eu_directiveslocalsettings

__Contactpoint:Ms.
RoxanneMcElvane,UnitedStatesFederalCommunicationsCommission,WashingtonD.
C.
,USA,Tel.
:+12024181489/Fax:+12024180398e-mail:rmcelvan@fcc/govC:\DOCUMENTSANDSETTINGS\MUNN\LOCALSETTINGS\TEMPORARYINTERNETFILES\OLK218\18_1.
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03Question18/1:Domesticenforcementoflaws,rulesandregulationsontelecommunicationsbynationaltelecommunicationregulatoryauthoritiesSTUDYGROUP1SOURCE:RAPPORTEURFORQUESTION18/1TITLE:DOMESTICENFORCEMENTOFTELECOMMUNICATIONSLAWS:GUIDELINESFORTHEINTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY-REPORTONQUESTION18/1INTERNATIONALTELECOMMUNICATIONUNIONDocument1/126-E10February2005TELECOMMUNICATIONDEVELOPMENTBUREAUITU-DSTUDYGROUPSEnglishTHIRDMEETINGOFSTUDYGROUP1:GENEVA,7-10SEPTEMBER2004THIRDMEETINGOFSTUDYGROUP2:GENEVA,13-16SEPTEMBER2004-2-ITU-D/1/126-EC:\DOCUMENTSANDSETTINGS\MUNN\LOCALSETTINGS\TEMPORARYINTERNETFILES\OLK218\18_1.
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03TableofcontentsI.
INTRODUCTION4II.
SOURCEOFENFORCEMENTPOWERS5A.
Overview5B.
Countryexamples.
5C.
Challengesidentified.
11D.
Draftguidelines.
11III.
ENFORCEMENTPRACTICE&PROCESS12A.
Overview12B.
Countryexamples.
13C.
Challengesidentified20D.
Draftguidelines.
21IV.
INDEPENDENTDECISIONMAKING.
22A.
Overview22B.
Countryexamples.
23C.
Challengesidentified23D.
Draftguidelines.
23V.
SANCTIONSANDPENALTIES.
23A.
Overview23B.
Countryexamples.
25C.
Challengesidentified29D.
Draftguidelines.
30VI.
GENDERANDENFORCEMENT.
30A.
Overview30B.
Countryexamples.
32C.
Challengesidentified33D.
Draftguidelines33-3-ITU-D/1/126-EC:\DOCUMENTSANDSETTINGS\MUNN\LOCALSETTINGS\TEMPORARYINTERNETFILES\OLK218\18_1.
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03VII.
ORGANIZATIONANDRESOURCES33A.
Overview33B.
Countryexamples.
34C.
Challengesidentified36D.
Draftguidelines36AnnexA-Summaryofguidelines.
38AnnexB-Commonenforcementchallenges.
42AnnexC-Indexofcountryexamples.
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03I.
INTRODUCTIONAdecadeagotherewereveryfewtelecommunicationsregulatoryauthoritiesineitherdevelopedordevelopingcountries.
Infact,in1990therewereonlythirteen.
1Sincethattime,thenumberhasroughlydoubledeveryfourtofiveyears.
Todaytherearenolessthanonehundredtwentythreeregulatoryauthorities–alittlemorethanninetimesthenumberfourteenyearsago.
Duringthistime,muchattentionnecessarilyhasbeendevotedtoformingtheseorganizations,andcreatingandtakingthefirststepstoapplyregulationsthatimplementthetelecompoliciespromulgatedbythelegislativearmofgovernment.
Atthesametime,thesenewregulatoryauthoritieshavehadtocontendwithmajorchangesinthetelecommunicationsindustryincludingliberalization,privatization,andcompetition,whilesimultaneouslylookingforwaystoensureandsafeguarduniversalaccesstotelecommunicationsservices.
Morerecently,convergenceissueshavebeenpresentingnewchallenges.
Consequently,therehasbeenlittletimetoconsiderhowbesttoenforcenewlypromulgatedlaws,rules,andregulations.
Wheresuchenforcementanddisputeresolutionfunctionshaveexistedinthepast,theywereprimarilytheprovinceofthecourts.
2Effectiveenforcement,however,isacriticalcomponentofregulatinginthepublicinterest.
Broadlyspeaking,withouttheabilitytoenforcelaws,aregulatoryregimeismeaningless.
Eveninthemostderegulatoryenvironment,itsvalueisselfevident:togiveeffecttothoserulesdeemednecessarytomaintainorderinthesector;tofacilitatestability,predictability,progressandinvestment;todeterwrongdoing;andtomaximizesocialandcorporatewelfare.
Inthetelecommunicationscontext,effectivelyenforcinglawscanhelpprotectconsumers,ensureservicequality,guardpublicsafetyandotherservicesfrominterference,fostertheefficientuseofspectrum,andpromotecompetition,growth,andinvestmentinthesector.
Ithasbeensaidthatastuteenforcementcanremedydesigndefectsinregulatorymechanismswhileill-enforcementcanunderminethemostsophisticateddesignsofregulation.
3Ofcourseitiscrucialthatadecisionbyanationalregulatoryauthority(NRA)toundertakeanenforcementactionbebasedonobjectivefacts.
Arbitraryorcapriciousenforcementactionsunderminethefairnessandeffectivenessofanenforcementregime.
Inthispaper,wewilllookatwaysforregulatoryauthoritiestoeffectivelyenforcedomestictelecommunicationslaws.
Contributionstoourworktodateremindusthatformanycountries,certainconceptsofregulationintelecommunicationsareunfamiliar,andpracticesorsolutionsthataresuitableindevelopedcountriesmaynotworkwellinonesthataredevelopingoremerging.
Wealsonotethedistinctchallengesfacedbymanycountriesduetolackofresourcesandcapacity,4andwilllooktomakerecommendationsthatcanaddressthesecircumstancesinparticular.
Ultimately,wehopetobeabletoprovideamenuofrecommendationsthatmaybeappliedindiversecircumstancesthatwillassistourMemberStates'effortstoenforcetheirdomestic1See"TrendsinTelecommunicationsReform2003,"InternationalTelecommunicationUnion,at15.
2See"EffectiveRegulation,TrendsinTelecommunicationReform2002",InternationalTelecommunicationUnionat54.
Experienceseemstobeshowing,however,thatexcessivedivisionofregulatoryresponsibilityamongdifferentgovernmentagenciescanleadtodelayedandinconsistentresponsestomarketandregulatorydevelopments.
Id.
3"UnderstandingRegulation–Theory,Strategy,andPractice,"RobertBaldwin,MartinCave,OxfordUniversityPress,Inc.
NewYork1999at96.
4Seee.
g.
,"DomesticEnforcementofTelecomlawsandregulationsandlimits:Uganda'sExperience"December2002,UgandaCommunicationsCommissionContributiontoITU-Dquestion18/1at1–2.
(UCCContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,December2002);"EffectiveRegulation:CaseStudy-Morocco",InternationalTelecommunicationUnionat41.
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03telecommunicationslaws.
Thisinturnshouldfacilitatedeliveryofthebenefitsarobusttelecommunicationssectoriscapableofprovidingtoall.
II.
SOURCEofENFORCEMENTPOWERSA.
OverviewMostregulatoryauthoritiesderivetheirpowertoenforceregulationfirstandforemostfromtheirdomesticenablinglegislation.
5Inadditiontoconferringpowertodisposeofsubstantivematters,6enablinglegislationgenerallyempowerstheregulatoryauthorityto:(i)inquire;(ii)collectinformation;(iii)investigate;(iv)determineculpability,and(v)imposepenalties.
Inaddition,someregulatoryauthoritiesplaceconditionsforenforcementorevenenforcementmechanismsthemselvesinthelicensestheyissue.
InEgypt,forexample,asystemtoreceiveandinvestigatecomplaintsandrepairfaultsmustbespecifiedinalicense.
7InMorocco,qualityofservicestandardsareincluded(andpresumablyenforcedbytheNationalRegulatoryAuthority(orNRA)aslicenseconditions.
Inothers,e.
g.
,SingaporeandBrazil,qualityofservicestandardsareadoptedasregulationsapplicabletoallserviceproviders.
8Whenaskedtodescribethesourceoftheirenforcementpowers,manycountriesalsorefertoregulationspromulgatedbytheregulatoryauthorityitselfthatpresumablycarryoutorfurtherinterpretthelegislature'sstatedgoals.
RegulatoryauthoritiesoftheEuropeanUnionmemberstatesmustfollowtherelevantdirectivesissuedbythissupra-nationalbody.
B.
CountryExamplesPursuanttotheUgandaCommunicationsAct,theUgandaCommunicationsCommission's(UCC)regulations,andlicenseprovisions,theUCCmayreceive,investigate,andactoncomplaintsandviolations,imposefinesforunlawfullyprovidingcommunicationsserviceorforunlawfullypossessing,installingconnectingoroperatingcommunicationsequipment/apparatus.
TheUCCmayalsoappointinspectorstoverifycompliancewiththeUgandaCommunicationsAct,andpursuanttopermissiongrantedfromtheUgandaDirectorofPublicProsecutions,maycriminallyprosecuteoffensesconcerningcommunicationsservices.
9TheUgandaCommunicationsActandUCCregulationsalsoprovidefortheprotectionofconsumers.
Accordingly,theUCChasincorporatedbroadprovisionsinoperator'slicensesrelatingtoqualityofservice,masterserviceagreements,tariffs,interconnection,customerassistance,conflictresolution,equipmenttypeapproval,andconfidentiality.
10InBrazil,LawNo.
9472enactedonJuly16,1997isknownastheGeneralTelecommunicationsLaw.
ThislawcreatedANATELasaregulatoryagencyoftheindirectFederalPublicAdministration,reportingtotheMinistryofCommunications.
Underthislaw,ANATELhas5AnexceptiontothisisColumbia,wheretheregulatoryauthorityisnotresponsibleforenforcementactionsinthetelecomsector.
Rather,anentirelydifferentgovernmentagencymaintainsthisresponsibility.
See"TrendsinTelecommunicationReform2002",InternationalTelecommunicationUnionat45.
6Forexample,Article8ofMorocco'sLaw24-96,requiresANRTtoestablishtermsandconditionsforinterconnectionandtoestablishtheprocedureforsubmittinginterconnectiondisputes.
ANRTalsomustestablishtherulesgoverningtheradiofrequencyspectrum.
"EffectiveRegulation:CaseStudy-Morocco,"InternationalTelecommunicationUnionat23.
7ArabRepublicofEgypt,LawNo.
10/2003,IssuedFebruary2003,Article25,no.
18.
8See"TrendsinTelecommunicationReform2002,"InternationalTelecommunicationUnionat46.
9SeeUCCContributiontoITU-Dquestion18/1,December2002,at1-2.
10"AddendumtoUganda'sContributionontheEnforcementofLaws,Rules,andRegulationsbyNationalTelecommunicationRegulatoryAuthorities,"January3,2004,at3(AddendumtoUganda'sContribution).
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03authoritytoregulate,amongotherthings,telecommunicationsserviceofferings,licensing,interconnection,useofradiofrequency,useoforbitalslots,universalaccessandqualityofserviceobligations,unfaircompetitionpractices,ownershipandcorporatecontroloftelecommunicationsoperators,andtoenforceassociatedregulationsintheseareas.
11TheLawgivesANATELthepowertorequestspecificinformation,inspectoperators'premises,andifwarranted,searchandseizetelecomequipmentorhaltandsealunlicensedoperation.
12Article19oftheGeneralLawgivesANATELthedutyto"settleconflictsofinterestamongtelecommunicationserviceproviders.
"13ANATELmayalsofunctionasanarbitratorinordertosettleconflictsamongtelecommunicationsoperatorsandusers.
Inthatcase,thepartiesmustagreetosubmittheirconflicttoANATELandacceptitsdecisioninarbitrationasfinalandbinding.
14TogetherwiththeAdministrativeCouncilforEconomicDefense(CADE),ANATELisresponsibleforassuringahealthycompetitiveenvironmentinthetelecomsector,curbingunfaircommercialandtechnicalpractices.
15Egypt'sNationalTelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority(NTRA)derivesitsenforcementpowersfromLawNo.
10/2003–TelecommunicationsRegulation,issuedatthePresidencyinFebruaryof2003.
ThislawgivesEgypt'sNTRAauthoritytoregulateandadministerspectrumuse,(Article49)establishlicensingfees,conditions,andrulesforfrequencyorbandwidth,(Articles51&53)andincoordinationwiththeArmedForcesandthenationalsecurityauthority,monitorspectrumandinspectlicensedwirelessequipmenttoensurecompliancewithrelevantlicenseconditions(Article55).
ThislawalsogivesNTRAthepowertoestablishthepriceforservicesidentifiedasbeingprimaryforoperatingandprovidinglicensedtelecommunicationsservices,(Article29)establishcriteriaandregulationsfornon-economictelecomservices,developrulesforuser'sprotection,anddevelopasystemtoreceiveuser'scomplaints.
(Article5).
Chapter12:05ofZimbabwe's2000PostalandTelecommunicationsActcreatedthePostalandTelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthorityofZimbabwe(POTRAZ)asaseparate,legalentitywithadministrativeandfinancialautonomy.
UndertheAct,POTRAZ'dutieswithregardtotelecommunicationsincludespromotingdevelopmentofandensuringdomesticandinternationaltelecommunicationsservices,issuinglicenses,promotingeffectivecompetition,monitoringandapprovingtariffs,administeringthenationalnumberingplan,andpromotingtheinterestofconsumers.
16TheBhutanTelecommunicationsActof1999establishedtheBhutanCommunicationsAuthority(BCA)withintheMinistryofInformationandCommunications(thencalledtheMinistryofCommunications)onJanuary1,2000,andonJuly1,2000createdBhutanTelecom,formerlythe11See"EnforcementandtheBrazilianNationalTelecommunicationsAgency"ContributionfromANATELtoITU-DQuestion18/1,March12,2003atpp.
2-4.
(ANATELcontributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,March12,2003).
Seealso"EnforcementandtheBrazilianNationalTelecommunicationsAgency(ANATEL),"ContributionfromANATELtoITU-DQuestion18/1,July30,2003at2.
(ANATELContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,July30,2003).
12ThoughprovidedforintheGeneralTelecommunicationLaw,ANATEL'spowerofsearchandseizureiscurrentlybeingchallengedbeforetheSupremeFederalCourt.
ANATELContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,July30,2003at2.
13SeeTrendsinTelecommunicationReform2002,InternationalTelecommunicationUnionat50.
ANATELhasalreadyarbitratedseveralcasesinvolvinginterconnectionandnetworkaccess.
Id.
14ANATELContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,July30,2003at2.
15Id.
at5.
16"ContributionofZimbabwetoDomesticEnforcementofLaws,Rules,andRegulationsonTelecommunicationsbyNationalTelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthorities"January2004at1-2.
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03DepartmentofTelecom.
TheBCAisresponsibleforregulatingtelecommunicationsandradiocommunicationsinfrastructureandservices,cabletelevision,andpostalcommunications.
Amongotherthings,the1999ActempowerstheBCAtoregulatethepriceoftelecomservices;financialandtechnicalaspectsofinterconnection;universalservice;andthenationalnumberingscheme.
BCAmayalsoissuelicensesforradiocommunicationsfacilitiesandservices,andtoachieveinteroperability,settechnicalstandardsfortelecommunicationsystemsandterminalequipment.
17The1999lawalsogivesBCAtheauthoritytoconductadministrativehearingstoresolvetechnologicalissues,disputesandcomplaints,andtomakeandenforceregulationsandissueguidelinesandcodesofpracticegoverningthetelecomsector,particularlyinthecaseofpublictelecommunicationssystemsorservices.
BCAcanacttoeliminateanyabuseofmarketpoweroranticompetitivebehavior,andcanorderanoperatortocomplywithappropriateinternationalequipmentandtechnicalstandards.
18Bolivia'stelecommunicationssectorunderwentsignificantstructuralchangesinthemid-nineties.
Specifically,asectorregulationsystem(SIRESE)wasestablished;anewtelecommunicationslawwaspromulgated;andanindependentregulatoryinstitutioncalledtheTelecommunicationsSuperintendencewascreated.
19TheSuperintendenceregulatesBolivia'sinfrastructureandservicesintelecommunicationandradio,withinthepolicyframeworkdefinedbytheExecutivethroughtheMinistryofServicesandPublicWorks.
Ithastechnical,economic,andfinancialautonomy,anditsactivitiesarefinancedbyaregulationratedeterminedbylawforallholdersofconcessions,licenses,orregistries,irrespectiveofwhethertheyareserviceprovidersorradioprogrammingproviders.
20Bolivia'sTelecommunicationsLaw,No.
1632,anditssubsequentmodifications,togetherwithSupremeDecreesandMinisterialResolutionsdeterminethelegalframeworkforthetelecommunicationssector.
ThislawiscomplementedbyitsFrameworkProcedures(D.
S.
25950),theInterconnectionRegulations(D.
S.
26011),theMarketOpeningPlan(D.
S.
26005),andtheRegulationsforInvoicing,CollectionandServiceCuts(D.
S.
26401).
21UndertheSIRESELaw(No.
1600)theTelecommunicationsSuperintendencecan,amongotherthings,promotecompetition,andregulatelicenses,servicequality,pricesandrates,andtechnicalstandards.
Itcanalsoinvestigateanticompetitiveordiscriminatoryconduct,hearandprocesscomplaintsunderSIRESEjurisdiction,andapplysanctions.
22Inaddition,theTelecommunicationsLawauthorizestheSuperintendencetoregulatetheelectromagneticspectrum,andconcessioncontractsincludingthosepertainingtoaccountingrates,amongotherthings.
TheLawalsoauthorizestheSuperintendencetoestablishtechnicalstandards,identifynoncompetitiveservices,andrequireinformationnecessarytofulfillitsobligations.
