JUDICIALxvm

AnnualSurveyofInternational&ComparativeLawVolume10|Issue1Article22004NonLiquet:FromModernLawtoRomanLawAlfredoMordechaiRabelloFollowthisandadditionalworksat:http://digitalcommons.
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RecommendedCitationRabello,AlfredoMordechai(2004)"NonLiquet:FromModernLawtoRomanLaw,"AnnualSurveyofInternational&ComparativeLaw:Vol.
10:Iss.
1,Article2.
Availableat:http://digitalcommons.
law.
ggu.
edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/2NONLIQUET:FROMMODERNLAWTOROMANLAW*ALFREDOMORDECHAIRABELLO"ToFedericoCarpiinfriendshipI.
MAYTHEJUDGEREFUSETOPRONOUNCEJUDGMENTInmodernlegalsystems,thejudgecannotasaruleevadehisbasicduty,thatofadjudicating.
Hehastheoptionofeitherallowingorofrejectingtheplaintiff'sclaims.
Underthecriminalprocedurerulesadoptedbyseveralcountries,ajudgemayacquitforinsufficientevidence.
(Buthecannotbereleasedfromexercisinghisfunctionasajudge,claimingeitherthatthefactsofthecasearenotsufficientlycleartohim(factualdoubt),orthatthenormtobeappliedinthespecificcasecannotbedeterminedUudicialdoubt),oreventhatthereexistsnofixednormfor*Anexplanatorynoteonthestructureandlimitsofthepresentessaymaybeuseful.
Instudieswhichalsohaveahistoricalcharacter.
itiscustomarytopresentthesubjectmatterinchronologicalorder,firstoutliningthemoreancientlegalsystem,followingthenasfaraspossibleitsevolutionarysteps,finallytoendwiththeanalysisofexistinglegalsystems.
Inthisarticle,however,inordertoplacethereaderinmediasresheispresentedwithmodernlegalsystemswithwhichheisalreadyfamiliar:insuchsystemsitispracticallyinconceivablethatthejudgeshouldrefusetogivejudgmentincaseofdoubt.
Aftertheargumentsadducedinjustificationhavebeendiscussed,theauthorturnstotheprobleminthecontextofRomanlaw,reachingsomeconclusionsdelegeferenda.
Neitherthecriminalaspectoftheproblemi.
e.
,thatofthepenaltyincurredbyajudgeforomittingtoperformhisdutyofpronouncingjudgment,northeproblemofnon-justiciabilitywhichasrecentlybeenthesubjectofintensecontroversy,isdealtwithinthisarticle.
**MontesquieuEmeritusProfessorofLegalHistoryandComparativeLaw,FacultyofLaw,TheHebrewUniversityofJerusalem;Professor,FacultyofLaw,HaifaUniversity.
\.
Forthediscussionofproblemsconnectedwithdismissalforinsufficientevidence,seeA.
Malivemi,L'Assoluzioneperinsujficienzeadiprove,3STUD!
INONOREDIGIUSEPPEGROSSO557(1970).
11Rabello:NonLiquetPublishedbyGGULawDigitalCommons,20042ANNUALSURVEYOFINT'L&CaMP.
LAW[Vol.
10thedeterminationofthecase(lacunainthelaw)2.
ThustheCodeCivildesFran~ais(orCodeNapoleon)laysdownexplicitly:"Ajudgewhorefusestodecideacase,onthepretextthatthelawissilent,obscureorinsufficient,maybeprosecutedasbeingguiltyofdenialofjustice.
"3Thisarticleistheoutcomeofalongevolutionaryprocess.
PriortotheFrenchRevolution,beforetheseparationofpowers,themainquestionwasnotthatoflacunaebutratherthatofthedirectionsgiventothejudgeinordertohelphimcarryouthisfunctions.
IntheMiddleAges,whenthejudgewasconfrontedwithasituationinwhichtohisbestknowledgenoavailablenormcouldbeapplied,heusedtoturndirectlytoGod(God'sJudgment).
4Thiswasthecustom,especiallyinFrance,duringthe10th,11thand12thcenturies;andinsomerareinstancesGod'sJudgmenttendedtoprovideasolutionnotonlytoquestionsoffact,buteventoquestionsoflaw.
sLater,duringthe13thto16thcenturies,seekingamorerationalsolutiontodisputesandusingthewrittentextofthe(traditional)orallaw,thejudgewasexpresslyexpectedtobeable,indubiouscases,topasssentenceaccordingtohisconscienceorbytheprocessofanalogy.
"Judgesgenerallyare,moreover,alsolegislators:theyfillthelacunaein2.
Itisnotourintentiontoexamineheretheimportantandinterestingquestionoflacunaeingeneral,butonlyinsofarastheyrelatetothespecificproblemofnonliquet;forthegeneralquestionseeN.
Bobbio.
LacunedelDiritto.
9NOVISSIMODIGESTOITALIANO419(1963)andtheanthologicalworkLEPROBLEMEDESLACUNESENDROIT(c.
Perelmaned.
1968).
3.
.
oLejugequirefuseradejugersouspretextedusilence,deI'obscuriteoudeI'insuffisancedelaloi.
pourraetrepoursuivicommecoupablededenidejustice"(art.
4).
SeeJ.
NORMAN.
L'OFFICEDUJUGEETLACONTESTATION(1965).
Boileux,commentingonthisarticle,observes.
Letusremarkherethatthejudgeappointedtosolvealitigationmustperforcepronounce(doitnecessairementprononcer);heisevenforbiddentosuspendsentenceinordertoconsultwiththelegislatoronthemeaningofthelaw:suchaconsultation(rejerejwouldamounttoadenialofjustice,anddenialofjus-ticeispunishedbyafine.
.
.
.
"J.
M.
BOILEUX.
1COMMENTAlRESURLECODENAPOLEON28(6thed.
1866).
SeealsoE.
BONNIER,TRArrETHtORIQUEETPRATIQUEDESPREUVESENDROITCIVILETENDROITCRIMINEL49(1873),includingadiscussionoftheprincipleactorenonprobantereusabsolviturasanobstacletononliquet.
4.
OnGod'sjudgment,seeM.
A.
Benedetto,7NOVISSIMODIGESTOITALIANO899(1961);J.
Gaudemet,LesOrdaliesauMoyenAge:Doctrine,LegislationetPratiqueCanoniques,2RECUEILSDELASOCIETEJ.
BODIN,XVII,LAPREUVE99(1965);H.
LEVy-BRUHL.
LAPREUVEJUDICIAIRE559(1964).
5.
OnthispointseeJ.
Gilissen.
LeProblemedesLacunesduDroitdans{'EvolutionduDroitMedievaletModeme,inLEPROBLEMEDESLACUNESENDROIT197.
205(C.
Perelmaned.
1968)whichprovidesthemainsourceofthepresentbriefhistoricalexcursus.
SeealsoA.
FERTILE,6:2STORIADELDlRITTOITALIANODALLACADUTADELL1MPEROROMANOALLACODIFICAZIONE199n.
8(1966).
2AnnualSurveyofInternational&ComparativeLaw,Vol.
10[2004],Iss.
1,Art.
2http://digitalcommons.
law.
ggu.
edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/22004]NONLIQUET3thelawwiththeirownrulings.
"6Indubiouscasesitwasadmissibletoinvoketheauthorityoflocalexperts.
Lateragain,aswrittenlawcametoprevailoveroraltradition,ahierarchyofsourceswasestablished:themagistratewassupposedtoconsultfirstthewrittenlaw,thenoraltraditionsandultimatelytorefertoRomanlaw,orrathertotheiuscommunescriptum,whichincludednotonlytheJustinianlaw,butalsocanonlawandthecommentariesofjurists,glossatoresandpost-glossares:Quicquidnonagnoscitglossanonagnoscitforum.
7Thismethod,however,couldnotsolvealltheproblems:gapsweresometimesdiscoveredeveninthewrittencommonlaw.
Then,onthebasisofRomanisttextsandundertheinfluenceofauthors(mainlyDeGhewietinBelgiumandDomatinFrance),itwasdecidedtofollowwhatappearedtobeanalogousandequitable;andtheseprinciplescanevenbefoundinmoderncodes.
Ontheotherhand,duringtheancientregimetheprincipleofmonarchyasthesolesourceoflawwassteadilygainingground(rexfonsestomnismodiiustitiaeandquiveutleroi,siveutLaLoi).
8In1766LouisXVdeclaredthatalllegislativepowerbelongedtohim,withoutrestrictionandinitsentirety.
TheKingconsideredittobehisexclusiveprerogativetofillanygapsinthelawandincaseoflegaldoubtsthejudgewasobligedtoturntohimandtohiscouncil.
"Referencetothelegislativepower(refereaulegislatij)derivesfromtherecoursetointerpretthelaw.
Whilethecourtsareempoweredtointerpretthelaw,theycannotcontradictitstermsanditsclearconstruction:incaseofseriousdoubt,theymustaskthelegislature,i.
e.
theKing,whowillthenissuea'declarationofhiswill'.
"9ThisrefereaulegislatifremainedinuseevenaftertheFrenchRevolution,duetoarigidlydogmaticviewoftheseparationofpowers,consideredasaprotectionagainstroyalabsolutism.
Thus,underalawdatedAugust1790,incaseofseriousdoubtsastointerpretationthejudgewasrequiredtoconsulttheLawandthelegislativepower,basedinthepeople.
Thismethod,however,provedevenmoredangerousthantheevilitsoughttoremedy.
Notonlydiditdisturbthebalancebetweenthe6.
Gilissen.
supranote5at202.
7.
"Hewhoknowsnotthecommentariesknowsnotthecourt".
OnthemanyproblemsconnectedwiththatiuscommuneseeF.
Calasso,1MEDIOEvoDELDIRITIO,LEFONTI345(1954)(forthedogmaticconceptionseeinparticular,p.
375);seealsoG.
Ermini,DirittoComune,5NOVISSIMODIGESTOITALIANO826(1960).
8.
"ThewilloftheKingisthewilloftheLaw.
"9.
Gilissen,supranote5at229.
3Rabello:NonLiquetPublishedbyGGULawDigitalCommons,20044ANNUALSURVEYOFINT'L&COMPoLAW[Vol.
10powersinfavorofthelegislature,itevenledineffecttooutrightviolationoftheprincipleofnon-retroactivity.
ForthisreasontheauthorsoftheCivilCodeof1804preferredtocompelthemagistratetopassjudgmentevenwherethetextofthelawwassilent.
Theoutcomewas,ontheonehandawideningofthepowersofthejudgeandontheotherhand,theabolitionoftheformeroptiongiventothejudgetoturnforhelptothelegislativepower.
Afurtherstageinthisdevelopmentwasreachedacenturylater,inSwitzerland.
ThereisanevolutionofacenturybetweentheNapoleonicCodeandtheSwissCivilCode.
Article4oftheFrenchandBelgianCivilCodesexpressesacertainlackofconfidenceinthejudge,justifiedundertheancienregime,butclearlynotsonowadays;indeedArticle258oftheBelgianPenalCodehasbecomeanachronistic.
ItmaybesaidthattheSwissCivilCode,elaboratedatthebeginningofthetwentiethcentury,reflectsthespiritofthemostadvancedjuristsofthattime.
"l0Article1oftheSwissCivilCodeindeedprovidesthat:"Intheabsenceofsuitablelegaldispositions,thejudgepronouncesaccordingtocustomand,intheabsencethereof,accordingtosuchnormsasthejudgehimselfwouldliedown,washecalledtoactaslegislator.
"11Theruleprohibitingnonliquetthereforefindsitsimplicitorexplicitexpression,inpracticallyall-modernlegalsystems.
However,itshouldbenotedthattheyconsiderthequestionmainlyfromtheperspectiveofthejudgewhenconfrontedwiththejuristicnormtobeappliedtoaspecificcase.
Thus,oneoftheintroductoryprovisionstotheItalianCivilCode(art.
12)statesthat"Inapplyingstatutesnoothermeaningcanbeattributedtothemthanthatmadeclearbytheactualsignificanceofthewords,accordingtotheconnectionbetweenthem,andbythelegislativeintent.
"Ifacontroversycannotbedecidedbyapreciseprovision,considerationisgiventoprovisionsthatregulatesimilarcasesoranalogousmatters.
If10.
E.
Wolf,LesLacunesduDroitetleurSolutionenDroitSuisse,inLEPROBLEMEDESLACUNES105(C.
Perelmaned.
,1968).
11.
