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LoyolaUniversityChicagoLawJournalVolume18Issue2Winter19861985-1986IllinoisLawSurveyArticle51986CriminalLawPaulAlexanderRogersAssist.
PublicDefender,KaneCounty,ILLisaWetzelFollowthisandadditionalworksat:http://lawecommons.
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edu/lucljPartoftheCriminalLawCommonsThisArticleisbroughttoyouforfreeandopenaccessbyLAWeCommons.
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Formoreinformation,pleasecontactlaw-library@luc.
edu.
RecommendedCitationPaulA.
Rogers,&LisaWetzel,CriminalLaw,18Loy.
U.
Chi.
L.
J.
435(1986).
Availableat:http://lawecommons.
luc.
edu/luclj/vol18/iss2/5CriminalLawPaulAlexanderRogers*andLisaWetzel**TABLEOFCONTENTSI.
INTRODUCTION436II.
CASELAW436A.
CrimesAgainstThePerson4371.
Homicide:LegallyInconsistentVerdicts.
.
.
.
.
4372.
Homicide:JuryInstructionIssues4393.
SexuallyDangerousPersons4404.
UnlawfulRestraint4415.
TheftversusRobbery:Definitionof"Force"442B.
CrimesAgainstProperty4431.
Theft4432.
ResidentialBurglary4453.
AggravatedArson446C.
CrimesAffectingPublicHealth,Safety,andDecency4471.
DrivingUndertheInfluence4472.
Drugs4493.
Gambling451D.
Sentencing.
451III.
LEGISLATION454A.
MajorRevisions4551.
Murder/VoluntaryManslaughter4552.
DrivingUndertheInfluence4563.
Feticide457B.
OtherAmendmentstoExistingStatutes4591.
UnlawfulUseofWeapons4592.
ChildAbductionandSexualAbuse4593.
AggravatedArson4604.
Theft460*AssistantPublicDefender,KaneCounty,Illinois;formerlyIllinoisStateAppellateDefender(1983-86);B.
A.
,1977,UniversityofIowa;J.
D.
,1981,UniversityofChicago.
**A.
B.
1985,UniversityofMichigan;J.
D.
candidate,1988,LoyolaUniversityofChicago.
LoyolaUniversityLawJournal5.
ResidentialBurglary4616.
Bribery461C.
NewOffenses4621.
AggravatedUnlawfulRestraint4622.
DisarmingaPeaceOfficer4623.
PublicAidWireFraudandPublicAidMailFraud462IV.
CONCLUSION462I.
INTRODUCTIONThisarticlewillreviewthemajordevelopmentsinIllinoissub-stantivecriminallawsinceJuly,1985.
Thearticledoesnotpur-porttobeanexhaustivestudyofeverycourtdecisionorpieceoflegislation.
ThediscussionofthecaselawwillbelimitedtoIllinoisSupremeCourtdecisions.
ThesurveyoflegislationwillcovernewlawsenactedsinceJuly,1985.
II.
CASELAWTheIllinoisSupremeCourt,duringits1985-86term,issuedsev-eralimportantdecisionsintheareaofsubstantivecriminallaw.
Forexample,thecourtaddressedtheproblemoflegallyinconsis-tentverdicts'andjuryinstructionsinhomicidecases.
2Thecourtalsoconstruedprovisionsinstatutesgoverningthefollowingcrimes:robbery;3theft;4drivingundertheinfluence("DUI");5criminaldrugconspiracy;6andgambling.
7Inaddition,thecourtexaminedtheSexuallyDangerousPersonsAct,'andvarioussen-tencingstatutes.
9Finally,thecourtruledontheconstitutionality1.
Seeinfranotes14-35andaccompanyingtext.
2.
Seeinfranotes36-53andaccompanyingtext.
3.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
18-1(1985).
Seeinfranotes70-78andaccompany-ingtext.
4.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
16-1(1985).
Seeinfranotes79-95andaccompany-ingtext.
5.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
951/2,para.
11-501(a)(1985).
Seeinfranotes109-28,204-15andaccompanyingtext.
6.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
561/2,para.
1405(1985).
Seeinfranotes129-44andaccom-panyingtext.