2317"EnforcementoftheBhutanTelecommunicationsActandtheNationalRadioRegulations"(ContributionofBhutantoITU-DQuestion18/1,April2004)pp1-3.
18SeeContributionofBhutantoITU-DQuestion18/1,April2004at2.
19See"ObservanceoftheNormativeFrameworkforthetelecommunicationsSectorinBolivia,"ContributionofBoliviatoITU-DQuestion18/1,May4,2004at2.
20Id.
21Id.
22SeegenerallyId.
at3.
23Id.
at3.
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03TheTanzaniaCommunicationsAct,theCommunicationOperator(Licensing)Regulations,andlicensesconferpowerupontheTanzaniaCommunicationsCommissiontoissuesanctions.
24TheSriLankaTelecommunicationsActNo.
25of1991,amendedbyActNo.
27of1996governstelecommunicationsinSriLanka.
UnderSection9oftheAct,theTelecommunicationsRegulatoryCommissionisgivenbroadpowertoinquireintocomplaints.
TheActalsoempowerstheCommissiontodirecttheserviceprovidertorectifythecauseofthecomplaint,includingfinancialredress.
25Law24-96undertheaegisofHisLateMajestyKingHassanIIsetsforththeoverallframeworkofthereorganizationofthetelecommunicationsectorinMorocco.
26Pursuanttothislaw,Morocco'sNationalTelecommunicationRegulatoryAgency(ANRT)haspowersofinvestigationandoversight.
Itspowerofinvestigationisexercisedthroughinquiries,includingon-siteinspectionswhereANRTstaffcanrequest"anynecessaryinformation"thatwillenableANRTtoverifythatcompaniesoperatingnetworksortelecommunicationsservicesareincompliancewiththeirobligations.
27TheAgencedesTélécommunicationsdeCted'Ivoire(ATCI)isresponsiblefortelecommunicationsregulationinCted'Ivoire.
ATCIderivesitspowertoenforcetelecomlawsfromLawNo.
95-526of7July1995oftheTelecommunicationCode,theLicensingAgreementbetweenCted'IvoireTélécomandtheStateofCted'Ivoiresignedon3February1997,andOrderno.
97-173of19March1997onradiocommunicationchargesandfees.
28TheprincipalsourceoftheUnitedStatesFederalCommunicationsCommission's(FCC)authoritytoenforcetelecomlawsandregulationsisderivedfromitsenablingstatute,theCommunicationsActof1934,asamended.
ThisstatutegivestheCommissionbroadauthoritytoconductinvestigationsintoviolationsbyregulatedentitiesandtotakeenforcementaction.
ThroughtheformalcomplaintprocesssetforthinSection208oftheCommunicationsAct,theCommissiondecidesformalcomplaintsbetweenprivateparties.
Asanadjuncttotheformalcomplaintprocess,theCommissionprovidesmediationassistancetolitigantsorpotentiallitigantstohelpthemreachaprivatesettlementoftheirdisputes.
TheCommissionalsoconductsinformalinvestigationspursuanttoSections218,403,and503(b)oftheCommunicationsAct.
Theseinvestigationsmayleadtomonetaryfinesorconsentdecrees.
Mostconsentdecreesalsoincludesignificantcomplianceplans.
29NewZealand'skeycompetitionstatuteistheCommerceActof1986.
LegislationamendingthisstatutepassedonMay26,2001,andstrengtheneditscoreprovisionsaswellastheenforcementpowersandresourcesofNewZealand'scompetitionenforcementagency,theCommerce24See"FourStepstoEnforcement,"contributionoftheTanzaniaCommunicationsCommissiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,9September,2002,at1.
(TCCContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,9September2002).
25See"DomesticEnforcementofLaws,Rules,&Regulations,"ContributionoftheTelecommunicationsRegulatoryCommissionofSriLankatoITU-DQuestion18/1,December2002,at1.
(SriLankaRegulatoryCommissioncontributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,December2002).
26ThislawestablishedtheNationalTelecommunicationRegulatoryAgency,andintroducedtheconceptofuniversalserviceinMorocco.
See"EffectiveRegulation:CaseStudy-Morocco,"InternationalTelecommunicationUnionat24.
27Id.
28ContributionofCted'IvoiretoITU-DQuestion18/1,May28,2004at1.
29See"DomesticEnforcementofTelecommunicationsLaws,Rules,&RegulationsbyNationalTelecommunicationRegulatoryAuthorities,"contributionoftheUnitedStatesofAmericatoITU-DStudyGroupQuestion18/1,September2002,at1.
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03Commission.
Keyamendmentsincludeincreasingtheperiodforthestatuteoflimitations,increasingtheamountandrangeofsanctionsthatmaybeimposed,andempoweringtheCommissiontoimposeapricecontrolregimeincertaincircumstances.
30InFrance,theobjectivesoftelecommunicationsregulation,ensuredjointlybytheMinisterofTelecommunicationsandtheTelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority(Authority),aredefinedbytheLawofTelecommunicationsofJuly26,1996.
Thelawsetsforththedivisionofduties(orcompetencies)ofboththeMinisterandtheAuthority.
Dividedcompetenciesariseinfourcases:(i)TheAuthorityinstructs,forthebenefitoftheMinisterofTelecommunications,requestsforauthorizationsunderArticleL.
33-1andL.
34-3.
(ii)TheAuthorityproposestotheMinisterofTelecommunications,whothennotesthecostofuniversalserviceandthecontributionsoftheoperators.
(iii)TheAuthorityreturnspublicopiniononFranceTelecom'sproposedtariffsbeforetheirapprovalbytheministersofeconomyandtelecommunicationsand(iv)DecisionsoftheAuthoritythatarestatutoryincharacterareconfirmedbytheMinister(Art.
L.
36-6).
31OnMarch7,2002,theCouncilofMinistersoftheEuropeanUnionandtheEuropeanParliamentadoptedfourDirectivesandoneDecisionintroducingfarreachingchangestotheregulatoryframeworkgoverning"electroniccommunications.
32Keypointsinthenewframeworkincludeestablishingaharmonizedregulatoryframeworkforallelectroniccommunicationsnetworkswhilemaintainingseparatearrangementsfortheservicesprovidedonthosenetworks,establishingeffectivecompetition,andstrengtheningtheroleofregulatoryauthoritiesinimplementingthedirectivesandintheircoordinationwitheachother.
Thenewframeworkdoesnotcovercontentprovidedbycommunicationsnetworksorservices,nordoesitgovernthedistributionofaudiovisualcommunicationsservices,exceptinthecaseofconditionalaccessservices.
33AstheEuropeanUnionincreasinglytakesonmoreimportantfunctionsinissuingvariousDirectives,individualregulatoryauthoritiesareobligedtoincorporateandimplementthesedirectivesatthenationallevel.
34Withregardtoenforcementmatters,Articles20and21ofthenewEuropeanFrameworkDirectiverequiresnationalregulatoryauthorities(NRAs)inEUMemberStatestoresolvedisputeswithintheshortestpossibletimeframeandinanycasewithinfourmonthsexceptinexceptionalcircumstances.
ThenewdirectivesenteredintoforceonApril24,2002,andwererequiredtobeimplementedbyMemberStatesbymidnight,July24,2003.
30SeeOECDreport-"NewZealand:1September2000–31August2001,"http://www.
oecd.
org/docm00029000/m00029535.
docat2–3.
(OECDReport).
31See"EvolutionoftheStrengthsoftheTelecommunicationsRegulator:theCaseofFrance,"ARTContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,January2003,at2.
(ARTContributiontoQuestion18/1,January2003).
32See"EuropeanLegalFrameworkforElectronicCommunications,"ContributionofThales(France)toITU-DQuestion18/1,November8,2002at2.
(Thales'(France)contributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,November8,2002.
)TheCouncilofMinistersoftheEuropeanUnionanditsParliamentadopted:theFrameworkDirective(2002/21/EC);theAuthorisationDirective(2002/20/EC),theAccessDirective(2002/19/EC),theUniversalServiceDirective(2002/22/EC),andtheRadioSpectrumDecision(676/2002/EC).
Id.
atpp2-3.
33Id.
at2.
34France,forexample,reportedlywillneedtoamenditsPostandTelecommunicationsCode,andtheamendedActof30September1986onfreedomofcommunicationinordertoimplementthenewDirectives.
SeeContributionbyThales(France)toITU-DQuestion18/1,November8,2002,at2.
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03TheFederalOfficeofCommunications(OFCOM),thenewregulatorfortheUnitedKingdom'scommunicationsindustriescreatedin2003,hasresponsibilitiesfortelevision,radio,telecommunicationsandwirelesscommunicationsservices.
Section3(1)oftheCommunicationsActof2003outlinesOFCOM'sdutieswhichinclude:(i)ensuringtheoptimaluseoftheelectromagneticspectrum;(2)ensuringthatawiderangeofelectroniccommunicationsservices–includinghighspeeddataservices–isavailablethroughouttheUK;and(iii)ensuringawiderangeofTVandradioservicesofhighqualityandwideappeal.
35Inenforcingrulesunderitsjurisdiction,OFCOMabidesbytheprovisionsandstandardsoftheEnforcementConcordatdrawnupbytheCabinetOfficetoprovideguidancetocentralandlocalgovernmentwhencarryingoutenforcementwork.
36ThatdocumentrequiresOFCOMto:(i)haveclearstandardssettingoutthelevelofserviceandperformancethepublicandbusinesscanexpecttoreceive;(ii)provideclearinformationandadviceontherulesthatapply,andbeopenabouthowtheydotheirwork;(iii)provideahelpfulservicewithawell-publishedandeffectivecomplaintsprocedure;(iv)minimizethecostsofcomplianceforbusinessbyensuringthatanyactiontakenisproportionatetotherisks;and(v)carryoutitsdutiesinafair,equitable,andconsistentmanner.
37AsOFCOMhasassumedthedutiesofmanyofitspredecessoragenciessuchasOftel,itmayinvestigatecomplaintsaboutlicensebreachesandanti-competitivebehaviorundertheTelecommunicationsActof1984,consumercomplaintsaboutunfaircontractterms,disputes,andwhereappropriate,initiatesitsowninvestigations.
38Inaddition,theUnitedKingdomCommunicationsBillseekstodirectresourcesatthoseissueswheregenuinedifficultiesexist,bypermittingOFCOMtorecoveritscostsfromoperatorswhoabusetherighttobringadisputebymakingfrivolousorvexatiousclaims.
TheBillalsogivesOFCOMtherighttochargeafeeforresolvinginvestigationsinvolvingdisputesaboutradiospectrumastheyarelikelytobeveryresourceintensive(e.
g.
,involvingtechnicalcompatibilitytestsormonitoring).
39TheprincipalsourcesofauthorityfortheCommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority(CRA)oftheRepublicofLithuaniaaretheLawonTelecommunicationsandtheCodeofAdministrativeOffenses.
Article9oftheLawonTelecommunications–inforceasofJanuary1,2003--providesthatLithuania'sCRAhastheauthoritytocontrolcompliancewiththelaw,regulationsandotherlegalactsrelativetotelecommunicationactivity,tocontrolequipmentanddevicesaccordingtotheparametersofradioemission;toperformradiomonitoring40,andtoreceiveinformationnecessarytofulfilltheabovetasks.
41Additionally,underArticle62,theCRAhasauthoritytosettleanumberofdisputesincludingthoseconcerningthejointuseofconduits,cableducts,collectors,towers,masts,andforcontractualconditionsandcharges.
Disputesettlementproceedingsaretobepublicinnature,unlessaclosedhearingisnecessarytoprotectstate,official,orcommercialsecretsorto35Seegenerally,http://www.
ofcom.
org.
uk.
36Id.
37Id.
38See"DisputeresolutionunderthenewEUDirectives--astatementbyOftelandtheRadiocommunicationsAgency(Ofter/RadiocommunicationsAgencyFinalStatement)28February2003,http://www.
ofcom.
org.
uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/eu_directives/2003/eud0203.
htm;"DisputeresolutionunderthenewEUDirectives–AconsultationbyOftelandtheRadiocommunicationsAgency,"(Oftel/RadiocommunicationsAgencyReport),4November2002at22.
39SeeId.
at14.
40SeealsoArticles45and46oftheLithuaniaLawonTelecommunications.
ContributionfromLithuaniatoITU-DQuestion18/1,March10,2003at5.
41SeeId.
at1-3.
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03ensureanindividual'srighttoprivacy.
PartiesdissatisfiedwithaCRAdecisionmayappealittothecourts.
42C.
ChallengesIdentifiedThefollowingliststhosechallengesthatarerelatedtolegislationreportedlyfacedbyNRA'sastheyattempttoenforcetheirdomestictelecommunicationslaws:-Thelawprovidesnodescriptionofappropriatefines;-Thelawprovidesnoauthoritytoissuefines;-TheLawlacksintermediateormid-rangeeconomicpenalties;-TheLawdoesnotprovidestatutoryfinesthatarehighenoughtoprovidesufficientdeterrence;-TheLawdoesnotprovideforautonomyoftheNRA;-ThelawdoesnotprovidejurisdictionoverorrecourseattheNRAforcomplaintsofcompaniesnotsubjecttoaNRAlicense(e.
g.
,ISPs);-CourtssometimesissuepreliminaryinjunctionsthatindefinitelysuspendanNRAdecision;-Absence/delayinestablishingatribunaltohandlecommunicationsdisputes;-ThedifficultyofaccommodatingthenewEuropeanDirectivesintodomesticlegislationandproceduresonatimelybasis;-Theprocesstoobtainanamendmenttothelawistoolengthy.
D.
DraftGuidelines:SourceofEnforcementPowersEnsureharmonybetweentheconstitution,legislation,andadministrativepowers.
Identifychangeasnecessary.
Ensurethatthetelecomlawprovidessufficientpower,authority,andfinancialresourcestotheNRAforittoimpartially,swiftly,andtransparentlycarryoutthewillofthelegislature.
EnsurethatthelawcontainsclearandunambiguouslanguagedescribingthejurisdictionoftheNRAand,whereappropriate,otherinterestedstateagenciesEnsurethatthelawispromulgatedclearly,transparently,andprecisely.
Avoidtechnicaltermsthatarenotunderstandablebythepublicorthatmaybeunclearbeforeareviewingcourt.
Describetheobjectivesandrationaleofpromulgatedlawstoinduceenforcementandcompliancebyallparties,includingenforcementagentsofthestate.
Ensurethatconsumers,operators,andserviceprovidershaverecourseattheregulatoryagency.
Ensurejurisdictionoverserviceproviderswhomaynotbelicensed(e.
g.
,ISPs)Ensurethattheenablinglaw/telecomlegislationprovidestheNRAwithawiderangeofpenaltiestoincludethoseappropriateforminor,midrange,andmaximumoffenses.
42Id.
at8.
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ENFORCEMENTPRACTICE&PROCESSA.
OverviewSecondonlyinimportancetoaregulatoryauthority'senablingactorstatutearetheday-to-daypracticesandproceduresitemploystoimplementitslaws.
Insomecasesenforcementprocedures(orcertainoftheircomponents)arespecifiedintheenablingstatute.
Oftentheregulatoryauthoritydevelopsandpublishesadditionalproceduresonitsowntocarryoutpowersconferreduponitbystatute.
Regardlessofthesource,however,itisessentialtohaveprocessesinplacethatenableswiftandfairadjudicationofviolationsandcomplaints.
Transparencyintheseprocedureswillfacilitatecomplianceandisnecessaryforthedecisionsoftheregulatoryauthoritytogainpublictrustandwithstandjudicial,ministerial,orroyalreview.
43Someregulatoryauthoritieshavedevelopedseparateproceduresforindustryviolatorsandcomplaintsbyconsumers/endusers.
Ineithercase,asmanyofthefollowingexamplesillustrate,enforcementproceduresgenerallyinclude:(i)providingnoticeoftheallegedinfraction;(ii)providinganopportunitytorespond;(iii)issuinginterimdecisionsororders;and(iv)imposingsanctions.
44Manyregulatorshavethepowertoorderoperatorstoproduceindividualdocumentsorrecords,andcanenteranoperator'spremisesandseizethosedocumentsifoperatorsdonotcomply.
Similarly,someregulatorsmayconducton-sitetestsinordertodetermineanoperator'scompliancewithtypeapproval,qualityofserviceorradiocommunicationnon-interferencerequirements.
Becausethesearefairlyintrusivepowers,agencyofficials–suchasthoseinTrinidadandTobagoandinBolivia–mustoftenobtainjudicialwarrantsbeforetheyexercisetheirsearchandseizurepowers.
Inothercountries,however,thosepowersaregrantedbystatuteandmayrequirenojudicialpre-clearance.
45Withregardtothoseenforcementprocessesandpracticesthataimtosettleconflictsordisputesbetweenparties,someNRAshaveelectedtoemploylessformalmethodstoassistwiththeirworkload.
Commonlyreferredtoasalternativedisputeresolution(ADR),theselessofficialtechniquesincludenegotiationandmediation(voluntary,flexible,andconsensual)andarbitration(adjudicatory;awardsusuallyenforceableviathecourts)46andmaybeconductedbyentitiesotherthantheNRAoracourt.
43Brazil'sAnatel,forexample,hasundertakenaninitiativetopromoteenforcementconsistencybydevelopingamanualthatdictatesfixedmethodsforinvestigatingcompaniesandpenalizingthosethatcommitspecificviolations.
See"TrendsinTelecommunicationReform2002,"InternationalTelecommunicationUnionat49.
Thisinitiativepromotestransparencyaswell.
AnotherillustrationoftransparencyisOftel,whichpublishesdetailsofdisputesandinvestigationsinitsquarterlyCompetitionBulletin.
Thispublicationgivesdetailsofnewandclosedcases.
Underthenewregime,OftelwillpublishdetailsofCompliancecasesastheyareopenedandclosed.
ThisinformationwillonlybepublishedonOftel'swebsite.
Oftel/RadiocommunicationsAgencyReportat20.