"Adefautd'unedispositionlegaleapplicable,IejugeprononceselonIedroitcoutumieret,adefautd'unecoutume,selonlesreglesqu'iletabliraits'ilavaitafaireactedelegislateur.
"OnthisimportantissueseeA.
MEIERHAYOZ,DERRICHTERALSGESETZEBER:EINEBESINNUNGAUFDIEVONDENGERICHTENBEFOLGTENVERFAHRENSGRUNDSATZE1MBEREICHEDERFREIENRICHTERLICHENRECHTSFINDUNGGEMASSART.
lABs.
2DESSCHWEIZERISSCHENNZIVILGESETZBUCHES221(1951)withseveral(notalwaysaccurate)quotationsfromothercodes.
SeealsoG.
CHIOVENDA,PRINCIPIDIDIRITIOPROCESSUALECIVILENAPOLI74(4thed.
,1928)(withbibliography);andG.
DuPASQUIER,LESLACUNESDELALOIETLAJURISPRUDENCEDUTRmUNALFEDERALSUISSESURL'ART.
ICCS(1951).
4AnnualSurveyofInternational&ComparativeLaw,Vol.
10[2004],Iss.
1,Art.
2http://digitalcommons.
law.
ggu.
edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/22004]NONLIQUET5thecasestillremainsindoubt,itisdecidedaccordingtothegeneralprinciplesofthelegalorderoftheState.
"12Insuchacase,ratherthaninterpretinganorm,andbeforeinterpretingit,thequestionistoseekitortoreframeit.
13Butthespecificproblemofthejudgeconfrontedwithacaseoffactualdoubtisnotevenmentioned,andthecasemustbeadjudicatedaccordingtothegeneralprinciplesoftheburdenofproof.
Yetinsomelegalsystems,thereisatendencytodenytheeffectofresiudicatatoadecisiongivenonlyonthegroundofaparty'sfailuretoraisetheburdenofproof,i.
e.
,whenthejudgecannot"find"thefactspositivelyorwithanydegreeofcertainty.
14InEnglishlawthejudge'sdutytoadjudicateisrecognizedbytheCommonLawandsomeofthemostprominentjudges,likePollock,considerthistobetheessentialfunctionofthejudge,sothatrefrainingfromgivingjudgmentistantamounttoadenialofjustice.
15ThissituationissimilartomodernIsraelilaw.
Thefollowingprecedentmayserveasanillustration:"Iamnotashamedtoacknowledge",saysthejudge,"thatIcannottellwhetherthetruthiswiththeplaintifforwiththedefendant",addingthat"bothversionswereequallyplausible.
"Therefore,thejudgeabsolvedthedefendant,sincetheplaintiff,uponwhomtheburdenofproofrested,hadbeenunabletoadducemorepersuasiveevidence.
1612.
Codicediproceduracivile[C.
p.
c.
](It).
"Nell'applicareIeleggenonsipuo'adessaattribuirealtrosensochequellofattopalesedalsignificatopropriodelleparolesecondelaconnessionediesseedellaintenzionedellegislatore.
Seunacontroversianonpuoesseredecisaconunaprecisadisposizione,sihariguardoailedisposizionicheregolanocasisimili0materieanaloghe;seilcasorimaneancoradubbio,sidecidesecondoiprincipigeneralidell'ordinamentogiuridicodelloStato":notwithstandingitslocation,itsscopeofapplicationisnotrestrictedtotheCode.
13.
ForawiderstudyofthispropositionseeF.
MESSINEO,MANUALEDIDIRITIOCIVILEECOMMERCIALE65(1947);C.
P.
C.
art.
55(ItalianCodeofCivilProcedure).
Forsomeinterestingcriticalnotesonthepracticalitiesofjudges'functions,seeG.
Lazaro,LaFunzionedeiGuidici,26RIvISTADIDIRITIOPROCESSUALEI(1971).
A1lgemeinesBiirgerlichesGesetzbuch[ABGB]art.
7(AustrianCivilCode);C6digoCivilart.
6(SpanishCivilCode);C6digoCivilarts.
5,7(BrazilianCivilCode);andtheAlbanianCivilCodeart.
2.
SeealsoMEIERHAYOZ,supranote11.
14.
Thistendencyisfound,forinstance,inAustrianlaw;seeH.
Lorber,DasNonLiquet,1970OSTERREICHISCHEJURISTEN-ZEITUNG[OJZ]537;H.
HAUSMANINGER,THEAUSTRIANLEGALSYSTEM28,n.
19(1998).
Forageneralview,includingthehistoricalevolutionandpresentnormsofcivillaw,seeG.
Pugliese,GiudicatoCivile,StoriaDirittoVigente,18ENCICWPEDIADELDIRITIO727(1968);A.
M.
Rabello,WorkingtowardsCodificationofIsraeliPrivateLaw:BetweenCommonandCivilLaw,inH.
HAUSMANINGERETAL.
EDS.
,DEVEWPMENTSINAUSTRIANANDISRAELIPRNATELAW(1999).
15.
SeeG.
WHITECROSSPATON,ATEXTBOOKOFJURISPRUDENCE88,n.
168(3rded.
1964).
16.
Vorbichikv.
Schoengarten,1964,(III)18P.
O.
95;AttorneyGeneralv.
ABach,Magistrate,1954,9P.
O.
\056,\064;thisdecision,criticizedonappeal,wascommentedonwithapprovalbyE.
Hamon,HowshouldaJudgeactwhenhecannotchoosebetweenthecredibilityofeitherplaintiffordefendant,21HAPRAKLIT415(1965).
Thedecisionwasultimatelyupheldbythe5Rabello:NonLiquetPublishedbyGGULawDigitalCommons,20046ANNUALSURVEYOFINT'L&COMPoLAW[Vol.
10Perhaps,fromtheIsraeliexperience,newlighthasbeenshedinthelimitationofthistheoryregardingtheeventoflacunasincethepassingoftheFoundationsofLawAct1980whichprovidesthat:Wherethecourt,facedwithalegalquestionrequiringdecisionfindsnoanswertoitinstatutelaworcaselaw,orbyanalogy,itshalldecideitinthelightoftheprinciplesoffreedom,justice,equityandpeaceofIsrael'sheritage.
IThisisanormdirectedatincorporatingtraditionalJewishlaw,atleastinpart,intheIsraelilegalsystem.
SupremeCourt,seeE.
HARNON,LAWOFEVIDENCE188(1970)(inHebrew).
Suchadecisionhasthevalidityofresiudicata.
Insomerecentenactmentshowever,suchastheCivilProcedureRules,1963,K.
T.
1477,490,adistinctionismadebetweentherejectionofaplaintiffsclaimsonthemerits,effectiveasresiudicata,andthemerestrikingoutoftheactionwhichdoesnotprecludethefilingofanewactiononthesamecause;seeonthissubjectS.
Ginossar,RenewalofActions,in5STUDIESINLAW48(1958).
SeealsoE.
Hamon,ResludicataandIdentityofActions,IISR.
L.
R545(1966):Inconsideringthisproblem,someemphasizetheideathatapresumptionoftruthisattributedtothedecisionsofcourts.
Resiudicataproveritateaccipi-tur.
Relyingonthisrationale,theSupremeCourtinIsraelcametotheconclu-sionthataformerjudgmentshouldnothavetheeffectofresiudicataascol-lateralestoppelisthecourtdidnotmakeanypositivefindingsonthecontro-versialissue.
ForfrequentrelianceonthisideabytheSupremeCourtinIsraelseeFelmanv.
Shachav,1952,6P.
O.
313,321,323;Knopfv.
Popper,1956,toP.
O.
785,793;Mugrabiv.
Vardimon,1957,IIP.
O.
1242,1250.
OntheproblemoflacunaeinIsraelilaw,seeG.
Tedeschi,Article46ofthePalestineOrder-In-CouncilandtheExistenceofLacunae,inLEPROBLEMEDESLACUNESSTUDIESINISRAELILAW275(1959);G.
Tedeschi,L'lnsufJicienzadellaNormaelaFedeltadell'lnterprete,inRrvISTADIDIRrrroCIVILE7(1962)containingsomeinterestingconsiderationsonTalmudiclaw.
Onthequestionsofnon-justiciabilityseealsothedissertationofY.
Zemach,PoliticalQuestionsinIsraelandtheUnitedStates(1971)(unpublishedPh.
D.
dissertation,UniversityofVirginia),andmoregenerally,A.
Witkon,Justiciability,IISR.
L.
R.
60(1966).
17.
FoundationsofLaw,5740-1980,34LawsoftheStateofIsrael181(MinistryofJusticetrans.
,1980);onthislawseeprimarily:A.
Barak,GapsintheLawandtheIsraeliExperience,20MISHPATIM281(1991);A.
Barak,TheFoundationsofLawActandtheHeritageofIsrael,13SHENATONHA-MISHPATHA-HAIVRI(1987);H.
BENMENACHEM,THEFOUNDATIONSOFLAWACT-HowMUCHOFADUTY257;H.
H.
COHN,RESIDUARYLAW285;M.
ELON,MOREABOUTTHEFOUNDATIONSOFLAWACT227;E.
SHOCHETMAN,ONANALOGYINDECISIONMAKINGINJEWISHLAWANDTHEFOUNDATIONSOFLAWACT307;S.
SHILO,COMMENTSANDSOMENEWLIGHTONTHEFOUNDATIONSOFLAWACT351;B.
SCHERESCHEVSKY,THEFOUNDATIONSOFLAWACT379;A.
Kirschenbaum,TheLegalFoundationLaw,1980-TodayandTomorrowIIIYUNEIMISHPAT117(1985);G.
Procaccia,TheFoundationsofLawAct1980,toIYUNEIMISHPAT,145(1984);M.
Cheshin,Israel'sHeritageandtheLawoftheState,inCIVILRIGHTSINISRAEL:ESSAYSINHONOUROFHAIMH.
COHN47(R.
Gavisoned.
,1982);M.
Keshet,FoundationsofLawAct1980,33HAPRAKLIT611(1980);G.
Tedeschi,TheLawofLaws,14ISRAELL.
R.
145(1979);S.
Z.
Feller,TheApplicationoftheFoundationsofLawActinCriminalLaw,inSEPHERSUSSMAN345(A.
BaraketaI.
,eds.
,1984);Y.
M.
Edrei,TheFoundationsofLawActasaStatutorySourceforJudicialActivism,inJUDICIALACTIVISM127(A.
Porated.
,1993).
6AnnualSurveyofInternational&ComparativeLaw,Vol.
10[2004],Iss.
1,Art.
2http://digitalcommons.
law.
ggu.
edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/22004]NONLIQUET7Thislawhistoricallyunderwentdecadesofdebateandcontroversy18untilitsfinalwording19adebatethathasmanifesteditselfinthejudicialarena,thoughalbeitinonlyameagernumberofdecisions.
20Withrelevancetoourdiscussion,thelawdirectedtothejudge,constitutesadejureobligationuponthejudgetopassjUdgment,evenintheeventoflacuna.
2118.
ForthehistoricaloverviewhighlightingthefiercediscussionsintheKnessetactingasaconstituentassemblyoverthenatureandformofthelaw,tothe1959precursoroftheeventualbilluntilitsultimatepromulgation,seeEWN,supranote17;SHILO,supranote17,351-353.
19.
Foraninsightinthelegislator'Sintent,seeFoundationsofLawBillandtheappendixinA.
Barak,GapsintheLawandtheIsraeliExperience,20MISHPATIM280-283(1991).
Inthe1959discussioninKnesset,thetermJewishLaw(MishpatIvri)wasproposedconnotingdirectapplicationofthelegalmaterialinthissystem,onlytobeultimatelyreplacedinitsfinaldraftbythemoreamorphousterm,"Israel'sheritage.
"Forthepurposeofclarity,juristshaveinterpreted"Israel'sheritage"asmerelyasynonymforJewishLaw,seeELON,supranote17,253-256;SHOCHETMAN,supranote17,307-308;SCHERCHEVSKY,supranote17.
Thoseopinionsdissentinginclude:A.
Barak,TheFoundationsofLawActandtheHeritageofIsrael,13SHENATONHA-MISHPATHA-HANRI(1987);MENACHEM,supranote17;CHESHIN,supranote17;COHEN,supranote17;SHILO,supranote17.
20.
IntheapproximatelyfortycaseswhichhavebeendecidedintheIsraeliSupremeCourt,twomajorconflictingviewshaveemergedconcerningtheinterpretationoftheFoundationsofLawsAct.
JusticesA.
BarakandM.
Elonholdthesetwoapproaches.
ThepositionsaredealtwithatlengthinHandelsv.