7.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
28-1.
1(d)(1985).
Seeinfranotes145-52andaccom-panyingtext.
8.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
105-1.
01(1985).
Seeinfranotes54-57andaccompa-nyingtext.
9.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
1005(1985).
Seeinfranotes153-83andaccompany-ingtext.
[Vol.
181986]CriminalLawofstatutesdefiningunlawfulrestraint,'°residentialburglary,Iag-gravatedarson,12andDUI.
'3A.
CrimesAgainstThePerson1.
Homicide:LegallyInconsistentVerdictsInPeoplev.
Spears,'4theIllinoisSupremeCourtaddressedthefrequentlyoccurringproblemoflegallyinconsistentjuryverdicts.
5ThecourtpreviouslyaddressedthisprobleminPeoplev.
Hoffer.
'6InHoffer,thecourtheldthatsimultaneousguiltyverdictsformur-der,voluntarymanslaughter,andinvoluntarymanslaughter,basedonasingleact,werelegallyinconsistent.
Becausethoseoffensesinvolvedmutuallyinconsistentmentalstates,theHoffercourtor-deredanewtrial.
'7InSpears,thecourtfacedtheproblemofin-consistentverdictsnotinthespecificcontextofahomicidecase,butratherintheanalogouscontextofanattempt(murder)prosecution.
I8ThedefendantinSpearshadbeenchargedwithattempt(mur-der)9andarmedviolence,2°basedonhisfiringoftwogunshotsathisestrangedwifeandathirdshotathiswifeandherfriend.
21Thethreeshotshadbeenfiredinrapidsuccession.
22Atthedefendant'srequest,thejurywasinstructedregardingthelesserincludedof-10.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
10-3(1985).
Seeinfranotes58-69andaccompany-ingtext.
11.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
19-3(a)(1985).
Seeinfranotes96-101,250-56andaccompanyingtext.
12.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
20-1.
1(1985).
Seeinfranotes102-05,244-46andaccompanyingtext.
13.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
951/2,para.
11-501(a)(1985).
Seeinfranotes109-25,204-15andaccompanyingtext.
14.
112Ill.
2d396,493N.
E.
2d1030(1986).
15.
Id.
at403,493N.
E.
2dat1033.
Inconsistentverdictsaremutuallyrepugnantorcontradictory.
BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY689(5thed.
1979).
16.
106Ill.
2d186,478N.
E.
2d335,cert.
denied,106S.
Ct.
139(1985).
17.
Id.
at190-96,478N.
E.
2dat338-41.
TheproblemoflegallyinconsistentverdictsinhomicidecasesarisesinlargepartbecauseofthemannerinwhichtheoffensesarestructuredintheIllinoisCriminalCode.
Inessence,theCodetreatsmurderasalesserincludedoffenseofvoluntarymanslaughter.
Thisanomalycreatesnotonlyproblemsofinconsistentverdicts,butalsoproblemsindraftingcoherentjuryinstructions.
SeeHad-dad,AllocationofBurdensinMurder-VoluntaryManslaughterCases:AnAffirmativeDe-fenseApproach,59CHI.
[-]KENTL.
REV.
23(1982)foraninsightfulanalysisoftheseproblems.
Seealsoinfranotes35,200andaccompanyingtext.
18.
Spears,112Ill.
2dat400,493N.
E.
2dat1031.
19.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
8-4(1985).
20.
Id.
atpara.
33A.
21.
Spears,112Ill.
2dat401,493N.
E.
2dat1031-32.
22.
Id.
at401,493N.
E.
2dat1032.
LoyolaUniversityLawJournalfenseofrecklessconductinadditiontothetwochargedoffenses.
23Thejuryreturnedverdictsofguiltyforthethreeoffenses.
24Thetrialcourtenteredjudgmentonthethreeverdicts,buttheappellatecourtreversedtheconvictions,findingthattheverdictswerele-gallyinconsistent.
"Onreview,theIllinoisSupremeCourtaffirmedthereversalandremandedthecaseforanewtrial.
26RelyingonHoffer,thecourtheldthattheguiltyverdictswerelogicallyandlegallyinconsistent.
