestablishit.
Forexample,thepropertyrightwithrespecttocustodyofthechildrenwasawardedtotheirmotherintherancorousdivorceofafriend.
Myfriendresolvednottopursuehisgrievanceswithhisex-wifethroughhisdaughtersandtoldmehewouldsaynothingabouttheirmotherthathecouldnotjustifytothemwhentheywere25yearsold.
Theex-wifedidnotsimilarlyrestrainherself,however,andherrelationshipwiththedaughtersdeterioratedastheydefendedtheirfatheragainstherdeprecations.
Thingsbecamesoacrimoniousbetweenthemotheranddaughtersthatbymutualagreementofallfamilymem-bersthegirlswenttolivewiththeirfather.
Thecourtsstillheldthatthemotherwascustodialparentwhilethegirlslivedwiththeirfather.
Bytheirmutualagreementthefamilycreatedanewsetofrights,contrarytothecourt'sruling.
Ofcourse,hadthemothernotagreed,thecourtswouldhavepreservedhercustodialcareandthegirlsmakingtheirhomewithher.
Inadditiontoclarifyingtherelation-shipofrightstothelaw,theexampleabovealsoillustratesthepointthatTaylormakesabouttheoriginsofproper-ty.
"It'smine!
"notbecauseIassertit,butbecauseyouagree.
"Myrightofpropertyinathingdependsnotuponmyclaimtoit,butpreciselyuponyourreadinesstoadmitmyclaimasprivileged,"saysTaylor.
Thisistheparadox:yourpropertyrightsinanythingdepend,notonyourclaims,butonothers'acknowledgementandforbearance,whichmayormaynotbecodifiedinlaw.
Thisradicalsensethatallpropertyinadegreeis"public"isthefundamentalbasis,saysTaylor,ofallpeaceableintercoursebetweenpeople.
Thereisnopropertywithoutcommunity.
Thisisaconceptnotfullyunderstoodbysomeinthe"propertyrights"movementaroundthecountry.
FormalandinformalpropertyrightsAsindicatedearlier,somepropertyrightsareformal,andcodifiedinlaw,administrativerules,andpractices,whileothersarecustomaryandinformal,most-lyunconsciousandembeddedincultureorhabit.
AccordingtoJohnR.
Commons,"Ifweendeavortofindauni-versalcircumstance,commontoallbehaviorknownasinstitutional,wemaydefineaninstitutionascollectiveactionincontrol,liberation,andexpansionofindividualaction.
"Inanotherreference,Commonsstatesthatinstitutions,orrights,"ordertherelationshipsbetweenpeople.
"Oneofthemostgraphicinstitutions,orpropertyrights,isthelinedowntheWhyPropertyRightsMatter!
byGeorgeMcDowell,DepartmentofAgriculturalandAppliedEconomicsVirginiaInstituteofTechnology10PropertyRights:APrimermiddleoftheroad.
Itsphysicalpresencehelpsyouknowyourplacevis-a-vistheotherusersoftheroad.
Togetsomesenseoftheeffectivenessofthephysicalaspectsofthisinstitution,oneneedonlydriveanewlypavedroadwithoutanylinesonadark,rainynight.
Examinedfurther,thelinerepresentsasetoflegalarrangementsthatcanresultinaticketfromthepoliceifyoupassanothercarwhenthelineissolid.
Theeffectivefunctioningofthelineasaninstitutiondependsonmorethanitsphysicalattributesandtheformallegalrulesrelatedtouseoftheroad.
Italsodependsonpublicunderstanding,tosuchadegreethattheruleshavebecomeapartofourculture.
Stepoffthecurbandlooktotheleftforoncom-ingtrafficinLondon.
Thered,double-deckerbuscomingfromtherightwillremindyouthatthereissomethingelseatworkinadditiontolaw.
InterdependenceofpeopleSolongaseveryoneisinagreement,keepingeithertotheleftortotherightofthecenterlineintheroadisequallyconvenientinpredictingwheretheotherguywillbe.
Thetougherpropertyrightsissuesarewhenthereisdisagree-mentaboutwhatisconvenient—whoownsthelandwheretheroadmightgo;howitcanbeacquiredforthatpurpose;andwhetherthereisneedtoprotectswampsinitspath.
Propertyrightsareneededbecausepeopleareinterdependent.
Propertyrightssortouttheconflictsthatcomefromthatinterdependenceandprovidepredictabilityaboutoutcomes—partofthestabilityfunctionofrightsinasoci-ety.
Theconflicts,orinterdependencies,betweenpeopleareinfluenced,orevenpartlydeterminedby,people'srelation-shipstothings.
AttributesofthingsThephysicalcharacteristics,orattributes,ofthingsmakearealdiffer-enceinrelationshipsamongpeopleandinthepropertyrightsthatmaybeusefulinorderingthoserelationships.
Differentattributescreatedifferenttypesofinterdependencies,whichleadtodif-ferentchoicesofpropertyrights.
ChoiceFrequently,alternativerights,orinstitutions,willachievesimilarout-comes.
Speedlimitsigns,"childrenatplay"signs,andspeedcontrolbumpsareallintendedtoordertherelationshipsbetweenchildrenatplayanddriversofcarsthroughtheneighborhood.
Eachhasadvantagesanddisadvantagesinachievingthedesiredrelationship—pre-ventionofaccidentsinvolvingchildrenwhilekeepingtheroaduseablefortrans-portation.
Groupswillargueoverthechoiceoftheinstitutionevenwhenallagreethatsomedegreeofspeedlimitintheneighborhoodisessential.
OpenmarketeconomiesarenotfreePropertyrightsinpracticeDebateaboutpropertyrightsfre-quentlyreferstospecificlegaloradmin-istrativerightsthatarecodifiedinlaw.
Rightsthatareculturallyorinformallyenforced,however,areaneglectedareaworthyofconsideration,particularlytherightsimplicitinmarkettransactionsthatmakeitpossibleforthemarkettofunction.
Someoftheserightsarefor-mal,butmanyareinformalandembed-dedinculture.
JamesFallowssays,inhisbookMoreLikeUs,"Inthelongrun,asociety'sstrengthdependsonthewaythatordi-narypeoplevoluntarilybehave.
Ordinarypeoplematterbecausetherearesomanyofthem.
Voluntarybehav-iormattersbecauseit'stoohardtosupervisethemallofthetime.
Thisvol-untarybehavioriswhatImeanby'cul-ture.
'"Ourownrhetoricaboutoureconom-icsystemisonereasonitisdifficulttoseethevoluntarybehavior,orculturallybasedpropertyrights,thathelpsmakeoureconomyfunction.
Considerthefol-lowingquotefromanarticleonAlbaniaintheWallStreetJournalofMarch4,1998:"Whilepyramidschemesarecom-moninpost-communistcountries,theygrewtomorethan$1billioninAlbania,swallowingasmalleconomy,whichlackedthebasicregulatoryinsti-tutionscommoninthefreemarket.
"Thesentenceiscontradictory.
Therhetoriciswrong.
ThetroubleinAlbaniaisthattherearefreemarkets,andfreemarketsdonotdescribewhatwehaveorwantintheUnitedStates.
Thatinternallyinconsistentstatementinthemostprominenteconomicnews-paperintheU.
S.
suggeststhatmanymisunderstandtherealbasisofamarketeconomy.
ThechangesinEasternEuropeandtheformerSovietUnionofferaper-spectiveonourowneconomicsystem.
Economistsandnon-economistsalikegiveevidenceofmisunderstandingourownmarketsystemanditsunderlyingbasisinpersistentlycallingitafreemar-ketsystemratherthananopenmarketeconomy.
Informalpropertyrightsincludingagenerallawfulnessandtrustworthinessarenecessarytothesuccessfulfunction-ingofoureconomy.
Brokenkneesareasubstitutetosecurecontractswheremafiaorblackmarketorganizationsoperateintheabsenceoftrustand/orawillingnesstofollowcommerciallaw.
Thesamesystemoperatesinoursocietyintheundergroundeconomy,wherenormalpropertyrightsdon'tfunction.
InTaylor'sterms,thisisanotherexampleofanabsenceofcovenant,orcommunity.
Therearenopropertyrightstopermitanytransactionsbeyondcashexchangeundertheruleofcaveatemptor("letthebuyerbeware"),whichappliestoboththebuyerandtheseller.
Currencyandcommoditiesalonedonotconstituteamarket.
Amarketexchangesclaims,andtheexistenceofclaimsiscontingentuponsomesenseofcommunity,somethingmorethanphysicalpossessionofthegood.
Communityrequiresadegreeofcivility,trustworthiness,andgoodwill.
NewrightsAsasocietygrowsanddevelops,newrightsemergetocontrolandmanageadvancesintechnology.
Newtechnolo-gymeansnewthings,newinterdepen-denciesbetweenpeople,andthusnewrights.
Withoutnewtechnology,however,theonlywaytoachievedevelopmentistocreatenewrightsthatbringmoreproductivity,ormoresatisfactionfrombetteruseofexistingresources.
Itislike-Asanillustrationofhowtheattributesofthingsmatterinrelationships,considerthefollowingcommunicationbetweenCanadianauthoritiesandthecommanderofaU.
S.
NavyshipoffthecoastofNewfoundlandinOctober,1995:Americans:Pleasedivertyourcourse15degreestotheNorthtoavoidacollision.
Canadians:Recommendyoudivertyourcourse15degreestotheSouthtoavoidacollision.
Americans:ThisistheCaptainofaU.
S.
Navyship.
Isayagain,divertyourcourse.
Canadians:No.
Isayagain,youdivertyourcourse.
Americans:ThisistheaircraftcarrierU.
S.
S.
Lincoln,thesecond-largestshipintheUnitedStates'AtlanticFleet.
Weareaccompaniedbythreedestroyers,threecruisers,andnumeroussupportvessels.
Idemandthatyouchangeyourcourse15degreesNorth,That'sone-fivedegreesNorth,orcountermeasureswillbeunder-takentoensurethesafetyofthisship.
Canadians:Thisisalighthouse.
Yourcall.
Nomattertherelativeauthorityoftheindividualsincommand,thephysicalattributesoftheirchargesdeterminetheoutcomeoftheconflictintherelationship.
Lighthousesdon'tdiverttheircourse.
11PropertyRights:APrimerlythatnewcovenantsabouttheuseofotherresourceswillcomeininformalagreementsthatexpandpeople'sradiusoftrustandcontrolovertheirdestiny.
SummaryThelaycommunitytendstoviewpropertyrightsasrightsinland.
Inrecentyears,thegeneralpublichasacknowledgedthenotionofintellectualpropertyrightstocovertheresultsofcreativeefforts—fromcomputerpro-gramstopopularsongs—butsuchviewsofpropertyrightsaremuchtoolimiting.
Herewe'veconsideredpropertyrightstobeallthelaws,rules,customs,conventions,andpresumptionsthatinfluencethesocialandeconomicbehaviorofindividualsorgroupsastheyrelateoractinsociety.
JohnR.
Commons'snotionisthatpropertyrightsarecollectiveactionincontrol,liberation,andexpansionofindividualaction.
Propertyrightsarenecessarybecausewegetintoeachother'shair.
"Nofreelunch,"isafundamentalpreceptofeconomists.
Muchmoreinteresting,however,iswhoprepareslunch,serveslunch,setsthemenu,andpaysforthelunch.
That'sthedomainofpropertyrights.
Referencesandotherreading:Commons,JohnR.
1931.
Institutionaleconomics.
AmericanEconomicReview21:648-657.
Fallows,James.
1989.
MoreLikeUs.
HoughtonMifflinCompany,Boston.
Frank,Robert.
1998.
Albania'spyramidschemeslooksick.
TheWallStreetJournalMarch4,p.
A-14.
Lancaster,KelvinJ.
1966.
Anewapproachtoconsumertheory.
JournalofPoliticalEconomy74:853-58.
Litwack,JohnM.
1991.
LegalityandmarketreforminSoviet-typeeconomies.
JournalofEconomicPerspectives5(4):77-89.
Ostrom,Elinor.
1990.
GoverningtheCommons:TheEvolutionofInstitutionsforCollectiveAction.
CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeandNewYork.
Schmid,A.
Allen.
1987.
Property,Power,andPublicChoice(2ndedi-tion).
Praeger,NewYork.
Shabman,Leonard.
1995.
Demosclerosis:Assessingtheargu-ment.
AmericanJournalofAgriculturalEconomics.
77(December):1135-1140.
Shabman,LeonardandDavidWhite.
1995.
UnderstandingFederalTakingLegislation.
Staffpaper,DepartmentofAgriculturalandAppliedEconomics,VirginiaTech.
Stone,ChristopherD.
1972.
Shouldtreeshavestanding—Towardlegalrightsfornaturalobjects.
SouthernCaliforniaLawReview45:450.
Taylor,JohnF.
A.
1966.
Theethicalfoundationsofthemarket.
Chapter5inTheMasksofSociety.
Appleton-Century-Crofts,NewYorkInarecentspeech,thepresidentoftheAmericanFarmBureaucomplainedthat"ratsandbats,bugsandweedsareclaimingtitletoourlands.
"HearguedthatrestrictionsimposedbylawssuchastheEndangeredSpeciesActamount-edtoa"taking"ofthepropertyrightsoffarmersandranchers.
Heapparentlybelievesthatpropertyrightsareabsoluteandself-defining:iffarmerscan'tdowhattheywantontheirprop-erty,thentheirrightsmusthavebeeninfringed.
Mostconstitutionalprovisions,how-ever,arenotabsolute.
Thesecondamendment,forexample,clearlystatesthatwehavearighttobeararms,butnoonequestionsthegovernment'srighttopreventyourneighborsfromarmingthemselveswithnervegasornuclearweapons.