BankKupatAmLtd.
,35(2)P.
O.
785(1980);thefirstcasetoexaminetheactinthesupremecourtsinceitscomingintoforce.
JusticeBarakinterpretsthestatuteasapplyingonlyinlegalareasoflacunae;andifagapinthesystemindeedexists,i.
e.
,noanswerhasbeenfoundinstatutelaworcaselaw,thejudgemustthenfollowatwo-tierexamination:thesearchbeginsfirstandforemostwiththeprocessofanalogyandonlyintherareinstancesthatasuitableanalogyisnotfound,isthejudgeobligatedtodecideupontheprinciplesofIsrael'sheritage.
JusticeElondissentsontwomajorpointsregardingthelaw'sactivation:firstly,heisoftheopinionthatthelegislatordidnotenhancetheroleofanalogyinthejudicialprocess:Iseenoneedinexplicitlydeclaringtheanalogyasasourceoflaw.
.
.
foritisthe"breadandbutter"ofthejudgeinhisdaytodayjudgments.
.
.
andthere-fore,claimingthatanalogyisoneofthesourcesoflawdelineatedintheFoundationsofLawActappearstoberedundant,EWN,supranote17,at232-233.
Therefore,ElonviewstheprinciplesofIsrael'sheritageastheonlysupplementarysourceprovidedbytheFoundationsofLawAct.
Secondly,hebroadensthescopeofthelaw'sperformance.
Thelawisnotlimitedtotheareaoflacuna,rathertheissueathandisopentovariousinterpretationsandthesourcefromwhichtheproperinterpretationmustbeexaminedmustfirstandforemoststemfromJewishlaw(acc.
toElon'sinterpretationof'Israel'sheritage')asJewishlawisthesupplementarysourceoflawoftheIsraelilegalsystem;seeElon,"IsraeliLawanditsPlaceinIsraeliJurisprudence,"1968,25Hapraklit27.
Forfurthercasesexaminingthislaw,seeSheferv.
StateofIsrael,1993,(notyetinprint);Szerszevskyv.
PrimeMinister,1991,(VI)45P.
O.
779;Shakdielv.
MinisterofReligiousAffairs,1988,(II)42P.
O.
221;Adrasv.
HarlowsG.
M.
B.
H.
,1988,(I)42P.
O.
221;InsuranceCorporationofEnglandv.
StateofIsrael,1985,(II)41P.
O.
309.
21.
G.
Tedeschi,OnDispositiveLaw(IusDispositivum),15IYUNEIMISHPAT5,13(1990):"TheIsraelilegalsystemdoesnotpermittheexistenceoflacunaebygrantingthejudgetheprerogativeofrefusingtopronouncejudgmentclaimingnonliquet.
TheFoundationsofLawAct,1980obligatesthejudgetofindasolutiontoeverylegalproblem.
"SCHERECHEVSKY,supranote17at380,claimsonthebasisoftheauthoritativenatureofArtreinforcesthisclaim.
46ofthePalestineOrder-in-Council"thatthisisobligatorylawandnotmerelyusedforcomparativepurposesoronlyaccordingtothejudge'sdiscretion,"supranote17,at380.
Foradissentingopinion,seeMENACHEM,supranote17,whointerpretsthelawasrequiringmerecounselandnotobedience.
SeealsoBARAK,supranote20,critiqueofBenMenachem'sopinionwhereheconcurswithJusticeElon'spositioninHandelswhichstatesthat"thesupplementarylawisnotmerelyasuggestiondirectedtowardsthe7Rabello:NonLiquetPublishedbyGGULawDigitalCommons,20048ANNUALSURVEYOFINT'L&CaMP.
LAW[Vol.
10Essentially,thejudicialtaskof'fillinginthegaps'ofthelegalsystemexistedpriortothisactviaArt.
46ofthePalestineOrder-in-Council,1922-19472Art.
46wastherebyrepealedandreplacedwiththeFoundationsofLawAct.
However,inadditiontoformalizingunderIsraelilawtheactoffillinglacunaeandreplacingEnglishcommonlawandthedoctrinesofequitywiththeprinciplesofIsrael'sheritageasasupplementarysourceofIsraelilaw,23theinclusionofanalogy(notablyexcludedinArt.
464asanadditionalandmoreover,primarysupplementarysourceisofgreatimport.
25Itisunnecessarytostressthepowerfultoolthatanalogyisinthefaceoflacunae.
Itisanall-encompassingcorpusofcomparativelawwhichcanrejectvirtuallyallclaimsofnonliquetinthecaseoflacunaandcompoundedwiththesubsequentobligationofimplementingtheprinciplesofIsrael'sheritage.
Intherareeventofunsatisfactoryanalogy,theIsraelijudgeiseffectivelybarredfromrefusingtopronouncejudgment.
26judge.
Itislawthatthejudgeisrequiredtoapply.
Oncealacunaisrevealed,thejudgeisobligatedtorefertothesupplementarylawinordertofillthelacuna.
"22.
SeegenerallyG.
Tedeschi,LacunaeintheLawandArticle46ofthePalestineOrder-in-Council,inSTUDIESINISRAELILAW132(1959);A.
LEVONTINANDC.
H.
GOLDWATER,CONFLICTOFLAWINISRAELANDART.
46OFTHEPALESTINECOUNCIL-IN-ORDER(1974);I.
ZAMIR,ADMINISTRATIVEPROCEDUREINISRAELANDART.
46OFTHEPALESTINECOUNCIL-IN-ORDER(1974).
23.
TheconceptofsupplementarysourcesappearsinFoundationsofLawAct,supranote17,Art.
I,undertheheading:"SupplementarySourcesofLaw.
"ThispronouncementtherebypotentiallyelevatesthestatusofIsrael'sheritage.
TheactualweightofthissupplementarysourceestablishedisdependentupontherelationshiponedeterminesbetweenanalogyandtheprinciplesofIsrael'sheritage.
H.
H.
Cohnpreferstheinterpretationof'residuarysources'tosupplementarysources,whichconnotesamoreperipheryimplementationoftheprinciplesofIsrael'sheritage(whichiswhatCohnidentifiesasresiduarylaw)asmerelyguidingprinciplesinthejudicialprocess.
Legislationdoesnotenhancetheseprinciplesfortheyare"etchedintheheartofeveryjudge"andsuitablyfindnaturalhabitat"inthetrendsoftheJewishanddemocraticstateoftoday.
"(COHN,supranote17,295.
ThispositionisinpracticequitesimilartothatofBenMenachemand,essentially,deviatesonlyinsemantics.
24.
SeeTedeschi,supranote,22at149-152.
25.
Asaforesaid,thisstatementisinlinewithBarak'sinterpretationdelineatedabove(supranote20),asopposedtothoseofBenMenachem,Cohn,Elon,Shochetman,andSchereschevsky.
Baraktermsthedistinctionbetweenthefuststage(analogyexamination)andthesecondstage(Israel'sheritageexamination)inthetwo-tierprocesswiththeformerasahomogeneoussupplementarysource,i.
e.
,viaaprocesswhichisdomestictothelegalculture,andasthatofthelatterasaheterogeneoussource;however,hereinlaysthedifficulty.
ForalthoughtheprinciplesofIsrael'sheritagearenotincludedperseamongthecomplexoftheIsraelilegalsystem,theseprinciplesarecertainlynotforeigntoit.
Barakdistinguishesbetweentheprinciples,whichhedecidesasthephilosophicalorientationoroutlook,andnottheindividualnormativeapplicationofspecificlaw.
A.
Barak,GapsintheLawandtheIsraeliExperience,20MISHPATlM281,319-315(1991).
26.
Thispositioniscompatiblewiththeexistingtrendinexpandingjudicialpowers(seegenerallyA.
PORATED.
,JUDICIALACTIVISM(1993).
Oftheopinionthatresolvingdisputesistheprimarytaskofthejudge,Barakclaimsitwouldbeantithetical"forthejudgetorefrainfrompassing8AnnualSurveyofInternational&ComparativeLaw,Vol.
10[2004],Iss.
1,Art.
2http://digitalcommons.
law.
ggu.
edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/22004]NONLIQUET9II.
THEPROBLEMINCANONLAWANDINT'LLAWWhatisthepositionofthejudgeincanonlawIshefreetofollowthedictatesofhisconscienceand,accordingly,torefusetoadjudicatewheneverheisunabletoreachaclearopinionastotherightofthepartiesThatanswerisno.
Incanonlaw,hemaynotrefrainfrompronouncingjudgment,hisfunctionsarenotoptionalandwithinthirtydaysfromthedaywhenthehearingisconcluded,hehastodecideeitherinfavouroragainsttheclaim(Can.
1710).
Ifheisunabletoreachtherequiredmoralcertainty,dueeithertojudicialortofactualdoubt,hehastoseekthatcertaintywiththehelpofthesupplementarymeansofferedbythecanonlaw.
Shouldthosemeansproveinsufficient,hemustdismisstheclaimasinsufficientlyproved;sothatinfactthedefendantwillemergereleasedfromtheliabilityallegedagainsthim.
27Inthecaseoflegallacuna,thejudgemustpronounceandcannotrefusetopasssentencepleadingthesilenceortheobscurityortheinsufficiencyofthelaw.
28Thus,Canon1608providesthatnojudgemayrefusetoadjudicatebyreasonorinabilitytofinddirectguidanceinthetextofthelaw:thecanoncodeclearlydefinesthejudge'sposition,andinsuchcasesitgiveshimlegislativepowers.
29judgmentinasituationofuncertainnesswhichstemsfromunclarityormultiplepossibilitiesintheinterpretationofthestatute"A.
Barak,"OntheOutlookofLawandJudgmentandJudicialActivism"(supra),15.
ThisisinlinewithBarak'spersonalbeliefthatthejudiciarymustbehandedthetaskofpreventingsocialchaos:"Wherethereisnojudge-thereisnojustice.
Thelandisfilledwithjustice(Psalms);similarly,thelandisfilledwithcourtsoflaw.
Therelienoareasdevoidoflaw,forinlawlessness,existsthe'law'of'mightmakesright'(orkold'alimgvarBabylonianTalmud,BabaBatra,34,b.
).
"(supra),31.
WithspecificregardstotheFoundationsofLawAct,Y.
M.
EdreidisagreeswithBarak'slegaltheoryoflegaldevelopmentclaimingthatthetheorydoesnotproperlyheedtothelegislator'sintentions.
EdreipositsthatBarak'stheory,failingtoviewthesupplementarysourcesoflawintermsofsourcesforjudicialinterpretation,willleadtothedangerousresultofunrestrainedjudicialpower.
Alegaltheorylackingdefinedsourcesoflaw,claimsEdrei,islikelytospurnjudgmentsbasedonpersonaldiscretion,thatarenotanchoredinstatuteaswaswitnessedinYardorv.
DirectorofElectionCommittee,1965,(III)19P.
O.
36orElectricCompanyLtd.
v.
Ha'aretz,1978,(III)32P.
O.
337.
Edrei'sposition,expandingtheFoundationsofLawAct'susagebeyondlacunaetoincludelegalsourcesorinterpretationseemstobeparalleltoElon'saforementionedposition.
27.
SeeF.
DellaRocca,"Sentenza(DirittoCanonico)",1969,16NND1,1104.
Canon18694providesthatifajudgecannotreach(moral)certainty(throughfactualevidence),hemustpronounceunprovedtheplaintiffsclaimandreleasethedefendant.
SeeA.
Jullien,lugesetAvocatsdesTribunauxdeI'Eg/ise(Rome),1970,471ff.
28.
SeeW.
Onclin,"LesLacunesdelaLoienDroitanonique"LeProblemedesLacunes,op.
cit.
atp.
181ff.
(esp.
p.
186);seealsoA.
vanHove,DeLegibusEcclesiasticis(Rome,Malines),1930,321.
29.
SeeR.
Naz,"Juge",1957,6DictionnairedeDroitCanoniquecol.
205ff.
;seealsoA.
Jullien,op.
cit.
atp.
471ff.
"Whenthejudgecannotreachmoralcertainty-ararepossibility-hemustjudge,butinaccordancetoCanon1869,4.
Thejudge.
.
.
iseverthelessobligedtopronounce,9Rabello:NonLiquetPublishedbyGGULawDigitalCommons,200410ANNUALSURVEYOFINT'L&COMPoLAW[Vol.
10Whereacourtcomposedofseveraljudgesisconfrontedwithamatteroffactualdoubt,thematterisdecidedbyamajorityvote.
Intheexceptionalcaseofavotedividedamonganevennumberofjudges,thedecisionfallsaccordingtotheprincipleactornonprobante,reusabsolvitur.