Theattempt(murder)andarmedviolencechargesrequiredthejurytofindthatthedefendantactedintentionallyorknowingly,27whiletherecklessconductchargerequiredthejurytofindonlythatheactedwithrecklessness.
28TheSpearscourtdistinguishedHofferfromitsinterveningdeci-sioninPeoplev.
A/mo.
29InAlmo,thejuryinitiallyhadreturnedguiltyverdictsformurderandvoluntarymanslaughter.
30Thetrialcourt,however,refusedtoacceptthoseverdictsandreinstructedthejury,whereuponitreturnedaverdictofguiltyonthemurdercharge.
31ThesupremecourtinAlmoheldthatthetrialcourtac-tedproperlybyrefusingtoaccepttheverdictsandreinstructingthejury,therebycuringtheinconsistentverdictdilemma.
32Ac-cordingly,theAlmocourtconcludedthatthecasewasnotcon-trolledbyHoffer.
33ThetrialcourtinSpearshadnotfollowedtheprocedureutilizedinAlmo.
Thus,thesupremecourtheldthat23.
Id.
at399-400,493N.
E.
2dat1031.
24.
Id.
at402,493N.
E.
2dat1032.
25.
Id.
at400,493N.
E.
2dat1031.
26.
Id.
at410,493N.
E.
2dat1036.
27.
Id.
at406,493N.
E.
2dat1034.
ThearmedviolencechargesinSpearswerepredi-catedonaggravatedbatterywhichrequiresthementalstateofknowledge.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38para.
12-4(1985).
28.
Spears,at403-08,493N.
E.
2dat1033-35.
ThecourtrejectedtheState'sargu-mentthatthethreeshotsconstitutedseparableactswhichcouldsupportinconsistentverdicts.
TheSpearscourtemphasizedthattheshotshadbeenfiredinrapidsuccessionandthateachchargeasallegedintheinformationwasbasedonthedefendant'sentirecourseofconduct.
Id.
at403-06,493N.
E.
2dat1033-34.
29.
108Ill.
2d54,483N.
E.
2d203(1985).
30,Id.
at61,483N.
E.
2dat206.
31.
Id.
at61,483N.
E.
2dat206.
32.
Id.
at63-64,483N.
E.
2dat207.
33.
Id.
at62-63,483N.
E.
2dat206-07.
ThedefendantinAlmoalsohadarguedthattheoriginalverdictswerenotlegallyinconsistent,andthatthetrialcourtshouldhaveenteredjudgmentonthelesseroffenseofvoluntarymanslaughter.
ThebasisforthisargumentwasthatthejuryinstructionformurdergiveninAlmohadomittedtheso-called"fourthproposition,"requiringthejurytofindthatthedefendantactedwithoutbeliefthathisuseofforcewasjustified.
Thedefendantarguedthatthisomissionleadthejurytoerroneouslyconcludethatthementalstatesformurderandvoluntarymanslaugh-terwereconsistent.
SeeIllinoisPatternJuryInstruction(IPI),CriminalNo.
27.
01[Vol.
181986]CriminalLaw439HoffercontrolledSpears.
34Readtogether,SpearsandAImoclarifyandlimitHoffer.
Anewtrialshallberequiredonlywhenthetrialcourtacceptsthelegallyinconsistentverdictsandentersjudgmentonthem.
Thus,ifthecourttakesstepstoobtainaconsistentverdict,asinAlmo,theultimateconvictionmaystand.
AlthoughSpearsandAlmopro-videguidelinesfortrialcourtstousewhenfacedwithlegallyin-consistentverdicts,thosecasesfailtoaddresstheunderlyingproblemofinartfullydraftedjuryinstructionsandverdictformsthatresultininconsistentverdicts.
352.
Homicide:JuryInstructionIssuesInPeoplev.
Perez,36thesupremecourtheldthatifthedefendantcouldnotbefoundguiltyofalesseroffense,thenthetrialcourtisnotrequiredtogivealesserincludedoffenseinstruction.
37ThedefendantinPerez,aprisoninmate,wasconvictedofmurderforstabbingafellowinmatetodeath.