Thus,"arms"isnotaself-definingconceptandiscertainlynotabsolute.
Atsomepoint,linesmustbedrawnandtermsdefined.
Wemustgooutsidethewordsthemselvestodeterminetheirmeaning.
Historyisoneplacewecangetthatcontext.
Historyshowsthatpropertyrightshaveevolvedovertime.
Ourrecogni-tionofpropertyrightshasnotbeenlin-ear,butschizophrenicanddynamicinnature.
Ononehand,wefirmlybelievethatpeopleshouldbeabletodowhattheywantwiththepropertytheyown.
Thedesiretomaintainstrongpropertyrightsprotectionisbasednotonlyonutilitariangrounds(thatis,weneedtoprotectpropertytogivepeopleincen-tivetoproduce),butalsoonfairnessgrounds(ifyouworkedhardtogettheproperty,youshouldbeabletouseit).
Ontheotherhand,weholdanequallystrongconvictionthatthereisapublicinterestinhowpropertyisused,andatsomepoint,thepublic'sinterestoutweighstheindividual'srights.
TheFederalistperspectiveBothofthoseperspectivesarewellrepresentedinhistory,beginningwiththeframersoftheConstitution.
Ononesidewasclassicalliberalism,embodiedinFederalistthinkerssuchasJamesMadison,whobelievedthatindi-vidualpropertyrightswereofcrucialimportanceanddeservedstringentpro-tection.
"Government,"Madisonsaid,"isinstitutednolessfortheprotectionofpropertythanofindividuals.
"FederalistsunderstoodthatotherPropertyRightsinHistoricalPerspectivebyJerryL.
Anderson,AssociateDeanandProfessorofLawDrakeUniversityLawSchoolAlSchmid'sbook,Property,PowerandPublicChoice,listsasetofattributesthathearguescreatesdifferenttypesofrela-tionshipsbetweenpeople.
Incompatibleuse:Likeapples—ifyoueatit,Ican't.
Exclusioncosts:Childrencanmakemoneysellingapplesorlemonade,buttheyprobablywon'tdoaswellsellingviewsoftheirsnowsculptures.
Economiesofscale:Ilikehamburg-ersandfries,butIalsolikehummus.
Ihavetomakehummusathome,becauseitisn'tgenerallyavailableinthegrocerystore.
Becauseofothers'sharedtastesandfastfoodscaleeconomies,theunitcostofhamburg-ersandfriesislow.
Forexactlytheoppositereasons,theperunitcostofhummusishigh.
Jointimpact:Peopleprefertolivenexttoaconservationareainsteadofalandfill.
Transactioncosts:It'swhatsmallclaimscourtisabout.
Surplusesandpeakloads:Retiredpeople,withoutkidsathome,takevacationswhenschoolsareinses-sion,demandislow,andtherefore,soareprices.
Pricesvarybyseason.
Pricingisapropertyright.
12PropertyRights:APrimerrightswereofnouseunlesspropertywassafe.
ArthurLee,ofVirginia,saidthat"therightofpropertyistheguardianofeveryotherright,andtodeprivepeopleofitisinfacttodeprivethemoftheirliberty.
"Forexample,therightoffreespeechwouldbeworthlessifthegov-ernmentcouldthreatenyourpropertyinretaliation.
TheRepublicanperspectiveColonialrepublicans,suchasThomasJeffersonandBenjaminFranklin,placedmoreemphasisonthelimitationsofindividualpropertyrights.
Ofcourse,theybelievedstronglyinproperty—Jeffersonmaintainedthatthekeytodemocracywasanationpopulat-edbysmalllandownerssecureintheirpossessions.
Theyalsobelievedthatpropertyitselfisacreatureofsociety,andisthereforesubjecttolimitationsimposedforthepublicgood.
Jefferson,forexam-ple,hadbeentoFranceandhadseenrichlandowners'fieldslyingidlewhilepoorpeoplestarved.
InalettertoMadison,Jeffersondeclaredthatinthatcase,privatepropertyrightshadbeentakentoofar:Propertyis"thecommonstockofallmentoliveonanduse,''heconcluded.
Franklinhadasimilaropinion:"Privatepropertyisacreatureofsocietyandissubjecttothecallsofthatsocietywhereitsnecessityshallrequireit.
"Theyrecognizedthatpropertyexistsinthefirstplaceonlybecauseweagreeasasocietytorespectaperson'sclaims.
Therefore,toprotectthebroadercom-munity,societyhastherighttolimittheuseofproperty.
DynamicdebateThesefundamentallydifferentwaysofviewingpropertyhavebeenimbed-dedintheU.
S.
ConstitutionfromitsinceptionandarenicelydescribedbyProfessorPhilbrick:"Onewaslookingtoindividualismtosavesociety.
Theotherwaslookingtosocietytosavetheindi-vidual.
"Thesamesortofdebate,betweenindividualismandsociety,goesontodayovertopicslikewelfare,socialsecurity,guncontrol,andaffirmativeaction.
ViewpointsstressingindividualrightscanbetracedbacktotheFederalists,whilethosestressingsociety'sinterestsarerootedinthecolonialRepublicans.
Propertyrightsshouldreallybeunderstoodasabalancebetweenthesecompetinginterests.
SeveralSupremeCourtdecisionsillustratehowourlegaldecisionshavefavoredonesideortheotheratvarioustimesinhistory.
LegalhistoryMuglervs.
Kansas,123U.
S.
623,8S.
Ct.
273(1887)Inthe1880sKansaspassedaprohibitionlawagainstthemanufactureorsaleofalcoholicbever-ages.
ThiswasnotgoodforMugler,whoownedabrewery.
Hesuedthestate,claimingthelawhaddestroyedthevalueofhisproperty,andwasthereforea"taking"ofpropertyinviolationoftheconstitution.
TheSupremeCourtrejectedthatclaim.
JusticeHarlanwrotethatsocietymustbeabletocontroltheuseofprop-ertyforthegeneralgoodandthatprop-ertyisheldunderanimpliedobligationthatitsusenotbeinjurioustothecom-munity.
Atthistime,theRepublicanphilosophy—thatpropertyisacreatureofsocietyandthereforeitsusecanbelimited—wasmorepersuasivetotheCourt.
PennsylvaniaCoalvs.
Mahon,260U.
S.
393,43S.
Ct.
158(1922)ThislandmarkcaseadoptedinsteadtheFederalistphilosophy,articulatedinthemajorityopinionbyJusticeOliverWendellHolmes.
ThecaseinvolvedtheKohlerAct,bywhichPennsylvaniapre-ventedcoalcompaniesfromminingcoalinsuchawayastocausethesubsi-denceofthesurface.
Thatseemslikeareasonablethingtowanttoprevent,andHolmesdidnotdenyit,buthebelievedthatthelawdeprivedthecoalcompaniesoftheirpropertyinterestinthecoalthatmustnowbeleftunmined.
Thecoalcompanieshadpurchasedthemineralinterestsfromthesurfaceowners.
Nowthegovernmenthadcomealongandbasicallytransferredtheinter-estback,withoutcompensation.
Thatitmightbeagoodlawisirrelevant,Holmessaid:ifsocietywantsthisdone,itmustpaytheindividualwhoseproper-tyistaken.
ThisviewisreminiscentoftheFederalistposition,stressingindivid-ualrightsoversociety'sinterests.
JusticeBrandeiswroteapowerfuldis-sentthatechoedtheRepublicanview-point.
Brandeisarguedthatsocietymustbeabletolimitpropertyusesthatareharmful,withouthavingtopaytheowner.
AsJeffersonandFranklinmighthavesaid,henotedthatpropertyisheldalwayssubjecttoanimpliedlimitationthatitsusenotbeinjurioustothepub-lic.
PennCentralTransportationCo.
vsNewYorkCity,438U.
S.
104,988S.
Ct.
2646(1978)Fiftyyearslater,thiscaseinvolvedamodernexampleofpropertylimitation:NewYorkCity'slandmarkpreservationlaw.
PennCentralclaimedthelawbasicallyprohibitedthemfrombuildinganofficetowerontopoftheGrandCentralStation,whichtheysaidresultedinatakingoftheirproperty.
JusticeBrennanwrotethemajorityopinion,andonceagaintheRepublicanpositionwonout.
BrennanreliedonMuglerandheldthatthepublic'sinter-estinpreservinglandmarksoutweighedtheharmtothelandowner.
JusticeRehnquist,indissent,followedtheFederalistphilosophyandfoundthateventhoughthismightbeaverygoodlaw,therestrictiononprivatepropertywastoogreatandrequiredcompensa-tiontothelandownerbesustained.
KeystoneBituminousCoalAssocvsDeBenedictus,480U.
S.
470,107S.
Ct.
1232,(1987)ThiscaseisfascinatingbecausethefactsappeartobevirtuallyidenticaltothoseinPennsylvaniaCoalsome60yearsbefore.
Again,itinvolvedaPennsylvanialawprohibitingcoalminingthatcouldcausesubsidence.
Itprovidesagoodillustrationoftheebbandflowofviewpoints,becausetheCourtdecidedtheoppositeway.
ThemajorityopinionreliedontheRepublicanphilosophyofthepublicgood.
JusticeStevensemphasizedthepublicinterestinpreventingtheharmofsubsidence,holdingthatitout-weighedtheprivatepropertyinterestinthecoal.
JusticeRehnquistagaindis-sented,stressingtheFederalistviewthatpropertyrightscannotbetrampledevenforpublicgood.
LucasvsSouthCarolinaCoastalCommission,505U.
S.
1003,112S.
Ct.
2886(1992)Justsixyearslater,Rehnquist'sFederalistpositionprevailedduetosomemajorchangesintheCourt'scomposition.
TheLucascaseinvolvedsomerestrictionsonsomebeachfrontlotsontheSouthCarolinacoast.
Lucasclaimedthattherestric-tionsimposedbythestatetopreventerosionandforotherenvironmentalreasonstotallydestroyedhispropertyinterest.
JusticeScalia,writingthemajorityopinion,saidthatifpropertyinterestsaredestroyed,theymustbepaidfor,nomatterhowbeneficialtherestrictions.
JusticesBrennanandStevens,whoseRepublicanviewwasascendantinKeystoneandPennCentral,nowwroteindissentthatthepreventionofharmfulpropertyusesshouldnotrequirecompensation.
AhealthybalanceThetwophilosophieshaveseesawedbackandforthinourjurisprudence:Republicanviewin1887,Federalistin1922,backtoRepublicaninthe1970sand80s.
NowtheFederalistpositionisonceagaindominant.
Wemustconcludethatbothviews13PropertyRights:APrimerarelegitimatepartsofourconstitutionalculture.
Neitheroneisabsolute—thereisabalancebetweenthemthatmakesitdifficulttopredicttheoutcomeofapar-ticularcase.
Thebalanceisprobablyahealthyone,asneithertheindividualnorsocietyshouldbeallowedtogounchecked,andbothphilosophiesaresoclearlyapartofourculture.
EvolvingrightsHistoryalsoteachesusthatpropertyrightsareconstantlyevolvingtofitthechangingconditionsofsociety.
Therehasneverbeenanabsolute"right"todoanythingwithproperty.
Restrictionsresultfromevolvingsocietalneeds.
Afterthegreatfireofthe1600sinLondon,stringentrestrictionswereplacedonthetypeandlocationofnewbuildings.
Whenthefearofhighway-menreachedapeak,theEnglishgov-ernmentoutlawedbushesandtreesneartheroadswheretherobberscouldhide.
Thepublicneedforsafetyjustifiedpri-vatepropertylimitations.
InAmerica,propertyrightswererightfullyemphasizedbyanoverwhelm-inglyagrariansocietyinwhicheightypercentofthepeoplederivedtheirliv-ingfromtheland.
Governmentrestric-tionsonpropertywerenaturallysuspect,giventhedesireofAmericanstobefreeofthefeudaltendenciesandtheoppres-sionoftheEnglishcrown.
Butasthenatureoftheeconomychanged,propertyrightschangedwithit.
Jobsandbenefits,orstockownership,becamejustasimportantasland.
Thelawchangedtogiveemployeessomeprotectionandtorecognizeintangiblepropertyaswellasrealproperty.
Astheinformationagehasevolved,wehaveseenadditionalchangesinproperty.
Trademarksandcopyrightsmaybefarmorevaluablethanland.
TheframersoftheConstitutioncouldnothaveforeseenpropertyrightsinInternetwebsites,bodyparts,andfertil-izedhumaneggs,andyetwemustadapttheirideastofitthesenewrealities.
Historyteachesthatwhatwemeanby"property"and"propertyrights"hasneverbeensetinstone.
Instead,ourrecognitionoftheseinterestsiscon-stantlyevolving—whatmayhavebeenallowedyesterdaymaybeunacceptabletosocietytoday.
Particularlyintheenvironmentalarea,theabsolutistviewofpropertyrightsseemsmisplaced—whatweseeastheproperuseofland(andthereforethe"right"oftheproper-tyowner)isboundtoreflectthecon-stantlychangingneedsofoursociety.
ReferencesEly,JamesW.
Jr.
1992.
Thatduesatis-factionmaybemade:TheFifthAmendmentandtheoriginsofthecompensationprinciple.
TheAmericanJournalofLegalHistory,36(1).
McElfish,JamesM.
Jr.
1994.
PropertyRights,PropertyRoots:Rediscoveringthebasisforlegalpro-tectionoftheenvironment.
EnvironmentalLawReporter24(10231).
McElfish,JamesM.
Jr.
,PhilipWarburg,andJohnPendergrass.
1996.
Property:Past,present,future.
TheEnvironmentalForum,EnvironmentalLawInstitute.
PennsylvaniaCoalCo.
v.