TheNewZealandCommerceCommission'squarterlynewsletter"Fair'sFair"providesinformationaboutrecentandcurrentwork.
Thisincludesinvestigations,decisions,enforcement,educationactivities,andappointmentsofseniorstaff.
OECDReportat9.
44"TrendsinTelecommunicationReform2002,"InternationalTelecommunicationUnionat48.
SomeNRA's,e.
g.
,Zimbabwe'sPOTRAZ,andMexico'sCOFETELdonothavetheauthoritytolevyfines.
InthecaseofZimbabwe,thisiscarriedoutbythecourts.
SeeContributionofZimbabwetoITU-DQuestion18/1(January2004)at2.
InMexico'scase,theSecretaryofCommunicationsandTransportationimposesafineontherecommendationoftheNRA,COFETEL.
45SeeId.
at47.
46Seegenerally"DisputeResolutionintheTelecommunicationsSector:CurrentPracticesandFutureDirections,"ITUandWorldBankDiscussionPaper,August2004,http://www.
itu.
int/itudoc/gs/promo/bdt/86215.
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03Disputeresolutionviaalternativemeansinthetelecomsectorisatarelativelyearlystageand,likethetelecommunicationssector,ischangingrapidly.
47Someregulators,e.
g.
intheUnitedKingdom,takethepositionthatADRtechniquescanbeemployedwheredisputingpartieshavesimilarlevelsofmarketpower,sinceinthatcasepartiesaremorelikelytonegotiatesolutionsthatmeettheirmutualoron-goingneeds.
ForthosewhofavortheuseofADRtechniquesbyNRA's,regulatoryinterventionismoreoftenconsiderednecessarywheredisparitiesofmarketpowermeanthatonepartyeffectivelyrequirestheprotectionoftheofficialsectorfromabuseofprocessbytheother.
48Officialdisputeresolutionmechanismsareimportantasabasicguaranteethatsectorpolicywillbeimplemented.
49GiventhatasignificantportionofanNRA'senforcementpracticesareaimedatsettlingdisputes--itselfabasicfunctionoftheregulator–andthecredibilityderivedbyNRAsthroughexercisingtheirstatutoryauthoritytoadjudicateandenforcethelawandNRAdecisions–itisimportanttoidentifythosecircumstancesinwhichADRisappropriate.
Incertaincircumstancesforexample,aninterconnectiondisputemaylenditselftoADRwhileinothercasesofficialmechanismsmaybepreferable.
DisputesinvolvingspectrummaybelesslikelytobesuitableforADRtechniquesthanconflictsinvolvingsomeothermatters.
Issuesofsufficientjurisdiction,authority,andenforcementcapabilitiesareadditionalconsiderationsthatarisewhenanentityotherthantheNRAoracourtisemployedtoresolveadispute.
Further,anewNRAseekingtoestablishitselfmaywishtobalanceitsneedtoconserveresourceswithitsneedtobetakenseriouslybythoseitregulates.
Nevertheless,inappropriatecircumstances,ADRcanprovideausefulmeansofaugmentinganNRA'sarsenalofenforcementpractices.
Indeed,inadditiontoADRbyoutsideentities,manyNRA's(e.
g.
,theU.
S.
FederalCommunicationsCommission)conductmediationaspartoftheirownenforcementprocedures.
AsnotedrecentlybytheITUandtheWorldBank,eveninalternativedisputemethods,thepresenceandparticipationoftheregulatorcanhelpcreateincentivesforimprovedbehavioronthepartoftheparties.
50TheappropriateplaceforADRintheregulatedandfast-changingtelecommunicationsindustryisstillevolvinganditspotentialtoassistNRAenforcementobjectiveswillcontinuetobedefinedinthefuture.
B.
CountryExamplesInSingapore,IDA'scodeofpracticeforcompetitionsetsouttheproceduresandstepsthatmustoccurbeforeIDAcanimposeasanction.
Therearefivesteps:(1)IDAnotifiesthelicenseeinwritingofitsintenttotakelegalaction.
Thenoticespecifiesthetimepermittedforreply;(2)thelicenseehas15daystorespondinwriting(timecanbeextendedatIDA'sdiscretion);(3)IDAreviewsthelicensee'sresponseandmayissueatemporaryceaseanddesistorder;(4)ifIDAdeterminesthataviolationoftheCodeofPracticeforCompetitionhasoccurreditmayissueawarning,ceaseanddesistorder,oradirectivetotakeremedialaction,itmayalsoimposeafine,suspend,cancel,orshortenthedurationofallorpartofthelicense;(5)alicenseemayappealanIDAdecisiontomodifyitslicenseprovidedtheappealisfiledwithin14daysoftheIDAdecision.
PendingtheMinister'sdecision(andonlyincasesinvolvinglicensemodifications)theIDAcannotenforceitsdecision.
InsituationsotherthanlicensemodificationsIDA'sdecisionsaregenerallyenforceablependingappeal.
TheMinistry'srulingontheappealisfinal.
5147SeegenerallyId.
at11–12.
48Id.
at12.
49Id.
at14.
50Id.
at10.
51TrendsinTelecommunicationReform2002,"InternationalTelecommunicationUnionat48.
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03IntheUnitedStates,theFCCusesavarietyoftoolstoinvestigateviolationsincludinglettersofinquiry,fieldinspectionsandinvestigations,andadministrativesubpoenas.
Thesetoolsareusedtogatherrelevantinformationandformthebasisforadecisiontotakefurtherenforcementactionortoconcludethematter.
Onceithasdeterminedthataviolationhasoccurred,theCommissionandtheEnforcementBureauhaveseveraltoolstoaddressthiscircumstance:(i)LetterofAdmonishment/Warning(responsenotalwaysnecessary);(ii)aFieldOfficeNoticeofViolation(requiresresponse);(iii)citationfornonlicenseesorothersnotusuallybeforetheFCC;aNoticeofApparentLiability("NAL")andmonetaryforfeiture(fines)(seediscussionbelowin"Sanctions");consentdecrees;CeaseandDesistOrderfollowinganOrdertoShowCausewhyacease/desistordershouldnotbeissued;licenserevocationfollowinganordertoshowcausewhythelicenseshouldnotberevoked;incoordinationwiththeU.
S.
DepartmentofJustice,seizureofequipment;referralforcriminalprosecutiontotheU.
S.
DepartmentofJustice;andfinally,damagesinresponsetoformalcomplaints.
52TheFCCalsoemploysmediationincertaincircumstances.
TheMarketDisputesResolutionDivisionoftheEnforcementBureau53participatesinnegotiations(mediations)betweencarrierstofacilitatesettlementofdisputesbeforecomplaintsarefiled.
54Mediationisacorollarytothecomplaintprocessandcanoccurbeforeorduringthecomplaintprocess.
Itisahighlysuccessfulenforcementtool.
Aseparate,acceleratedcomplaintprocessexiststhatrequirespartiestofirstattemptmediation.
Thisisalsoveryeffective.
Pre-complaintmeetingsandmediationareencouraged;participationisvoluntary.
FCCstafffindsmediationtobeextremelysuccessfulbecauseitpromotesspeedyresolutionofthedispute,avoidstheexpenseoflitigation,helpstonarrowtheissuesindispute,andbringspartiestogethertoresolvemattersthatarenotinpostureforlitigation.
55Mediationalsofacilitatescommunicationandtheparties'assessmentoftheirpositions.
Typically,pre-mediationstatementsareemployed.
There,thepartiesexchangepositionsregardingfactualbackgroundandlegalpositions.
Thesestatementsaredestroyedatendofthesessiontomaintaintheoff-the-recordnatureofmediation.
InamediationsessionEBstaffwillusuallymeetwithpartiestogetherandindividually.
TheFCCstronglyencouragestheattendanceofbusinessrepresentativeswhoareintegraltothedispute,notjustlegalcounsel,becauseFCCstaffhasfoundthatthedirectinvolvementofrelevantbusinessrepresentativescanproduceamoreclearunderstandingoftheissuesandincreasetheprobabilityofaquickresolution.
FCCstaffgiveseachsideaninformal,off-the-recordassessmentoftheirargumentsintheindividualsessions.
Subsequently,moreinformationmaybeexchangedafterthesessionwithfollow-upphonecallsandpossiblymorein-personsessions.
56Whilemediationmaybeidealforsettlingprivatedisputes,FCCstaffhasfoundthatitisnotthemostadvantageousforpolicymakingbecauseanegotiatedresultonlyappliestothenegotiatingpartieseveniftherearesimilardisputesbetweenothercarriers.
Anadditionaldifficultyisthat52Seegenerally,USAcontributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,September2002,atpp.
8–10.
53TheFCC'sMarketDisputesResolutionDivisionoftheEnforcementisresponsibleforresolvingcomplaintsagainstcommoncarriers(wireline,wireless,andinternational)bycompetitorsandothercarriersinvolvingmarketissuesaswellasforpoleattachmentcomplaints.
"FederalCommunicationsCommission-AdjudicationandMediation,"TraceyBridgham,Esq.
,MarketDisputesResolutionDivision,September2004.
54Intheadjudication(complaint)process,anactionisinitiatedagainstacarrierbyacomplainingparty(consumer,company,oranothercarrier)ratherthanbytheCommission.
Id.
at1.
55Id.
56Id.
at2–3.
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57InUganda,theUCChasthepowertoreceiveandinvestigatecomplaintsbyinterestedpartiesaswellasonitsownmotion.
PublicpetitionsfiledinresponsetolicenseapplicationsthathavebeenfiledwiththeUCCandpublishedpermittheUCCtodiscoverpossibleviolationsofthelaw.
TheUCCinspectslicensedfacilitiesandtakesactionwhereitdiscoversviolationsofrules,regulations,licenseconditionsetc.
LettersofinquiryareissuedbytheUCCtoobtaininformationfromalicenseeorotherentityduringthecourseofanon-goinginvestigationorwhenfollowingupacomplaint.
58WhenalicenseebreachesalicenseconditionoractscontrarytoTanzania'sActorregulations,awrittennoticemaybeissuedspecifyingthebreachandinformingthelicenseeoftheTanzaniaCommunicationsCommission'sintentiontotakelegalaction.
Thelicenseeisaffordedtimetorectifythebreachand/orrespondtotheCommission'snotice.
Thereafter,ifthelicenseefailstoprovideanexplanationtheregulatormayimposeasanction.
59InFrance,ART'stoolsofregulationincludebutarenotlimitedto:theabilitytosanctionforbreachesoftherules,theabilitytoestablishmediation,thepossibilitytomanageinvestigationsofthesector,andtheabilitytosetupgeneralrulesoforderframedbytheapprovaloftheMinister.
60Thelegislatureof1996endowedtheARTwiththeabilitytoinvestigate.
ThetwoprincipalprovisionsoflawthatcanserveasthefoundationfortheinvestigatoryproceduresareArticlesL.
32-4andL.
40ofthecodeofPostsandTelecommunications.
UnderArticle32-4,ARTcanconductasimpleinvestigationofinformationordocumentsfromtheoperators.
IftheoperatorrefusestodefertoART'srequestforthisinformation,however,Article32-4doesnotprovideanabilitytocoercecompliance.
Inordertoassureitselfthatitsrequestswillberespected,ARTcanemploythecombinedprovisionsofArticles32-4andL-40.
TheinvestigationseffectuatedunderArticleL.
40regardaregimethatisoneofjudicialpoliceoperationsandisframedonaproceduralplan.
Thelawalsoinstitutesasimplerightofaccess,butdoesnotprovidethepowertosearch.
61InFrance,proceduresforsettlingdifferencesareatthecenterofthemechanismofregulationandpermitresolutioninabrieftime-threetosixmonths--ofdifferencesbetweentwopartiesindefiningtechnicalconditionsandtariffsinlawsuits.
Inthecurrentregulatoryframework,ARTisconcernedwithlawsuits/disputesonthefollowingissues:access,interconnection,unbundlingthelocalloop,placementofnetworkcableforprovidingtelecommunicationsservices,dividinginfrastructure,furnishingalistofsubscribersforauniversaldirectoryorfurnishinginformationonuniversalservice.
Currently,ARTprincipallyhandlesproblemsofinterconnectionaccess,andforthefirsttime,theframeworkforplacementofnetworkcables.
Theyhavealsorenderedadecisionsettlingdifferencesaboutunbundlingthelocalloop.
6257Id.
at3.
58UCCContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,December2002,at2.
59TCCContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,September2002at2.
60SeeARTContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,January2003,at2.
61SeeId.
at6.
62Id.
at3.
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03InBrazil,allofANATEL'Sbureaus(exceptforGeneralServices)conductenforcementactivitiesfortheserviceswithintheirspecificmandate.
63Afteraninspectionisperformed,expertandotherreportsareissued,andifaviolationofaregulationorlicenseconditionisfound,ANATELmayeither(i)sendaninfractionnoticetotheoffenderdescribingtheviolationandgivingtimefortheoffendertoprovideanadministrativedefense,or(ii)sendanOfficialLetterrequestingadditionalinformationorclarification.
Basedontheinspection,ANATELmayalsoinitiateaprocedureforVerificationofNonCompliancewithObligation(PADO)toverifybreachofaregulation.
Followingdueprocess,anonlyuponconclusionofaPADO,apenaltymaybeestablished.
Thisrulingmaybeappealedtoacourt.
ANATELmayalsoinitiateaPADObasedonwrittencomplaintsorthosereceivedbyitscallcenterfromacustomerorcompetitorofanoperator.
64Duringitsfive-yearexistence,ANATELinitiated42,300PADOs,themajorityofwhichwererelatedtononcompliancewithitsregulatoryobligationsestablishedintheGeneralQualityPlanforFixedTelephony,ratherthanforconsumercomplaints.
6511%weredismissedwithnopenalty;in19%fineswereimposed,andin4%awarningwasissued.
66Thevastmajority--90.
3%--wereinitiatedbytheRadiofrequencyandSpectrumBureau;7.
3%werebroughtbythePublicUtilityServiceBureau;1.
26%bytheMassCommunicationsServiceBureau;0.
77%werebroughtbythePrivateServicesBureau;and0.
63%bytheUniversalAccessBureau.
ThetotalamountoffinesissuedforthesePADOstotalR$126.
5million.
Duetopendingappeals,however,thisfullamounthasnotbeencollected.
67Further,thoughfinesareimposedbyANATEL,theyarereviewedbythecourts,andonlyacourtmaycollectthefine,executeajudgment,orconfiscateproperty.
WhentheCommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority(CRA)ofLithuaniahasdeterminedthataviolationofthelaworregulationshasoccurred,theCRAmustinformtheviolatorofitsinfringementandprovideanopportunitytorespondoreliminatetheviolationwithinonemonthafterthedatethenoticeismailed.
Ashorterperiodoftimemaybepermissibleuponagreementoftheputativeviolatoror,inthecaseofrepeatedviolations,ontheorderoftheCRA.
Iftheviolatorfailstoremedytheviolationwithinthetimespecified,theCRAmayapplyremediestoensurecompliance,includingeconomicsanctionswithintwomonthsafternoticeoftheviolationwassent.
Lithuania'stelecomlawsareenforcedprimarilybytheCRA'sinspectors,whoareappointedanddismissedbytheDirectoroftheCRA.
68Article10oftheLawonTelecommunicationsprovidesthatCRAinspectorshavetheauthoritytomonitorcompliancewiththelawsandregulationsgoverningtelecomnetworksandradiocommunication,radioequipmentandtelecomterminalequipment,issuerecordsofadministrativeinfringements,uponobtainingawarrantissuedbythe63SeeANATELContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,March12,2003,at3.
ANATELhassixbureaus:PublicUtilityServices;MassCommunicationsService,UniversalAccess;PrivateServices;RadioFrequencyandInspection,andGeneralAdministration.
ANATELContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,July30,2003,at3.
64Id.
at3.
SeealsoANATELContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,July30,2003,at5.
65BothincumbentsandnewentrantsmustcomplywiththeGeneralQualityPlan,whichdescribeminimumaccessandqualityofserviceobligations.
SeeANATELContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,July30,2003,at4.
66Idat7.
67Id.
68TheDirectoroftheCRAisappointedbythePresidentoftheRepublicontherecommendationofthePrimeMinister.
SeeContributionofLithuaniatoITU-DQuestion18/1,March10,2003at2.
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Whendischargingtheirofficialduties,CRAInspectorsproduceanauthoritycardandadocumentissuedbytheCRAcertifyingtheirauthorityandfunctions.
UnderArticle10oftheLawonTelecommunications,inspectorshavetherighttoobtainoralandwritteninformation,obtaindataanddocuments(andtemporarilyholdthemforaperiodofupto30daysinthecourseofaninvestigation)inspect/auditbusinessactivitiesandequipmentonsite,toemployspecialistsinaninvestigation.
Inordertoenterandinspectpremisesorvehicles,inspectorsmustproduceawarrantissuedbytheVilniusRegionalAdministrativeCourt.
Incarryingouttheirduties,aCRAinspectormayseektheassistanceofpoliceofficers.
Inspector'sactionsmaybeappealedtotheDirectoroftheCRAwithin10daysoftheactioncomplainedof.
TheDirectormustissueadecisionwithin10daysaftertheappealisfiled,ortheaggrievedpartymayappealtothecourt.
PartiesdisagreeingwiththeDirector'sdecisionmayalsoappealtothecourt,butsuchappealdoesnotsuspendthedecisionoftheCRAinthemeantime.
70Morocco'sANRThasthepowertoenjoin,tocompel,andtolaunchpublicaction.
ThepowertoenjoinallowsANRTtoputonnoticeanylicense-holderthatfailstoabidebytherequirementsimposedasaconditionofthelicense.
ThepowertocompelallowsANRTtosuspendthelicenseandseizetheequipmentofanyonecommittinganoffense.
Italsoallowsittotakethe"necessarymeasures"toassurecontinuityoftheserviceandprotectusers.
Iffoundguilty,acourtmayorderthenetworkconfiscatedordestroyedatANRT'srequest.