UnlesstheOrdinarydismissesthejudgesandappointsasubstitutecollegiatechamber.
30Thequestionofnonliquetalsoarisesininternationallaw.
Althoughtheprincipleofnonliquetinitselfisgenerallyrejected,opinionsarenotunanimous.
Municipallaw,aswehaveseensometimesoffersthejudgessomemethod,eitherinternalorexternal,tofillapossiblelacuna.
Butwhataboutasystemlikethatofinternationallaw,withitslimitednumberofnorms,wheretherecoursetoanalogyandtogeneralimplicitprinciplesisnotadmitted,andwhosejudgesarenotallowedtoadjudicateinequitywithouttheexplicitagreementofthepartiesTothisquestion,whichhasrepeatedlybeenraised.
31somehaveponderedwhethertheinternationaljudgeshouldnotbeempoweredtodeclaresibinonliquetintheabsenceofasuitablenorm.
32Ontheotherhand,ithasbeensuggestedthattheprinciplerejectingnonliquet,notunknownincertainnormsofinternationallegaldispositions33issodeeplyrootedinmodernlegalconsciencethatitshouldbeconsideredtoapplyevenininternationallaw.
34becausehisisapublicfunctionfromwhichhecannotexempthimself'.
Seealso:M.
Falco,IntroduzionealloStudiodelCodexJurisCanonici(Torino),1925,103-4andFJ.
Connel,"ReflexPrinciples",1966,12NewCatholicEncyclopaedia169.
30.
F.
dellaRocca,"Sentenza"op.
cit.
;R.
Naz,"Juge"op.
cit.
col.
203ff.
(IhavebeenunabletoobtaintherecentvolumebyL.
Musselli,IIConcettodiGiudicatoneUeFontiStorichedelDirittoCanonico(dalleoriginialsecoloXVII)(Padova),1972.
31.
J.
Stone,LegalControlsofInternationalConflict(London),1954,153If.
;J.
Stone,"NonLiquetandthefunctionofLawintheInternationalCommunity",1959,BritishYearbookofInternationalLaw124etseq.
;J.
Stone,"NonLiquetandtheInternationalJudicialFunction"inLeProblemedesLacunesop.
cit.
p.
3304ff.
;I.
Tammelo,"OnthelogicalOpennessofLegalOrders,1959,8Am.
LCompoL187ff.
32.
Itmustbestressedthatthetwoquestionsoflegallacunaeandofnonliquet,whiletheyarestrictlyinterconnected,areneverthelesstwoseparateissues:acaseofnonliquetisperfectlypossiblewithoutanylacunainlaw,ashasbeenclearlyshownespeciallybyP.
Reuter,DroitInternationalPublic(Paris),1958,303.
33.
See,forinstance,Art.
422oftheConventionfortheregulationofcontroversiesrelatingtoinvestmentbetweenStates,providingthatLeTribunalnepeutrefuserdejugersouspretextedusilenceoudel'obscuritedudroit(Thecourtscannotrefusetopasssentenceowingtothesilenceortheobscurityofthelaw"):onthispointseeespeciallyJJ.
A.
Salmon,QuelquesObservationssurLacunesenDroitInternationalPublic"inLeProblemedesLacunes,op.
cit.
pp.
313-330.
34.
SeeinthisparticularaspectH.
Lauterpacht,"SomeObservationsontheProhibitionofNonLiquetandtheCompletenessoftheLaw"SymbolaeVerzijl(TheHague),1958,197If.
;Idem,InternationalLaw(Cambridge),1970,96(thisthesiswasparticularlyattackedbyJ.
Stone,inhisessayscitedsupra,n.
21.
10AnnualSurveyofInternational&ComparativeLaw,Vol.
10[2004],Iss.
1,Art.
2http://digitalcommons.
law.
ggu.
edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/22004]NONLIQUET11Inthisrespectthequestionalsoarisesofthecompletenessoftheinternationallaw.
Obviouslythisquestionmakesnosenseforasupporteroftheprincipleofnonliquet;but,asheldbyKelsen,thegeneralrulethatwhateverisnotexpresslyprohibitedisimplicitlypermittedprobablyextendstointernationallaw.
"Hewhoassumesthatinsuchacasetheexistinglawcannotbeappliedignoresthefundamentalprinciplethatwhatisnotlegallyforbiddentothesubjectofthelawislegallypermittedtothem.
"35Consequently,ifanyoneoftheaboveargumentsisacceptedasvalid,thequestionofnonliquetininternationallawwillnotdiffersubstantiallyfromthatundermunicipallaw.
36Indeedthemainsupporterofallowingnonliquetininternationallawbeforediscussing"theMeta-LegalaspectsoftheProblem,"statedinadvance,".
.
.
thoughthedebatehasproceededasifthequestionwaswhetheranonliquetwasadmissibleasamatteroflaw,delegelata,themorecorrectlevelmayratherbeintermsofwhetheranonliquetshouldbeadmissibledelegeferenda.
"37III.
GROUNDSFORREJECTINGNONLIQUETINMODERNSYSTEMSWhatarethereasonsforrejectingnonliquetWhatisthebasisofthejudge'sdutytopassjudgmentinallcases,toadjudicate,evenifthismaybeattheexpenseoftruth38Thisisjustifiedbytheargumentthatineverycase,regardlessofitscomplexity,thelawmustfindadefinitesolutionanddetermineaccuratelytherightsoftheparties.
DelVecchioinhisGeneralPrinciplesofLawhasadequatelyexpressedthis.
39Thereisnosourceoffrictionamongmenandnopossiblecontroversy;howevercomplicatedorunforeseen,thatisnotonlysusceptibleofadefinitejudicialsolution,but35.
H.
Kelsen,PrinciplesofInternationalLaw(NewYork),1952,3306;seealsoB.
Akzin,"Kelsen-inMemoriam",1973,8Is.
LR.
325.
OnthecompletenessofInternationalLawseealsoA.
PierisereniI,DirittoInternazionale(Milano),1956,vol.
I,p.
98ff.
36.
SeeN.
Bobbio,LesLacunesop.
cit.
atp.
423etseq.
37.
J.
Stone,LegalControls.
.
.
op.
cit.
supran.
20atp.
153ff.
;seealson.
I,p.
153,stressingthedifferencebetweennonliquetinRomanLawandinInternationallaw:ThemodernmeaningofthetermisthusdifferentfromthatinRomanlaw,wheretheterm'nonliquet'originated.
Ittherereferredeithertothemeredefermentofadecisionpendingfurtherinformation,orthepersonalnon-participationofaparticularmemberofthetribunalinthedecision.
Thoughthesesituationscouldariseinternationally,thesituationdebatedonthemodern'nonliquet'involvesafullnonpossumusofthetribunal,therefusaltodecidebeingbothabsoluteandinstitutional.
"OntheproblemasitaroseinRomanlawseeinfra.
Textatn.
344ff.
ForthepositioninJewishlaw,seetextatn.
76ff.
38.
Forsomeobservationsonthefunctionsofthejudge,theaffinitiesanddifferencesbetweenthefunctionsofthejudgeandthoseofthehistorian,togetherwithsomeremarkson"judicialtruth",seeS.
Ginossar,"PreuveJudiciaire"EncyclopaediaUniversalis;seealsoH.
Levy-Bruhl,LaPreuveJudiciaireop.
cit.
supran.
4atp.
14ff.
39.
TranslatedbyF.
FORTE(Boston),1956;theoriginaleditionwaspublishedas"SuiPrincipiGeneraIidelDiritto"1921,ArchivioGiuridico,F.
Serafini85.
11Rabello:NonLiquetPublishedbyGGULawDigitalCommons,200412ANNUALSURVEYOFINT'L&COMPoLAW[Vol.
10infactdemandsit.
Nostatementdemonstratessoadequatelytheeminentlypracticalnatureoflaworitsfullandperfectrelationtolife.
Greatdoubtanduncertaintymaywellpersistinthetheoreticalaspectsoflaw,foreverybranchofknowledge(includingJurisprudenceasatheoreticalscience)hasalwayspresentedquestionswhichhaveremainedunsolvedtothepresentday,althoughtheyhavebeendiscussedforcenturies.
ButtothequestionQuidiuris(Whatarethelimitstomyrightsandthoseofothers)Ineveryconcretecasetheremustbeananswer,whichmaybecertainlyopentocriticism,butisatleastdefinitiveinpractice.
Ourpresentjuristicsystemconformstothisexigencyofpracticaljusticebywithholdingfromthemagistratethepowertodenyfinaljudgment"onanypretext,evensilence,obscurity,contradictionorinsufficiencyofthelaw.
"Hemustdisposeofallcasesoftransgressionwithsuchappropriatecivilorpenalremediesaseachmayrequire.
40Anotherquestionthenarises,relatingtothenatureofthejudge'sduty.
Itshouldbenotedthatthisdutymayextendbeyondthetermsoftheplaintiff'sclaim,aswhenthelatterisnotlegitimatelyentitledtosueandthejudgeisneverthelessboundto"decidenottodecide",andtodeclarehimselfincompetent.
Thiswouldindicatethatthejudge'sdutyisnotnecessarilythatofdeterminingtherightsoftheparties.
40.
Ibid,p.
1ff.
;wealsoquoten.
I,p.
6;"ThisdoesnotarisefromJuridicalmegalomania'(juristischerGrossenwahn),aswastheopinionofH.
U.
Kantorowitz(GnaeusFlavius,DerKampfurndieRechtswissenschaft(Heidelberg),1906,17,butfromthepracticalnecessitythateachonemust,inacertainway,coordinatehisownbehaviorwiththatofothers.
Thisistheessentialbasisorconceptoflaw.
Asystemoflawwhich,thoughabletosolvesomeproblemsinlife,shouldproveitselfincapableofsolvingallotherswouldnUllifyitselfipsofacto,sinceitfailsinitsprimaryfunction-thatofcreatingorderamonghumanbeings(hominisadhominemproportio-therelationofmantoman).
Onlyinthispracticalsenseisajuristobligedtoreachaconclusionregardingeachquestionpresentedhim;alineofdemarcationbetweenthelawfulandtheunlawful,betweentheexigibleinthefacts,ebusipsisdictantibusethumanisnecessitatibus(thefactsthemselvesandhumannecessitiesbeingdecisive);andthejuristmustintheendrecognizeit.
Ifthebiologist,thephilologistandthehistorianconfesstheirinabilitytosolvealltheproblemspertainingtotheirrespectivesciences,thisisnotbecausetheyaremoremodestthanthejurist(asH.
U.
Kantorowitz,loc.
cit.
,hints),butratherbecauselimitsanddoubtsintheoreticalknowledgedonotsuspendtheprogressoflife.
Wheninstead,asinlegalscience,oneseekstoregulatehumanactionseffectively,sciencemergestosomeextentwiththenecessarilycontinuouscourseoftheseactions,and,therefore,cannotfailtoaccompanythemwithitsjudgments,whichare,however,onlyofimmediatepracticalvalue.
Whileitisindeedtruethatinitstheoreticalrangejurisprudencealsohasdoubtfulpoints,itsage-oldproblems,andcanadinfinitumdoctrinallydebateevenresiudicatae;neverthelesseachnewcontroversy,asitarises,althoughitmayinvolvepointsscientificallyunclarified,bearswithittheconcomitantnecessityoftheissuanceofajudgmentthatwillbedefiniteandcertainandwhichwillhavepracticalfinality".
12AnnualSurveyofInternational&ComparativeLaw,Vol.
10[2004],Iss.
1,Art.
2http://digitalcommons.
law.
ggu.
edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/22004]NONLIQUET13Carnelutti'sdoctrine,41whichdistinguishesbetweenthejudge'sdutytothelitigantsandhisdutytotheState,seemsmostacceptable:"TheState,havingappointedthejudge,laysuponhimtheobligationtojudgethecontroversyattherequestoftheparties,whoareinfactexactlyinthesituationofthethirdparty,favouredinacontractmadewithouttheirdirectparticipation.
"42Toconclude,inmodernlegalsystemstheJudgecannotconsider--asisoftendoneatwillbythescientist--thathisopinionisnotsufficientlyclear,refusing,onthisground,topassjudgment.
Incivilaffairs,heisimperativelyordered,underpainofseveresanctions,tofindwithinthelawthesolutionofthecontroversysubmittedtohisjudgment.
Incriminalmatters,hemusteitherconvictoracquit.
Atmosthemay,shouldheclaimtobeinsufficientlyenlightened,demandsomeadditionalinformation.