3Attrial,thedefendantsoughtajuryinstructiononthelesserincludedoffenseofaggravatedbat-tery,arguingthattheevidencesupportedtheconclusionthathewasnotresponsibleoraccountableforthedeath.
39Thetrialcourt,however,refusedtogivetheinstruction.
'Onreview,thesupremecourtaffirmedtheconviction.
41Thecourtheldthat"anincluded-offenseinstructionisrequiredonlyincaseswherethejurycouldrationallyfindthedefendantguiltyofthelesseroffenseandnotguiltyofthegreateroffense.
"'42Thecourtthenreviewedtheevidenceattrialandconcludedthattheevidenceofbothdirectresponsibility43andaccountability'for(1968).
TheAlmocourt,however,rejectedthisargument.
Almo,108Ill.
2dat64-65,483N.
E.
2dat207-08.
34.
Spears,112Ill.
2dat409-10,493N.
E.
2dat1036.
35.
SeegenerallyHaddad,supranote17.
36.
108Ill.
2d70,483N.
E.
2d250,cert.
denied,106S.
Ct.
898(1985).
37.
Id.
at81,483N.
E.
2dat255.
38.
Id.
at77,483N.
E.
2dat253.
39.
Id.
at77-81,483N.
E.
2dat253-255.
40.
Id.
at80,483N.
E.
2dat255.
41.
Id.
at81-84,483N.
E.
2dat255-56.
42.
Id.
at81,483N.
E.
2dat255.
Inreachingthisholding,thecourtassumedthataggravatedbatterywasalesserincludedoffenseofmurder.
Id.
43.
Id.
at81-82,483N.
E.
2dat255.
Thedefendantwas"directlyresponsible"forthedeathbecauseheadmittedtostabbingthevictiminthesidewithaweaponcompatiblewiththefatalwound.
Id.
44.
Id.
at83,483N.
E.
2dat256.
"[Eventhoughdefendant'sactionsmayhavebeenspontaneous,hisparticipationinthestabbingmadehimlegallyaccountablefortheac-tionsofeveryothermemberofthegroup.
"Id.
LoyolaUniversityLawJournalmurderprecludedajuryfromrationallyfindingthedefendantguiltyofonlyaggravatedbattery.
45Accordingly,thePerezcourtheldthatthetrialcourtwasnotrequiredtogivethelesserincludedoffenseinstruction.
46InPeoplev.
Sloan,47thesupremecourtagainaddressedtheissueofjuryinstructionsinahomicidecase.
ThedefendantinSloanwasconvictedofmurderandhomeinvasion.
48Herequestedandwasrefusedself-defenseandvoluntarymanslaughterinstructionsdespitehisassertionsthathehadfearedthatthevictimwouldat-tackhimbecausetheroomwasdarkandhecouldnottellwhetherthevictimhadanythinginhishands.
49Onappeal,thesupremecourtaffirmedtheconvictions,5"concludingthatthedefendant'sbeliefthathewasinimminentdangerofdeathorgreatbodilyharmwasnotreasonable.
51Thecourtheldthatthevictimwasentitledtouseforcebecausethedefendanthadinvadedtheprem-isesarmedwithashotgun,andthereforeclearlyhadprovokedanyshowofforcebythevictim.
52Becausethedefendant'suseofforcecouldnothavebeenjustified,thesupremecourtdeterminedthatthetrialjudgecorrectlyhadrefusedthedefendant'sself-defenseandvoluntarymanslaughterinstructions.
533.
SexuallyDangerousPersonsInPeoplev.
Allen,54theIllinoisSupremeCourtheldthatthe45.
Id.
at82-83,483N.
E.
2dat255-56.
46.
Id.
at81,483N.
E.
2dat255.
47.
111Ill.
2d517,490N.
E.
2d1260(1986).
48.
Id.
at518,490N.
E.
2dat1261.
49.
Id.
at520,490N.
E.
2dat1262.
50.
Id.
at521,490N.
E.
2dat1262.
51.
Id.