Mahonetal.
,1922CommonPropertyandNaturalResourceManagementRobertGorman,AssociateProfessor,CooperativeExtensionServiceUniversityofAlaskaFairbanksIntroductionIntheUnitedStates,propertytypi-callybelongsinoneoftwoclasses:pri-vateorpublic(state).
Anotherform,commonproperty,haselementsofbothprivateandpublicproperty.
Commonpropertyisfoundworldwideinnaturalresourcemanagement,mostnotablyinfisheriesmanagement.
Incontemporaryeconomicsliterature,thetermcommonpropertyisoftenconfusedwithopenaccessproperty.
Openaccesspropertylacksanydefinedownershipsothattheresourceisopentoharvestorusebyanyonewishingtoexploitit.
Thispaperattemptstodefinecom-monpropertywithintheAmericanper-spectiveofpropertyandtolookathowotherculturesmanagecommonproper-tyresources.
Exampleswillbepresentedoftheeffectsofshiftingresourceman-agementfromcommonpropertytoeitherprivateorpublicproperty.
Whilemuchoftheliteratureoncommonpropertyfocusesonfisheries,thereareexamplesofcommonpropertymanage-mentregimesforgrazing,communalforests,irrigation,andgroundwater,amongotherresources.
Finally,theauthorsdiscusstheuseofcommonprop-ertyasameanstomanagelandandnat-uralresourcestoachieveoptimalutiliza-tioninAmericansociety.
Althoughpropertyrightsissuesareoftenconsideredthedomainofecono-mistsandlawyers,thispaperdemon-stratesthatanthropologists,sociologists,andothersocialscientistshaveprovidedmuchresearchintopropertyrightsingeneral,andcommonpropertyinpar-ticular.
Furthermore,treatingpropertyrightsasstrictlyamatterofeconomicsandlawoftenresultsinexploitationofnaturalresources.
Itcanalsoerodeordestroylocalculturesthathaveeffec-tivelymanagedthesenaturalresourcesthroughcommonpropertymanagementregimes.
PropertyrightsterminologyTheAmericanHeritageDictionaryoftheEnglishLanguage(Morris,1981)definesterminologyas,"Thevocabularyoftechnicaltermsandusageappropriatetoaparticulartrade,scienceorart;nomenclature.
"Terminologyistheessenceofcommunicationwithinandbetweendisciplines.
Whenincorrectterminologyisused,concepts,theories,issues,andsolutionswillbedistortedandmisunderstood.
Thecommonsandcommonpropertyhavebeensubjecttoavarietyofacademicstudiesbybiolo-gists,economists,sociologists,anthro-pologists,geographers,lawyers,andhis-torians,eachwiththeirownterminolo-gy.
Thecommonsandcommonpropertyarefrequentlymisunderstoodconceptsinnaturalresourcesandeconomicslit-erature.
Theprecisedefinitionofcom-monpropertyvariesamongscholars.
However,mostdefinitionsofcommonpropertyrightsincludetheseelements:1)Awell-definedgroupofco-owners,who2)developandadheretoawell-definedmanagementregimethatincludes3)proscribedaccessbyownersandexclusionofnon-owners,and4)rightsanddutiesofownerswithregardstoratesofuseofthecommonpropertyresource(Bromley1991;McCay1996;Swaney1990;Feenyetal.
1990).
Commonpropertyisfrequentlycon-14PropertyRights:APrimerfusedwithopenaccessproperty,inwhichtheresourceisavailabletoany-onewhocanaccessanduseit.
Swaney(1990)andotherssuggestthattheLatintermresnulliusbeusedtodescribeopenaccessornon-propertyandthatrescom-munesbeusedtodescribecommonproperty.
Theconfusionbetweenthecommonsandopenaccesshasledtonotablemisunderstandingswithincon-temporarynaturalresourceusers.
Forexample,inTheTragedyoftheCommons,Hardin(1968)confusesopenaccessforcommonpropertyusinganexampleofanovergrazedmeadow.
Thissinglecitationhasbeenusedbyanum-berofpolicymakersindeterminingnat-uralresourcemanagementschemes.
AnaturalresourcemanagementschemereflectiveofHardin'sfindingswilllikelyleadtoprivatizationorastronggovern-mentrole(McCay,1997).
Increasedgovernmentinvolvementinpropertyusewilllikelyplacelimitsinthewaypropertyrightsmaybeused.
Anyreductioninpropertyrightsiscalledattenuation(Quiggin,1988).
AttenuationofcommonpropertyisalikelyconsequenceofacceptingHardin'stragedyofthecommonsasfact.
LimitedworkhasbeendoneintheUnitedStatestomanagenaturalresourceswithinacommonpropertyregime,despitenumerousexamplesofsuccessfulnaturalresourcemanagementascommonproperty.
Historically,failuretorecognizecommonpropertyhasledtoexploitationofresourcesasdescribedbyBrox(1990)inthenorthernNorwayfisheryandMatthews(1995)inthecol-lapseoftheGrandBanksfisheryoffNewfoundland.
AnotherexampleisthedisregardofNativeAmericancommonpropertyrightsthroughoutthecourseofthesettlementoftheUnitedStates(Swaney,1990).
Propertyis,infact,therighttoastreamofbenefits.
Itincludestherighttoexcludeothers.
Propertyisareflec-tionoftheculturewhereitisrecog-nized.
Propertyrightsinwesternculturehaveevolvedtoassistintheharvestoflimitedresources,usuallyforeconomicpurposes.
However,cultureslessdrivenbyeconomicsmaydefinepropertypri-marilytosupportresourcesustainabilityandcommunitysurvival(Quiggin,1988andMatthews,1995).
Generally,fourcategoriesofpropertyrightsarerecognized:openaccess,com-monproperty,privateproperty,andstate(public)property(Ostrom,1985;Bromley,1991;Feeneyetal.
,1990).
Openaccessandcommonpropertyhavebeendescribedabove.
Understateprop-ertyrights,thegovernmentisvestedwithsolerightstotheresource,includ-ingresourceaccessandtherateofuse,ifapplicable.
Privatepropertyveststheindividualwithrightstoexcludeothersfromthebenefitsstreamandtouseitatarateandinamannerdeterminedbytheindividual.
Privatepropertyisacor-nerstoneofcontemporaryeconomicandlegalsystemsintheUnitedStatesandmostwesternsocieties.
Itisthepropertyrightsregimethatbestfitseconomicanalysis.
Privatepropertyhasaspecific,definedrightsstructureconsistingofuniversality,exclusivity,transferabilityandenforceability(Swaney,1990).
Privatepropertyownershipismostoftenassociatedwithreadilydegradedresourceslikeagriculturallands,grazingandforestlands.
Commonpropertyownershipismostfrequentlyassociatedwithtransientresourceslikefish,wildlife,groundwater,andirrigationwater(Ostrom,1990).
ThecommonpropertymanagementregimeusedintheSwissAlpsexistswithinalandownershipsystemwhereprivateandcommonpropertyexistssidebyside.
Factorsthatfavorcommonpropertymanagementregimeinclude:1)alowvalueofproductionperunitofland,2)lowdependability/frequencyofuseandyieldfromtheresource,3)alowpotentialforimprovementorintensifi-cationofthecommonpropertyresource,4)alargeareaoflandneededforeffectiveuseoftheresource,and5)largegroupsofownersneededforcapitalinvestmentactivities(Ostrom,1990).
PropertymanagementsystemsPropertyismorethananobjectand,infact,consideringpropertyasanobjecthasledtoconfusion.
Bromley(1991)describespropertyasabenefitthatsocietyagreestoprotect.
Propertyrightsareclaimstoabenefitstream(accessanduseofanaturalresource).
McCay(1996)separatespropertyrightsfrompropertymanagementregimes.
Itisausefulconcept,especiallywhenstudy-ingordesigningcommonpropertysys-tems.
Thedifferenttypesofpropertyhavebeendescribedabove.
However,McCaydescribesfourmanagementregimesthatareseparateinstitutionsfrompropertyrights.
Themanagementregimesinclude:laissez-faire(frequentlyassociatedwithopenaccess),marketregulation(mostcommonlyrelatedtoprivatepropertyrights),usergovernance(wherelocal-leveldecision-makingmanagesacommonpoolresource),andstategovernance(propertyoverwhichthestategoverns,irregardlessofowner-ship).
Separatingpropertyrightsandpropertymanagementregimesisusefulwhendealingwithcommonproperty.
Commonpropertymanagementregimeswillbediscussedlater.
Animportantdistinctionbetweencommonpropertyandprivatepropertyishowownershipchanges.
Privateprop-ertyrightsmaybereadilyandvoluntari-lyexchangedbetweenowners.
Forexample,underprivatepropertyregimestheindividualownermaysellportionsoftheprivateproperty,suchasmineralrights.
However,ifthatsameprivatelandwasinNebraskaorOklahomaandhadgroundwaterirrigationwells(recog-nizedbystategovernmentsascommonproperty),thewaterrightscouldnotbesoldwithoutalsosellingtheland(EmelandBrooks,1988).
Commonpropertyrightsaregenerallytiedtothecommu-nityofcommonpropertyowners;unlikeprivateproperty,accessandusecannotbeexchangedseparately.
Methodsofpropertyexchangehaveimportantconsequences.
Onetypeofpropertyexchangeoccursvoluntarilybetweenindividualswithinapropertyrightsstructureasdescribedabove.
Thisexchangeofpropertyrightsistypicalofaprivatepropertymarket.
Thesecondtypeofpropertyexchangeoccurswhenthereisachangeinthestructureofpropertyrights,suchaswhencommonpropertybecomesprivateproperty(Quiggin,1988).
Changesinpropertyrightsstructureusuallyresultfromgov-ernmentaction,suchaswhentheUnitedStatesextendedtheeconomicexclusionzonefrom12milesto200milesfromcoastalareas,therebycreat-ingcommonpropertyrightsfromprevi-ousopenaccessresources.
PrivatizationofstatepropertyinRussia,easternEuropeancountries,China,andMexicoarefurtherexamplesofchangingprop-ertyrightsstructure.
Thesechangesinpropertystructuredemonstratethatpropertyrightsarenotstaticandthattheconsequencesofchangingpropertyrightsaresignificant.
Consider,forexample,theprivatizingofopenaccess,commons,andstateproperty.
Thebene-Table1.
PropertymanagementsystemsdefinedbytypeofpropertyownershipManagementsystemOwnerLaissez-faireOpenaccessMarketregulationPrivatepropertyUsergovernanceClosedaccesscommonpoolStategovernanceStategovernanceforallowners15PropertyRights:APrimerfittotheindividualgainingtheprivatepropertyrightsfrompreviousopenaccess,commons,orstatepropertycanleadtolessthanoptimalresourceuseorresourceexploitation.
Theroleofeconomicdevelopmentthroughtheprivatizationofstateprop-ertywasacentralfeatureintheUnitedStatesHomesteadLaws(AndersonandHill,1990).
Ofcourse,thepublicprop-ertydisposedthroughhomesteadinghadoriginallybeencommonpropertyofvar-iousNativeAmericansuntileconomicexploitationforfursandotherresourcesshiftedtheseunrecognizedcommonpropertyresourcesintodefactoopenaccessandthenpublicproperty.
Governmenttake-overofopenaccessandcommonpropertymaybeviewedasnecessaryforsomeresourcemanage-ment,suchasmineralextractionandtheexpansionofacoastal200-mileeco-nomicexclusionzoneforfisheriesman-agement.
However,governmenttake-overofprivatepropertyrightsisuniver-sallyconsideredaneconomicandlegaltravesty.
Itisnotablethatexistingrightsofdisplacedindigenousandlocalcom-monpropertyownersseldomreceiveconsiderationandtheinjusticestheysufferarerarelyrecognizedwhenproper-tyrightsstructureschangeinfavorofeconomicventures(Berkes,1985,andSwaney,1990).
CommonpropertyconceptsandterminologyAnunderstandingofcommonprop-ertyconceptsandterminologyisneces-saryinordertoprotectexistingsustain-ablecommonpropertyresources,ortostructurecommonpropertyregimesfornaturalresourcemanagement.
Rightsrefertoactionsauthorizedbylaworconvention,whilerulesareprescriptionsthatauthorizeaction.
Commonproper-tycarriestwoclearlyrecognizedrights:accessorexclusion,andwithdrawalorharvest.
Theserightsclearlydistinguishcommonpropertyfromopenaccessproperty.
Everyrighthasaruleauthoriz-ingparticularactionsintheuseofthatright(SchlagerandOstrom1992).
Rulesshouldbeclear,withlittleroomforinterpretation.
Forexample,EmilandBrooks(1988)describegroundwaterrulesintheAmericanHighPlains,includingtheprovisothatgroundwaterwellsmustbespaced1,230feetapart.
Commonpropertyrulesareoftenthisspecificinordertoavoidmisinterpreta-tion.
Ostrom(1990)describesthreetypesofrulesusedincommonpropertyinsti-tutions:operationalrules(concernedwithappropriating,monitoring,andday-to-dayenforcinguseofcommonproperty);collectiverules(involvingmanagement,policymaking,andadjudi-cationofcommonpropertyresources);andconstitutionalrules(concernedwithformulation,adjudication,andmodificationofthefundamentalcom-monpropertyprocess).
Undercommonpropertyownership,allchangestocom-monpropertyrulesarecarriedoutinformalandinformalforumsopentoallthecommonpropertyownersoftheresourceinquestion.
Thefactthatrulesarenotwrittenorarenotrecognizedbyagovernmentalbodymakesnodifference,aslongasthecommonpropertyusersadheretotherules.