71ANRT'semployeeshavethepowertoenterthepremisesofanycompany"actingimproperly"andseizeanydocumentsthatwillsupportitscase.
ANRTmayalsopresschargesthroughitsowndulyswornandcommissionedofficers,throughofficersofthejudicialpolice,andthroughofficersofthepublicforces.
ChargesaresetforthinawrittenstatementandforwardedtotheRoyalProsecutorwithinfivedays.
Thestatementofchargesistakenasconfirmationofwrongdoinguntilprovenfalse.
72Whenaninterconnectiondisputearises,ANRTbecomesinvolvedonlywhennegotiationsbetweenoperatorshavefailedandoneofthepartieshasrequestedANRT'sintervention.
ANRTthenhas30daystohearthedisputeandissueadecision.
ThedecisionmustbesupportedbyANRT's69Toobtainawarranttoinspectavehicle,premises,orterritory,CRAinspectorsmustfileanapplicationforauthorizationwiththeVilniusRegionalAdministrativeCourt,whichmustdeliverareasoneddecisionontheapplicationwithin72hours.
CRAinspectorscanappealdenialsoftheapplicationtotheSupremeAdministrativeCourtofLithuaniawithin7days.
TheSupremeCourtmustexaminetheappealwithin7days.
Itsdecisiononthematterisfinalandisnotsubjecttoappeal.
Inurgentcases,CRAinspectorsmaytakeactiononadecisionoftheDirectoroftheCRA.
Inthiscaseanapplicationforauthorizationmuststillbefiledwiththecourtwithin24hoursoftheDirector'sdecision.
Ifthecourtuponreviewdeniestheapplication,theinspectionmustbeterminatedandallinformationobtaineddestroyed.
Id.
at5.
70Id.
at4.
71See"EffectiveRegulation:CaseStudy–Morocco,"InternationalTelecommunicationUnion,2001,at24.
72Id.
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73ANRTalsohasthepowertoreviseinterconnectionagreementsifitdeemsthisnecessary.
Tocarryoutitsdutytoregulateservicequality,ANRTconductstechnicalinspectionsonbothoperators'premisesandonitsownpremises.
Itengagestheservicesofexternalexpertsandconductsuserandoperatorsurveys.
74OperatorsandserviceprovidersmayappealANRT'sdecisionsbeforeanadministrativejudge,whohasthepowertorescindthem,butnotamendthem.
Amaximumperiodof2monthsisestablishedtosettlethisappeal–whichmaybeinoroutofcourt–andtheregulatorydecisionremainsinforceduringthisperiod.
75TheTanzaniaCommunicationsCommission(TCC)hasincludedinlicensesithasissuedtotelecomoperatorsaconditionprovidingpowerstoinvestigatewhenthereisabreachofthetermsofthelicenseorviolationoftheLawsofTanzania.
Underthisschemeinvestigationmayoccurwherethereis:(i)failuretocomplywithinstallationandservicerequirements;(ii)partialortotalinterruptionofthelicensedservicesforacontinuousperiodof24hoursinDaresSalaamand48hoursinotherareas;or(iii)failureofthelicenseetoprovideinformationtotheTCC.
76MembersoftheEuropeanUnionhaveanobligationtodevelopdisputeresolutionprocedures.
Articles20and21ofthenewEuropeanFrameworkDirectivereducetheformer6-monthdeadlineforresolvinginterconnectiondisputestorequiringallclassesofdisputes--includingthoseregardinguseofradiospectrum--tofourmonths(exceptinexceptionalcircumstances).
ThenewdirectivesenteredintoforceinApril2002.
MemberStateshave15months--untilJuly2003--toenactnationallegislationthatisinlinewiththenewDirectives.
Ofcom'spredecessor,theUnitedKingdom'sOftel,generatedinvestigationsinthefollowingways:(i)byacomplaintaboutanti-competitivebehavior;(ii)byarequestforOfteltoresolveadisputeunderthecurrentinterconnectionDirective;or(iii)Oftel'sownmotion.
77InordertomeettheEUnewdeadlines,Oftelproposednewproceduresandsoughtcommentfromthepublic.
Specifically,beforeitwillacceptadispute,Oftelproposedthatcomplainantsberequiredtosubmitclearinformationonalldetailsofthedisputeincluding:(i)afullstatementofthescopeofthedispute;(ii)adescriptionoftheobligationstowhichthedisputerelates,includingaviewontherelevanteconomicmarket;(iii)fulldetailsofthepreferredremedy;and73ANRT'sManagementCommitteeischairedbythePrimeMinisterandhasfourrepresentativesoftheState:theMinisteroftheInterior,theMinisterofEconomicAffairs&Finance,theSecretaryGeneraloftheGovernment,andtheministerofNationalDefense.
ThesemembersareappointedbytheANRTBoardofDirectorsforafiveyearterm.
TheManagementCommitteeischargedwithsettlingdisputesbetweenoperatorsthatarefiledwithANRT.
SeeId.
at20.
TheBoardofDirectorsischairedbythePrimeMinisterortheirdelegateandconsistsof9representativesofthestate:thesecretarygeneralofthegovernment,ministersresponsiblefortheinterior,finance,highereducation,commerce,economicdevelopment&privatization,telecommunications,communications,nationaldefense,theDirectorGeneralofANRT,andfivepeoplefromthepublicandprivatesectorsappointedbythePrimeMinisterforafiveyearterm.
Id.
at18.
74Id.
at37-39.
75Id.
at40.
76TCCContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,September2002,at1.
77Oftel/RadiocommunicationsAgencyReportat11.
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03(iv)documentaryevidenceofcommercialnegotiationsonallissuescoveredbythescopeofthedispute.
Additionally,tofacilitatecompliancewiththisproposednewrequirement,andtoassistinuniformity,Oftelpreparedandpublishedforcommentitspreferredformatforsuchsubmissions.
78OftelalsoproposedtoallowfiveworkingdaysforrepresentationstobemadeonthepracticalityofmeetingadeadlineforprovidinginformationithasrequestedundertheTelecommunicationsActof1984,oratelecommunicationslicense.
Oftelindicatedthatitwouldgenerallyconfirmoramendtheinformationrequestwithintwoworkingdays,but"wouldnotexpecttoagreetoanextensiontothedeadline.
"79TheEUDirectivesallowedOfteltodeclinetoresolveadisputewherealternativemechanismsexist.
Accordingly,OftelmaintainedtheviewthatAlternativeDisputeResolutionshouldbeusedtoresolvedisputesbetweenoperatorsthatarenotdominant,asthesewould(intheabsenceofaregulator)beresolvedthroughnormalcommercialnegotiations.
Theexceptioniswherearegulatoryobligation(e.
g.
,ageneralobligationaboutnumberportability)hasbeenimposedonoperatorsthatarenotdominantandthedisputerefersdirectlytothisobligation.
80TheinvestigatoryandadjudicatorypowersoftheTelecommunicationsRegulatoryCommissionofSriLanka(RCSL)areaptlyillustratedbyarecentexampleinvolvingaccessinSriLankatotheSEA-ME-WEsubmarinecablelandingsystemwhichconnectsSouthEastAsia,theMiddleEast,andWesternEurope.
Inanefforttointroducecompetitioninbothdomesticandinternationaltelecommunicationservices,andpursuanttoSection7oftheSriLankaTelecommunicationsActNo.
25of1991,theRCSLrequestedandobtainedwritteninformationviaquestionnairesfromtheincumbentandmorethan40otheroperatorsseekingaccesstotheSEA-ME-WEcable.
Ahearingatwhichallaffectedoperatorswereaskedtocommentconcludedthepaperinvestigationphase.
Asaresultofitsinvestigationandhearing,theRCSLdeterminedthattheincumbent'stariffsforitsleasedcircuitswerediscriminatory,didnottakeintoaccountexcesscapacityavailable,andthereforewereanti-competitive.
TheRCSLdirectedtheincumbenttosubmitaproposedplanforprovidingaccesstothecable;asofJune2003,theRCSLwilldeveloptariffsforcompetitiveuseofthecablesystem.
81Someregulatoryauthoritieshaveinstitutedspecialmeasurestoaddresstheneedsofconsumers.
Uganda'sUCChasestablishedaConsumerComplaintdeskalongwithproceduresforhandlingcomplaints.
82Morerecently,UgandahasdevelopedarelationshipwiththeUgandaConsumerProtectionAssociationandhasdevelopedandpublishedmaterialstoincreaseconsumerawarenessoftheirrightsandobligations.
83Similarly,Brazil'sANATELworkscloselywithspecializedconsumerprotectioninstitutionsandmaintainsatollfreecallcentertoreceivecomplaintsfromconsumers.
ThesecomplaintsareprocessedbyUserRelationsAssistance,whichscreensinformationandforwardsittothespecificareaforaction.
84ACommitteehasbeenappointedby78SeeId.
at15.
79Id.
at19.
80Id.
at16.
Oftelbelievesthatitsroleindisputeresolutionistoaddress"problemsthatariseastheresultoftheparticularnatureofelectroniccommunications,or…disputesinvolvinganoperatorwithmarketpower.
"Id.
81TelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthorityofSriLanka,contributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,June11,2003at1-3.
82UCCContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1at2.
83AddendumtoUCCContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1(January2004)at3.
84ANATELcontributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,March12,2003,at5.
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03theTelecommunicationsCommissionofSriLankatoresolvedisputesbetweenconsumersandtheserviceproviders"byfollowingatransparent,non-discriminatoryprocessencouragingpublicparticipationandopendialogue.
"TherighttoappealisavailabletoanypersonaggrievedwiththedecisionoftheCommitteeonaquestionoflaw.
85InSouthAfrica,tohelpICASAmonitorperformance,licenseesmustpublishstatisticsonconsumercomplaintseverysixmonths.
86ItisnotcharacteristicofMoroccancultureforassociationstodefendconsumer'sinterests,orforwrittencomplaintstobesubmittedtotheauthorities.
Nonetheless,duetothegoodreputationenjoyedbyANRT,reportedlyindividualsdoapproachthemdirectlywithcomplaintsandrequestsforassistance.
87C.
ChallengesidentifiedThefollowingliststhosechallengestoeffectiveenforcementproceduresandpracticereportedlyfacedbyNRA's:-Absence/delayinfinalizingNRAregulationsthatimplementtheirenablingact;-ItisoftenveryexpensivefortheNRAtocarryoutitsenforcementfunction,anditcanbeextremelytimeconsuming.
-OftenitisdifficultfortheNRAtoobtainsufficientinformationtoassistwithinvestigationsandcompliance.
-NRA'sareconstitutedasexpertagencieswithresourcesallocatedtoachieveefficiencies,yetaresubjecttothejudiciarywhichlargelyhaslessexpertiseincommunicationsmattersandfewerresourcesdedicatedtoadjudicatingthosematters.
-Politicians,courts,andlocaladministrativeauthoritiessometimestakeactionsthataffectordelaytheNRAenforcementprocess;-PreliminaryinjunctionsissuedbythecourtsthatindefinitelysuspendNRAdecisions;-Courts'unfamiliaritywithtelecommunicationsissuesandconsequentlevyingoffinesnotcommensuratewiththeseriousnessoftheoffenseortheNRA'sinspector'sefforts;-Theexistenceofmorethanoneauthorityinvolvedinissuingasanction(e.
g.
,wheretheNRArecommendsasanctionandanotherinstitutionimposesthesanction)resultsinduplicationofprocedures,andsometimes,conflictingrecommendations.
-OperatorssometimesresistanewNRA'sinspectionsandenforcementorders;-Newentrantsaresometimesunawareoftheirobligations;newentrantsandincumbentsaresometimesunawareoftheNRA'spowerormandate;-Consumers/usersaresometimesunawareoftheirrightsandoftheauthority,role,orinsomecasesexistenceoftheNRAasavehicleforrecourseofgrievancesorcomplaints-Inabilityordifficultykeepingupwithfasttechnologicaldevelopments;-Regulatoryagencies'relianceonpractices/methodsusedbydevelopedcountrieswhichattimesmaynotbesuitablefordevelopingcountries'environment;-Enforcementprocessesthatrequiretoomuchpaperwork.
85SriLankaRegulatoryCommissioncontributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1atpp.
1and3.
86See"TrendsinTelecomreform2002,"InternationalTelecommunicationUnionat46.
87See"EffectiveRegulation:CaseStudy-Morocco,"InternationalTelecommunicationUnionat41.
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03D.
DraftGuidelines:EnforcementProcessDevelopandpublishproceduresfortheNRA'sinternaloperationsanditsexternalpublicfunctionsthatreflectfairness,speed,efficiencyandtransparencygoalsDesigntransparentproceduresthatenabletheNRAtorenderandpublishadecisionthatconsidersallrelevantfactsandlaw.
Followrulesandlaws;observeprecedent.
Includetheconsumer/userpointofviewinNRAdeliberationsanddecisions.
Toassistinobtaininginformationnecessarytoevaluatecompliancewithlaws,policiesorregulations,adoptproceduresfortreatingconfidentialorcommerciallysensitiveinformationprovidedbyoperators,serviceproviders,orotherlicenseesthatwillprotectthesensitivenatureoftheinformation.
Identifyareaswheretheactionsofotherinterestedstateauthorities(e.
g.
,courts,localrepresentatives,administrativeauthorities)frequentlyorsignificantlyaffectNRAenforcementprocesses.
Wherefeasibleandappropriate,developaplanforcommunication,coordination,andcooperationwiththegoaloffacilitatingequitableandspeedyresolutionofviolations.
88Consideremployingavarietyoftoolsforinvestigationtoincludelettersofinquiry,on-siteinspections,andsubpoenas.
Insofaraspossible,usetechnologytofacilitatespeedybutdeliberativedecision-making,andsubsequentpublicationofthesedecisions.
Placedecisionsandcommentsontheweb.
Tocompensateforlimitedstaffandresources,considerplacingtheburdentoproduceinformationneededbytheNRAuponserviceproviders/licensees.
MakethisinformationpublicsothatcompetitorsandconsumerscannotifytheNRAiftheybelievetheinformationisinaccurateorotherwiseflawed.
ToassisttheNRAingatheringinformationfromregulateesandforreceivingcomplaintsfromconsumers,considerpublishingastandardformatforeach.
ToassisttheNRAingatheringinformationtorenderadecisiononrlicenseapplicationsorotherlineprocessingwork,prepareastandardizedworksheetforstafftoensurethatallissueshavebeenreviewedandrelevantrulescompliedwith.
88GoodexamplesofthisapproachincludeactionstakenbyUganda,Peru,Brazil,Mexico,andColombia.
NotingthatunderthelawonlytheDirectorofCriminalProsecutionscouldprosecutecriminaloffensesundertheCommunicationsAct,andwishingtominimizeanypotentialadministrativedelayorotherinefficiencies,Uganda'sNRA,UCC,petitionedtheDirectorofCriminalProsecutionsforauthoritytoprosecutecriminaloffensesundertheCommunicationsActandwonthisauthority.
Asaresult,UCCcomplianceeffortsinthisareaarelesscomplex.
Recognizingthatcoordinationwiththejudiciaryisessentialtosuccessfulenforcementofitstelecompoliciesandlaws,Peru'sNRA,OSIPTEL,sponsoreda1-weektrainingcourseinLimafor30–40judgesattheendof2003coveringhighlyspecializedcommunicationsissues.
InColombiaandBrazil'sANATELhavealsosponsoredsimilarseminarsforthejudiciary.
In2003,Mexico'sCOFETELprovidedtechnicaltrainingfornewjudgesonmobilequalityregulations.
Suchoutreacheffortsservetofamiliarizethejudiciarywithtelecommunicationsissues,procedures,objectives,andpersonnel,andtoexposetheNRAtothecourt'sprocedures,objectivesandviews.
Asaresult,inefficienciesareminimized,andthenecessarycoordinationbetweentheseinstitutionsoncommunicationsissuesisoptimized.
SeeRapporteur'sReport:MeetingoftheRapporteur'sGrouponITU-DQuestion18/1,RiodeJaneiro,21-22April2004(ITU-D/1/RGQ18/024(Rev.
1)-Eat3.
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03Developandmaintainadatabaseorotherappropriaterecordkeepingsystemtotrackviolatorsandviolationsforuseinreportingtothegovernmentandthepublic,trackingindustrytrends,andinsettingfuturepenaltiesorsanctions.
IV.
INDEPENDENTDECISIONMAKINGA.
OverviewCloselyrelatedtopracticeandprocedure,indeedinherenttherein,arethedecision-makingprocessesoftheNRA.
BecauseNRA-issueddecisionsthatareconsideredtobeindependentarewidelybelievedtobethemostdesirable,wediscussthiselementofenforcementpracticeandprocedureseparatelyinthissection.
Akeyfunctionofaregulatoryauthorityistomakeimpartialandreasoneddecisionsforthebenefitofthepublic.
WhenanNRAhasthefreedomandabilitytorenderadecisionthat:(i)isbasedonallrelevantfacts,(ii)appliesandimplementstheappropriatelaw,policy,orregulation,and(iii)isfreeofunduepressurefrompoliticalentities,powerfulincumbents,orothershavingastakeintheoutcome,itcanbesaidthatthedecisionstheNRAmakesareindependent.
Inshort,animpartialdecisionisanindependentdecision.
PublicawarenessoftheindependentnatureofNRAdecisionsbolstersboththeNRA'scredibilityandthetelecommunicationssectorasawhole.
Apatternofindependentdecisionsarehighlylikelytoinspireconfidenceinthesectorandthereforeencourageprivateinvestment,bothdomesticandforeign.
PublicawarenessthatanNRA'sdecisionsareindependentmaybeattainedbypublishingdecisionsthatclearlyandsuccinctlydescribethereasonsfortheoutcome,includinghowthelaw,policyorregulationwasappliedtothefactsorcircumstancespresented.
Inthecontextofregulatorydecisionmakingprocedures,anumberofprincipleshavebeenpresented(andacknowledgedinthestatutesofmanycountries)thataimtopromotepredictability,clarity,andconsistency.