Butthisisonlyashortreprieve.
Hemustadjudicate.
43IV.
THEQUESTIONSOFNONLIQUETINROMANLAWIfwestoptoconsiderthepositionofthejudgewhoisbutahumanbeing,riddledwithdoubtsanduncertainties,wemustfirstrecognizethatsometimes,onrareoccasions,hemayfindhimself,notasaninstitutionbutaperson,confrontedwithgraveproblemsofconscience.
Forexample,whenhewouldratherrefrainfromapplyingthegeneralprincipleonusprobandiincumbiteiquidicit(seeDigesta22.
3.
21)directinghimtorejecttheclaimoftheplaintifffornootherreasonthanthelatter'sinabilitytoadducesufficientevidence.
Althoughhemayappeartobeaperfectlyuprightandhonestperson.
IstherealegalsystemthattakestheplightofthejudgeintoconsiderationToanswerthisquestionweshallbrieflyexaminethesamepositioninRomanlaw,JewishlawandinMoslemlaw.
ThewellknownprocedurefollowedunderRomanlawincivilactionsinvolvingthetrialofaclaimbroughtbyonepartyagainstanopponentwasdividedintotwoseparatestages:thefIrstone(iniure)tookplacebeforethemagistrate,generallythepraetor,inhiscourtoflaw,thesecond(apudiudicem)beforeajudge41.
DirittoeProcesso(Napoli,undated)118ff.
intheseriesTrattatodelProcessoCivile:"ObbligodelGiudice"and"ObbligodelGiudiceeDirittodellaParte".
42.
SeealsoG.
Chiovenda,PrincipidelDirittoProcessualeCivile(Napoli),1928,43ff.
,accordingtowhomtheactionisanauthoritativeright.
Onthedifferencesbetweenthefunctionsofthearbitratorandthoseofthejudge,seeibid.
atp.
J08;onsubmissiontoarbitrationbyagreement,seeF.
Carnelutti,IstituzionidelProcessoCivileItalianovol.
I,p.
68.
43.
H.
Levy-Bruhl,AspectssociologiquesduDroit(Paris),1955,114ff.
13Rabello:NonLiquetPublishedbyGGULawDigitalCommons,200414ANNUALSURVEYOFINT'L&COMPoLAW[Vol.
10orjudges,beinggenerallyaprivatepersonorpersonsselectedbythepartiesortakenfromalistofregisteredjudges.
44Thisdivisionoftheprocedureintotwostages(iniure-apudiudicem)wascharacteristicofthecivilprocedureinRomanlawthroughouttheperiodofordoiudiciorumprivatorum,i.
e.
,intheancientprocedureperformulas45Itdisappearedonlyinthecognitioextraordinem,inwhichtheprocedureiscarriedoutentirelybeforethemagistrate.
DuringthefIrststage,itwascustomarytostatetheissues;inthesecond,thejudge,havingheardtheevidence,judgedandpronouncedsentence.
46WhiletheInstitutionsofGaiuscontainmanydetailsconcerningthefIrststageoftheprocedure,givingusaclearpictureofthelegisactiones,theformulaeandtheprerogativesofthepraetor,onlylittle,ifanything,issaidaboutthesecondstage.
Thuslittleisknownaboutthedutiesofthejudge(officiumiudicis).
47Anessay,DeofficioiudicisbyQ.
ElioTubero,alawyerofthelastcenturyoftheRepublicdedicatedtothelayjudge(iudex)48whichmighthavethrownlightonthissubjecthasregrettablynotbeenpreserved.
WhatnowistheattitudeofRomanlawtowardsamagistratewhenindoubtIntheDigestwefindthedistinctionbetweenjudicialandfactualdoubt:44.
Onthispoint,seeinparticularV.
Arangio-Ruiz,IstituzionidiDirinoRomano(Naples,14thed.
),1960,112.
F.
LaRosahasrecentlyconfirmedthattheselectionofjudgeswasnotamatterofCreeprivatechoice,butwaslimitedbythelistsofpersonsinthealbumiudicum,withoutclaiming,however,tohavefoundanyexplicitevidenceofthiscustom:"Laformuladell'Actioludicati(ContributoallostudiodeipoteridelIudex)"St.
Grossovol.
4,1971,240ff.
;contraseeG.
Pugliese,IlProcessoCivileRomanovol.
2-JlProcessoFormularePartI.
(Milano),1963,228etseq.
,andalso235ff.
,andA.
Biscardi,LezionisuiProcessoRomanoAnticoeClassico(Torino),1968,118ff.
and410-11;A.
Berger,EncyclopedicDictionaryofRomanLaw(Philadelphia),1953,359,s.
v.
"albumiudicum";andfinally,P.
Collinet,"LeRoledesJugesdanslaFormationduDroitRomainClassique",1936,Capitolium5ff.
(reprint).
45.
Onthispoint,seeH.
P.
Jolowicz,"ProcedureinlureandApudIudicem.
ASuggestion.
"AftiCongressoBologna,1935,vol.
II.
p.
57ff.
(nonvidi);H.
R.
Hoetink,"TheOriginoftheDualModeinRomanProcedure,"1947,55Seminar16etseq.
;H.
FelixJolowicz,"TheIudexandthearbitralPrinciple",1949,2RIDA477ff.
(=Mel.
DeVisscher).
46.
ForsomecomparativeremarksbetweenRomanandEnglishprocedure,seeA.
EngelmannandOthers,AHistoryofContinentalCivilProcedure(Boston),1927,269ff.
;W.
W.
BucklandandA.
McNair,RomanLawandCommonLaw(Cambridge),1936,315ff.
;seealsoM.
CappellettiandJ.
Perillo,CivilProcedureinItaly(TheHague),1965,26ff.
47.
SeejustificationinG.
I.
Luzzatto,IiProblemad'originedelprocessoextraordinem(Bologna),1965,105.
48.
F.
Schulz,HistoryofRomanLegalScience(Oxford,2nded.
),1953,94.
WithregardtothetermofficiumseeG.
Cervenca,"Sull'usodeltermineofficiumnellalegislazionepostclassica-giustinianea"St.
Grosso,1970,vol.
3,p.
206ff.
withbibliography.
14AnnualSurveyofInternational&ComparativeLaw,Vol.
10[2004],Iss.
1,Art.
2http://digitalcommons.
law.
ggu.
edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/22004]NONLIQUETwhentheJudgesclaimtheexistenceofjudicialdoubts,thepraesidesanswerthem.
Inthecaseoffactualdoubtpraesidesmustabstainfromadvising,butshouldinstructthemtopronounceaccordingtotheirconscience;forinsuchcasestheadvicemightbedetrimentaltojusticeandconducivetofavoritismorself-seeking.
4915Ulpianusexplainsthatthepraesidesshouldserveasthemagistrates'refereesincaseofjudicialdoubt,inwhichcasetheywillinstructthejudgetopronouncesentenceaccordingtotheimperativesofreligio(iudexexconscientiaiudicaredebet)isexpresslystatedbyGotofred);while(thetextcontinues)anyattempttoinfluencethejudgeintheexaminationoffactualevidenceisanabominabledistortionofjusticeandmayresultinunjustsentencesorevenindishonesty.
Althoughthispassagecarries,wemightsay,acertainJustinianaeanflavour(especiallytheappealtothejudge'sconscience,religio),itssubstance,withitscleardistinctionbetweenfactualandjudicialdoubt,bearsthemarkoftheclassicaljurist.
50Thepassagereferstotheprovincialmagistrate,whomayhavebeenexpectedtohavehadgreaterdifficultiesinfindingthelaw,wemayneverthelessassumethatthefunctionoftheRomanjudgewasalsonotfreefromproblems:indeedArangio-Ruizbrilliantlywritesthat"thefunctionoftheprivatejudgeshouldnotbeconsideredlimitedtothesolutionoffactualquestions,asifjudicialquestionswerealreadyimplicitlysolvedintheformula.
"51Therefore,themagistratemayfind49.
D.
5.
11.
79.
1:"Iuddicibusdeiuredubitandibuspraesidesresponderesolent:defactoconsulentibusnondebentpraesidesconsiliumimpartire,verumiubereeosproutreligiosuggeritsententiamproferre:haecenimresnonnumquaminfamatetmateriamgratiaevelambitionistribuit.
"50.
ItwouldappearthatweconcurneitherwiththeexcessivecriticismofG.
Beseler,whoconsidersthewholephasefromthewordsolventtotheend,asaninterpolation("RomanisstischeStudien",1930,50ZSS33),norwithA.
Dell'Oro,whodiscardsthepointaltogether:I[ibrideOfficionellaGiurispridenzaRomana(Milano),1960,142;seealsotheaccurateremarksbyDell'Oro,ibid,n.
157.
Onthispassageseealso:TH.
Mommsen,"AegyptischerErbschaftsprozessvomJ.
135",1893,14ZSS6;E.
Weiss,RecitatioundResponsumimromischerProvinzialprozess,einBeitragrumGerichtsgebrauch",1912,33ZSS238;F.
Vassalli,"MiscellaneaCriticadiDirittoRomanon,IuseFactumContrapposticomeOggettodiConoscenza",1914,annaaliPerugia(=ScrrittiGiuridiciVol.
ill,1,p.
388)whoalsoarguessuccessfullythatthelastpartofthesentence(fromhaecenimrestotheend)hasbeeninterpolated;B.
Biondi,"AppuntiintornoaliaSentenzanelProcessoCivileRomano",inSt.
Bonfante,Vol.
4,1930,45and68;A.
Steinwenter,"RhetoricundromischerZivilprozess",,1947,65ZSS88;M.
Kaser,"BeweislastundVerrnutunginromischerFormularprozess",1954,71ZSS,232,quotingG.
Donatuti'Sessays-whichwehavebeenunabletoobtain;idem.
"InfamiaundIgnominiaindenromischerRechtsquellen",1956,73ZSS231.
51.
From"Istituzioni"op.
cit.
atpp.
138-9;seealsoG.
Broggini,"LaProvanelProcessoRomanoArcaico",1960,IIIus(=Coniectanea,1966,167n.
90).
15Rabello:NonLiquetPublishedbyGGULawDigitalCommons,200416ANNUALSURVEYOFINT'L&COMPoLAW[Vol.
10himselfconfrontedwithdoubtsand,iftheevidenceproducedappearstobeinsufficienthemaybeunabletoformaclearopinion.
52Lemossewrites,".
.
.
asforhimself,thejudgepronouncesaccordingtohispersonalconviction.
.
.
.
Theoutcomeofthetrial,therefore,dependsneitheruponthecredibilityofthewitnesses,norupontheargumentspresented",althoughherecognizesthat"seriousreasonswererequiredinordertodiscardanyevidence.
"AulusGelliusintimatesthatinthefinalanalysis,conscienceisnottheonlynorm.
Inoneword:theRomanswaverbetweenthenecessitytorespectevidence,whosevaluemustprevailuponarbitrarychoice,ontheonehand,and,ontheother,thedesiretoprotectthefreedomofthejudge,whichisoftentheonlydefenseagainsttherogueryofcertainlitigants.
Thisiswhytheiudexisgivenfreescopeofactiontoapointborderingupondenialofjustice.
"53ButhowshouldthejudgebehaveifhehasbeenunabletoformsuchanunequivocalopinionMayhenotthenhonestlyclaimthatthecaseisnotcleartohim(sibinonliquere)54AulusGellius,awriterwhodiedcirca130AD,tellsusaboutaninterestingcasethatoccurredduringhistermofserviceasacivilcourtjudge.
"Asumofmoneywasclaimedbefore52.
Onevidenceseeespecially:J.
P.
Levy,"LaFormationdelaTheorieRomainedesPreuves"St.
Solazzi,1948,418ff.
;E.
Levy,"BeweislastimKlassischenRecht",1952,3Iura155ff.
;M.
Kaser,"BeweilastundVermutung"op.
cit.
atp.
221etseq.
;O.
Pugliese,"L'OneredellaProvanelProcessoperformulas",1956,3RIDA349ff.
;J.
A.
AriasBonet,"PruebaTestificialyObvagulatioenelAntiguoDerechoRomano",StDeFrancisci,1956,vol.
1,p.
283ff.
;O.
Longo,"L'OneredellaProvanelProcessoCivileRomano",1960,11lura149ff.
;O.
Broggini,"LaProvanelProcessoRomanoArcaico"op.
cit.
atp.
133ff.
;OJ.
Luzzatto,IIProblemad'OriginedelProcesso"extraordinem"vol.
I,op.
cit.
atpp.
106-D7.