Inconcludingthatthedefendant'sbeliefwasunreasonable,thecourtreliedonILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
7-4(c)(1983)whichprovidesinpart:ThejustificationdescribedintheprecedingSectionsofthisArticleisnotavail-abletoapersonwho:(a)Isattemptingtocommit,committing,orescapingafterthecommissionof,aforciblefelony;or(c)Otherwiseinitiallyprovokestheuseofforceagainsthimself,unless:(1)Suchforceissogreatthathereasonablybelievesthatheisinimminentdangerofdeathorgreatbodilyharm,andthathehasexhaustedeveryreasonablemeanstoescapesuchdangerotherthantheuseofforcewhichislikelytocausedeathorgreatbodilyharmtotheassailant;or(2)Ingoodfaith,hewithdrawsfromphysicalcontactwiththeassailantandindicatesclearlytotheassailantthathedesirestowithdrawtheuseofforce,buttheassailantcontinuesorresumestheuseofforce.
52.
Sloan,111Ill.
2dat521,490N.
E.
2dat1262-63.
53.
Id.
at520-21,490N.
E.
2dat1262.
54.
107111.
2d91,481N.
E.
2d690(1985),aff'd,106S.
Ct.
2988(1986).
[Vol.
181986]CriminalLaw441Stateisrequiredtoproveonlyoneactofattempt(sexualassault)orsexualmolestationforadefendanttobeconsideredasexuallydangerouspersonundertheSexuallyDangerousPersonsAct("theAct").
"BecausetheActisdesignedtopreventcrimesbypredict-ingadefendant'sfutureconduct,thecourtrejectedthedefendant'sargumentthatanadjudicationofsexualdangerousnessshouldde-pendonproofofmorethanonesexcrime.
56Inreachingthisre-sult,thesupremecourtfoundthattheplurallanguageinthestatutereferredtothe"defendant'sfuturepropensities,nottothedemonstratedconduct.
""74.
UnlawfulRestraintInPeoplev.
Wisslead,18thecourtanalyzedthreeissuespertain-ingtotheunlawfulrestraintstatute.
9Thefirstissueinvolvedwhetheracharginginformationthatmirroredthelanguageofthestatutesufficientlyapprisedthedefendantofthenatureofthecharge.
6°Insomecases,aninformationwordedinaccordancewiththestatutorylanguagedoesnotadequatelyinformthedefend-antofthenatureandelementsoftheoffensecharged.
61TheWissleadcourt,however,concludedthattheinformationwassuffi-cientbecausethestatutorylanguageadequatelydescribedthespe-cificchargedconduct.
62Thecourtalsoheldthattheclassificationofunlawfulrestraintas55.
Id.
at104-05,481N.
E.
2dat696-97.
TheActprovides:Allpersonssufferingfromamentaldisorder,whichmentaldisorderhasexistedforaperiodofnotlessthanoneyear,immediatelypriortothefilingofthepetitionhereinafterprovidedfor,coupledwithcriminalpropensitiestothecom-missionofsexoffenses,andwhohavedemonstratedpropensitiestowardactsofsexualassaultoractsofsexualmolestationofchildren,areherebydeclaredsexuallydangerouspersons.
"ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
105-1.
01(1985).
56.
Allen,107Ill.
2dat105,481N.
E.
2dat697.
57.
Id.
at105,481N.
E.
2dat697.
58.
108Ill.
2d389,484N.
E.
2d1081(1985).
59.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
10-3(1985).
60.
Wisslead,108Ill.
2dat393-94,484N.
E.
2dat1082.
Thestateandthefederalconstitutionsrequirethatacharginginstrumentsetforth"thenatureandelementsoftheoffensecharged.
"Id.
(citingILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
111-3(a)(3)(1983)).
TheinformationinWissleadstatedthat"apersoncommitstheoffenseofunlawfulrestraintwhenheknowinglywithoutlegalauthoritydetainsanother.
"Id.
61.
SeePeoplev.
Heard,47Ill.
2d501,266N.
E.
2d340(1970)(chargewritteninaccordancewiththestatutorylanguagelistedpossiblegamblingoffensesbutfailedtospecifywhichofthemanypossibleactsthedefendantcommitted);Peoplev.
Griffin,36Ill.
2d430,431,223N.
E.