89Chiefamongtheseforpurposesoffacilitatingindependentdecisionsaretheprinciplesoftransparencyandpublicparticipation.
Atransparentprocessisfirstofall,onethatisopen.
90Fortunately,withthegrowingpopularityoftheInternet,manyregulatorsnowmaketheirprocessestransparentbypublishingpublicnoticesandconsultationdocumentsontheirwebsite.
Asaresult,regulatorsarenowbetterabletoconveyinformationonaproposeddecisiontoallinterestedparties.
91Proceduresthatfacilitatetransparencyalsoencouragepublicparticipation.
Bypresentingaproposedruletothepublicbeforeittakeseffect,andinvitingopendiscussionandactiveparticipationinthedecision-makingprocess,publictrustintheintegrityofthedecisionisincreasedandvaluablepublicinputonchallengingissuesisobtained.
92Publicandprivatesectorparticipationinthedecisionmakingprocessallowsanopportunityforthosewhowillbemost89Seee.
g.
,FinalReportonITU-DQuestion8/1:"Establishmentofanindependentregulatorybody"Document1/204(Rev.
1)-E,[www.
itu.
int/ITU-D/study_groups/SGP_1998-2002/SG1/Documents/2001/204Rev1E.
doc]November7,2001atpp16-17discussingprinciplesforregulatorydecisionmaking:transparency;timeliness;monitoring;privatesectorparticipation/publicinvolvement.
90SeeFederalCommunicationsCommission,ConnectingtheGlobe:ARegulator'sGuidetoBuildingaGlobalInformationCommunity,[http://www.
fcc.
gov/connectglobe/sec1.
html],June1999atI-2.
91See,FinalReportonITU-DQuestion8/1:"Establishmentofanindependentregulatorybody"Document1/204(Rev.
1)-E,November7,2001at16.
92SeeFederalCommunicationsCommission,ConnectingtheGlobe:ARegulator'sGuidetoBuildingaGlobalInformationCommunity,[http://www.
fcc.
gov/connectglobe/sec1.
html],June1999atI-3.
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93TransparentprocessesthatinvolvethepublicandmakethemawareoftheimpartialityandofadecisionfacilitateindependentdecisionbyaNRA.
B.
CountryExamplesBhutan'sTelecommunicationsActof1999explicitlystatesthat"regulationofthe…sectorshallbecarriedoutindependentlyoftheoperationoftelecommunicationsystemsandtheprovisionoftelecommunicationservices.
"Inaddition,facilitatingtransparency,theActalsoprovidesthatanydirection,regulation,guideline,orcodeofpracticeissuedinaccordancewiththeActshallbe:(i)adoptedandpublishedinsuchmannerastheDirectorconsidersappropriatetoinformthepartiesaffected;and(ii)placedontheRegisterofRegulations,LicensesandOrdersmaintainedbytheBCA.
TheActalsogivesBCAbroadpowerstoestablishadvisorybodiestoprovidetheDirectorwithadviceonexercise,performanceanddischargeoftheDirector'sduties,functionsandpowersundertheAct,therebyprovidinganotheravenueforreceivinginputfromthepublicinadditiontotheadministrativeprocessesandhearingalreadyspecifiedinthelaw.
94Uganda'sUCChasendeavoredtoincreasepublicparticipationintheregulatoryprocessthroughaseriesofworkshopsandseminarsorganizedonvariousissues,andheldduringtheformationstageofpoliciesunderconsiderationforadoptionbytheUCC.
95ThisfacilitatestransparencyandmakespossiblebroadpublicinputinadvanceofapolicydecisionbytheUCC.
C.
ChallengesIdentifiedThefollowingliststhegeneralchallengestoindependentdecisionmakingreportedlyfacedbyNRA's:-Politicians,courts,andlocaladministrativeauthoritiessometimestakeactionsthataffectordelaytheNRAenforcementprocess.
-AlthoughtheNRAisrequiredtoconsultwiththepubliconsignificantissues,theMinistermayissuedirectiveswithoutpublicconsultation,whichtheNRAmustthenimplement.
Insuchcases,thevalueofpublicconsultationmaybelost.
D.
DraftGuidelines:IndependentDecisionMakingDesigntransparentproceduresthatenabletheNRAtorenderandpublishadecisionthatconsidersallrelevantfactsandlaw.
Identifyandinstituteinternalandexternalprocedurestofacilitateimpartialdecisionmaking.
Revisecurrentprocedures,ifnecessary,toimplementaprocessdesignedtoreachimpartialdecisionsthatincludepublicparticipation.
V.
SANCTIONSandPENALTIESA.
OverviewHavingestablishedauthoritytoact,determinedculpabilitythroughafair,expeditious,andtransparentprocess,andrenderedanindependentdecisiononthematter,theregulatoryauthorityisnowinapositiontoimposeasanction.
Theissueishowtodeterminetheappropriatepenalty.
In93See,FinalReportonITU-DQuestion8/1:"Establishmentofanindependentregulatorybody"Document1/204(Rev.
1)-E,November7,2001at16.
94ContributionofBhutantoITU-DQuestion18/1,April2004at2–3.
95AddendumtoUCCContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1(January2004)at3.
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03thissection,wewillexploreguidelinesthatmayenableadministrationstoselectsanctionsthatreflecttheiruniquevaluesandobjectives.
Asageneralmatter,peopleoftenobeylawsthatembodythesocialnorms.
Publiclawenforcementalsomaybeabletoreinforcesocialnormsandtherebyindirectlycontributetoeffectiveenforcement.
96Thatsaid,however,therewillbeacriticalgainabovewhichindividualswillcommitaharmfulactandbelowwhichtheywillbedeterred.
Thecriticalgainisdeterminedbytheprobabilityofdetection,thelevelofsanctions,andthestandardforimposingliability.
97Assuminganenforcementauthoritywishestoemployafault-basedstandardforculpability(asopposedtostrictliability)98ithasbeensuggestedthatanoptimalpolicyistosetthefaultstandardequaltotheharm,andthefineatalevelthatachievescompliancewiththatstandard.
99Indeterminingthesanctiontoimpose,aregulatorshouldconsidertheseverityoftheharm,thecostofenforcement,theprobabilityofdetection,andwhethertheoffenderisrisk-averseorriskneutral.
Ingeneral,sanctionsshouldrisewiththeactualortheexpectedlevelofseverityofharmuptoamaximum,100andshouldreflectenforcementcosts.
Thisisbecausewhenanindividualorcorporateentitycommitsaharmfulact,societymustnotonlybeartheimmediateharm…butalso,ifdetected,thecostofimposingthefine.
Costsassociatedwithimposingafinemayincludeinvestigationandprosecution(attheendofwhichafineisimposedonlyinsomecases.
)Togetherthatistheexpectedtotalsocialcostoftheact.
101Whentheprobabilityofdetectionofaharmfulactisnotcertainorisvariable,highsanctionsmaybeoptimal.
Theoptimalfineisthemaximuminthiscircumstanceifindividualsarerisk-neutralinwealth.
Whenindividualsareriskaverse,however,theoptimalsanctionmaybelower.
102Whentheprobabilityofdetectionofaharmfulactistakenasfixed,theoptimalfineistheharmdividedbytheprobabilityofdetection,becausethisresultsinanexpectedfineequaltotheharm.
Riskaversionofinjurersshouldusuallylowerthelevelofthefine.
103Itisalsogenerallydesirableforthestructureofenforcementtoencourageself-reporting.
Self-reportingcanbeinducedbyloweringthesanctionforviolatorswhodisclosetheirowninfractions.
96Seegenerally"TheEconomicTheoryofPublicEnforcementofLaw,"MitchellPolinsku,StevenShavell,WorkingPaper6993,NationalBureauofEconomicResearchCambridge,MA,March1999at43.
97SeeId.
at7.
98Fault-basedliabilitymaybepreferabletostrictliabilitywhenindividualsareriskaverse:fault-basedliabilitycandeterharm-creatingconductwithoutimposingriskonrisk-averseindividuals,whereasunderstrictliability,allindividualswhocommittheharmfulactbeartheriskofbeingfined.
Id.
at13.
Ontheonehand,faultbasedliabilityismoredifficulttoadminister.
[T]oapplyfaultbasedliability,theenforcementauthoritymusthavemoreinformationthanunderstrictliability:itmustbeabletocalculateoptimalbehaviortodeterminethefaultstandard,anditmustascertainwhetherthefaultstandardwasmet.
Understrictliability,theauthorityneedonlydetermineharm.
Additionally,strictliabilityencouragesbetterdecisionsbyinjurersregardingtheirlevelofparticipationinharm-creatingactivities.
Ontheotherhand,fault-basedliabilitywillresultinfewerenforcementactionsthanstrictliabilityandtherebysaveenforcementcosts:injurerswhoclearlywerenotatfaultpresumablywillnotbeprosecutedunderfault-basedliability,buttheywillbeunderstrictliability.
Id.
Anadvantageoffaultbasedliabilityoverstrictliabilityisthatsanctionsthatarecostlytoimposeareimposedlessoften.
Id.
at42.
99Idat12.
100Id.
atpp30and44.
101SeegenerallyId.
at22-23.
102SeegenerallyId.
at41.
103Id.
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Self-reportinglowersenforcementcosts,reducestheriskofharm,andmayallowharmtobemitigated.
104Settingafinethatrepresentsapercentageoftheoffendingserviceprovider'srevenuesmaypermitregulatorstodisciplinemarketplayerswithoutseriouslyunderminingsmall,non-dominantoperators.
105SomeNRA'suserevenuescollectedfromsanctionedviolatorstoadvanceuniversalaccess/servicegoals.
InPeru,forexample,finescollectedforviolationsaredepositedinOSIPTEL'suniversalservicefund,wheretheyareusedtofundnetworkdevelopmentinruralareas.
106TheDominicanRepublicalsousesrevenuesobtainedfromfinesforconnectivityprojectsincommunitieswithmorethan200inhabitants.
Someoftheseprojectsusesolarenergyandincludetelemedicineandvideoconferenceapplications.
Othercountries,e.
g.
,Ecuador,investrevenuesreceivedfromsanctionsimposedintelecommunicationsequipmentordisbursethemtothepoliceforcetohelpdefraythecostofinvestigations.
107B.
CountryExamplesIntheUnitedStates,itisCongress'explicitintentionthatforfeitures(orfines)serveasa"meaningfulsanctiontothewrongdoersandaneffectivedeterrenttoothers.
"108Accordingly,section503oftheCommunicationsActsetsforthmaximumforfeitureamountsforviolationsbylicenseesorregulatesinthreecategories:(1)broadcastersandcableoperators,(2)commoncarriers,and(3)otherlicensees,entitiesandmembersofthepublic(notcoveredbytheothercategories).
Inaddition,section503(b)(2)(D)oftheCommunicationsActrequirestheFCCtotakeintoaccountmitigatingfactors–"thenature,circumstances,extent,andgravityoftheviolation,andwithrespecttotheviolator,thedegreeofculpability,anyhistoryofprioroffenses,abilitytopay,andothersuchmattersasjusticemayrequire.
"109TheFCCthereforeusestheadjustmentfactorstoassesstheforfeitureamountinlightofallrelevantfacts.
TheFCC'sForfeiturePolicyStatement,CIDocketNo95-6,FCC97-218(July1997)containsbaseamountstoguidethedeterminationsofforfeitureliabilityamountsforspecificviolationsoftheActandtheCommission'srules.
Thebaseamountspecifiedintheguidelinesisthestartingpointinassessingafine.
Thatfinemaybedecreasedbelowthebaseamountorincreasedtothestatutory104Id.
at35–36.
InAugust2000forexample,theNewZealandCommerceCommissionreleaseditsnewleniencypolicyinwhichtheCommission,initsdiscretion,willbelenientifapartycooperatesandprovidesinformationpriortoaninvestigationbeinginitiated.
OECDReportat5.
Inpractice,asimilarpolicyofleniencyinsuchcircumstancesisalsoemployedbytheFCCintheUnitedStates.
105See"TrendsinTelecommunicationReform2002,"InternationalTelecommunicationUnionat49.
106Rapporteur'sReport:MeetingoftheRapporteur'sGrouponITU-DQuestion18/1,RiodeJaneiro,21-22April2004(ITU-D/1/RGQ18/024(Rev.
1)-Eat3.
107MeetingoftheRapporteur'sGrouponITU-DQuestion18/1,RiodeJaneiro,21-22,April2004(Discussion);ANATEL/ITUBDTSeminaronEnforcementPractices,RiodeJaneiro,19-20,April2004.
(Discussion).
108SeeIntheMatteroftheCommission'sForfeiturePolicyStatementandAmendmentofSection1.
80oftheRulestoIncorporatetheForfeitureGuidelines,CIDocketNo.
95-6,FCC97-218at11citingOmnibusBudgetReconciliationActof1989,H.
R.
Conf.
Rep.
386,101stCong.
1stSess.
,434(1989).
Furthermore,theDebtCollectionImprovementActof1996(DCIA)Pub.
L.
No104-134,Section31001,110Stat.
1321(1996)requiresthatcivilmonetarypenaltiesassessedbythefederalgovernment,whethersetbystatutorymaximaorspecificdollaramountsasprovidedbyfederallaw,beadjustedforinflationbasedontheformulaoutlinedintheDCIA.
109See47U.
S.
CSection503.
Thereisanupwardadjustmentfactorunderthissectionforrepeatedorcontinuousviolations.
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03maximumwhentheadjustmentcriteriadescribedinsection503(b)(2)(D)areconsidered.
110Uniformbaseamountscannotbehigherthanthestatutorymaximaforanyservice.
111Theforfeitureguidelinesareintendedtoaddressfrequentlyrecurringviolations.
Theyarenotintendedtobeacompleteorexhaustivelistofviolations.
112Violationsthatarenotlistedintheguidelinesarenotconsideredtobeunimportantornonexistent.
TheFCCretainsthediscretiontoimposeforfeitures,includingforfeituresfornewviolationsofexistinglawsorregulations,orviolationsthatarisefromtheuseofnewtechnologiesorservices.
113TheFCCsetthebaseforfeitureamountformisrepresentationatthestatutorymaximumfortheparticulartypeofserviceprovidedbytheviolator.
Regardlessofthefactualcircumstancesofeachcase,misrepresentationtotheFCCisalwaysconsideredanegregiousviolation.
Anyentityorindividualthatengagesinthistypeofbehaviorshouldexpecttopaythehighestforfeitureavailabletotheserviceatissue.
Indeed,therevocationofthelicensemayalsoresultfrommisrepresentation.
114Finally,under18UnitedStatesCodeSection1001,arespondentwhomakesknowingandwillfulmisrepresentationsoromissionsmaybesubjecttopossiblecriminalpenalties.
115Currently,finesforcertainserviceprovidersare$130,000perviolationorperdayofacontinuingviolation,withtheamountforacontinuingviolationnottoexceed1.
325million.
116UnitedStatesFCCChairmanMichaelPowellsupportschangestotheCommunicationsActthatwouldgivetheFCCauthoritytoimposesubstantiallygreaterfinesforsignificantviolationsandotherproceduralchangesthatwouldenabletheCommissiontoprosecutewrongdoersforthebenefitofconsumers.
Specifically,finesforcertainserviceproviderswouldincreaseten-foldto$1millionforasingleviolation,orforcontinuingviolations,$1millionperdayuptoamaximumof$10million.
PursuanttotheTanzaniaCommunicationsAct,theCommunicationOperator(Licensing)Regulationsandlicenses,theTanzaniaCommunicationsCommissionhasthepowertoissuethefollowingsanctions:(i)Suspensionorcancellationofalicense;(ii)Monetaryfinenotexceeding1%ofapostalortelecomoperator'sgrossannualrevenue;(iii)Publicapologybythelicenseeatitsowncostsforitsinfractioninanewspaperofgeneralcirculationintheareaofservices;(iv)Outagecredits;110Id.
at15.
111Idat12.
112Id.
at23.
113Id.
at24.
114SeeId.
at12citing47U.
S.
C.
Section312(a)(1).
Seebelowalso,atpage16,anexampleofSriLanka'spenaltyforanoperatorthatprovidedfalseinformationtotheregulator.
115SeeUSAcontributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,September2002,at8.
116SeeAmendmentofSection1.
80(b)oftheCommission'sRules,June2004.
SeealsoUSAcontributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,September2002,at2citingForfeitureGuidelinesReportandOrderhttp://www.
fcc.
gov/eb/Orders/fcc99407.
htmlandForfeitureGuidelinesReconsiderationOrder(http://www.
fcc.
gov/eb/Orders/fcc99407.
html).
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g.
,ceaseorder.
117InUganda,theUCCemploysmonetaryfines,lettersofwarning(UCChasdeterminedthataviolationhasoccurred)notingtheviolationandrequiringcompliance.
Subsequently,theUCCwillmonitororinspecttoensurecompliance.
Incaseswhereequipmentisunlawfullypossessed,installed,connected,oroperated,orwherealicensee'sequipmentoperatesoutsidethespecifiedtechnicallimitstheUgandaCommunicationsActgivestheUCCthepowertoconfiscatetheequipment/apparatus.
TheUCCmayrevokealicense,thoughthisisreservedformostseriouscasesinvolvingfailuretoadheretorepeatedwarningsorcontinuousorrepeatedviolations.
TheUCCisalsoauthorizedtoarbitratedisputesbetweenoperatorsandbetweenoperatorsandconsumers.
TheagencymayalsocommencecriminalproceedingsagainstanypersonoroperatorwhohasviolatedthelaworrelevantUCCregulations.
118ItisnoteworthythattheUCCobtainedthislatterprivilegeasaresultofitsowninitiativebecauseundertheUgandaCommunicationsAct,onlytheDirectorofCriminalProsecutionsmayprosecuteacriminaloffense.