Economicdevelopmentofnaturalresourcesheldascommonpropertyoftenbeginswithnon-ownersdisregard-ingordiscountingtherightsofcommonpropertyownersandfailingtofollowcommonpropertyrules.
TherecentdemiseofNewfoundland'snearshorefishery(Matthews,1995)andthesettle-mentofthewesternUnitedStatesareexamplesofeconomicexpansionattheexpenseofunrecognizedcommonprop-ertyrightsandrules.
Againtheresultisunsustainableresourceuseandcommu-nitydeterioration(Swaney,1990;Feenyetal,1990;Matthews,1995;McCay,1996).
Propertyrightsmaybefactsoflawandenforcedbygovernment.
Thesearedejurerights.
Thesedejurerightsappealtoeconomistsandotherswhowishtohaveadefinable,predictableviewofresourceaccessanduse.
However,thesedejurerightsoftendiscreditlocalknowl-edgeandlocalcommonpropertyman-agementregimes.
Inothersituations,naturalresourceusersmaydevelopandenforceinformalrightsamongthemselveswithoutanygovernmentrecognition,inwhichcasetherightsaredefacto.
Defactorightsareimportantbecausetheyhaveworkedinmanyareasandtheyarelikelytopro-viderulesthatbestfitthelocalenviron-mentandeconomy.
Recognizingthevalueofdefactorightswillincreasepoli-cymakers'awarenessofthevalueoflocalknowledgeinnaturalresourcemanage-ment.
Finally,defactorightsandrulesareself-enforced,sotheyarecheapertoadminister(SchlangerandOstrom,1992).
Thereareanumberofexamplesofdefactorightsthathavebecomedejurerightsovertime,asgovernmenthasacceptedtheconventionalknowledgeofcommonpropertymanagementregimes(Ostrom,1990).
Governmentinvolvementwithcom-monpropertymanagementregimesmaythreatenthesemanagementregimes.
Oneexampleofgovernmentinterfer-enceisthechangeinstructureofprop-ertyfromcommonpropertytostatepropertyundertheguiseofenvironmen-talprotection.
Feeneyetal.
(1990)describethegovernmentofNepal'sattempttohaltdeforestationofitsrecentlynationalizedforestsbyconvert-ingdefactocommonpropertyforestsintostateproperty.
Lackingresourcestoenforcegovernmentaccessanduserestrictions,theforestsbecameopenaccessanddeforestationaccelerated.
Ultimately,thegovernmentre-estab-lishedthecommonpropertyrightstoforests(therebycreatingdejurecommonpropertyrights).
Thefailureofresourceprotectionwhengovernmentsexpropri-atecommonpropertymanagedresourceshasbeenobservednumeroustimes(Ostrom1990).
Buck(1989)andLambert(1995)dis-cusstheevolutionofwesternranchersgrazinglivestockonpubliclands.
Theranchersarrivedsoonafterthegovern-mentcreateddefactoopenaccesstopre-viouslycommonpropertyofNativeAmericans.
Developmentofthewesternlivestockindustryresultedinconflictswithingrazingusersforthelimitedgraz-inglands.
Eventuallysomeoftherange-landwasdejuredesignatedpublic(state)lands.
Ranchersutilizedthelandunderacommonpropertymanagementregimeforanumberofyearsalthoughthelandwasunderpublicpropertyownership.
Recentconflictswithnon-ranchershavecenteredontwocriticalissuesofpublicproperty:accessanduse.
Governmentmanagersandpersonsexcludedbythelivestockownershavefocusedontheissuesoftheirrighttoaccesspublicrangelandandtheuseofpublicresourcessuchaswaterandplantsbylivestock.
Theconflicthascenteredonuseandaccessofpublicpropertymanagedasadefactocommonpropertymanagementregime.
Theironicresultofthisconflicthasbeentostrengthenthelivestockowners'defactocommonpropertymanagementregimes:theywereallocatedgrazingrightstopubliclands.
Thesuccessorfailureofanypropertyrightsstructuretoprotectresourcesismoreafeatureoftheabilitytoregulateaccessanduseofthepropertythanwhetherthepropertyisprivate,com-monsorstateproperty(Feenyetal.
,1990).
Ostrom(1990)proposeseightprinciplesfoundinstudyingcommonpropertymanagementregimesthathavelastedforcenturies.
Theseprinciplesinclude:1)Clearlydefinedboundariesofaccessanduse16PropertyRights:APrimer2)Relevanceofrulestolocalresourceconditions3)Collectivechoicearrangementfordecision-making4)Effectivemonitoringofaccessandusesofthecommonpropertyresource5)Graduatedsanctionsforviolatorsofrules6)Conflictresolutionmechanisms7)Minimalrecognitionofrightstoorganizebyexternalauthorities8)Nestedmanagementoflargercom-monpropertysystems(eachlayerofmanagementfitswithinthehighermanagementlayer)Theseprinciplesexpandtheprevi-ouslymentionedattributesofcommonpropertymanagement,includingself-governmentatthelocallevelofacom-monlyusedresourceinawaytoexcludeoutsiders,andinvolvestherecognition,monitoringandenforcingofrulestousethecommonresource.
CommonpropertyandnaturalresourcemanagementSustainabilityisaninherentfeatureofcommonproperty.
Hardin'sTragedyoftheCommonsgreatlycontributedtotheconfusionbetweenopenaccessandcommonproperty.
Moreimportantly,itdiscreditedthesustainabilityandvalueoflocalknowledgeintrinsictocommonpropertymanagementregimes.
Commonpropertyresourceshavesever-alelementsthatfostersustainability,includingtheecologyoftheresource,thetechnologyusedtoextracttheresource,andcommunityvalues.
Theresourcemayonlybeavailablewithinthecommunityforalimitedperiod.
Theecologyoftheresourcewillaidinitssustainableextraction.
Forexample,thetransientnatureoffishenablenearshorefishermentoaccesstheresourceforalimitedtimewiththeirlimitednearshorefishingresources.
Commonpropertymanagementrulesreflectcommunityvaluesandusuallyconcentrateonhow,when,andwherecommonpropertyresourceusemayoccur(Wilson,1996;SchlagerandOstrom,1992;Matthews,1995;Berkes,1985).
Incontrast,centralizedgovern-mentsetslimitstoresourceextractionbasedonarbitrary,althoughbiologicallybased,quotas.
Becausefisharebynaturetransientandtheaccesstomostfishstocksisseasonal,fisherieslendthem-selveswelltocommonpropertyman-agementregimesfromthestandpointofecologicalsustainability.
TechnologyandcommonpropertyTechnologyisanimportantfeatureofcommonpropertyregimes.
Aslongasalltheownershavethesametechnology,accessanduseofthepropertyisequitable.
However,ifindividualcommonpropertyownersusemoreeffi-cienttechnologytoaccessandharvesttheresource,theregimewilldeteriorateunlesstheruleschange.
TheunequaladaptationofmoreefficienttechnologybyalimitedgroupofcommonpropertyownersiscalledverticalgrowthbyBrox(1990).
HedescribesacommonpropertygroundwaterresourceinIndia.
Increasedpopulationusingatraditionallydugwelltoaccessgroundwaterhadnoadverseimpactontheexistingwaterusers'accesstothegroundwater.
However,whengovernmentassistedsomeofthelandownerswithdeepwellwaterwith-drawaltechnologyaspartofanagricul-turaldevelopmentproject,groundwaterlevelsdroppedtothepointthatownerslackingthenewtechnologylostaccesstothewater.
Matthews(1995)likewisenotesthattechnologicalimprovements(largerfishingboatswithgreatertripcapabilityandmoresophisticatedfish-findingandcatchgear)wereamajorfactorinthecollapseoftheNewfoundlandcoastfishery.
Matthewsandothersnotetheimpactthatchangingeconomicandpoliticalconditionshaveoncommonpropertyregimes.
Whencommonprop-ertyownersadoptdifferenteconomicvalues,thecommonpropertyregimenmusteitheradaptorprivatizationwilllikelyoccur.
Studiesofthemedievalcommonsnotethatthecommonsworkedwell(Feenyetal.
1990).
However,theshiftfromsubsistencetoproductionagricultureledtotheprivati-zationofthemedievalcommons(Quiggin,1988).
Whetheracommonpropertyregimewillsurvivechangesintechnology,eco-nomics,andecologyislargelyafeatureofthestrengthofthevaluesofthecom-monpropertyowners.
Thefactthatsomanycommonpropertymanagementregimesexist,whetherdejureordefacto,isproofofthepotentialofcommonpropertymanagementregimesinsus-tainablenaturalresourcemanagement(Ostrom,1990).
In1995,thestateofMainerecognizedthedefactocommonpropertyregimeofthenearshorelobsterfishingtodevelopdejurelobsterfish-eriesthatincludedemocraticinvolve-mentandgrassrootsoversight(Wilson,1996).
Localcommunitiesandgroupswithsomeclaimtoavaluableresourcewillbemotivatedtoeffectivelydevelopandmanagetheresourceifallowed(McCay,1996,andFeenyetal.
,1990).
Thedevelopmentofsuchacommonpropertymanagementregimerequiresgrassrootsinvolvementandself-gover-nance.
Suchcommunitymanagementregimesshouldincludethefeaturesofcommonpropertylistedpreviously.
Therulesofaccessanduseofcommunallymanagedclaimsmustbeclearandbasedonlocalknowledge.
Sharedvaluesandacommoninterestinlocalnaturalresourceswillfostervol-untarycomplianceofcommonpropertymanagementrules(Swaney,1990).
Sharednormsreducethedirectcostofmonitoringandenforcingcommonpropertyrules.
Theroleofcommunityvaluesinmonitoringandpreventingtheftofcommonpropertyresourcesisinfluencedbythenumberofowners,thecostofmonitoring,thebenefitfromstealing,thepunishmentifcaughtsteal-ing,andtherewardformonitorswhouncoverstealing(Ostrom,1990).
Conflictsareunavoidable,butcon-flictswithincommonpropertyownersshouldbedealtwithquickly,fairly,andopenly(Quiggins,1988).
Sharinginfor-mationandopencommunicationwith-inthegroupofcommonpropertyuserswillreduceconflictsanduncertaintiesandincreasecommoninterests(Swaney,1990).
Ostrom's(1990)studiesoflong-timecommonpropertyresourcesreport-edthatextensivenormsevolvedthatdefinedproperbehaviorandenabledindividualcommonpropertyuserswithmanyinterdependenciestoavoidcon-flict.
Moreimportantly,however,washomogeneityamongallcommonprop-ertyuserswithregardtoassets,skills,knowledge,ethnicity,andanyotherdivisivefeaturewithinthegroup.
Withinalocalarea,theuseofcommonpropertymanagementregimescanbeaneffectivetooltomanagenaturalresources.
CommonpropertyregimeshavebeenusedeffectivelyinboththeUnitedStatesandothercountries.
Thisman-agementregimeisnotapanaceafornaturalresourceconflicts.
Itwillonlyworktotheextentthatthelocalcom-munityandtheholdersofpropertyclaimsagreetoparticipate.
However,thesuccessofthesysteminfishingman-agement,grazing,andgroundwatermanagementwarrantsitsconsiderationinawidevarietyofnaturalresourceandenvironmentalqualitysituations.
Conflictsregardingenvironmentalqual-ity,watershedmanagement,andforestmanagementmaybenefitfromutiliza-tionofcommonpropertymanagementregimes.
17PropertyRights:APrimerConclusionsCommonpropertyresourcesexistinanuncertainandcomplexenvironment.
Unlikeopenaccessresources,commonpropertyresourceshaveadefinedusergroupwithlimitedaccess.
Theyalsohavelocallyconstitutedusagerulesthataremonitoredandenforcedwithintheframeworkofcommunitynorms.
Commonpropertyresourcesarebynatureasustainable,self-governinginstitutionthatreflectscommunityval-ues.
Rulesformonitoringandenforcingaccessanduseofcommonpropertyresourcesaredevelopedoveralongperi-odoftime.
Theserulesaredevelopedinformalandinformalforumsopentoallcommonpropertyresourceowners.
IntheUnitedStates,existingcommonpropertyresourcesincludefisheries,irri-gationandgroundwatersystems,andwesterngrazinglands.
Althoughsuccessful,long-termcom-monpropertyresourcesgenerallyexistwithinhomogenouscommunities,com-monpropertymanagementregimescouldbecraftedtofitthediversityofusersfoundinlocalnaturalresourcemanagementinthiscountry.
TheTragedyoftheCommonshasfueledanunfoundedfearthatlocaluserswillexploitanddestroycommonpropertyresources.
Asaresult,decision-makershaveeitherprivatizedcommonpropertyresourcesormadethempublicpropertywithastronggovernmentrole.
Privatizingcommonpropertyresourcesdoesnotguaranteesustainableuseanditwillexcludeformercommonpropertyusers.
Centralizedgovernmentmanage-mentofpublicpropertyresourcesoftendisregardsyearsoflocalmanagementknowledge,resultingincostlyorineffec-tivemonitoring.
Governmentmanage-mentmayalsoimplementunilateralsanctions,alienatinglocalusersandincreasingmonitoringandenforcementcosts.
Commonpropertymanagementregimeshavetheprovenpotentialtoassistlocalusersinselfgovernanceandindevelopingrulesofaccessanduseoflocalnaturalresources,whetheracom-monpropertyresourceorpubliclyownedresource.
Asthecostandroleofgovernancecomeundercontinuedscrutiny,theroleofcommonpropertymanagementregimesmaybecomeincreasinglyvaluableinprovidingsus-tainableuseofnaturalresourcesforanominalpublicinvestment.
Ultimately,thesuccessofacommonpropertyman-agementregimerestsonthelocalcom-munity.