2d158,159(1967)(complaintallegedthatthedefendantdrove-withawillfulandwantondisregardforthesafetyofpersonsorproperty,"withoutspecifyingtheconduct).
62.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
10-3(a)(1985).
LoyolaUniversityLawJournalaClass4felonyisnotirrational.
63Thedefendantarguedthatun-lawfulrestraintisalessseriousoffensethanaggravatedassault64whichisaClassAmisdemeanor.
65Becausethetwooffensesareclearlydistinct,thecourtconcludedthatitwasnotirrationaltoprescribegreaterpenaltiesforunlawfulrestraintthanforaggra-vatedassault.
66Finally,theWissleadcourtheldthattheunlawfulrestraintstat-uteisnotunconstitutionallyvague.
67Thecourtnotedthatthestatuteclearlyinformsanordinarycitizenwhatconductisprohib-ited.
68Thecourtobservednovaguenessproblemsinthestatutebecauseitclearlydefinesunlawfulrestraintastheunlawfulrestric-tionofanother'sfreedom.
695.
TheftversusRobbery:Definitionof"Force"InPeoplev.
Bowel,7"thesupremecourtdeterminedtheamountofforcerequiredtocommitarobbery.
71ThedefendantinBowelwaschargedwithrobberybasedonapursesnatching.
72Thevic-timwasawarethatthedefendantwasapproaching;heimmobi-lizedherhandbypushingitback,causingthevictimtoturnslightly.
73Thecourtheldthatthiswassufficientforcetoconstitutearobbery.
74ThesupremecourtdistinguishedBowelfromitsearlierdecisioninPeoplev.
Patton,75thusdrawinganarrowdistinctionbetween63.
Wisslead,108Ill.
2dat398-99,484N.
E.
2dat1085.
64.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
12-2(b)(1985).
65.
Wisslead,108Ill.
2dat399-400,484N.
E.
2dat1085.
Theonlybasisforthede-fendant'sargumentwasthatfalseimprisonment,theforerunnerofunlawfulrestraint,wasonceaformofaggravatedassault.
Id.
SeePeoplev.
Cohoon,315Ill.
App.
259,42N.
E.
2d969(4thDist.
1942).
Underthepresentlaw,unlawfulrestraintisneitheraformofaggravatedassaultnorisitalesserincludedoffense.
Wisslead,108Ill.
2dat399-400,484N.
E.
2dat1085.
Aggravatedassaultisconcernedwiththreatenedbodilyharm,whereasunlawfulrestraintisconcernedwiththeactualrestrictionofanother'sfreedomtomoveabout.
Id.
66.
Wisslead,108Ill.
2dat400,484N.
E.
2dat1085.
67.
Id.
at397-98,484N.
E.
2dat1084.
Theoffenseofunlawfulrestraintiscommittedwhenone"knowinglywithoutlegalauthoritydetainsanother.
"Id.
(citingILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
10-3(a)(1983)).
68.
Wisslead,108Ill.
2dat397-98,484N.
E.
2dat1084.
69.
Id.
70.
111Ill.
2d58,488N.
E.
2d995(1986).
71.
Id.
at63,488N.
E.
2dat997.
Robberyiscommittedwhenone"takespropertyfromthepersonorpresenceofanotherbytheuseofforceorbythreateningtheimminentuseofforce.
"ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
18-1(1985).
72.
Bowel,111111.
2dat64,488N.
E.
2dat998.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
at63,488N.
E.
2dat997.
75.
76Ill.
2d45,389N.
E.
2d1174(1979).
[Vol.
18CriminalLawthecrimeofrobberyandtheftfromtheperson.
InPatton,thedefendanthad"swiftlygrabbed"thevictim'spurse,throwingherarmbackalittle.
76Thecourtreasonedthatthisforcewasnotsuf-ficienttoconstituterobbery,andtherefore,heldthedefendantguiltymerelyoftheftfromtheperson.
7AlthoughtheuseofforceinPattondifferedonlyslightlyfromthatinBowel,thecourtdistin-guishedthecasesonthegroundthatthevictiminBowelknewthatthedefendantwasapproaching,whereasthevictiminPattondidnotrealizewhatwashappeninguntilafterthedefendanthadbegunhisflight.