RecognizingboththespecializednatureofoffensesundertheAct,andtheefficienciesthatwouldbegainedbyhavingdelegatedauthoritytocarryoutsuchprosecutions,theUCCpetitionedtheDirectorofCriminalProsecutionsforauthorityfortheUCC'sLegalOfficertoprosecutecriminaloffensescommittedundertheActThisauthoritywassubsequentlygranted,andnowsignificantlyfacilitatestheUCCsabilitiestoenforcecompliancewiththeActandlicenseprovisions.
InBrazil,penaltiesmayonlybeimposeduponconclusionofaPADO119duringwhichthenatureandseriousnessofaviolationwillbeevaluated,alongwithanypreviousdelinquencyorrepeatedoffenses.
120TherearefivemainpenaltiesthatmayimposedbyANATEL:(i)warning;(ii)fine(inwhicheconomicconditionoftheoffenderandseriousnessofharmisconsidered)nottoexceedR$50,000000.
00foreachviolation121;(iii)licenserevocation122;(iv)temporarysuspensionoflicense;and(v)unsuitabilitytocontractwiththePublicAdministration.
Inextremecases,ANATELmayinterveneinaconcession,orinothercasesitmayrequireaviolatingentitytodirectlyredressitsusersforlossesithascaused.
Forcasesofinterference,operationoftheoffendingequipmentmaybeinterrupted.
123Formerly,thequestionofdamagesorcompensationwerenotissuesthattheUnitedKingdom'sOftelconsideredwhenresolvingadisputebutwereissuesthatmustbepursuedbycomplainantsthroughthecourts.
124Currently,Section392oftheCommunicationsActof2003requiresOfcomtoprepareandpublishastatementcontainingtheguidelinestheyproposetofollowindetermining117TCCContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,September2002,at2.
118UCCContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,December2002,at3-4.
119PADO:ProcedureforVerificationofNonCompliancewithObligation.
120ANATELcontributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,March12,2003,at5.
121FiftymillionReaisequalsnearly$14millionU.
S.
dollarsatanexchangerateofUS$1/R$3.
6.
SeeId.
at6.
122Revocationmaybeimposedinthecaseof:(i)failuretopaytheconcessionservicefeeaftertheestablishedtermhaslapsed;(ii)failuretocomplywiththecoverageestablishedintheconcessioncontract;(iii)transferoftheconcessionwithoutANATEL'spriorconsent(whererequired)and(iv)serviceprovisionthatissystematicallyinappropriateordeficient.
ANATELContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,July30,2003,at6.
123Id.
at5–6.
124SeeOftel/RadiocommunicationReportat13.
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03theamountofpenaltiesimposed.
Theseguidelinescanbefoundathttp://www.
ofcom.
org.
uk/codes_guidelines/penalty_guidelines/a=87101.
Withregardtopenalties,Law24-96,Morocco'sLawonTelecommunications,doesnotallowANRTanyotheroptionthantoinvokearticle30.
Thisarticlestatesthatifalicenseholderfailstoabidebythelicenseconditions,ANRTcanputthatlicenseholderonnoticeandgiveit30daystocomply.
Ifcomplianceisnotforthcomingwithinthattimeframe,the"appropriategovernmentauthoritymay,attheproposaloftheANRTDirectorGeneral,totallyorpartiallysuspendthelicense,temporarilysuspendthelicenseforuptooneyear,orpermanentlywithdrawthelicense.
"125AccordingtoArticle60ofLithuania'sLawonTelecommunications,anumberoffactorsareconsideredwhendeterminingthesanctiontobeimposed:thescopeofdamagecausedbytheviolation;itsduration;extenuatingoraggravatingcircumstances;incomereceivedasaresultoftheviolation;and,whenseveralpartiesareinvolved,theextentofinfluenceofeachpartyinthecommissionoftheviolation.
126Normally,finesimposedbytheCommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority(CRA)mustbepaidtothestatebudgetwithinthreemonthsofreceivingthedecision.
Upontheviolator'srequest(includingitsreasons)andCRA'sapproval,however,paymentmaybedeferredforuptosixmonthsinwholeorinpart.
127Ifapartyfailstopayafine,theCRA'sdecisionwillbesubmittedforenforcementtoacourtbailiffwhowillfollowproceduresspecifiedintheCodeofCivilProcedure.
128Afinecanbeimposedonanaturalpersononly,sowhereacompanyhasviolatedalaworregulation,thefineisimposedontheChiefExecutiveOfficer.
129Afineofupto3percentoftheannualturnoveroftelecommunicationsactivities,butnotmorethan300,000LT(approximately85,000EUR)willbeimposedforviolatingconditionsassociatedwiththefollowing:useofradiofrequencies,telephonenumbers,consumer'srights,universalserviceobligations,technicalrulesassociatedwithradioortelecommunicationsterminalequipment,ordecisionsoftheCRAdisposingofadispute.
Forrepeatedviolations,afineofupto5percentofannualturnoverfortelecommunicationsactivitieswillbeimposed.
IfapartyfailstocomplywithanorderoftheCommunicationsRegulatoryAuthoritytoterminateillegalactivityortoprovideinformation,afineamountingto5,000LT(equivalenttoapproximately1400EUR)willbeimposedforeachdaytheviolationiscommitted.
130Egypt'sLawonTelecommunicationscontainsspecificsanctionsforviolatingitsprovisions.
Licenseviolations(e.
g.
,conditions,technicalqualityregulations,performancestandardmeasurements)carryafineofnotlessthanLE20,000andnotmorethanLE200,000.
131SimilarbutpotentiallymoreseverepenaltiescanbeincurredforassigningfrequencybandwidthlicensetoathirdpartywithoutNTRA'spriorconsent.
Inthiscase,thelicensewillbecancelled,thepartywillbeimprisonedforaminimumof3months,andpaymentofafineofnotlessthanLE20,000and125See"EffectiveRegulation:CaseStudy-Morocco,"InternationalTelecommunicationUnion,2001,at40.
126ContributionfromLithuaniatoITU-DQuestion18/1,March10,2003at7.
127Id.
at7–8.
128Id.
at8.
129SeeId.
at1130PriortoenactmentofthenewLawonTelecommunications,finesimposedundertheLithuanianCodeofAdministrativeOffenseswereverylow--infact,theycouldnotexceed10,000LTL(approx.
2800EUR).
Id.
at1.
131See,ArabRepublicofEgypt,LawNo.
10/2003–TelecommunicationsRegulation,February2003,Article85.
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03notmorethanLE100,000willberequired.
132Moreseverepenaltiespotentiallyapplyinthecaseofcausinginterference,wherethelawproscribesimprisonmentforamaximumofsixmonthsandpaymentofafineofnotlessthanLE20,000andnotmorethanLE50,000.
133Ingeneral,themostseverepenaltiesareprovidedforoperatingwithoutaNTRAlicense(establishinginfrastructure,operatingatelecommunicationsnetwork,providingtelecomservices,ortransferringinternationalcallsinanyway).
Fortheseviolations,Egypt'snewtelecomlawimposesapenaltyofimprisonmentbetweensixmonthsandfiveyears,afineofnotlessthanLE50,000ormorethanLE500,000,andconfiscationofallequipmentandconnectionsused.
134InPoland,whereanoperatorisviolatingthetermsofitslicense,theregulatormaylevyafineonthenoncompliantoperatorinanamountupto3percentoftheoperator'srevenuesforthepastcalendaryear.
Theregulatormayalsofinetheindividualmanagerofthecompanyanamountupto300percentofthemanager'smonthlysalary.
135InPortugal,theregulatormayimposefinesonnon-compliantoperatorsofbetween0.
001percentand0.
5percentofthelicensee'srevenueintheprioryear.
InTurkey,non-compliantoperatorsaresubjecttoafineofupto3percentoftheoperator'sturnover.
136TheregulatoryauthorityinKenyacanfinelicenseesafineofKSHS500,000foreachviolationofthetermsandconditions.
Thisfineappliesmonthlyuntiltheviolationends.
137DescriptionsofvariousinfractionsandtheapplicablesanctionscanbefoundinBolivia'sRegulationsforSanctionsandSpecialInfractionofRegulatoryFrameworkProcedures(D.
S.
25950)andareadequatelydefined.
138Boliviaalsomaintainsaregisterofallthosewhohavebeensanctioned.
139InSriLanka,thetelecommunicationlegislationandconditionsinthelicensesrequiresserviceproviderstofurnishinformationtotheTelecommunicationsRegulatoryCommission.
Thecorrectnumberofnewconnections,forexample,mustbereportedbytheCommissiontotheParliamentandthepublic.
OnelandmarkdecisionbytheSriLankanRegulatorrequiredaserviceprovidertopaycompensationtothepublicfordelayedtelephoneinstallations.
Informationprovidedtotheregulatorbytheserviceproviderinthatinstancewasincorrect;moreovercomplaintsfromthepublicindicatedthattelephoneconnectionsclaimedbytheserviceproviderwerenotactuallyinservice.
Therefore,UnderSection11oftheSriLankaTelecomActof1991asamendedbyActNo.
27of1996,actionwastakenagainstaserviceproviderfornoncompliancewithlicenseconditions.
Theviolatorwasorderedtopay69millionSriLankarupeesto"theaggrievedpublic.
"140C.
ChallengesIdentifiedThefollowinglistsgenerallythosechallengesreportedlyfacedbyNRA'sintheareaofsanctionsandpenaltiesastheyattempttoenforcetheirdomestictelecommunicationslaws:132Id.
,Article74.
133Id.
,Article78.
134Id.
,Article72.
135See"TrendsinTelecommunicationReform2002"InternationalTelecommunicationUnion,at48,box4.
3.
136Id.
137Id.
at49.
138ContributionofBoliviatoITU-DQuestion18/1,May4,2004atp.
6.
139MeetingoftheRapporteur'sGrouponITU-DQuestion18/1,RiodeJaneiro,21-22,April2004(Discussion).
140SriLankaRegulatoryCommissioncontributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1(December2002)at2.
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03-Nodescriptionofappropriatefines;-Lackofintermediateormid-rangeeconomicpenalties;-Statutoryfineswhicharenothighenoughtoprovidesufficientdeterrence.
-Infractionsandapplicablepenaltiesareadequatelyidentifiedinthelaw,however,difficultyisencounteredinimplementation,duetoresistancetocollaborationbyjudgesandlackofsupportfromlawenforcement.
D.
DraftGuidelines:SanctionsandPenaltiesEnsurethattheNRAhasauthoritytoimposeawiderangeofpenaltiesthatincludeminor,midrange,andmaximum.
Indeterminingasanction,considertheseverityoftheharm,theprobabilityofdetection,therisksensitivityoftheoffender,andthecostofenforcement.
Riskaversionofinjurersshouldusuallylowerthelevelofthefine.
Establishandemploysanctionsthatarereasonable(proportionaltotheoffense)andeffective,buthighenoughtodeterwrongdoingandachievecompliancewithrules.
Considerimposingafinethatexceedsthebenefittheoffenderreceivedfromcommittingtheoffense.
Consideringthecostofenforcement,seekeffectivealternativestofines(forexampleincludespecificrequirementsinlicenseobligations)Considerprovidingarangeofresponsestoviolationsincluding,e.
g.
,warningletters,fines,consentdecrees,preventiveceaseanddesistorders,licenserevocation,equipmentseizure,damageawards,andreferralforcriminalprosecution.
Consideremployingthestrictestpenalties,includinglicenserevocation,foroffensesinvolvingmisrepresentation.
Considerdeveloping,publishing,andemployingspecificbutflexibleguidelinesfordeterminingtheseverityofasanctionasthesecandeterviolationsofimportantrulesandcanassisttheNRAindevelopingprioritiesamongdifferentviolations.
Considerencouragingself-reportingasthiscanlowerenforcementcosts,reducetheriskofharm,andmayallowharmtobemitigated.
Considersettingafinethatrepresentsapercentageoftheoffender'srevenuesasthismaypermitregulatorstodisciplinemarketplayerswithoutseriouslyunderminingsmall,non-dominantoperators.
Seektominimizethecostofcompliancewithregulationsforbusinessusersandconsumers.
VI.
GENDERandENFORCEMENTA.
OverviewTheabilitytoefficientlyandadequatelyenforcedomesticprioritiesmayhavetheaddedbenefitoffavorablyimpactingcertainsegmentsofthepopulationtargetedbythestateevenmorethanothers.
Forexample,theabilitytoenforceuniversalserviceorruralconnectivitygoalsmayprovidefarreachingbenefitstowomenincertaincountries.
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03ofcommunicationsservicestoruralcommunitiescanhaveagreatimpactonwomeninAfrica,whoforexample,makeup70%ofitsruralpopulation.
141Recognizingthattheunevendistributionoftechnologiesinsocieties--thedigitaldivide--isreflectedmostsharplyinthecaseofwomen,particularlyindevelopingcountries,andthatthisphenomenonisreinforcedbysocio-cultural,political,andeconomicsystems,thefailuretoconsiderissuessuchasgender-baseddivisionoflabor,culturaldefinitionsofwomen'sactivities,women'spaidandunpaidlabor,andwomen'smultiplerolesfromtheearlystagesoftechnologydiffusionmayunwittinglygenerateunintendednegativeeffectsonwomen,andICTmaybedevelopedandutilizedinwaysthatdonotreflectwomen'sspecificneeds.
142Therefore,identifyingandenforcingthosedomesticpoliciesandrulesthataddresswomen'saccess,use,andparticipationininformationtechnologyandcommunicationscanhelpreverseexitinginequalitiestothebenefitofthetelecommunicationssectorandsocietyasawhole.
Forexample,illiteracylimitswomen'saccesstotext-basedcomputerapplications,becausewomenmakeupnearlytwo-thirdsofthe876millionpeopleintheworldwhocannotread.
143Enforcinguniversalaccessschemesthat,forexample,promoteuser-friendlytechnologiesinthecontextoflowliteracylevelsorforusebypeoplewhocannotread(e.
g.
,humancomputerinterfacesthatarenon-textbased;"scribes"fordictationattelecenters)canaddressthisdisparity.
AninnovativeexampleofthiscanbefoundinSriLankaandMongoliawherelocalpopulationshavegainedaccesstoinformationontheInternetthroughcommunityradionetworks.
TheradiostationusesfacilitatorstosearchtheInternetforinformationsoughtbylocalcommunities,andbroadcaststheinformationintheirlanguage.
144Enforcinggenderawarepoliciestoprovideuniversalaccess,suchascommunicationstechnologyaccesspoints(e.
g.
,telecenters,communitycenters,technologycenters,etc)particularlythosewithaccesspointslocatednearplacesfrequentedbywomen(e.
g.
,schools,markets,clinics)canhavesimilarbenefits.
145Regulationsthatensurethatconsumers,particularlywomen,(e.
g.
,viaconsumeradvocacyoffices)arerepresentedinthepolicyprocess,likewisecanservetofacilitategenderbalance.
146Women'saccesstoICTsisalsomoredependentonthecostoftelecommunicationsservices.
Itiswidelydocumentedthatthereisawagegapbetweenwomenandmeninmostcountriesoftheworld.
147Enforcingregulatorydecisionsthatrecognizewage/incomegapsintermsofgenderaswellasgeographicareacanhelpimplementdomesticintentionstoaddressthisdisparity.
141TransformingInformation&CommunicationsTechnologiesforGenderEquality,GilliamM.
Marcelle,GenderinDevelopmentMonographSeries#9,May2000at13.
142See,IsInformationTechnologyGender-NeutralInformationandCommunicationTechnologiesforDevelopment,anIDRC(Canada)ProgramInitiative,http://www.
idrc.
ca/pan/gender/ginftecgn.
htm.
143See"TheTaskForceonGenderIssues-ACatalystfortheSustainableDevelopmentofInformationandCommunicationTechnologies(ICTs)"InternationalTelecommunicationUnionDevelopmentBureau(2001)at4,citingUnitedNations,"TheWorld'sWomen2000,at87referencingUNESCO,StatisticalYearbook1999.
(Datareferstothepopulation15yearsandover.
)144SeeIdat5citingUNU/INTECHandUNIFEMandHighLevelPanel2000;"GenderandTelecommunications:AnAgendaforPolicy"andatp.
26.
145Id.
at21.
146Id.
at25.
147"GenderperspectivesinTelecommunicationsPolicy:ACurriculumProposal",SoniaNunesJorge,ITU-BDTTaskForceonGenderIssues,http://www.
itu.
int/ITU-D/gender/projects/GenderCurriculum.
pdf(July2000)at4.
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03TheWorldBankhasdiscoveredthatdecreasingdisparitiesbetweenmenandwomenresultsinfastereconomicgrowth.
148TheimportanceofICTasatooltopromotethefullparticipationofwomenintheinformationsocietyhasbeenwidelyrecognized.
AsnotedintheDeclarationandRecommendationsofthe"TheForumonICTandGender:OptimizingOpportunities"(KulalaLumper,Malaysia,20-23August2003)149ICToffersimmensepossibilitiestoovercomewomen'sisolationandenhancetheparticipationofwomeninsocio-economicandpoliticaldevelopmentthatwillreducepovertyandimprovethequalityoflife.
150Insomecountries,womenfiguresignificantlyinhouseholdspendingprovidinganadditionalreasontheirinclusionintheinformationsocietywillinuretothebenefitofsocietyasawhole.
IntheUnitedStatesforexample,womencontrolatotalof$5.
2trillioninspending(consumerandbusiness)annually.
Womenpurchase83percentofallhouseholdproductsandservices,includingcableandcommunicationsservices.
Womencontributeandhandle75percentofallhouseholdfinancesandmake53percentoftheinvestmentdecisions.
151Whilethesenumbersmayreflectsignificantlydifferenteconomiccircumstances,therolewomenplayinhouseholdfinancesmaybereflectedproportionatelyelsewhereintheworld.
B.
CountryExamplesInSouthAfrica,thetelecommunicationslegislationof1996includesprovisionsforthegovernmenttotakestepstoencouragetheparticipationofwomeninallaspectsoftheindustry.