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EconomicsofPropertyRightsSteveMedema,DepartmentofEconomicsUniversityofColoradoEconomicsandlawOfthefourbasiceconomicapproachestopropertyrights,thefirstandmostwellknownistheeconomicanalysisoflaw,primarilycommonlaw,butalsostatutoryorconstitutionallawasitpertainstoproperty.
Heretheeco-nomicmodelisappliedtoanalyzethewayindividualagentsrespondtoincen-tivesgeneratedbyalternativerightsstructures.
Thisaspectoflawandeconomicsisnotconcernedsomuchwiththeeco-nomicsystemaswiththelegalsystemandtheevaluationoftheincentivesforefficientbehaviorgeneratedbyalterna-tivelegalrules.
Forexample,supposethatanew,upstreamfactorythatdumpswasteintoarivercausessubstantialdamagetothecropsofdownstreamfarmers.
Supposethatthecropdamageisvaluedatamilliondollarsandthatthecostofabatingthenuisanceistwomilliondollars.
The"firstintime"rule,atraditional,commonlawrulefordeal-ingwithnuisances,statesthattheper-sonwhoistherefirsthasthepropertyright.
Thisrulewouldprotecttheinterestofthefarmers,becausetheyweretherefirst.
Ifthisprotectiontakestheformofaninjunction,thefactorywouldbeforcedeithertoabatethenuisanceortoshutdown,therebygeneratinganineffi-cientoutcome.
Iftheprotectionofthefarmerscameunderaliabilityrule,however,thesitua-tionwouldbeverydifferent.
Thefactorycouldcontinuetopollutesolongasitcompensatedthefarmersfortheirdam-age.
Facedwithachoicebetweenabat-ingandcompensating,thefactory18PropertyRights:APrimerownerwouldobviouslydothelatter,therebygeneratinganefficientoutcome.
PropertyrightsandeconomicsAsecondapproachtotheeconomicsofpropertyisagrowingbodyoflitera-turefocusingontheimpactofpropertyrightsontheeconomicsystem.
Muchofthisworkispositiveratherthannorma-tiveinnature,entailingdescriptionsofpropertyrights,institutions,theirori-gins,evolution,andeffects.
Forexample,theeconomiccondi-tionofAmericanIndiantribesisverymuchanissuetoday.
AstudybyGaryLibecapandRonaldJohnsonaboutadecadeandahalfagosuggeststhattheU.
S.
DepartmentoftheInteriorandtheNavahoTribalCouncilPoliciesestab-lishedasystemofprivatepropertyrightsonNavajolandsinsuchawaythat,inspiteofaprivatepropertyrightsregime,therightsremaineddefactocommon.
Verysmallplotswereassignedtoeachfamily.
Thetransactioncostsassociatedwithfencingand/orconsolidationofthesegrazinglandssoastoachieveeconomiesofscalewereincrediblyhigh.
Theresultwaserosionofgrazinglands,reducedincomepersheep,andamassexodusfromthetraditionalpracticeofsheepfarmingintotheregularworkforceorontothewelfarerolls.
Thispri-vatepropertysystemdestroyedtheveryformofpastoralnativeculturethatitwasdesignedtopreserve.
Commonpoolfisheriesareanotherareathathasbeenasourceofcon-tentionamongvariousinterestgroupsoveralongperiodoftime.
Thecommonpoolproblemiswellknown.
Eliminationofthecommonpoolappearstoaccom-plishthegoalsbothofcertainenviron-mentalactivists,whoareagainstover-fishing,andthoseinfavorofresourceusethatmaximizeswealth.
Evenfisherieseconomistshaveusuallyignoredtheoften-substantialcostofenforcingprivaterightsstructures,atleastuntilrecently.
InthecaseofoceanfisheriesunderU.
S.
control,enforcementcostsrunsintothehundredsofmillionsofdollarsperyear.
Economistshaveonlyrecentlybeguntoanalyzetheenforce-mentcostsassociatedwithalternativerightsregimes.
ContinuityversuschangeAthirdapproachcomesfromtherecognitionthatpropertyrightscreatewinnersandlosers.
Changesincircum-stanceinfluencetherelativeopportunitycostsofdifferentcoursesofactionandofdifferentstructuresofrights(particularlytheexistingone),givingrisetopressuresforchangeinpropertyrightsregimesand,ofcourse,countervailingpressuresforcontinuity.
Thisistheoldproblemofcontinuityversuschange.
Itoccursatboththejudicialandlegislativelevelsandisexaminedfromseveralperspec-tivesinthelawandeconomicslitera-ture.
AnexampleofthisproblemwouldbeharvestingbeaverpeltsinLabrador.
PriortothearrivalofEuropeans,nativetribesmenheldbeaverhabitatsascom-monproperty.
SometimeafterthearrivaloftheEuropean,however,thesehabitatsbecameprivateproperty.
Therearedifferentstoriesaboutwhatchangedandwhy,butaneconomicexplanationisthatbecauseoftheEuropeansettle-ments,Europeanmarketsbecameacces-sible.
Theresultingincreaseinthevalueofbeaverpeltsmadeitworthwhile,then,toestablishprivatepropertyrightsoverthatwhichhadpreviouslybeenheldincommon.
Accordingtoeconomists,thecostsassociatedwithestablishingprivaterightswerenotworthincurringpriortotheopeningoftheEuropeanmarket.
Positive/normativedichotomyWrappedupwithinalltheprecedingperspectivesisafourth:thepositive/normativedichotomy.
Thisistheattempttocometogripswiththelegal-economicnexusontheonehand,andtoprescribeparticularpropertyrightsrelationshipsontheother.
Withinthelawandeconomicscommunitythelatterisoftenbasedonefficiencyorwealthmaximization.
Thisnormativebaggageisresponsibleforthevastmajorityofhostilitytowardslawandeconomicsandpublicchoiceapproach-estopropertyrightsanalysis,andtolawandeconomicsgenerally.
Butthis"efficiencyasjustice"lineofthinkingisnotonethatoughttobecasuallytossedaside.
TheCoasetheo-remtellsusthatindividualswillbargainaroundinitialrightsassignmentstoanefficientallocationsolongastransac-tioncostsdon'tprecludethemfromdoingso.
Wewillendupbeingatthisparticularpointregardlessofhowrightsareassigned.
Peoplewillarriveatthatpointvoluntarily,throughnegotiation,irrespectiveofinitialrightsassignments.
Ifthisistheoutcometowhichindividu-alswouldvoluntarilyagreeiftransactioncostsdidnotprecludethemfromdoingso,thenwhyshouldn'tthecourtsassisttheminattainingthisoutcomeviajudi-cialfiatMuchofthenormativecriticismoflawandeconomicsismisplacedinthesensethatitfailstorecognizeboththediversityofapproachesineconomics(approachesthataresometimescompli-mentaryandsometimescompeting)andthefactthatnonormativeconclusionsnecessarilyfollowfromlawandeco-nomics.
Whilethevastmajorityoftheeco-nomicanalysisofrights,normativelydone,iscouchedintermsofefficiency,theeconomicapproachalsoprovidesagreatdealofinsightintotheeffectofalternativepropertyrightsregimesonthedistributionofincomeandwealth,amongotherissues.
BehaviorThereareseveralimportantissuesfacinglegaleconomicanalysis,and,byextension,theeconomicsofpropertyrights.
Someofthemoreinterestingrecentliteratureinlawandeconomicsandeconomicsofpropertyrightscon-cernsthebehavioralunderpinningsofthetheory.
Theeconomicanalysisoflawdevelopedlargelyasabodyofdeductivetheory.
Itsempiricalvaliditywasplacedfoursquareontheshouldersoftheeconomictheoryofchoice,accompaniedbythestandardaxiomofbehavioraltransitivity.
Ifwegrantthattheeconomictheoryofchoiceisempir-icallyrobustinstandardeconomiccon-texts,thequestioniswhethertheassumedtransitivityisaccurateforbehaviorwithinthelegalarena.
TheCoaseTheorem(iftransactioncostsarerelativelylowpeoplewilltendtonego-tiatetorelativelyefficientpositions)andthe"doingwhatcomesnaturally"justificationfortheefficiencycriteriapreviouslymentionedbothturnonthevalidityofthisdepictionofindividualbehaviorandthetransitivityofthechoiceaxiomintothelegalarena.
Theexperimentalandempiricallit-eratureassessingthepropensityofagentstobargainalongthelinessug-gestedbytheCoaseTheoremhavegen-eratedverymixedreturns.
SeveralsetsofexperimentsundertakenbyBetsyHoffmanandMatthewSpitzer,attimeswithothers,showedthatagentsdoindeed,whentransactioncostsareverylow,haveahighpropensitytobargaintothewealth-maximizingoutcome,includingcasesinwhichasortofquasi-experimentalexternalityisintroducedintotheprocess.
Evenintheserelativelysterileenvi-ronmentswithpracticallynotransac-tioncosts,however,efficiencyisonlymaintainedabout93percentofthetime.
EquallyinterestingisthefactthattheHoffmanandSpitzerexperimentsrevealbehaviorthatisverymuchatoddswiththedictatesofindividualrationality,eveninthepresenceofeffi-cientbargains.
Thatis,individuals19PropertyRights:APrimerexhibitsomethinglessthanindividualrationality,failingtotakefulladvantageoftheopportunitiesforgainopentothem,exhibitingbehaviorthatseemstobemoreLockeianinnaturethanutili-tarian.
Stillotherexperimentsshowthatendowmenteffectssignificantlyimpactthewillingnessofagentstobargain.
Itappearsthatentitlementcreatesanendowmenteffectandreducesone'swillingnesstoeffectivelybargain,essen-tiallybyincreasingone'sreservationprice.
Thishasparticularimportfortheeconomicsofpropertyrights.
Thefactthatpartieshavelitigatedovertherightsinquestioncancreateparticularlystrongattachment,orfeelingsofentitle-ment,onthepartoftheindividualassignedtherights.
Inaddition,therightsinquestionareoftenunique.
Ifwhatwasbeingcontestedcouldbeeasi-lyobtainedfromothersources,litiga-tionwouldbeunlikelyinthefirstplace.
ThenormativeprescriptionsoflawandeconomicsbasicallyrestontheCoaseTheorem.
Thepreferenceforpropertyrulesversesliabilityruleswhentransactioncostsarelowpresupposesthatindividualswouldbargainaroundthepropertyruletoanefficientout-come.
Ofcourse,thewholeefficiencycriterioninlawandeconomicsgetsagreatdealofitsjustificationfromthebehavioral-basedideathatcourtsshouldfacilitateallowingpeopletodowhattheywoulddonaturallyoftheirownvolitionifthelawdidnotpreventthemfromdoingso.
Extensiveandrapidlyaccumulatingliteraturecallsintoques-tionthebehavioralunderpinningsoflawandeconomics,andisstimulatingapushtowardsanew,morebehaviorallygroundedapproachtothefield—onewithamoreaccuratedepictionofagentbehaviorthatnonethelessemploysmanyofthebasictoolsofeconomicanalysis.
ValuationandchoiceAnothersignificantissuehereisthatofvaluationandchoice.
Therelation-shipbetweengovernmentandpropertyhasboundupwithinit,inexorably,thenotionofchoice.
Thegovernment'sbasicroleistodeterminewhowillhaverights,andtowhatextent,andwhowillbeexposedtotheexerciseofthoserightsbyothers.
Assuch,theroleofgovernmenthereiscriticallyinvolvedintheprocessofvaluation,evidentbothinthechoiceofcriteriauponwhichrightsaretobebased,andtheapplica-tionofthecriteria.
Anynaturalrights-basedresolutionsarenecessarilyaffectedbythemeaninggiventotheterm"natural"withinthelegaldecision-makingprocess.
Wefaceverysimilarproblemswiththeapplica-tionoftheefficiencycriterion,whichinvolvestheuseofcircularreasoning.
Efficiencycanonlybedeterminedbyanevaluationofbenefitsandcosts,butbenefitsandcoststhemselvesareafunc-tionofrights.
Therefore,todeterminerightsbasedonefficiencyistoreasoninacirclebecauseonecannotexamineefficiencywithoutgrantingprivilegesforacertainsetofrights,whichinturngenerateacertainsetofbenefitsandcosts.
Anotherproblemassociatedwiththeefficiencycriterioninvolvesthecalcula-tionofbenefitsandcosts.
Theamountofknowledgerequiredofgovernmentpolicymakersissimplytoogreattosus-taintheefficiencyargumentandbeliesthesimplicitythatisoftenascribedtoit.
PersonalperspectiveInmyview,ultimately,rightsarerightsbecausegovernmentprotectsthem.
Theothersareinterests,norms,whateveryouwanttocallthem,butrightsarerightsbecausegovernmentprotectsthem.
LetmequoteBentham:"Therearenorightsanteriortothelaw.
"Lockeianandothernotionsofprop-ertythatattempttoprovideanextra-governmentaljustificationforrightsarenormativetheoriesdescribinghowgov-ernmentoughttoactratherthanposi-tivetheoriesdescribingtheoriginsofrights.
Claimsthatrightssomehowarepre-existentoradhereinnatureandthusoughttobeprotectedbygovern-mentarewrong;theseinterestsarenotrightsunlesstheyaregivengovernmentprotection.
Governmentisaninevitableandnecessarycomponentoftheeconomicsystem.
Thereisnosuchthingasmore-versus-lessgovernmentinterventionintheeconomy.
Thereisonlygovernmentgivingrightstothisgroupversusgov-ernmentgivingrightstothatgroup.
Theonlyquestionistowhomshallgov-ernmentgivetherights,andthisisjustastruewithinamarketsystemasitiswithanyother.
Thatis,governmentisthebasisforthemarket.
ReferencesCoursey,DonL.
,ElizabethHoffman,andMatthewL.