WedonotwishtotakeastandinthecontroversybetweenJ.
P.
Levy,E.
Levy,M.
Kaserontheonehand,andO.
PuglieseandG.
Broggini,ontheother,concerningtheexistenceofrulesofevidence.
OJ.
Luzzatto,afterfullexamination,sustainsthetraditionalopinion,accordingtowhich,whilenostrictnormsofevidencecanbeassumed,thereexistedcommonsenserulesgenerallyandcustomarilyacknowledgedinpractice;seeonthispointE.
Cuq,Manue1882;"thetheoryofevidenceisthefruitoftherectors'workratherthanofcase-law",affirmsLemOSSSE,"Cognitio-EtudesurIeRoledulugedansl'InstructionduProcesCivilAntique"(Paris),1944,158ff.
53.
From"Cognitio.
EtudesurIeRole.
.
.
.
"op.
cit.
atp.
162ff.
seealsoB.
BIONDI,"AppuntiintornoalIaSentenzanelProcessoCivileRomano"St.
Bonfantevol.
4,p.
34ff.
(=StudiBiondivol.
2,pp.
435etseq.
);OJ.
Luzzatto,IIProblemad'Origine,op.
cit.
atp.
109,n.
1.
54.
Onnonliquetespecially:M.
A.
vonBethmann-Holwegg,DerRomischeCivilprozess,1864,vol.
I,p.
182ff.
;Keller-Wach,DerRomischeCivilprozessunddieActionen,1883,338;C.
Bertolini,AppuntiDidatticidiDirittoRomano(Torino),1914,vol.
I.
,p.
314,andvol.
2,p.
152;E.
Costa,ProfiiloStoricodelProcessoCivileRomano(Roma),1918,76;L.
Wenger,lnstitutionendesRomischenZivilprozessrechts(Munchen),1925;F.
Leonhard-E.
Weisse"NonLiquet",1926,13PW-REcol.
726-7;A.
Scialoia,ProceduraCivileRomana(Roma),1936,183ff.
;M.
Lemosse,"Cognitio-Etude.
.
.
"op.
cit.
atp.
I64;R.
Monier,ManuelEtementairedeDroitRomain(paris),1947,vol.
I,p.
166;P.
Duff,"NonLiquet",1956,3S.
A.
LR.
39ff.
;O.
Pugliese,IIprocessocivile-op.
cit.
,atp.
252ff.
A.
H.
JonesOreenidge,TheLegalProcedureofCicero'sTime,1901,(NewReprint,NewJersey),1971,497ff.
16AnnualSurveyofInternational&ComparativeLaw,Vol.
10[2004],Iss.
1,Art.
2http://digitalcommons.
law.
ggu.
edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/22004]NONLIQUET17me,whichwassaidtohavebeenpaidandcountedout;buttheclaimantdidnotshowthisbydocumentsorwitnesses,butrelieduponveryslenderargument.
"55Thecasewasmadeevenmoredelicatebecausetheplaintiffwasapersonofundoubtedrectitude.
Itwasclear,however,thathewas"athoroughlygoodmanofwellknownandtestedintegrityandofblamelesslife,"56whilethedefendantwasapersonofdubiouscharacter.
"Themanuponwhomtheclaimwasmadewasshowntobeofnosubstance,ofbaseandevillife,oftenconvictedoflying,andfulloftreacheryandfraud.
"57Inviewoftheplaintiffsincapacitytobringevidenceinsupportofhisclaim,thedefendantnotonlyinsistedonhisownrelease,butalsodemandedthattheplaintiffbecondemneddecalumnia.
58Heclaimedthatevidenceregardingtheprivatelifeofthepartieswasirrelevanttothecase,forthiswasacaseofclaimingmoneybeforeaprivatejudge,notaquestionofmoralsinquiredintobythecensor.
"59Gelllius'friendswerepersonswellacquaintedwiththeletterofthelaw,"whomIhadconsultedonthepoint"(quosregoveraminconsilium),advisedhimtoreleasethedefendant,applyingthusthecommonsensenormlateradoptedasarule,bywhichactorenonprobantereusabsolvitur,andthisshoulddoubtlesslyhavebeenthenormalbehaviour.
6055.
Petebaturapudmepecunia,quaedicebaturdatanumerataque,sedquipetebatnequetabulisnequetestibusidfactumdocebatetargumentisadmodumexilibusnitebatur(NoctesAtticae,XlV,2,4).
56.
Virumessefirmebonomnotaqueet.
expectaefideietvitaeinculpatissimae.
.
.
(Ibid).
57.
.
.
.
nonbonaereivitaequeturpietsurdidaconvictumquevulgoinmendaciisplerumqueesseperfidumetfraudumostendebatur(Ibid).
58.
"Ifadefendantwassuedmaliciously,theplaintiffhavingfullknowledgethathisclaimforatenthoftheamountclaimedintheformertrial,buthehadtoprovethatthelatteractedcalumnniaecausa".
SicA.
Berger,EncyclopaedicDictionaryop.
cit.
,atp.
520.
Itmaybenotedherethatrecentlyithasbecomemoreandmorevitaltointroducenormsofloyaltyandintegrityofthepartiesandtheirlegalrepresentativesincourt,"andespeciallytheintroductionofapledgeofloyalty(obbligodiverita)bytheparty(andhisrepresentative)nottoadducefactsitknowstobefalse,andnottocontestfacts(adducedbytheadversary)itknowstobetrue.
ApledgeofthissortwasknowntotheclassicalRomantribunal,togetherwithinstitutionsaimedatpreventingactsofreciprocaldeceptionandcheating(M.
Cappelletti,Processoeldeologie(Bologna),1969,216ff.
;nevertheless,thereremainotherseriousdangers,asnotedbyE.
Redenti,"L'UmanitanelNuovoProcessoCivile",1941,18RivistadiDirittoProcessualeCivile30ff.
;andP.
Calamandrei,OpereGiuridiche(Napoli),1966,3306ff.
and556ff.
;seealsoP.
HenryWinfield,TheHistoryofConspiracyandAbuseofLegalProcedure,1921;S.
Ginossar,"NuisanceBetweenLitigants",1970,2Mishpatim221ff.
and553ff.
59.
".
.
.
resenimdepetundapecuniaapudiudicemprivatumagi,nonapudcensoremdemoribus",Gellius,N.
A.
XIV,2,8).
SeeA.
Berger,EncyclopaedicDictionaryop.
cit.
,atp.
352andE.
Volterra,1963,9NND1344.
60.
ThereforewedisagreewithJ.
P.
Levy,"AFormationdelaTheorieRomainedesPreuves"op.
cit.
atp.
420n.
10,whenheaffirmsthatGelliuswasunabletofind(inthelaw)asolutiontotheproblemofburdenofproof,andwasforcedtoseekitinapurelypragmaticalwork(oneofCato'saddresses).
InfactGelliuswasconsciousthatwhathisadvisorssuggestedwasthegeneralprinciple,whichhoweverdidnotsatisfyhisconscienceinthatspecificcase;onthisseemainlyG.
Pug;oese,"L'OneredellaProva"op.
cit.
atp.
356andn.
6.
17Rabello:NonLiquetPublishedbyGGULawDigitalCommons,200418ANNUALSURVEYOFINT'L&COMPoLAW[Vol.
10Theproposedsolutionseemedindisputable,yetGelliuscouldnotbringhimselftoadoptitandtodisregardtheenormousreliabilitygapbetweentheparties;andthisdoubtcausedhimtoturnforadditionaladvicetothephilosopherFavorinus.
Thelatter,afteralengthylectureonthedutiesofajudge,referstotheprecedentofCicero(firsthalfofthe2ndcenturyBC)thatincaseofconflictingevidence,thepersonalitiesofthepartiesmustbetakenindueconsideration:iftheyareequallyhonest-orequallydishonest-thenthejudgemustpronounceinfavourofthedefendant:butifonlyoneofthepartiesisreliable,thenthejudgemustgivesentenceinhisfavour.
Favorinusthereforeadvisedinthepresentcasetoadmittheplaintiffsclaimandtocondemnthedefendant,basinghimselfontheprinciplequipetitmeliorest.
61Gellius,whowastheninhisyouth,wasconvincedbythemoraljusticeofFavorinus'speech,62butneverthelesswasstillunabletojudgeonthebasisofthebehavioroftheparties,withoutthesupportofevidence(deprobationibusreigestae)andunwillingashewastoreleasethedefendant,hedecidedtodeclarehimselfunabletoreachaclearopinion,therebyrelievinghimselfoftheobligationtopronouncejudgment(etproptereaiuravimihinonliquere,atqueitaiudicatuillosolutussum).
63Fromthisepisodewelearnthatthemagistratedidhisutmosttoreachadecisionthatwouldsatisfybothjusticeandhisownconscience;havingweighedtheevidenceandconsideredthepersonalityofthepartiesheturnedtotheadviceofhisconsiliumandthatofaphilosopher;hisfinaldecisioniuraresibinonliquerewasclearlynotreachedlightly,butwithfullcognizanceofhisresponsibilityasajudge.
Therefore,althoughhe61.
Onthispassage,andespeciallyonthispoint,seeH.
Levy-Bruhl,RecherchessurlesActionsdelaLoi,(Paris),1960,216-218;bythesameauthorseealsohisreviewofA.
Cecchini,in,1928,7RH116-7and"DissentionesPrudentium"inSyntV.
Agrangio-Ruiz,1964,vol.
I,pp.
537-8.
62.
FromtheepisodeitappearsthatGellius,andnotFavorinus,hadbeenappointediudex,andthatthedecisionsibinon-liquerewasthatofGelliusnotofFavorinus,contrarytowhatE.
Volterrawrites(IstituzionidiDirittoRomano(Roma),1961,235)"ciorisultadaunepisodionarratodaGellio,Noc.
Att.
14.
2.
25,intornoadunprocessoincuierastatononinatoiudexilfilosofoFavorino"thisappearsfromanepisodetoldbyGelluis-Att.
Nights,14.
2.
25-aboutatrialinwhichthephilosopherFavorinushadbeenappointediudex).
63.
"AndthereforeIswore'mihinonliquere',andwasthusdeliveredfromthedutytopronounce".
Inadditiontotheauthorsmentionedinn.
43,seealsoC.
Bertolini,IIGiuranmentonelDirittoRomano(Torino),1886,177.
M.
Lemosseop.
cit.
,seesinGellius'wordsajustificationofhisattitude:"thispassageshowsthereasonfortheattitudeadoptedbytheiudex.
Apowerfulmanwhoseintegritywasbeyondsuspicioncouldwelljudgeregardlessofthestrictnormsofthelaw,becausenoonewouldhavedaredtosuspecthimofhavingactedbyself-interestorbias".
18AnnualSurveyofInternational&ComparativeLaw,Vol.
10[2004],Iss.
1,Art.
2http://digitalcommons.
law.
ggu.
edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/22004]NONLIQUET19wasunabletopronouncesentence,hecannotbecensuredforfailingtopassjudgmentofthecase.
64OnthebasisofGellius'chronicleitiscommonopiniontoday65thatduringtheperiodofordoiudiciorumprivatorum66theiudexwasallowedtodeclaresibinonliquere,67inwhichcasethecasehadtoberearrayed.
68DidthiscustomoutlivetheordoiudiciorumprivatorumLemossedoesnotsupposeso.
"Butthisoathnonsibiliqueredisappearsfromlatersources:subsequentlytofurtherchangesintheprocedure,Justinianeancompilationsmentionitonlyindirectly.
.
.
Itisthereforenaturalthattheoathsibinonliquereshouldhavedisappearedwiththeordoiudiciorum,asithadnotmadeitsappearancebeforethecreationofthisordo.
69Regretfully,thereislittlesourcematerial,whichcouldgiveustheanswer.
Looking,ftrstofall,atJustinian'sDigest,wemustkeepinminditsparticularcharacter.
Inspiteofthemanyinterpolationsandmanipulationsofitscompilers,theDigestremainsinsubstanceacollectionoffragmentsborrowedfromclassicaljurists.
Thisexplainsflrsthow,unliketheCodexandtheNovelle,twoexplicitlynormativeworks,theDigesthasatthesametimeanormativeandascholasticanddoctrinarianfunction,withthelatterclearlyprevailingovertheformer;7064.
SeeG.
Pugliese:IIProcessoCivileRomano.
.
.
op.
cit.
,vol.
2,p.
253:theobligationtojudgedidnotnecessarilyentailtheobligationtoactuallysolvethecontroversy.
65.
Nevertheless,seeF.