152Accordingly,theDepartmentofCommunicationsinSouthAfricahasestablishedtele-centersthatareownedandmanagedbywomen,madeInternetfacilitiesavailableforwomen-based(andother)groups,andtrainedwomen'sgroup'stousetechnologies,includingwaystoenhancetheirbusinessesandotheractivities.
TheDepartmentalsohascommittedtogenderequalityinternallybydevelopingaGenderManagementSystemthatsetstargetsforchangeintheDepartmentandisleadbyagenderspecialist.
153InUganda'sruralareas,themajorityofinhabitantsarewomen.
In2001,theUCCadoptedaRuralCommunicationsDevelopmentPolicythatbroadlyaimstosupportthedevelopmentofcommunicationsinfrastructureinruralUgandawhileensuringreasonableandaffordableaccesstocommunicationservicestothepublic.
Uganda'sassociatedRuralCommunicationsDevelopmentFundhasbeenusedtoestablishaccesstobasiccommunicationsservicesincluding"SMART"subsidiestoprivateoperators.
LicensesissuesbytheUCCprovidespecificrolloutobligationsespeciallyinruralareas.
Additionally,theUCChasprovidedforgenderequityandmainstreaminginitsStrategicPlan.
154148TheTaskForceonGenderIssues--ACatalystfortheSustainableDevelopmentofInformationandCommunicationTechnologies(ICTs)at3.
149TheForumwashostedbythegovernmentofMalaysia,theAsia-PacificTelecommunity(APT),theITU,InternationalDevelopmentResearchCenter(IDRC),theU.
N.
EducationalScientific,andCulturalOrganization(UNESCO)andothers.
150ContributionofThales(France)toITU-DQuestion18/1(October20,2003)at1.
151See,CatalystStudyonWomen2004http://www.
catalystwomen.
org/publications/executive_summaries/financialperformance.
pdf.
152Id.
at19.
153See,"TheTaskForceonGenderIssues--ACatalystfortheSustainableDevelopmentofInformationandCommunicationTechnologies(ICTs),"InternationalTelecommunicationUnionDevelopmentBureau,2001http://www.
itu.
int/ITU-D/gender/projects/reports/ICTReportSept3.
pdf,at7.
154AddendumtoContributionofUgandatoITU-DQuestion18/1(January2004)at2.
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03SeventyninepercentofthepeopleofBhutanliveinruralandremoteareas.
ApriorityoftheRoyalGovernment,Bhutan'sruralaccesspolicyisaimedatencouragingaccesstotheuseofICTbybothgenders,especiallyyouthandwomen.
155C.
ChallengesidentifiedThefollowinglistsgenerallythosechallengesreportedlyfacedbyNRA'sinrecognizingandenforcingtelecomlawsthatimpactgender:-LowICTliteracyinwomen-Lackofdatatoevaluateenforcementoftelecompolicyongender:gender-disaggregatedstatisticsonaccessanduse,incomes,differentialimpactofcostsandtechnologychoice,andonemploymentandentrepreneurship.
156-DisparityinthedistributionofICTaccessfacilitiesandservicesacrossthecountry;-Assumptionsthatindividualsfromthepubliccanorwillbenefitequallyfrompolicydecisions.
(Policydecisionsmayhavedifferentimpactonwomenandmen.
)-Regulatorypricingpoliciesusuallyconsideraffordablepricesforservicesfromamacroperspective,withoutnotingtheimportantmicro-characteristicsofthecountry.
D.
DraftGuidelines:GenderandEnforcementCollectdatatoevaluatehowenforcingtelecompolicyimpactsgender:specifically,gender-disaggregatedstatisticsonaccessanduse,incomes,differentialimpactofcostsandtechnologychoice,andonemploymentandentrepreneurship.
Identifythosedomesticpoliciesandrulesthat,ifenforced,wouldincreasewomen'saccess,use,andparticipationinICTandICTservices.
Promotegenderanalysisaspartofthepolicyprocesssothatthepoliciesdescribedabovecanbeidentified.
157Identifyandenforcethosepoliciesandrulesthatareparticularlygearedtowardtheneedsofwomen,e.
g.
,ruralbuild-outrequirements,universalaccesstargets,distancelearningprojects,reproductivehealth.
VII.
ORGANIZATIONANDRESOURCESA.
OverviewRegulatorshavegenerallyfoundthatasignificantportionoftheirresourcesmaybeneededtosupporttheirenforcementefforts.
Tobesure,itisadvisableforeachNRAtobeclearonitsbasicfunctionsasdeterminedbyitsnationalprioritiesandtoassessandseektoattaintheresourcesneededtoadequatelyenforceregulationsthatimplementthosepriorities.
Thus,ataminimum,itisadvisablefortheNRA'sorganizationalstructuretobeconfiguredsothatitcansupportthosebasicfunctionsthatimplementdomesticpriorities.
ByconcentratingoncreatinganorganizationalstructureandsecuringresourcesthatenabletheNRAtocarryoutthose155ContributionofBhutantoITU-DQuestion18/1,April2004,at4.
156See"Gender,InformationtechnologyandDevelopingCountries:AnAnalyticStudy,NancyHafkinandNancyTaggart,AcademyforEducationalDevelopment(AED)fortheUSAIDOfficeofWomeninDevelopment,BureauforGlobalPrograms,FieldSupportandResearch"June2001at72.
157InternationalTelecommunicationUnion,"GenderAwareGuidelinesforPolicymakingandRegulatoryAgencies",http://www.
itu.
int/ITU-D/gender/projects/FinalGendAwrnGuidelns.
pdf,at2.
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03functionsthatimplementwhatismostimportantinthedomestictelecommunicationssector,anNRAcanallocateresourcesefficientlyandaccomplishimportantstategoals.
IncaseswhereresourcesareseverelylimitedanddonotcoverallNRAfunctionsimplementingstatepriorities,suchanalysiscanprovideanobjectivebasisforidentifyingwhichofanagency'sremainingneeds,giventheirrelativeimportance,shouldbeaddressedbyseekingadditionalresources.
Thisinformationcanformthebasisforrequestingadditionalallocationsfromstatebudgetsorothersources.
B.
CountryExamplesBrazil'sNationalTelecommunicationsAgency,ANATEL,ismadeupofaBoardofDirectors–itsseniorexecutivebody,anAdvisoryCouncil,anAttorney-GeneralOffice,aSupervisionOffice,aLibrary,anOmbudsman,andsixTechnicalBureaus.
158ThegeneralcounselforANATELisamemberoftheFederalAttorney'sOffice.
159ItismainlyfundedbytheTelecommunicationsInspectionFundorFISTEL,andbypaymentsmadebyoperatorsforgrantingconcessionsandauthorizations,andforusingtheradiofrequency.
ANATEL'Senforcementactivitiesareperformedbyalloftheagency'sbureaus(exceptGeneralAdministration).
EachBureauisresponsibleforinvestigationandenforcementrelativetoservicesunderitsmandate.
Additionally,theRadioFrequencyandInspectionBureauhasregionalunitsthatconductfieldinvestigationandenforcementactivities.
Theseagentscarryouttechnicalinspectionseitherdirectly(onsite)orindirectly(remotemonitoring)oftelecommunications,radio,andTVbroadcastingstations.
160ANATEL'sstaffwasoriginallyrecruitedfromtheranksoftheTelebrásSystemandtheMinistryofCommunications.
Subsequently,itwascompletedwithtemporaryemployeeshiredfor,atmost,fiveyears161.
ANATELspendsalmosthalfofitsfinancialandhumanresourcesonmonitoringandenforcement.
162IntheUnitedStates,theFCC'sEnforcementBureauhasfourdivisionsand25fieldoffices,withthefollowingkeyresponsibilities:TelecommunicationsConsumers;MarketDisputesResolution;TechnicalandPublicSafety;InvestigationsandHearings.
RegionalandFieldOfficeshandleon-sceneinvestigations,inspectionsandauditsinresponsetocomplaints.
Whencreatingthisbureau,itwasdeterminedthatamixofregulatoryandlitigationexperience,amixofFCCveteransandnewcomers,wouldprovidetheoptimalstafftoaccomplishitsmission.
CurrentlytheBureauhasapproximately330employees,163orroughlyone-sixthoftheCommission's1900employees.
WhencombinedwiththestaffintheConsumerandGovernmentalAffairsBureauhandlinginformalconsumercomplaints,thenumberofemployeesspecificallyworkingtoenforceFCCrulesincreasesto410orroughly20percentoftheCommission'sstaff.
Of158SeeANATELcontributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,March12,2003,at3.
Thesixbureausare:PublicUtilityServices,PrivateServices,MassCommunicationServices,RadioFrequencyandInspection,UniversalAccess,andGeneralAdministration.
Id.
158See,ANATELContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,July30,2003at3.
159SeeANATELContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,July30,2003at3.
160SeeId.
atpp.
3-5.
161See,ANATELContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,July30,2003at3.
162See"TrendsinTelecommunicationReform2002"InternationalTelecommunicationUnion,at46.
163SeeUSAContributiontoITU-DQuestion18/1,September2002,at4-5.
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03thisnumber,roughly80arewomen.
164Agreaternumbermaybeengagedinhandlinginformal,consumercomplaints.
InLithuania,approximately56peopleinseveraldivisionsoftheCommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority(CRA)areinvolvedinenforcement:theInspectionSectionwhichhas4employees;theMarketSupervisionDepartmentwhere14employeeswork,theTelecommunicationsDepartmentwhichhas14employees,andtheRadiocommunicationscontroldepartment,withatotalof24employeesinofficesinLithuania'sfivemaincities.
ThemainsourceoffundingfortheCRAcomesfromindustry.
165NewZealand'sCompetitionCommissionin2000–2001hadatotalof40FTE's:4lawyers,3economists,22otherprofessionalsand12supportstaff.
OutofitstotalannualbudgetofNZ$8.
64million(US$3.
77million),wellovertwo-thirdsorNZ$5.
098million(US$2.
22million)wasspentforenforcement.
AsofJune30,2001,19.
5FTE'sworkonenforcementagainstanticompetitivepractices;16workonmergerreviewandenforcement;5areengagedinadvocacy.
166Morocco'sANRTconsistsoftheDirectorGeneral(appointedbytheKingviaroyaldecree)andsevendirectorates(technical,regulatory,informationtechnology,evaluationandcompetition,administrativeandfinancial,managementcontrolandinternalaudit,andatraininginstitute:ThenationalInstituteforPostalandTelecommunicationStudies(INPT).
ANRT'sworkisorganizedingroups,aroundspecificprojects.
Amultidisciplinaryteamissetupwhichbringstogetherpeoplefromseveraldifferentdivisions/units,underthedirectionofoneormoreprojectheads.
Thusstaffcompetenciesarecontinuallybeingreinforcedandinterdisciplinarycapabilitiesareswiftlybeingdeveloped,somethingthatisdifficulttoachievebyothermeans.
167In2001,ANRThadastaffof389,including200employedatINPT,ANRT'straininginstitute.
Womenaccountedfor33.
2%ofthestaff.
Atthattime,nowomenheldpostsatthedirectorlevel,butwerewellrepresentedattheseniorprofessionallevel.
There,twowomenheldchargéedemissionposts,onewomanwasaprojecthead,onewasadivisionchief,andninewereheadsofservices.
168Outofthetotalnumberofemployees,3.
34%wereprofessionalspreviouslyemployedbytheMinistryofCommunications,5.
9%wereprofessionalspreviouslyemployedbyotherstateagencies,14%wereprofessionalspreviouslyemployedbytheincumbentoperator,and9.
8%camefromtheprivatesector.
Overall,93.
8%werecareerstaff,5.
4%wereshorttermemployees,andfewerthat1%werecontractualstaff.
Engineersformedthelargestgroupofspecialists,representing18.
5%oftheprofessionalstaff,followedbytechnicians(7.
2%),commercespecialists(6%),andlawyersandeconomists(5.
4%respectively).
Onaverage,seniorprofessionalswerebetween42and50yearsold,whilemid-levelprofessionalswerebetween25–30yearsold.
ManyprofessionalstaffreceivedtheirtrainingatINPT,whichisaffiliatedwithANRT.
Themaincommunicationtoolistheagency'sintranet,whichprovidesstaffwitheasy,effectiveaccesstoinformationonANRT'sprojects.
169164Ofthese,roughly7haveadministrativemanagementduties.
Additionally,29womenprovideclericalsupporttotheEnforcementBureau.
165SeeContributionfromLithuaniatoITU-DQuestion18/1,March10,2003at2.
166OEDCReportat8-9.
167See"EffectiveRegulation:CaseStudy-Morocco,"InternationalTelecommunicationUnion,2001atpp.
21–22.
168Id.
at25andnote16.
169Id.
at26.
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03TheBhutanCommunicationsAuthority(BCA)isheadedbyaDirectorandiscomprisedoffoursections:Telecommunications,Radiocommunications,MediaandPost,andGeneralMatters.
Allemployees,includingtheDirector,arecivilservants.
BCAreceivesitsannualbudgetviaanappropriationfromtheMinistryofFinance.
The1999TelecommunicationsActpermitstheuseoffeesandotherchargespayabletoBCAforperformingitsfunctionsundertheActforthispurposeaswell.
170Zimbabwe'sPOTRAZ,whichbecameoperationalin2001,isfundedbythefeesandchargesfromthelicensesitissues.
Mostofitsstaffmembersbeganservicein2003C.
ChallengesIdentifiedThefollowinglistsgenerallythoseorganizationalchallengesreportedlyfacedbyNRA'sastheyattempttoenforcetheirdomestictelecommunicationslaws:-Inadequatetechnicalcapacity;-Insufficientnumberofstaffresponsibleforenforcementandcompliance;-Lackofspectrummanagementandradiomonitoringsystems.
-Acquiringandmaintainingsufficientpersonneltomonitorsmalloperators'compliancewiththeradiofrequencyrules.
-Lackofaseparate,specializedsectionfordeliveryofenforcementfunctions;-Limitedtrainedhumanresources,especiallyineconomicandlegalfields;-Highriskoflosingtrainedandskilledemployees.
-Multi-sectoralNRA'sneedtotakeintoaccountothermarketsectors(e.
g.
,water,electricity,gas)strainsresources.
D.
DraftGuidelines:OrganizationandResourcesRequiredIndevisingitsorganizationalstructuretoenforcetelecomlawandpolicy,itisadvisableforanNRAto:C.
Knownationalandregionalpriorities;D.
Assessandseekresourcesneededtoenforceregulationsthatimplementnationalpriorities;andE.
designtheorganizationsothatitcansupportactivitiesthatimplementnationalpriorities.
TheNRAisencouragedtoseekhuman,technicalandfinancialresourcesneededtoenforceregulationsthatimplementthecountry'snationaltelecommunicationspriorities.
Hireandretainmultidisciplinaryexperts(legal,economic,technical).
a.
Employinterdisciplinaryteamsforcompetencyreinforcementandskilldevelopment;Consider,ifpossible,allocatingasignificantportionoftheNRA'sresourcestoenforcementefforts.
Considerdedicatingseparatestaffforenforcementefforts.
Targetinternaltrainingtoenhancethecapacityoftheauthority'sstafftoaddressconsumer,marketcompetition,andtechnicalissues.
170ContributionofBhutantoITU-DQuestion18/1,April2004,at1.
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03ANNEXA–SUMMARYOFGUIDELINESI.
ENFORCEMENTPOWERS-LEGISLATIONEnsureharmonybetweentheconstitution,legislation,andadministrativepowers.
Identifychangeasnecessary.
Ensurethatthetelecomlawprovidessufficientpower,authority,andfinancialresourcestotheNRAforittoimpartially,swiftly,andtransparentlycarryoutthewillofthelegislature.
EnsurethatthelawcontainsclearandunambiguouslanguagedescribingthejurisdictionoftheNRAand,whereappropriate,otherinterestedstateagenciesEnsurethatthelawispromulgatedclearly,transparently,andprecisely.
Avoidtechnicaltermsthatarenotunderstandablebythepublicorthatmaybeunclearbeforeareviewingcourt.
Describetheobjectivesandrationaleofpromulgatedlawstoinduceenforcementandcompliancebyallparties,includingenforcementagentsofthestate.
Ensurethatconsumers,operators,andserviceprovidershaverecourseattheregulatoryagency.
Ensurejurisdictionoverserviceproviderswhomaynotbelicensed(e.
g.
,ISPs)Ensurethattheenablinglaw/telecomlegislationprovidestheNRAwithawiderangeofpenaltiestoincludethoseappropriateforminor,midrange,andmaximumoffenses.
II.
ENFORCEMENTPRACTICE&PROCESSDevelopandpublishproceduresfortheNRA'sinternaloperationsanditsexternalpublicfunctionsthatreflectfairness,speed,efficiencyandtransparencygoalsDesigntransparentproceduresthatenabletheNRAtorenderandpublishadecisionthatconsidersallrelevantfactsandlaw.
Followrulesandlaws;observeprecedent.
Includetheconsumer/userpointofviewinNRAdeliberationsanddecisions.
Toassistinobtaininginformationnecessarytoevaluatecompliancewithlaws,policiesorregulations,adoptproceduresfortreatingconfidentialorcommerciallysensitiveinformationprovidedbyoperators,serviceproviders,orotherlicenseesthatwillprotectthesensitivenatureoftheinformation.
Identifyareaswheretheactionsofotherinterestedstateauthorities(e.
g.
,courts,localrepresentatives,administrativeauthorities)frequentlyorsignificantlyaffectNRAenforcementprocesses.
Wherefeasibleandappropriate,developaplanforcommunication,coordination,andcooperationwiththegoaloffacilitatingequitableandspeedyresolutionofviolations.
171171GoodexamplesofthisapproachincludeactionstakenbyUganda,Peru,Brazil,Mexico,andColombia.