Spitzer.
1987.
FearandloathingintheCoasetheorem:Experimentaltestsinvolvingphysicaldiscomfort.
JournalofLegalStudies16:217-248.
Hoffman,ElizabethandMatthewL.
Spitzer.
1982.
TheCoasetheorem:someexperimentaltests.
JournalofLawandEconomics25:73-98.
Hoffman,ElizabethandMatthewL.
Spitzer.
1985.
Entitlements,rights,andfairness:Anexperimentalexami-nationofsubjects'conceptsofdistrib-utivejustice.
JournalofLegalStudies14:259-297.
Hoffman,ElizabethandMatthewL.
Spitzer.
1985.
Experimentallawandeconomics:Anintroduction.
ColumbiaLawReview,85:991-1024.
Hoffman,ElizabethandMatthewL.
Spitzer.
1986.
ExperimentaltestsoftheCoasetheoremwithlargebar-gaininggroups.
JournalofLegalStudies15:149-171.
Johnson,R.
andLibecap,G.
1980.
Agencycostsandtheassignmentofpropertyrights:Thecaseofsouth-westernIndianreservations.
SouthernEconomicJournal47:332-347.
Libecap,GaryD.
andRonaldN.
Johnson.
1980.
Legislatingcommons:TheNavajotribalcouncilandtheNavajorange.
EconomicInquiry28(1)69-86.
Mercuro,NicholasandStevenG.
Medema.
1997.
EconomicsandtheLaw:FromPosnertoPostModernism.
Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.
20PropertyRights:APrimerManagementofnaturalresourcesonbehalfofcitizensisamongthemostimportantanddauntingtasksfacingstates.
Thestatedefendstherightsandresponsibilitiesofitscitizensfromregionalandnationalclaims.
Italsosavesthecitizenryfromitselfbymanag-ingindividualpropertyrightstobenefitthestateasawhole.
Wildlife,openspaces,viewscapes,waterqualityandquantity,landuse,culturalandarcheo-logicalheritage,andextractionofmin-eralwealthallfallwithintheauspicesofstategovernmentstooneextentoranother.
Zoning,taxes,regulations,licenses,usepermits,andothertoolsareavailabletothestatetoinfluencethebehaviorofindividualsregardingthemanagementofthestate'snaturalher-itage.
Statesaspiretotailoritstoolstoreflecttheneedsofthenaturalresourcebaseandtheuniquecompositionandoutlookofitscitizenry.
Policiesthatproveeffectiveinonecontextmaynotworkaswellunderotherconditions.
ThepoliciesandexamplesreviewedherearespecifictothestateofColorado.
However,anillustrationoftheColoradoexperienceshouldbeuse-fultostatesencounteringsimilarnaturalresourcepolicychallenges,particularlyintheAmericanWest.
FactorsaffectingtheidentificationandmanagementofColoradoStatepropertyThisstate'sgreatoutdooramenitiesandwesternlifestyle,inconjunctionwithotherfactors,havecreatedaneco-nomicboominmuchofColorado.
Coloradoisintransitionfromanecono-mybasedprimarilyonmineralextrac-tionandagriculturetoamorediverseeconomicbase,includingserviceindus-triesbasedonnaturalresources(e.
g.
,tourism),hi-techor"cleanindustry"(e.
g.
,HewlettPackard,MerrillLynch,Level3Communications,andSunMicrosystems),traditionalandcustomagriculture,andanincreasingroleinprovidingmedicalandotherservicestoretirees.
Some42percentofColoradolandsisdirectlymanagedbythestate(3millionacres)orfederalgovernment(25millionacres).
Accordingtothe1996NationalSurveyofFishing,HuntingandWildlife-AssociatedRecreation,morethanonemillionresi-dentsandout-of-statevisitorshunted,fishedorwatchedwildlifeinColoradoin1996,spendingatotalof$2.
6billion.
Colorado'spopulationhasgrownfrom3.
2millionin1990to4.
3millionpeopletoday.
Aboutthree-fourthsofthepeopleliveintheI-25corridorwithinabout25milesofthefoothillsoftheRockyMountains.
Severalofthenation'sfastestgrowingcountiesarelocatedinColorado.
Thestatepopula-tionispredictedtoincreaseby2per-centannuallythroughtheyear2001,comparedtoabout1percentnation-wide.
Coloradopersonalincomesarepredictedtoincreaseby5to7percent,annually,throughtheyear2001,out-pacingtheUnitedStatesaveragebyabout1percent.
Similarly,Coloradoemploymentisexpectedtogrowfrom2to4percentannuallyovertheperiod,comparedto1to2percentnationwide.
Retailsalesand,unfortunately,inflationinColoradoareexpectedtofollowsimi-larpatterns(StateofColorado,1998).
Morepeople,jobs,andincomemeanincreaseddemandforoutdoorrecreationandincreasingstressonthestate'snatu-ralresources.
LikemuchofthewesternUnitedStates,Coloradowassettledinthetra-ditionsoftheOldWest.
Acuriousmixofadventurers,risk-takers,explorers,entrepreneurs,andother"fringeele-ments"providedthehumanmilieuthatbegantoformthecultural,legal,andeconomicinstitutionsoftheWest.
Self-sufficiencyandstaunchindividualismwererewardedinthisenvironment.
ThesevaluespervadethecultureoftheWesteventoday,andinfluencetheappropriatenessandeffectivenessofthenaturalresourcemanagementtoolsthatareavailabletowesternstates.
Rapideconomicdevelopmenthasnotbeenwithoutcosts.
Conflictsbetweennewresidentsandthosewithsomewhatdeeperroots,betweenurbanorsuburbanitesandruralpeople,betweenagriculturistsandurbanites,betweendevelopersand"nogrowth-ers,"andbetweenagriculturalistsandrecreationistsareincreasinginmanyareasofColoradoandintheWest.
Thenaturalresourcebaseisstressed.
Infrastructureisstressed.
TheverywayoflifethatbroughtpeopletoColoradoisthreatened.
Asaresult,innovativesolutionstolanduseandnaturalresourcemanagementhavebeensoughtinColorado.
TheappropriateroleforstatepropertyThegoodsandservicesprovidedbyColorado'snaturalresourcesmayfallcompletely,partially,ornotatallunderthecontrolofabranchofthestategov-ernment.
Traditionally,citizensofthestatehavestronglysupportedthenotionthatonlythosethings(e.
g.
,land,miner-als,wildlife)thatarenotprivatelyownedandcontrolledmaybeappropri-ateforgovernmentownershiporcon-trolatsomelevel(municipality,county,state,orfederal).
Moreover,onlywhenthepublicgoodatwhateverlevelcanclearlybeshowntooutweighthepri-vategoodshouldcompleteorpartialcontrolofprivatelyownednaturalresourcesbewrestedfromtheowner.
Publicschools,parks,forests,wildlife,policeprotection,groundwatersupplies,cleanair,prairie,cityandmountainvis-tas,androadwaysarecommonexamplesofpublicpropertydemonstratingsomedegreeofstatecontrol(e.
g.
,McCloskey,1985;Oakerson,1992).
Indeed,ourjudicialandlegislativesystemscouldalsobeconsideredlocal,state,andfed-erallevelpublicproperty.
Thestatesetsspeedlimits,automotiveemissionsstan-dards,andlegalbloodalcohollevels.
Itregulatesthetransportationoftoxicsub-stances,implementsregularroadmain-tenance,andadministersdrivingtestsinordertodecreasetheriskofinjuryordeathtoitscitizensonitsroadways.
Eventhepuristofprivategoodshassomecharacteristicsofapublicgoodand,therefore,hassomeneedforman-agementaspublicproperty.
Alarapples,irradiatedstrawberries,organiclettuce,e-coliinhamburgers,"MadeintheUSA"and"FatFree"labels,"generic"drugs,"kosher"andgradedbeefareexamplesofthepublicgoodaspectsofotherwisehighlyprivateproducts.
Throughitssupportanditsvotes,thepublicprovidesthefinancialwherewithaltoinfluencethebehaviorofitsindivid-ualconstituentstoimprovethewellbe-ingofthewhole.
InColorado,themostlocal,mostStateProperty:Wildlife,lands,andopenspacesinColoradobyAndrewSeidl,AsstProfessor&ExtensionSpecialist—PublicPolicyDeptofAgriculturalandResourceEconomicsColoradoStateUniversity21PropertyRights:APrimerindividual,available,andeffectiveformofmanagementispreferred.
Asaresult,onlythosegoodsandservicesthatcan-notbeadequatelyprovidedtothestate'scitizensbyindividuals,localities,orcounties,inthatorder,fallwithinthegenerallyacceptedroleofthestate.
Inturn,itistheresponsibilityofthestatetomaintaincontroloveritsnaturalresourcesagainstclaimsfromotherstatesorthenationalgovernment,unlessitcanbeshownthatalternativemanagementisstronglyintheregionalornationalinterest.
Forexample,theheadwatersoftheColorado,Arkansas,Platterivers,andtheRioGrandeliewithinthestateofColorado.
Thestate,onbehalfofitscitizens,negotiatestheproportionofthewaterfromtheseriverstowhichithaslegalclaimrelativetotheclaimsofotherconcernedstates,includingKansas,Nebraska,Texas,NewMexico,Nevada,andCalifornia.
CurrentstructureforthemanagementofColoradoStatenaturalresourcepropertyTheColoradoDepartmentofNaturalResources(DNR)isthestategovernmentagencyprimarilyresponsi-bleformanagementofgeology,soils,mineralandenergyresources,water,parks,wildlife,forests,plains,andopenspaces.
TheDNRincludesthedivisionsofParks,Wildlife,WaterResources,MineralsandGeology,theGeologicalSurvey,StateLandBoard,SoilConservationBoard,OilandGasConservationCommission,andtheAvalancheInformationCenter.
ColoradoStateParksmanagesthestate'sfortyparks.
Thedivision'smissionistomeettheneedsofvisitorstodaywhileprotectingourparklandsforthefuture.
Camping,fishing,hiking,andwatersportsdrawnearly12millionvisi-torsperyeartoColorado'sstateparks.
UserfeesarechargedatallColoradoStateParks.
Entrancefeesforstateparksarenotdesignedtomaximizerevenue.
Rather,theyarekeptlowtomaximizevisitationforagivenlevelofservices.
Theperspectiveisthataccesstoparksisamongtherightsaffordedtoallcitizens.
Huntinglicensesarecommonlyallocat-edbylotteryforsimilarreasons.
ColoradoStateParksalsohousestheColoradoNaturalAreasProgram,asys-temforidentifyingandseekingprotec-tionforuniquenaturalareasinColorado,andtheStateTrailsProgram,asystemfordevelopingandmanagingtrailuse.
Inaddition,Parksoverseesallboat,snowmobile,andoff-highwayvehicleregistrationaswellasregulatingstateriveroutfitters.
Afive-memberParksBoardestablishesregulationsforthisdivision.
TheColoradoOilandGasConservationCommissionischargedwithpromotingresponsibledevelop-mentthroughtheefficientexplorationandproductionofoilandgasresourcesandthepreventionofwaste.
Italsopro-tectspublichealth,safetyandwelfare,theenvironment,andthecorrelativerightsofmineralowners.
Thisdivisionisresponsibleformineralandenergydevelopment,policy,regulation,andplanning.
TheDivisionofWaterResourcesprovidesservicestothewaterusersinthestateofColorado.
Themajorfunc-tionsoftheofficeincludesurfacewateradministration,damsafety,groundwaterwellpermittingandadministration,andhydrographicdatacollectionandanaly-sis.
TheStateSoilConservationBoardprovidesoversightandtechnicalassis-tancetoColorado's78soilconservationdistricts.
Italsooverseesthestate'sliv-ingsnowfenceprogram,providesguid-anceonstreambankerosionandripari-anconcerns,assistsfarmersandranchersonvariouswaterandenergyefficiencyprograms,andhelpssponsorCampRocky,anoutdoorenvironmentalpro-gram.
Soilconservationdistrictshavetheresponsibilitytoinventorythenatu-ralresourceconcernswithintheirareasandtodevelopaplantoaddresstheseconcerns.
TheDivisionofWildlifemanagesthestate's960wildlifespecies.
Itregu-lateshuntingandfishingactivitiesbyissuinglicensesandenforcingregula-tions.
TheDivisionalsomanagesmorethan230wildlifeareasforpublicrecre-ation,conductsresearchtoimprovewildlifemanagementactivities,providestechnicalassistancetoprivateandotherpubliclandownersconcerningwildlifeandhabitatmanagement,anddevelopsprogramstoprotectandrecoverthreat-enedandendangeredspecies,includingacquiring,monitoring,andenforcingconservationeasementsagainstprivate-lymanagedlands.
Wildliferegulationsareestablishedbytheeight-memberWildlifeCommissionappointedbythegovernor.
TheCommissionisalsoresponsibleforbuyingorleasingproper-tyforhabitatandpublicaccessandforapprovingtheDivision'sannualbudgetproposals.
TheDivisionreceivesnostatetaxrevenue.
Examplesofnaturalresourcemanage-mentpoliciescurrentlyinplaceThroughanumberofpolicymeas-ures,theColoradostategovernmentencourageslowerlevelgovernmentandindividualmanagement.
Throughthesepolicies,thestateexertssomepartialclaimoverthedispensationofnaturalresourceswithinColoradothroughuseincentivesorregulations,butleavesmanagementtomorelocalauthorities.
Thelegalsystemandcultureofthestateoftenrequirethattheseinitiativesbelocally-driven,incentive-based,andvol-untary.
Threeprogramsforthemanage-mentofwildlife,lands,andcriticalhabitatsareinplaceinColorado:theGreatOutdoorsColoradoTrustFund;theStateLandBoard'sStewardshipTrust;andtheHabitatPartnershipProgram.