Schuiz:ClassicalRomanLaw(Oxford),1951,14:"Incivi,unlikecriminalprocedureitisnotpermissibletopronouncenonliquet".
SchulzreferstotheRomischeStrafrechtbyThMommsen,inwhich,however,theauthordoesnotdealwiththequestionofnon-liquetintheframeworkofcivilprocedure.
AgainstSchulz'sopinion,andinfavorofW.
W.
Buckland'sandH.
F.
Jolowicz's,seeP.
Duff;"NonLiquet"op.
cit.
supran.
4.
66.
Withexplicitreferencetolegisactiones,seeG.
Franciosi,IIProcessodiLibertainDirittoRomano(Napoli),1961,68ff.
;contra,seeM.
MarroneinhisreviewofFranciosi'sessayin,1962,13Iura262;pro,seeG.
Pugliese:"ProcessoCivileRomano"vol.
I,p.
422,ff.
(nonvidi)andM.
Kaser,RomischenZivilprocezessrechtop.
cit.
atp.
88n.
3;seealsoM.
Mole,"Sentenza(DirittoRomano)"NNDIp.
1085andn.
7,wherehowever,thereisnodistinctionbetweensourcesrelatingtocivilandtocriminalprocedure.
67.
ItmaybeusefultoremarkthatPothierintroducedGellius'passageinhisPandette,affirmingexplicitly:nevertheless,ifthegivenJudgesdidnotgraspthequestionofthecase,theysworethatitwasnotcleartothem(sibinonliquere)"(sub.
D.
5.
1.
79.
1).
68.
Onthispoint,seeE.
Costa,ProfileStoricoopcit.
atp.
76.
69.
"Cognitio-Etude"op.
cit.
atpp.
164-5.
70.
Onthisimportantsubjectseeespecially:F.
Pringsheim,"dieArchaistischeTendenzJustinians"inGesammelteAlbandlungen(Heidelberg),1961,9ff.
andalso"TheCharacterofJustinian'sLegislation",ibid.
p.
73ff.
;F.
DEVisscher,"LeDigeste,CouronnemmentdelaPolitiquedesEmpereursvis-a-visdesPrudents",ConJerenzeperitxivCentenariodellePandette(Milano),1931,55ff.
;G.
G.
Archi,"IIClassicismodiGiustiniano"inGiustinianoLegislatore(Bologna),1970,169ff.
;ibid.
,p.
181ff.
especially186ff.
;"LaValutazioneCriticadelCorpusIuris",ibid.
,p.
206ff.
;M.
Kaser,RPR,,1969,vol.
2,p.
.
20ff.
;Th.
ayer-Maly,"BemerkungenrumAutbauderDigesetentitel"inSynt.
V.
Arangio-Ruizop.
cit.
atp.
884;seealsoGJ.
Luzzatto'sviewofU.
Ziletti'swork,in,1966,32SDHI363ff.
;andR.
Bonini,"IIManualeNovellarumdelVanDerWal(conalcuneConsiderazionisuiRapportifraNoveJleeDigesto)"inArchivioGiuridico,1966,vol.
171,p.
26est.
SeealsoK.
HeinzSchindler,JustinianusHaltungzurKlassik(Koln-Graz),1966,andreviews19Rabello:NonLiquetPublishedbyGGULawDigitalCommons,200420ANNUALSURVEYOFINT'L&COMPoLAW[Vol.
10andsecond,howvarioustermsassumeathoroughlydifferentmeaninginclassicallawandinpost-classicalJustinianlaw.
1Anoutstandingexampleistheiudex.
Asalreadyshown,inclassicallawtheiudexisgenerallyaprivatecitizenwhoappliestheletterofthelawuponspecificordersfromthepraetorasprescribedintheformula;whileinthelatecognitioextraordinemandinJustinianeantrials,theiudexisamagistrate,anorganofpublicadministration,havingageneralpotestasiudicandiwithinthelimitsofhiscompetence.
Inthe17thbookAdedictum,thejuristPaul,reportinganopinionofPomponius(38thbookAdedictum),writes:Ifinacollegialjudgmentoneofthejudgesappointedtoacivilcausedeclares"sibinonliquere",whiletheremainingjudgesreachanagreement;shouldhedeclareformally"sibinonliquere,"thesentencepronouncedbytherestofthecollegeremainsvalid;forshouldtheabstainingjudgehaveopenlydissented,yetthesentencewouldhavebeenvalidbymajorityvote.
72Weshallnotquestionatthispointtheuseofthetermiudex-theclassicaljuristmighthavewrittenrecuperatoribusorcentumviriinsteadofpluribusiudices3.
Whatappearsunequivocallyfromthispassageisthateveninthecaseofacollegialjudgment,asinglejudgehadtheoptiontoabstainfromgivingajudgmentifthequestionwasnotsufficientlycleartohim,andthathisabstentiondidnotimpairasentencepassedbyamajorityofthejudges.
Thisisjustifiedbythefactthat,hadtheabstainingjudgevotedagainsttheadoptedsentence,theotherjudgeswouldhavenonethelessbeenabletopronouncetheirsentence.
Thereisyetanotherlogicaljustification.
IntheDigestitselfwefindapassagebyCelsus(D.
42.
11.
39),assertingthatinacollegecomposedofthreejudges,twoofthememberscannotjudgeintheabsenceofthethird,fortheyareallboundtoadjudicate(quippeornnesiudicareiussisunt);however,asentencepassedbyamajorityagainstthevoteofthethirdbyG.
G.
Nem,1969,15Labeo84ff.
;G.
Grosso,in,1970,IIndex,InternationalSurveyofRomanLaw,206etseq.
;andTh.
Mayer-Maly,1968,85ZSS556ff.
71.
SeeespeciallyB.
Biondi,"IntomoaliaRomanitadelProcessoCivileRomano",inScrittiGiuridici,op.
cit.
Vol.
II,p.
368ff.
,andespecially388;"DirittoeProcessonellaLegislazioneGiustinianea",ibid.
at519ff.
;"IIProcessoCivileGiustinianeo,ibid.
atp.
567ff.
72.
Siuniexpluribusiudicibusdeliberalicausacognoscenti,derenonliqueat;eaeteriautemconsentienti,siisiuraveritsibinonliquere,EOquiescentecaeterosquiconsentiantsententiamproferre:quiaetsidissentiret,pluriumsententiamobtineret(D.
42.
1.
36).
73.
SeeIndexInterpolationum,col.
228;seealsothecorrespondingpassageinBasilica9,3,36.
20AnnualSurveyofInternational&ComparativeLaw,Vol.
10[2004],Iss.
1,Art.
2http://digitalcommons.
law.
ggu.
edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/22004]NONLIQUET21judgeisabsolutelyvalid,sincethebasiccondition"thatallthreejudgesmusttakepartinthejudgment"hasindeedbeenfulfilled.
74Romanlawisclearlybasedupontheassumption,explicitlymentionedbyMarcellus(0.
44.
1.
37),thatonlyifalljudgeswerepresent,cantheybedeemedtohavetakenpartinthejudgment;andthereisadistinctionbetweenthejudge'sdutytotakepartinthejudgmentandtheactofpronouncingsentence.
Anotherpassage,notdirectlyrelevanttoourproblemisthattakenfromUlpianusandreferringtothearbiterexcompromisso:"Also,shouldthePraetorurgehimtopronounce,andshouldhedeclarethatthecaseisnotyetsufficientlyclearhim,justicerequiresthathebegrantedadelay,afterwhichhewillberequiredtopronounce.
"75Notonlydoesthepassagereferneithertotheiudex,nortothecommonnonliquet,butalsoitdealswithacase,whichisnotyetclear.
Farfromrefusingtopronouncesentence,thejudgemerelyrequestsapostponementsothathemayreachthedegreeofcertaintyrequiredtoformanunequivocalopinion.
ApartfromtheDigest,othersources,morespecificallypost-classical,dealingwithourproblem,areasfollows:Inthecognitioextraordinemajudgeunabletosolvethecontroversy,becauseofeitherfactuaF6orjudicialdoubt,mayremitthedecisiontotheimperialcourtsoflaw(relatio).
ThejudgehadtheoptionofsubmittingtotheEmperorasimplequestionoflaw(consultatio),uponwhichthecasewouldbeturnedbacktohimforadjudicating,subjecttoarightofappeal,orofdeferringthewholecasetotheEmperor.
7774.
ThisprincipleisalsofoundinJewishlaw,where,however,contrarytotheRomansystem,itisprovidedthatshouldoneofthejudgeswishtoabstain,asubstitutemustactinhisplace,inordertoavoidareductionofthejudgingcollege:seeMishnaSanhedrin,III,6andV,5andRashi'scommentarytotheSanhedrintreatise,29a.
75.
"Proindesiforteurgeaturapraetoreadsententiam,aequissimumerit,siiuretsibidecausanondumliquere,spatiumeiadpronuntiandumdari.
"76.
InthissenseseeE.
Costa,ProfiloStorieo,op.
cit.
atp.
153;G.
Bassanelli,"LaLegislazioneProcessualediGiustinoI(9luglio518-agosto527)",1971,37SDHl1l9ff.
;"Suchnormsmaybemeaningfulonlyifusedtoprotectthepartiesagainstanimperialsentence,definitiveforthewholematter;theywouldceasetobenecessaryiftheimperialsentencewereintendedtosolveexclusivelyaquestionoflaw"(p.
164,inItalian).
77.
OnthisargumentseeM.
A.
vonBethmann-Hollweg,DerRomiseheZivilprozessop.
cit.
atp.
91;E.
Costa,ProfiloStorieo.
.
.
.
op.
cit.
atp.
153etseq.
E.
Andt,LaProcedureparE.
Rescrit(paris),1920,8;P.
deFrancisci,"OsservazionisulleCondizionidellaLegislazioneneiSecoliIVeV",Ser.
Salandra(Milano),1928,141ff.
;P.
Collinet,LaProcedureparLibelle(EtudesHistoriquessurIeDroitdeIustinien)(Paris),1932,vol.
4,p.
365;J.
Gaudemet,"L'Empereur,InterpreteduDroit"Fest.
Rabel,1954,vol.
2,p.
169ff.
;U.
Zilletti,StudisuiProeessoCivileGiustinianeo(Milano),1965;M.
Kaser,DasRomiseheZivilprozessreehtop.
cit.
atp.
501;andalsoG.
Bassanelli,"LaLegislazioneProcessuale",op.
cit.
at119ff.
21Rabello:NonLiquetPublishedbyGGULawDigitalCommons,200422ANNUALSURVEYOFINT'L&COMPoLAW[Vol.
10IntheCodexTheodosianus(XI,29)andintheCodexIustinianus(VIT,61),anentiretitleisreservedtothematterderelationibus.
ThefirstconstitutionoftheCodexTheodosianus,attributedtoEmperorConstantineandaddressedtothecorrectorLucaniaeetBrittiorum,78reads:".
.
.
Inviewofthefactthatthereremainstolitigantsthelegitimatechoiceofanappealfromdecisions,youmustconsultOurMajestyonlyconcerningafewmatterswhichcannotbedecidedbyjudicialsentence,inorderthatyoumaynotinterruptOurimperialoccupations.
"79Gaudemetoffersanexcellentjustificationofthispractice:"Alljurisdiction,whetherbysinglejudgeorbyjury,wasthereforeallowedtofollowthisprocedure(perrelationem).
Thiswasnormal,sincetheEmperorisnotconceivedhereasahierarchicallysuperiorinstance-whichmighthaveservedtojustifyaninterdictiontoinferiorjudgestotrythecasedirectly.
Theemperorintervenesinhiscapacityassolecourseoflawandjustice.
"80ThisisnottheplacetoexamineindetailthenormsdeterminingthevariousstepsofaperrelationemprocedureandtheconnectedinterventionsoftheEmperors.
8lWewouldonlyremarkthatatfirsttheEmperors,wishingtomaintaindirectcontactwithcivilofficialsthroughouttheprovincesandanxioustopromoteandexpandtheuseofRomanlawratherthanoflocalcustomarynorms,favoredtheprocedure.
82Butquitesoon,atthetimeofConstantine(God.
Theod.
11.
29.
2),theEmperorscametorecognizetheneedforrestrictingthisprocedure,inordertoavoidoverloadingtheimperialcourts.
ThefinallinkofthisevolutionarychainisprobablythepromulgationbyJustinianusoftheNovella125,DeIudicibusdated543AD,bywhichtheEmperorendeavoredtoresisttheimpactofpracticebyprohibitingjudgestryingacasefromaskingtheEmperor'sadviceonmerepointsoffactoroninferencestobedrawnfromthem.