NotingthatunderthelawonlytheDirectorofCriminalProsecutionscouldprosecutecriminaloffensesundertheCommunicationsAct,andwishingtominimizeanypotentialadministrativedelayorotherinefficiencies,Uganda'sNRA,UCC,petitionedtheDirectorofCriminalProsecutionsforauthoritytoprosecutecriminaloffensesundertheCommunicationsActandwonthisauthority.
Asaresult,UCCcomplianceeffortsinthisareaarelesscomplex.
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03Consideremployingavarietyoftoolsforinvestigationtoincludelettersofinquiry,on-siteinspections,andsubpoenas.
Insofaraspossible,usetechnologytofacilitatespeedybutdeliberativedecision-making,andsubsequentpublicationofthesedecisions.
Placedecisionsandcommentsontheweb.
Tocompensateforlimitedstaffandresources,considerplacingtheburdentoproduceinformationneededbytheNRAuponserviceproviders/licensees.
MakethisinformationpublicsothatcompetitorsandconsumerscannotifytheNRAiftheybelievetheinformationisinaccurateorotherwiseflawed.
ToassisttheNRAingatheringinformationfromregulateesandforreceivingcomplaintsfromconsumers,considerpublishingastandardformatforeach.
ToassisttheNRAingatheringinformationtorenderadecisiononrlicenseapplicationsorotherlineprocessingwork,prepareastandardizedworksheetforstafftoensurethatallissueshavebeenreviewedandrelevantrulescompliedwith.
Developandmaintainadatabaseorotherappropriaterecordkeepingsystemtotrackviolatorsandviolationsforuseinreportingtothegovernmentandthepublic,trackingindustrytrends,andinsettingfuturepenaltiesorsanctions.
III.
INDEPENDENTDECISIONMAKINGDesigntransparentproceduresthatenabletheNRAtorenderandpublishadecisionthatconsidersallrelevantfactsandlaw.
Identifyandinstituteinternalandexternalprocedurestofacilitateimpartialdecisionmaking.
Revisecurrentprocedures,ifnecessary,toimplementaprocessdesignedtoreachimpartialdecisionsthatincludepublicparticipation.
IV.
SANCTIONSandPENALTIESEnsurethattheNRAhasauthoritytoimposeawiderangeofpenaltiesthatincludeminor,midrange,andmaximum.
Indeterminingasanction,considertheseverityoftheharm,theprobabilityofdetection,therisksensitivityoftheoffender,andthecostofenforcement.
Riskaversionofinjurersshouldusuallylowerthelevelofthefine.
Establishandemploysanctionsthatarereasonable(proportionaltotheoffense)andeffective,buthighenoughtodeterwrongdoingandachievecompliancewithrules.
Recognizingthatcoordinationwiththejudiciaryisessentialtosuccessfulenforcementofitstelecompoliciesandlaws,Peru'sNRA,OSIPTEL,sponsoreda1-weektrainingcourseinLimafor30–40judgesattheendof2003coveringhighlyspecializedcommunicationsissues.
InColombiaandBrazil'sANATELhavealsosponsoredsimilarseminarsforthejudiciary.
In2003,Mexico'sCOFETELprovidedtechnicaltrainingfornewjudgesonmobilequalityregulations.
Suchoutreacheffortsservetofamiliarizethejudiciarywithtelecommunicationsissues,procedures,objectives,andpersonnel,andtoexposetheNRAtothecourt'sprocedures,objectivesandviews.
Asaresult,inefficienciesareminimized,andthenecessarycoordinationbetweentheseinstitutionsoncommunicationsissuesisoptimized.
SeeRapporteur'sReport:MeetingoftheRapporteur'sGrouponITU-DQuestion18/1,RiodeJaneiro,21-22April2004(ITU-D/1/RGQ18/024(Rev.
1)-Eat3.
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03Considerimposingafinethatexceedsthebenefittheoffenderreceivedfromcommittingtheoffense.
Consideringthecostofenforcement,seekeffectivealternativestofines(forexampleincludespecificrequirementsinlicenseobligations)Considerprovidingarangeofresponsestoviolationsincluding,e.
g.
,warningletters,fines,consentdecrees,preventiveceaseanddesistorders,licenserevocation,equipmentseizure,damageawards,andreferralforcriminalprosecution.
Consideremployingthestrictestpenalties,includinglicenserevocation,foroffensesinvolvingmisrepresentation.
Considerdeveloping,publishing,andemployingspecificbutflexibleguidelinesfordeterminingtheseverityofasanctionasthesecandeterviolationsofimportantrulesandcanassisttheNRAindevelopingprioritiesamongdifferentviolations.
Considerencouragingself-reportingasthiscanlowerenforcementcosts,reducetheriskofharm,andmayallowharmtobemitigated.
Considersettingafinethatrepresentsapercentageoftheoffender'srevenuesasthismaypermitregulatorstodisciplinemarketplayerswithoutseriouslyunderminingsmall,non-dominantoperators.
Seektominimizethecostofcompliancewithregulationsforbusinessusersandconsumers.
V.
GENDERANDENFORCEMENTCollectdatatoevaluatehowenforcingtelecompolicyimpactsgender:specifically,gender-disaggregatedstatisticsonaccessanduse,incomes,differentialimpactofcostsandtechnologychoice,andonemploymentandentrepreneurship.
Identifythosedomesticpoliciesandrulesthat,ifenforced,wouldincreasewomen'saccess,use,andparticipationinICTandICTservices.
Promotegenderanalysisaspartofthepolicyprocesssothatthepoliciesdescribedabovecanbeidentified.
172Identifyandenforcethosepoliciesandrulesthatareparticularlygearedtowardtheneedsofwomen,e.
g.
,ruralbuild-outrequirements,universalaccesstargets,distancelearningprojects,reproductivehealth.
VIORGANIZATIONANDRESOURCESIndevisingitsorganizationalstructuretoenforcetelecomlawandpolicy,itisadvisableforanNRAto:F.
Knownationalandregionalpriorities;G.
Assessandseekresourcesneededtoenforceregulationsthatimplementnationalpriorities;andH.
designtheorganizationsothatitcansupportactivitiesthatimplementnationalpriorities.
172InternationalTelecommunicationUnion,"GenderAwareGuidelinesforPolicymakingandRegulatoryAgencies",http://www.
itu.
int/ITU-D/gender/projects/FinalGendAwrnGuidelns.
pdf,at2.
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03TheNRAisencouragedtoseekhuman,technicalandfinancialresourcesneededtoenforceregulationsthatimplementthecountry'snationaltelecommunicationspriorities.
Hireandretainmultidisciplinaryexperts(legal,economic,technical).
b.
Employinterdisciplinaryteamsforcompetencyreinforcementandskilldevelopment;Consider,ifpossible,allocatingasignificantportionoftheNRA'sresourcestoenforcementefforts.
Considerdedicatingseparatestaffforenforcementefforts.
Targetinternaltrainingtoenhancethecapacityoftheauthority'sstafftoaddressconsumer,marketcompetition,andtechnicalissues.
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03ANNEXB-COMMONENFORCEMENTCHALLENGESAmongthepossiblerangeofissuesthatrepresentchallengesforanNRAtoenforce,anumberstandoutasrecurring:interconnection,spectrumissues,internetissues,consumer/userandprivacyissues,networkqualityandsecurityissues,andtariffs.
Whilewedonotattemptinthispapertoofferguidelinesontheseissues,herewesummarizetheinformationprovidedbyMemberStatesregardingchallengesfacedandsolutionssuccessfullyimplementedintheseareasbytheirNRA's.
Solutionsareitalicizedandappearinboldtype.
ContributionsforthissectionwereprovidedbyBahamas,Bolivia,andCted'Ivoire.
A.
InterconnectionBolivia:-Operatorsofestablishednetworksresistfacilitatingaccesstodisaggregatedelementsofthenetwork,specificallyaccesstothelocalloop.
Therearenospecific"norms"thatdefinetheconditionsforimmediateandopportuneaccesstothelocalloop.
-Itisnotpossibletoreliablydeterminethepriceorcostsassociatedwithsupportservicesfordisaggregatedelementsofthenetwork.
-Interconnectionchargesintheoperator'soffersarehighforthefixednetworkandlowinthemobilenetworkcomparedwithinternationallevels.
Tosolvethisproblem,theSuperintendencehasattemptedtousetheinitialinterconnectionchargesestablishedintheconcessioncontractswhentheregulatorysystemfirstbegan.
173-insomecases,operatorsdonotpayinterconnectionchargestoeachotheraccordingtoschedule.
Rulesorotherrequirementsgoverningthiscircumstancearenotrequiredtobecontainedintheinterconnectionagreementsorinthebasicinterconnectionproposals.
Toaddressthissituation,onrequestoftheoperators,theSuperintendenceestablishedanalternativeprocedurecalled"Avenimiento"or"Goodwillagreements.
"Currently,however,someobjecttothisinterventionandtheSuperintendenceisworkingonmodificationstotheinterconnectionregulationstoaddresstheobjections174Bahamas:-AlthoughtheTelecommunicationsActandthelicenseissuedrequiresunbundling,theseprovisionshavenotyetbeeninvoked.
Thedominantprovider'snetworkisnotunbundled.
-Costinformationislacking.
-Thereisnocompetitioninvoicetelephonyservices.
175Cted'Ivoire:-LawNo.
95-526(July7,1995)ofthetelecommunicationscodecontainsnoprovisionsoninterconnection.
Issuesofinterconnectionregulation,particularlydisputesrelatedtoratesmustbesoughtintheLicensingAgreementandspecificationssignedbytheStateofCoted'IvoireandCoted'IvoireTelecomonFebruary3,1997.
AsofMay28,2004abilltoamendtheabovelawwithanenforcementdecreeoninterconnectionisunderconsideration.
173ContributionofBoliviatoITU-Dquestion18/1,May4,2004atp.
3.
174Id.
at4.
175ContributionofBahamastoITU-DQuestion18/1,May4,2004atp.
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03B.
SpectrumIssuesBolivia:-Illegaluseofelectromagneticspectrumhasbecomeanimportantproblemespeciallyinthecaseofprivatenetworksandradiotransmitterservices.
Inresponse,spectrummonitoringisperformedalongwithsuspensionofunauthorizedemissionsandseizureofequipment,ifwarranted.
Additionally,attheSuperintendence'sproposal,LawNo.
2342wasapprovedwhichrequiresthatfinancialresourcesneededforcoveringspectrummonitoringandcontrolcostsbetakenfromwhatiscollectedforassignmentanduseoftheelectromagneticfrequencies.
176Bahamas:-Thedominanttelephonyproviderwasalsothespectrumregulator.
-Therearenorecordsofassignmentsorspectrumuseforthedominantprovider.
Smallercommunities(w/highconcentrationoftransientboaters)usemarinefrequenciesfornon-marineuse.
177Cted'Ivoire:-Theregulator'smonitoringpersonnelareunabletoobtainaccesstointernationalinstitutions'premises.
-Lackofappropriateormodernequipmenttomonitorinterference.
Tendershavebeenissuedtoacquirethenecessaryequipment.
178C.
InternetIssuesBolivia:-ThemainproblemfacedisvoicetrafficoverISPprovidedcybercafeswithoutconcessionsforprovidinglongdistanceservicestothepublic.
179-TheregimeinwhichInternetServicesareprovideddoesnotestablishservicequalitylevels,inspiteofthegeneralprincipleestablishedby"norms"thatservicesmustbeprovidedpunctually,efficiently,andwithgoodquality.
ConsultantshavebeencontractedtodefinequalitystandardsforInternetservices.
TheregulatorisalsoworkingonmodifyingthetelecommunicationslawandInternetuseregulationsasthegeneralrulesoftheInternetareconsideredtobeinsufficient.
180Bahamas:-ItisdifficultforISPstoobtaincompetitiveratesbecausetelecomoperatorsalsoprovideinternetaccessalongwiththeirtelecomorbroadcastingservices--andsoarecompetitorswiththeISPs.
(ThereisnocompetitioninvoicetelephonyservicesintheBahamas.
)181176ContributionofBoliviatoITU-DQuestion18/1,May4,2004atp.
4.
177ContributionofBahamastoITU-DQuestion18/1,May4,2004atp.
2.
178ContributionofCted'IvoiretoITU-DQuestion18/1,May28,2004at2.
179ContributionofBoliviatoITU-DQuestion18/1,May4,2004atpp.
4-5.
180Id.
at5.
181ContributionofBahamastoITU-DQuestion18/1,May4,2004atp.
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03Cted'Ivoire:-Twochallengesidentified:regulatingIPtelephonyservicesandmonitoringinternettelephony[used]forbusinesspurposes.
D.
ConsumerIssuesBolivia:-ThoughPublicserviceprovidersareobligedtopublishtheirratesfortheservicestheyoffer,thispracticeisinsufficientbecause"providerslackaclient-orientedculturewhichtranslatesintoinsufficientinformationdisseminationbothfornormal[standard]ratesandforpromotions.
ContributionofBoliviatoITU-DQuestion18/1,May4,2004atp.
5-Thelackofconsumereducationaboutrightsandprivilegesisalsonotedasachallenge,aswellaslackofunderstandingofaconsumercultureincompetitivemarketswithfreeandunrestrictedaccesstoservices.
Consumer[second-stage]complaints182havebecomeoneoftheSuperintendence'spriorities.
Accordingly,theunitofconsumerprotectionanddefensehasbeenreinforced;theSuperintendencehaspreparedguidelinesforoperator'spromotionsandpublicitywhichwillbesubmittedforpublicconsultation;italsolaunchedaconsumerinformationcampaign,andtheyalsoemploythegoodwillagreementasaninformalmeansofaddressingcomplaints.
FormerlysubmissionofthecomplainttotheSuperintendencewouldhaveresultedinuntimelydelays,butthisproblemhasbeenaddressedbythegoodwillagreementmethodaspartofaninformal,conciliationprocess.
183Bahamas:-Lawsaretargetedtobusinessinterests,nottoconsumers.
Thereisnocohesiveorstrongconsumeradvocacyvoiceinthecountry.
184Cted'Ivoire:-Cted'Ivoirenotesthatchallengesresideinboththeconsumer-regulatorrelationshipandintheconsumer-operatorrelationship.
Generallyconsumer'scomplaintsareaboutoperatorswhoareslowtoprocessrequests,aboutratesandinvoices,vagueclausesincontracts,andlackofconsumerinformationonhowtheservicesprovidedfunction.
Cted'Ivoire'sregulatoryauthoritymadeconsumerprotectionapartoftelecommunicationsregulationbyestablishingaconsumerrelationsorganization(thecomplaintsanddisputesservice)and(ii)adisputesettlementprocedureandarbitrationboard.
185Undertherulesofproceduresforthesettlementofdisputes,thecomplaintsanddisputesserviceinvestigatescomplaintsandrequeststhatusersaddresstotheregulator.
Amongotherthings,itexaminesthecontractsoperatorsoffertoconsumersandtheproceduressetuptohandlecomplaintswithaviewtoproposinganychangesrequired.
186Theregulatoralsoprovidesassistanceand182Customersmustdealwiththeoperatorsfirst,andonlyifthecustomerisunsatisfiedwiththeoutcomemayacomplaintbepresentedtotheTelecommunicationsSuperintendence.
183ContributionofBoliviatoITU-DQuestion18/1,May4,2004atp.
5184ContributionofBahamastoITU-DQuestion18/1,May4,2004atp.
2.
185ContributionofCted'IvoiretoITU-DQuestion18/1,May28,2004at2.
186Id.
at2-3.
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03advicetoconsumergroupstohelpthemcarryoutconsumerprotectionactivities.
187Thecountryreportsthatbothoperator/consumerandregulator/consumerrelationshaveimproved.
D.
NetworkSecurityIssuesBolivia:-Oversightcostsareexcessivelyhigh.
Therearegeneralprinciplesregardingprotectionofcommunicationsprivacyinthenormsforvoicecommunicationsnetworksecurity,andoperatorsareobligedtoreportannuallythemeasurestheyareadoptingtoensurenetworksecurity.
SecuritymeasuresrelatedtodatanetworksarebeingpreparedinthecontextofaprojectonInternetregulation.
188F.
TariffsBolivia:-pricecapregulationisemployed.
Challengesincludedefiningtheinitialpricecaporlimit,includingdeterminingtheproductivityfactor.
Benchmarkingwasusedtodeterminetheaboveandtheyareworkingonpreparingsystemsthatwillallowtheregulatortocapturethenecessaryinformationforthispurposeinthefuture.
189Bahamas:-Onlytelecommunicationslicenseesdeclaredtobedominantincertainmarketsaresubjecttotariffcontrols.
Thelicenseesarenotaccustomedtocost-basedaccounting.
Cross-subsidizationofservicesmaybeoccurring.
190Cted'Ivoire:-interconnectionratesbetweenoperatorsandforcertainservicessuchasInternetaccessarechallenges.
Inarbitratingdisputesrelatingtotariffissues,ATCIenforcestheprovisionsoftheoperator'stermsofreference.
DecisionsofATCI,theregulator,maybeappealedtotheConseildesTélécommunicationsdeCted'Ivoire(CTCI).
191187Id.
at3.
188ContributionofBoliviatoITU-DQuestion18/1,May4,2004at5.
189Id.
at6.
190ContributionofBahamastoITU-DQuestion18/1,May4,2004atp.
2.
191ContributionofCted'IvoiretoITU-DQuestion18/1,May28,2004at3.
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03ANNEXC-INDEXOFCOUNTRYEXAMPLESPAGE{Basedonoriginal,Englishversion:willbeaddedlater}Bahamas.
Bolivia.
Bhutan.
Brazil.
ColumbiaCted'IvoireDominicanRepublicEcuadorEgyptEuropeanUnion.
France.
KenyaLithuaniaMexicoMoroccoNewZealandPeruPoland.
Portugal.
SingaporeSouthAfricaSriLanka.
Tanzania.
Turkey.
Trinidad&Tobago.
UgandaUnitedKingdom.
UnitedStatesZimbabwe.