TheGreatOutdoorsColoradoTrustFundTheGreatOutdoorsColoradoTrustFund(GOCO),whichwasestablishedin1992byconstitutionalamendment,ischargedwithmakingmatchingfundgrantstolocalgovernments,parkandrecreationdistricts,andnon-profitlandprotectionorganizationstofacilitatethepurchaseandprotectionofland.
Programsincludetrailconstruction,environmentaleducation,parkpromo-tion,wildlife,outdoorrecreation,andopenspace,wildlife,andriverpreserva-tion.
StateLandBoardTheColoradoStateBoardofLandCommissioners,orStateLandBoard,wasestablishedalongwithstatehoodin1876.
Thefederalgovernmentgavethestateapproximately3millionacresofsurfacerightsand4millionacresofmineralrights,primarilyintendedtoprovidesupportforpubliceducation.
Theserightsaremanagedbyfivepart-timecitizencommissionersandastaffof29tobenefittheSchoolTrustandsevensmallertrusts.
Mostofthesurfaceacresareleasedforfarmandranchuse.
In1996,ColoradovotersamendedthestateconstitutiontoredefinetheLandBoard'smission.
RecognizingtheintergenerationalnatureoftheSchoolTrustandofpotentiallandmanagementalternatives,theLandBoardisdirectedtodesignatefrom295,000to300,000acresoftrustlandsintoaspecialtrustcalledTheStewardshipTrust.
TheStewardshipTrustlandsaretobeman-agedtopreservetheirnaturalvalueforfuturegenerationsofColoradochildren.
TheselandshadtobedesignatedbyJanuary1,2001.
Morethan600,000acreswerenominatedforTrustdesigna-tionduringthe3-monthnominatingperiodendingMarch31,1998.
MaintainingfuturelanduseoptionsthroughlandvaluepreservationisanobjectiveoftheStewardshipTrust.
However,trustdesignationdoesnot22PropertyRights:APrimernecessarilyimplyphysicalpreservationofthelandsortheirattendantresourcesinpristineopenspace.
Trustlandmaybeleased,sold,orexchanged,althoughAmendment16requirestheBoardtoincludeprovisionsfortheprotectionofnaturalvalueswithinanycontractualarrangementregardingthedispensationofTrustlands.
HabitatPartnershipProgramTheColoradoDivisionofWildlifehasbeenliableforwildlifedamagetoprivatepropertysince1931.
TheDivisionhasbeenliableforrangelandforagedamagesince1979,butthestatutewasineffectivelyimplemented.
AuthorizedbytheColoradoWildlifeCommission,theHabitatPartnershipProgram(HPP)beganin1990tohelpalleviatecrop,rangelandforage,andfenceconflictsbetweenbiggameani-malsandlivestockonprivateandpubliclands.
TheHPPseekstodeveloppartner-shipsamonglandowners,landmanagers,outdoorenthusiasts,thepublic,andtheDivisionofWildlifeinordertoresolvetheirconflicts.
Ithopestoensureappro-priatepublicinvolvement,onalocalbasis,inidentifyingrangemanagementproblemsandrecommendingsolutionssupportedbyadequatefinancialresources.
Theprogramstrivestoensurethatprivatelandhabitatissuesarecon-sideredinmanagementplansforbiggameherds.
SummaryandconclusionsNaturalresources,includingfish,wildlife,parklands,openspaces,soil,water,andcriticalhabitats,areamongthegreatestandmostdauntingpropertymanagementresponsibilitiesaffordedtostates.
Intra-andinterstateconflictsoverthemanagementofnaturalresourcesareparticularlycontentiousintheAmericanWest.
DuetotheculturalheritageoftheWest,state-levelpoliciestomanagenat-uralresourcepropertyaremorelikelytobeacceptedandadoptediftheyarelocally-driven,incentive-based,andvol-untary,withColoradobeingacaseinpoint.
Craftinginnovativesolutionstoresolveproperty-basedconflictsamongindividuals,localities,states,andfederalauthoritieswillcontinuetooccupypoli-cymakers,researchers,andlaycitizensfortheforeseeablefuture.
Throughadiscussionofstatepropertyrightsissues,managementstructure,andsomeofthepoliciesandprogramsinColorado,fur-therinnovationsandsolutionsmightbefacilitated.
ReferencesBecker,JohnC.
1996.
Exercisingproper-tyrights:ForindividualorcommunitybenefitFarmEconomics,PennStateCooperativeExtension.
Bromley,DanielW.
1993.
Regulatorytakings:CoherentconceptorlogicalcontradictionVermontLawReview17(3)647-682.
Cordes,MarkW.
1997.
Leapfroggingtheconstitution:Theriseofstatetakingslegislation.
EcologyLawQuarterly24:187-242.
Dragun,AndrewK.
1983.
Externalities,propertyrights,andpower.
JournalofEconomicIssues.
17(3)667-680.
Schmid,A.
A.
1987.
Propertyinasocialcontext.
Chapter2inProperty,Power,andPublicChoice,NewYork:Praeger.
Informationwascompiledfromavari-etyofinternetsourcesincludingtheStateofColoradoHomepage[http://www.
state.
co.
us/gov_dir/gov-menu.
html],ColoradoBytheNumbers[http://www.
colorado.
edu/libraries/gov-pubs/online.
htm],theColoradoDeptofNaturalResourcesHomepage[http://www.
dnr.
state.
co.
us]andtheUSDeptofAgricultureEconomicResearchServiceColoradoStateFactSheet[http://www.
econ.
ag.
gov/epubs/other/usfact/co.
htm].
PropertyRights:Aphilosophicalper-spectivebyPaulB.
ThompsonPurdueUniversityPhilosophicaldiscussionsofpropertyrightsareasubclassofproblemsthatcomeupinthedevelopmentofgeneralphilosophicaltheoriesaboutrights.
Forphilosophers,propertyrightsraiseissuesthatdifferfromtheproblemsencoun-teredwithothersortsofrights.
Manyofthe"propertyrights"referencedbyinsti-tutionaleconomistswouldbethoughtofasrightsbyphilosophers,butnotprop-ertyrights.
Thismaysimplybeatermi-nologydifferencebetweenthedisci-plinesofphilosophyandeconomics.
Buttheapproachinphilosophyistobeginwithageneraldiscussionofrights,thentodiscusspropertyrightsasasubclass.
WhatisarightApersonhasarighttoX,whetherXisagood,aservice,orevenanactionoractivity,ifandonlyifthatpersoncanmakeavalidclaimtoX.
That'sthebasiclogicaldefinitionofarightinphi-losophy.
Whatphilosophersfindinter-estingaboutthisdefinitionisthe"validclaim"part,becauserightscanbevali-datedonanumberofdifferentbases.
Thethreemostcommonlymentionedbasesforvalidationare:Legalrightsthatarevalidatedbythelaw,includingcommonlaw.
Customaryrightsthatarevalid"justbecause,"forexample,expectingtobeservednextifyou'reatthefrontoftheline.
That'saprettyrobustcus-tomaryrightintheUnitedStates,butperhapsnotsorobustinotherpartsoftheworld.
Moralrightsthatarenormativeclaimsaboutwhatsortsofrightspeo-plehaveinanormativesenseorinamoralsense.
Ourconventionistosaythatpeoplehavemoralrightsevenincaseswherethoserightsarefrequentlyviolatedorwherethere'safailureoflegalinstitutionsorcustomarynormstomakethoserightseffectiveandcer-tainlyincaseswherethere'snoenforcementofthoserights.
Philosopherstendtobemostinter-estedinmoralrights.
Certainconven-tionsinthewaythatphilosophersuti-lizerightsterminologycanbeconfusingtosocialscientistsandlegalscholars.
Inlawandsocialscience,assertingthatarightexiststypicallymeansthatpeopleactuallydoadjustbehaviorinaccor-dancewiththeclaimsthataremadebytherightsholder.
Butitistypicaltosaythatpeople"havemoralrights"evenwhenitisnotinfacttypicalfortheserightstobeobservedorrespectedbyothers.
Thus,whilelegalorcustomaryrightscanbeoperationallydefinedintermsofconductandexpectations,moralrightsdependwhollyontheirval-idatingprinciples.
23PropertyRights:APrimerNon-interferenceandopportunityrightsTherearetwobroadclassesofmoralrightsand,althoughthereisn'tmuchstandardizationintheterminology,thedistinctionbetweenthemmarksanimportantandrobustdifferenceinthewaythatphilosophersdiscussrightsinmoraltheory.
Non-interferencerightsprotectyourpersonandyourfreedom.
Asthenameimplies,theyarerightsthatallowtherightsholdertoclaimthatothersshouldnotinterferewiththerightsholderinexercisingcertainpowersorundertakingcertainactivities.
Theyconstrainothersfromactinginwaysthatwouldharmyouorpreventyoufromexercisingapersonalliberty.
Standardrightssuchasfreedomofspeechandsecurityofpersonareexamplesofnon-interferencerights.
"Myrighttoswingmyfistendsatthetipofyournose"illustratestherelation-shipbetweenlibertyandnon-interfer-ence.
Theserightsestablishconstraintsthatareextremelyimportantforindi-vidualstohavemeaningfullives.
Theycouldbeestablishedonthebasisofasocialcontractagreement,aconsentbasis,orstrictlyanenlightenedself-interestkindofargument.
Thedutiesrequiredbytheserightsarenegative,whichmeansthattheyrequireotherpeoplenottoperformcer-tainsortsofactions.
Theydon'trequireyoutodoanythingonmybehalforany-thingonbehalfofsocietyatlarge,buttheyrequireyoutorefrainfromcertainsortsofactions.
Non-interferencerightsaresometimescallednegativerights.
Opportunityrightsreflectabroadersetofrights,orentitlements.
Examplesincludetherighttoeducationorhealth-care.
Theserightsdorequiresomebodyelsetodosomethingonbehalfoftherightsholder.
Payingtaxesis,ofcourse,themostcontroversialthingthatpeoplearerequiredtodo.
Entitlements,oropportunityrights,areestablishedbydifferentkindsofnormativearguments,appealingtonotionsoffairnessandequalopportunity,andrequireactiononthepartofothers.
Onegroupoftheorists,whousuallycallthemselveslibertarians,essentiallyholdthatnon-interferenceisthelimitofrightsthatcanandshouldbeenforcedbyastateapparatus.
Asecondgroup,oftenappealingtoprinciplesoffairness,basicallyarguesthatwedon'thaveajustsocietyuntilcertainopportu-nityrightsareguaranteedintothemix.
Athirdphilosophicalgroupiscalledtheutilitarianschool.
Forutilitarians,thecostsandbenefitsattheendarewhatreallymatter.
Ifit'stoocostlytoprovideopportunities,itshouldn'tbedone.
Similarly,ifit'stoocostlytocon-strainrightstopurelynon-interferenceconsiderations,itshouldn'tbedoneeither.
Mostphilosopherswhodescribethemselvesasrightstheoristsprobablywouldnotbeutilitarians.
PropertyrightsPhilosophersgenerallythinkofprop-ertyrightsasasub-classofnon-interfer-encerightsthatareprotectingaperson'suseordisposalofprivatepropertyagainstinterferencebyothers.
Rightsintheformofbasicliberties,suchasfree-domofspeech,arenotpropertyrights.
Rightsarealsocreatedbypromises,forexample,butphilosophersdonotthinkoftheseofaspropertyrights.
Whatarethecharacteristicsthatdistinguishprop-ertyrightsfromothervalidclaimstonon-interfenceOneofthekeynotionsisalienability.
Propertyrightsarealienablerights.
Transferablemaybejustasgoodaterm,butthewordalienablewasprettyclearwithinthecontextofeighteenthcentu-ryphilosophy.
Alienablerightscouldbetransferredfromonepersontoanother.
Theseweretherightstocontrolanduseforaproductivepurposethebenefitsassociatedwithcertaingoodsandserv-ices.
Theserightscouldbegivenaway,orperhapsboughtandsold,buteventhoughtheycouldbealienatedfromthepersonwhoheldthemtherightsstillretainthecapacitytomakevalidclaims.
Typically,promisesdonotcreatepropertyrightsforphilosophers,becausetherightsthatarecreatedbymakinganordinarypromisearenottransferable.
SupposeIpromisetomeetPatfordin-nerbutLarrydecideshewantstohavedinnerwithmeandasksPatforhowmuchwouldshesellthatpromise.
Generallyspeaking,IhavetokeepmypromisetoPat,butifshedecidestosellthatpromisetoLarry,mypromiseisnotconsideredtobevalidanymore.
HereIamcitingacustomarybasisfordistin-guishingbetweenapropertyrightandadifferentsortofright.
MypromisetoPatentailssomedutiesonmybehalfandallowshertomakeavalidclaimagainstme,butthiswouldnotbethoughtofasanalienablesortofclaim.
Certainly,basiclibertiesarethoughttobeinalienablerights.
Ican'tsellortransfermyrighttospeakfreely.
Icanagreeasamatterofpromisenottosaysomething,nottoobjecttoaparticularclaim,ornottospeakoutindefenseofarightthatImayactuallyhave,butIcannotsellarightthatisinherentlyonlymine.
Eachofushasanindividualrighttofreedomofspeech,andalthoughwecannegotiateaboutwhatwewillsay,wecannottransferthatrightfromonepersontoanother.
Ofcoursethereisatendencytousethephrase"inalienablerights"fromtheDeclarationofIndependenceinconnec-tionwithpropertyrights.
Mostpeoplewhoarguethatpropertyrightsareinalienableinthissenseareprobablyjustfocusingonthefactthattheyarenon-interferencerights,ornotingtheircentralityandmorefundamentalchar-acterwithrespecttootherkindsofpub-licgoodsandopportunities.