TheEmperororderthe78.
OnthecorrectorLucaniaeetBrittiorumseeA.
M.
Rabello,"IPrivilegideiChiericisottoCostantino",1970,16Labeo391n.
13,withbibliography.
79.
Superpaucis,quaeiuridicasententiadecidinonpossunt,nostramdebesconsuleremaiestatem,neoccupationesnostrasinterrompas,cumlitigatoribuslegitimumrernaneatartibriumasententiaprovocandi.
80.
From"L'Empereur,InterpreteduDroit"op.
cit.
81.
Forsuchanexamination,seetheessaybyG.
Bassanelli:"LaLegislazioneProcessuale",op.
cit.
withrichbibliography.
82.
"IfanyjudgeshouldsupposethatacaseoughttobereferredtoUs,hemustpronouncenodecision,butratherheshallconsultOurWisdomonthepointonwhichhesupposesthatthereissomedoubt;butifheshouldrenderadecision,hemustnotthereafterdeterlitigantsfromappealingtherefrombypromisingtoreferthemattertoUS.
GivenonthefourthdaybeforetheidesofFebruaryatSirmiumintheyearofthefifthconsulshipofConstantineAugustusandtheconsulshipofLiciniusCasear.
February10,319;February7,318.
"22AnnualSurveyofInternational&ComparativeLaw,Vol.
10[2004],Iss.
1,Art.
2http://digitalcommons.
law.
ggu.
edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/22004]NONLIQUET23judgeto"perfecteexaminarecausametquodsibiiustumatquelegitimumvisumsitiudicare,"83remarkingthatshouldoneofthepartiesfeelinjuredbythedecision,hestillhastherighttoappeal.
84AcertainassumptionmaythusbemadethattheNovella125ofJustinianactuallylaysdownthesameruleaslateradoptedbymodernlegalsystems,byimposinguponthejudgesthedutytopronouncejudgmentinallcases.
85V.
THEPROBLEMINJEWISHANDMOSLEMLAW:SOMEREMARKS,WITHSUGGESTIONSDELEGECONDENDAItmaybeinterestingtonotethatboththeJewishandtheIslamiclegalsystemsallowthejudgetoabstainfrompronouncingsentenceincertaincases.
InJewishlaw,itmaybesaidthatthejudgemustasaruletakecaretoreachtheproperdecision,inaccordancewithhisresponsibilitytowardsGodbutwithoutunduefearastotheconsequencesofhisdecision.
Somerulesdealwithpossibledoubtsandhowtodisposeofthem.
Thesolutionsvaryaccordingtothesubjectmatter,adistinctionbeingmadebetweenmereproprietaryrights(dineimammonoth)andcasesinvolvingproblemsof"sanctity",suchasmarriage.
8683.
".
.
.
toexaminethecasewiththeutmostcareandtopronounceinaccordancewithwhatappearstothemfairandlegitimate".
Itwillberecalledthataroundthattimeatheoryofevidencewasbeingformulated,providingthejudgewithadditionalcriteriaofjudgment.
OnthispointseeG.
G.
Archi,"LaProvanelDirittodelBassoImpero,"1961,12lura1etseq.
;Idem.
"LesPreuvesdansIeDroitduBasEmpire"Rec.
Bodinop.
cit.
Vol.
1,p.
389ff.
;U.
Zilletti,"StudisulleProvenelDrinioGiustinianeo",1964,68BIDR167ff.
;alsoM.
Kaser,"RomZivilprozesrecht"op.
cit.
atp.
485ff.
;andnowD.
Simon,UntersuchungenzumJustinianischenZivilprozess(Munchen),1969,135ff.
andG.
Provera'sreviewin,1970,21lura211ff.
84.
OnNovella125andontheformerNovella113,seeespecially:N.
vanderWal,ManualeNovel/arumlustiniani(Amsterdam),1964,48andn.
4and147no.
2:("henceforththejudgesareforbiddentoconsultwiththeemperor"(inFrench);U.
Zilleni,StudisuiProcesso-op.
cit.
,atp.
46andn.
103,p.
261,etseq.
;G.
Bassanelli,"LaLegislazioneProcessuale"op.
cit.
atp.
162ff.
and214:".
.
.
ButthecodificationofJustinianhadevendeeperrepercussionsinthehistoryoftrial,foritbroughtaboutradicalchangesintherelationshipbetweenthejudgeandthelawtobeadministeredbyhim.
Thisisespeciallyevidentinthehistoryoftrialperrelationem:regulatedbyJustinianin529(Cod.
I,14,12),itwasentirelyabolishedafterthecodificationbyNovella25".
85.
Inthepresentarticlewehavediscussedthequestionmainlyasitarisesincivillaw.
Forastudyofitsaspectincriminallaw,seeTH.
Mommsen,RomischeStrafrecht,1899,4233ff.
;Hartmann,"Ampliatio"W,RE,1894,vol.
I,col.
1979ff.
;F.
Lanfranchi,IIDirittoneiRetoriRomani(Milano),1938,553ff.
;U.
Brassiello,"ProcessoPenaleRomano",1966,13NND/1159:("Atthecompletionoftheevidence,thejuryhastherighttoabstainfromjudgment,declaringsibinonliquereandorderingadditionalresearch.
Thisleadstotheampliatio").
Ampliatiowasin"Romancriminalprocedurethereiterationofalltheevidencewhenthejurydeclaredthatthecasehasnotbeensufficientlyelucidatedandrequiredfurther(amplius)investigation",A.
BergerEncyclopedicDictionaryop.
cit.
atp.
361.
OnLexAcililaseeS.
Riccobono,FIRAvoU,p.
84etseq.
andp.
94.
86.
ForathoroughanalysisonthispointseeP.
Shifman,"OntheConceptofDoubt('Safek')inHalachaandLaw"I,1974,ShenatonHa-MishpatHaivri328.
Inaddition,seeH.
Ben-Menahem,"IsThereAlwaysOneUniquelyCorrectAnswertoaLegalQuestionintheTalmud",1987,6TheJewishLawAnnual164.
Forfurtherbackground,thehistoricalaspectisdealtwithinLamm&Kirschenbaum,"FreedomandConstraintintheJewishJudicialProcess",1979,ICardozoLaw23Rabello:NonLiquetPublishedbyGGULawDigitalCommons,200424ANNUALSURVEYOFINT'L&COMPoLAW[Vol.
10Nevertheless,theMisharecognizesthejudge'srighttoremainindoubtandtodeclareexplicitly"Idonotknow"(Sanhedrin,3,6):".
.
.
iftwo(judges)findhiminnocent,twodeemhimguiltyandthefifthsays"Idonotknow"-additionaljudgesmustbeappointedtothecase.
"87Thisruleisbaseduponthegreatrespectduetothejudge'sconscienceandtheresponsibilityofhisfunction.
Itisinterestingtonotethatwhenajudgeissuspiciousoftheplaintiffsintentionsheshouldrefrainfromjudgment,regardlessofanyevidencepresentedbytheplaintiffhimself;butthiswillnotpreventanotherjudgefromhearingthecasedenovo.
88AsforMoslemlaw,"incaseswheretheqadifeelsunabletocometoacorrectdecisiononthebasisoftheevidenceoffered,heisallowedtoabstainfromjudgment.
.
.
Equally,wheretherelevantruleoflawisitselfamatterofdoubttheqadiisnotforcedtogivejudgment.
.
.
ifnopositiveindicationappearstohim,(hemust)abandonthecaseandrefrainfromjudgment,therebeingdoubtinhisheart.
"89Thisbriefhistoricalandcomparativesurveyshowsthatinmodernlegalsystemsthejudgemaynotrefrainfromgivingjudgment,eitherinfavororagainsttheplaintiffsclaim.
90BydeliveringhisdecisionthejudgeReview99.
DissertationbyP.
Shifman,UncertaintyintheValidityofMarriageinIsraeliLaw(thesis,Jerusalem,1972,inHebrew,notyetpublished).
87.
SeealsotheMishnaSanhedrin,5,5.
88.
OnthispointseeP.
Shifman,op.
cit.
,p.
14etseq.
;wheretheauthorremarksthatintheMiddleAges,dueprimarilytotheinfluenceofRabbenuAsher(Rosh),therewasachangeindirectives.
Ifthejudgehasgoodreasontosuspectfraudonthepartoftheplaintiff,hehastodecidethecaseinfavorofthedefendant;andconversely,ifhissuspicionsfalluponthedefendant,hemustpronounceinfavoroftheplaintiff(notethesimilaritywithGellius'problem,reportedsupra).
Finally,anewprinciplemakesitsappearance,namelythatifthejudgedeemsthecasetobeobjectivelydoubtful,andsuchthatpresumablyanotherjudgewouldreachthesameconclusion,hemustattempttobringthepartiestoacompromise.
Notdirectlyrelevanttoourproblemisthedutyofthecourttoabstainfromjudgmentwhenthereisreasontothinkthatlatereventsmaydisprovethejusticeofthesentence:Insuchexceptionalcasesthelegalpositionistobekeptinabeyancesubjecttosubsequentevidence;onthispointtoo,seeP.
Shifman,op.
cit.
atp.
IS.
89.
FromN.
J.
Coulson,"DoctrineandPracticeinIslamicLaw",1956,18BulletinoftheSchoolofOrientalandAfricanStudies,UniversityofLondon,pI.
2,p.
211etseq.
and224inparticular.
90.
OntheconceptofsentenceseeespeciallyB.
Windscheid,DirittodellePandette123ff.
andthenotestothoseparagraphsbyFaddaandBensa;G.
Chiovenda,PrincipidiDirittoProcessuale-op.
cil.
atp.
134ff.
and891ff.
;G.
Pugliese,"Notesull'IngiustiziadellaSentenzanelDirittoRomano",St.
Betti,(Milano),1962,Vol.
3,p.
725ff.
;M.
Marrone,L'EjfettoNormativodellaSentenza(CorsodiDirittoRomano)(Palermo),1960.
Forthediscussionofdelicateproblemsastothedistinctionbetweenefficacyandauthorityofjudgmentsandastounjustjudgment,see,withabundantbibliography,G.
Pugliese,"GiudicatoCivile,DiritoVigente",EnciolopediadelDiritto,1968,vol.
xvmn.
8ff.
andn.
12etseq.
;E.
BETTI,"Resiudicata(DirittoRomano)",1968,ISNNDI216ff.
;A.
Guarneri,"Resiudicata"(DiriUoProcessualeCivile)"1968,15NNDI218ff.
;F.
Lancellotti,"SentenzaCivile",1969,16NNDII106ff.
,withbibliography.
24AnnualSurveyofInternational&ComparativeLaw,Vol.
10[2004],Iss.
1,Art.
2http://digitalcommons.
law.
ggu.
edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/22004]NONLIQUET25dischargeshisobligationsastheystemfromthelawandfromthejudicialprocess.
Heisfunctusofficio.
Byconsentingtoactasjudge,hehasineffectwaivedtherighttoremainindoubt,whateverthenatureofthecase.
Hecannotclaimnottoknowhowtobehaveinthecontextofthecontroversywithwhichheisconfrontedinhiscourtofjustice,eitherunderjudge-madelaworwithinthescopeoflegislativeenactments.
Generallyspeakingthefunctionofthejudgeishighlyrespected,butweshouldmakesomeallowanceforthefactthatheisonlyahumanbeingjudginghisfellowman;andproportiohominisadhominemshouldbepreserved.
Thepossibilityofappealdoesnotremove,ordoesnotentirelyremove,thedoubtsofadjudication,allthemoresinceeveryjudgmentraisesacertainpresumptionoftruth,whichmayformthebasisforthefull-fledgeddoctrineofresiudicata.
Thereforeasimplerevivalofnonliquet,howeverdesirableitmightappearintheory,wouldhardlybepracticable.
Apropermitigationmightperhapsbefoundintheattitudeadoptedbysomelegalsystems,which,withoutrelaxingthejudge'sdutytoadjudicate,withholdthefulleffectsofresiudicatawheneverthedecisionhasbeenreachedonlythroughlackofproofandnotuponfactsclearlyfoundbythejudge.
Thisconcessionmayusefullyservetoreconciletheconflictingrequirementsoftruthandjustice,ontheonehand,andcertainty,ontheother.
25Rabello:NonLiquetPublishedbyGGULawDigitalCommons,200426AnnualSurveyofInternational&ComparativeLaw,Vol.
10[2004],Iss.
1,Art.
2http://digitalcommons.
law.
ggu.
edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/2