WhatmakestheclaimbasedonapropertyrightvalidPhilosophers,ofcourse,aremostinterestedinjustificationsofpropertyclaimsthatstressmorality.
Inthiscon-nectionJohnLocke'schapteronproper-tyfromthe2ndTreatiseonGovernmentsimplycan'tbeavoided.
Itisdifficulttooverstatetheimportanceofthose30pagesinthewayphiloso-pherscontinuetolookatpropertyrights.
Bothinhispoliticalphilosophyandhisepistemology,Lockewaslessinterestedinbuildingasystemthanhewasinmid-leveltheory,infindingpointswhereargumentswithalotofverydifferent,fundamentalbeginningsconverge.
Inpracticalissues,suchasforminggovernmentsorconductingsci-entificresearch,wecanbuildinstitu-tionsfromthismid-levelagreementwithoutsettlingallofourfundamentaldifferences,whichmaybereligiousandimpossibletosettle.
FourkeyclaimsfromLocke'sargu-menteachestablishadifferentfounda-tionformakingnormativejudgmentsaboutproperty.
Inabrilliantpieceofphilosophicalwork,Lockegivesacon-vincingreasonforthinkingthattheseallconvergeonacentraltheme.
Actually,Idon'tthinkhisargumentworksbutIdoadmireitssophistication.
Thefirstclaimisthatpropertyrightsarenaturalrights.
Lockewasworkinginthenaturallawtradition.
Hethoughtthatinsomesensetheserightswerewovenintothefabricoftheuniverse.
Second,propertyrightsareessentialtoliberty.
Third,propertyrightspromoteefficiency,inexactlythewaythatmosteconomistsunderstandefficiency.
Andfinally,hestressesthatpropertyrightsarelimitedbyequality,sothatonewouldbelimitedintheacquisitionandtheextensionofpropertyrightsbyaprincipleofequality.
Weareleftwithaquestion,whichiswhereIthinkthepropertyrightsdebateinphilosophyhasbeeneversinceLocke:Dothesecriteriaentailacoher-24PropertyRights:APrimerenttheoryofrights,ordoeseachcriteri-onestablishanindependentandper-hapscontradictorystandardforviolat-ingrightsclaimsLet'sexamineeachofthecriteriainalittlemoredetail.
NaturalLawThemainideainnatu-rallawisthattherationaleformoralprinciplesisnaturallyevidenttoanyrationalperson.
Withrespecttoproper-tyrights,itisplausibletothinkthatthathighlyrivalandexcludablegoodswill"naturally"betreatedasitemsofproperty,whilegoodsthatarenon-rivalorwithhighexclusioncostswillnottendtobetreatedasitemsthatareownedandexchangedaccordingtoaregimeofpropertyrights.
Non-rivalandnon-excludablegoods,suchasapublicpark,cleanair,orpublicdefense,cannotbeeasilyplacedunderthecontrolofaprivaterightsholder,however.
Theyare"heldincommon,"thephrasethatLockeactuallyuses.
Sothenaturallawcriterionwouldsuggestthatgoodssuchasanapple,ahouse,orevenpermission(aticket)toenteratheaterandwatchaperformancemightnaturallycometoberegardedasitemsofprivateproperty,whilegoodssuchasair,ideasorsun-shinewouldnot.
LibertyAsecondtypeofcriterionforestablishingthevalidityofapropertyclaimistoarguethatpropertyrightsareimportantfortheprotectionofpersonalliberty.
Lockewritesthateachpersonhasapropertyrightinhisorherownperson,thatinsomesenseweownour-selvesorsomerightaboutourselves.
Becauseofthispropertyright,asweinvestourlaborintotheextractionormanufactureofnaturalresources,wecreateapropertyrightinthefinishedgood.
Infailingtorecognizealaborer'svalidclaimoverthemanufactureditem,youessentiallyputthelaborerintoforcedservitude,aviolationofliberty,whichphilosophicallyisusuallythoughtofasamorefundamentalright.
AnotherargumentforvalidatingpropertyrightsasprotectingpersonallibertyissetforthbyKant.
Althoughnotregardedasagreattheoristofprop-ertyrights,Kantwouldarguethatitisimmoralforpeopletoregardeitherthemselvesorothersmerelyasameanstosomefurtherend.
Onecannotmoral-lyregardoneselforothersassimplytoolsforgettingsomethingdone.
Onehastorespecttheintegrityandautono-myoftheindividual.
Respectforper-sonstranslatesintorespectfortheclaimsthatotherswouldmaketocon-troltheuseofthingsthattheyhavemadeorotherwisefairlyacquired.
Thuspropertyrightsarevalidwhenfailingtorespectsuchclaimsisafailuretorespectthefreedomandautonomyofanotherperson.
LockeandKantaresomewhatsimi-larinthewaythattheyarriveatargu-mentsforrespectingproperty.
Peoplewhohaveinvestedlaborinthemanu-factureofaparticulargooddeserverespectforKant,andtakingthatlaborwithcompensationwouldbeaformofdisrespect.
ButKantclearlywouldn'tsupportLocke'sviewthatwehaveapropertyrightinourownperson.
ForKant,it'samistaketothinkthereisanymoraltheorythatvalidatesthenotionthathumanbeingsareproperty.
Plausiblythismeansthatitisalwaysimmoraltoregardhumanbeingsasaformofproperty.
Propertyrightsarealienablerightstouseinpursuitofotherhumanpurposes,andexploitingthelaborofothersistoregardthemasameremeanstoanend.
EfficiencyWecoulddevelopajustifi-cationofpropertyrightsbyarguingthatpropertyclaimsarejustifiedwhendoingsoproduces"thegreatestgoodforthegreatestnumber,"thatis,whentheypromoteefficiency.
Lockeclearlythoughtthatasystemofpropertyrightswouldenhanceproductivityinagricul-ture.
"Hethatenclosestenacresoflandandproducesmorethanahundredleftincommonmaybetrulysaidtoreturn90acrestomankind.
"RichardEpstein,amoremoderntheorist,hasbasicallythesameargument.
"Likeallrights,propertyrightsarejustifiedtothedegreethattheypromotethehealth,wealth,andsatisfactionofeveryindividual,allthingsconsidered.
"WhereEpsteindif-fersfromLockeishistreatmentofrival-ryandexcludability;hefeltthesefactorshaveatremendousinfluenceonthesocialbenefitsandcoststhataregener-ated.
EqualityItisalsopossibletoarguethatpropertyrightsshouldpromotenotefficiency,butsomeothersocialgood,suchasequality.
Lockesays,"Eachper-sonhasanequalrighttoacquireproper-tyuptothepointthatitlimitsanother'sabilitytodoso.
"Onthisview,propertysystemsarevalidwhentheyareequaliz-ing.
Thepointatwhichtheyceasetoequalizeisalsothepointatwhichtheyceasetobevalid.
PhilosophicalsystemsforjustifyingpropertyrightsWehavefourpossibleargumentsthatmightbeputforwardtovalidateapropertyclaimonmoralgrounds.
Letusnowlookathowtheseprincipleswouldbeusedinageneralphilosophicalapproachtoquestionsinethics.
Asalreadynoted,naturallawisanapproachtomoralsstressingthewaythatmoralprinciplesarenaturallyevi-denttorationalpeople.
Utilitariansseeallrights,includingpropertyrights,asarbitrarysocialconventions,orlegalrules,thatarevalidatedintermsoftheireffectsorconsequencesonindividualhealthandwelfare.
Utilitarianswouldbeinterestedinwhethertheinstitution-alizationofagivenpropertyrightpro-motesthemostefficientdistributionofcostsandbenefitsforsocietyasawhole.
Thus,theefficiencycriterionbecomesthekeytoautilitarianapproachtoproperty.
Thenthereareviewsthattakerightstobeveryfundamentaltomoralphilos-ophy.
Libertarianphilosophy,anotherfairlysystematicapproachtotheques-tionofjustifyingpropertyrights,assertsthatthenon-interferencerightismandatoryandabsolute.
Assuch,itisappropriatetousestatepowertoenforcenon-interferencerights.
Othermoralprinciplesmustbelefttothediscretionofindividuals.
Alibertarianwouldthusbemostimpressedbythelibertyargu-ment,thatpropertyrightsarecrucialtoprotectingindividualliberties.
Finally,wehaveanegalitarianviewthatstressestheneedtoprovideeverypersoninsocietywithequalopportunities.
Thisisanareaofsomeofthehottestactioninphilosophicalworkonproperty.
FollowersofJohnRawlshavetheviewthathisdifferenceprincipleprovidesanewapproachtopropertyrights:"Systemsofpropertyrightsarejustifiedonlywhentheytendtoimprovethelotandpromotetheinterestsoftheworst-offgroupinsociety.
"Contemporaryphilosopherswouldexpectthatpeopletakingeachofthesebasicviewpointswillreachverydiffer-entconclusionsaboutwhichclaimsarevalid,andwillsubsequentlyhaveverydifferentviewsaboutthemoraljustifica-tionofproperty.
Thosewhoareinclinedtowardegalitarianismmaybemosthos-tiletothegeneralnotionofprivateproperty,whilethosewhoareinclinedtowardlibertarianismmaybemostaccepting.
Locke'sviewIncontrasttotheseapproaches,eachofwhichseestheseprinciplesasatleastpotentiallyinconflictwithoneanother,Lockehimselfseemedtothinkthatallweremutuallycompatible,andthatallcouldbe(andshouldbe)satisfiedunderthesocialcontract.
Thekeytosocialcontractargumentsisthatpeoplewithsomewhatdifferentphilosophicalstart-ingpointswillagreeonrulesfortheorganizationofsociety.
25PropertyRights:APrimerWecanseehowcertainstrandsofLocke'sviewonpropertyrightscanbewoventogetherfairlyeasily.
Innaturallaw,rivalryandexcludabilityareimpor-tantbecausetheyarenaturalcharacter-isticsofgoods.
Inutilitariantheoriestheyareimportantbecausetheyentailcostsandbenefits.
Uptoapoint,atleast,wewouldexpectutilitarianstoagreewithnaturallawtheoristsaboutthedefinitionofpropertyrights.
ButwhywouldweexpectlibertariansoregalitarianstowindupatthesameplaceTheideathatinstitutionssuchasenclosureandmoneycouldactuallyincreasetheamountofwealthavailablethroughoutsocietymayhavebeenattherootofLocke'sbeliefthathisviewofpropertywascommensuratewithegalitarianism.
Whatismore,hethoughtthatthediscoveryofnewlandsinAmericamadenaturalresourcesintofreegoodsthatweresimplythereforthetaking.
Withrespecttotheconnectionbetweenefficiencyandliberty,onekeytoLocke'sviewmaybearelianceonthelabortheoryofvalue.
Ifthevalueofagoodcanbereducedtothelaborinvestedinit,thentheutilitariancalcu-lationofcostandbenefitwillmatchupwithpropertyrightsdesignedtoprotecteachlaborer'scontributiontothemanu-factureorcreationofthegood.
Butwiththeadventofneo-classicaleconomics,utilityisnotcalculatedintermsoflabor,andweshouldexpecttherationalesforutilitarianandlibertarianviewsofprop-ertytodiverge.
SummaryPhilosophersmakeabroaddistinc-tionbetweenmoraltheories(suchasutilitarianism)thatvalidatearightsclaimintermsoftheconsequencesthatfollowfromitsgeneralobservance,andmoraltheories(suchasthoseofLockeorKant)thatvalidaterightsonthegroundofprotectinglibertyorautono-my.
Propertyrightsare,ineithercase,asubclassofnon-interferencerightsdeal-ingspecificallywithcontrolandexchangeofalienablegoods.
Economicapproachestopropertyrightsareeasilyaccommodatedwithinutilitarianmoraltheory,andaneconomicanalysisofeffi-ciencycanbereadilyappliedwithinautilitarianargumentonthevalidityofspecificpropertyrights.
Libertarian,nat-urallaw,andegalitarianapproachesuseadifferentlogicforvalidatingpropertyclaims,thoughtheymightconvergewithutilitarianargumentstosupportagivenconfigurationofpropertyrightsinspecificcases.
Wheneverthesemultiplerationalesforassigningandvalidatingpropertyrightsconverge,theparticularconfigurationofpropertyrightswillberegardedasethicallywellsupported.
Whenevertheydiverge,propertyclaimsarelikelytobecontestedonethicalgrounds.
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00ApropertyrightsprimerTheeconomyisanexchangeofclaims,orpropertyrights,notofthings.
Propertyrightshavetheirorigininsomesenseofcommunityorsomelevelofagreementamongpeople.
Propertyrightsarecollectively(publicly)chosen.
Somepropertyrightsareformal,codifiedinlaw,administrativerules,andpractice.
Otherpropertyrightsarecustomary,informal,mostlyunconscious,andembeddedincultureorhabit.
Propertyrightsordertherelationshipsamongpeople.
Propertyrightsareneededbecausepeopleareinterdependentandoftencon-flict.
Conflictsthatariseoutofinterdependenciesamongpeopleareinfluenced,orevenpartlydeterminedby,people'srelationshipstothings.
Attributesofthingscreatedifferenttypesofinterdependencies,whichleadtodifferentchoicesofpropertyrights.
Alternativerights,orinstitutions,willresolveconflictsindifferentwayswithdifferentperformancesanddifferentdistributionsofcostsandbenefits.
Newthings(technologicalchanges)maycreatenewrelationships,andnewrightsmayemerge.
Newthingscertainlycreatenewopportunities.
Itmaybepossibletocreatenewrightsandthusdevelopmentwithouttechni-calchange.