78Thus,thevictim'sapprehensionofforcedistinguishesthetwocases.
B.
CrimesAgainstProperty1.
TheftInPeoplev.
Brenizer,79thesupremecourtenlargedthescopeoffelonytheftbyholdingthataseriesofmisdemeanortheftsbasedonasingledesigncouldbeaggregatedforpurposesofchargingthedefendantwithasinglecountoffelonytheft.
"ThedefendantinBrenizer,arestaurantmanager,appropriatedrestaurantgoodsforhisownuseonfifty-fouroccasionsoveratwoandahalfyearpe-riod.
"Oneachofthefifty-fouroccasions,thestolenpropertydidnotexceedthreehundreddollarsinvalue,renderingeachindivid-ualactonlyaClassAmisdemeanor.
82TheState,however,aggre-gatedthefifty-fourincidentsandchargedthedefendantwithonecountoftheftofpropertyexceedingthreehundreddollars,aClass3felony.
3Onappeal,thedefendantarguedthatthetrialcourterredindenyinghismotionforseverance.
84Thedefendantalleged76.
Id.
at47,389N.
E.
2dat1175.
77.
Id.
at52,389N.
E.
2dat1177.
78.
Id.
at48,389N.
E.
2dat1175.
79.
111Ill.
2d220,489N.
E.
2d862(1986).
80.
Id.
at226,489N.
E.
2dat865.
81.
Id.
at222,489N.
E.
2dat863.
82.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
16-1(e)(1)(1985).
ThesentenceofimprisonmentforaClassAmisdemeanorisanytermlessthanoneyear.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
1005-8-3(a)(l)(1985).
83.
ILLREV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
16-1(e)(3)(1985).
Thesentenceforatermofimpris-onmentforaClass3felonyshallnotbelessthantwoyearsormorethanfiveyears.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
1005-8-1(a)(6)(1985).
84.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
111-4(c)(1985).
Paragraph111-4(c)providesthattwoormoretheftscanbechargedasasingleoffenseifsuchacts"areinfurtheranceofasingleintentionanddesign,"andifthepropertyistakenfromthesameperson.
Brenizer,llIll2d.
at224,489N.
E.
2dat864(citingILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
111-4(c)(1981)).
Boththetrialcourtandtheappellatecourtagreedthattherequirementsofsec-tion111-4(c)hadbeenmetandthattheoffensescouldbejoined.
Id.
at225,489N.
E.
2d1986]LoyolaUniversityLawJournalthattheoffenseschargedwereseparateanddistinct,andthattheStateimpermissiblyhadjoinedtheoffensesinanattempttoen-hancethecombinedmisdemeanorstoafelony.
"sTheIllinoisSupremeCourt,however,heldthataggregationofseveralmisde-meanortheftsintoonefelonytheftchargewasproperundersec-tion111-4(c)oftheIllinoisCriminalCodeeventhoughthestatutedoesnotexplicitlymentionaggregation.
86Inreachingthisconclu-sion,thecourtassertedthatthe"totalvalueofthepropertytakenwilldeterminewhetherthetheftconstitutesamisdemeanororafelony".
87InPeoplev.
Davis,s"thedefendantofferedtoobtainanearlyprisonreleaseforthevictim'sboyfriendifshewouldpay$4000.
9ThevictimnotifiedtheDepartmentofLawEnforcementaboutthedefendant'sproposalbecausesheconsideredhimtobea"phony.
"9°Subsequently,thetrialcourtconvictedthedefendantoftheftbydeception9andtheappellatecourtaffirmed.
92Holdingthatthevictimmustrelyonthedefendant'smisrepresentationstosustainatheftbydeceptionconviction,93thesupremecourtre-versedandreducedtheconvictiontothelesserincludedoffenseofattempt(theftbydeception).
94Thecourtdeterminedthatthevic-tim'sawarenessofthedeceptiveconductprecludedaconvictionoftheftbydeception.
95at865.
Neithercourt,however,hadaggregatedthevalueofthosesuccessivemisde-meanortheftsandchargedasingleoffenseoffelonytheft.
Brenizer,111111.
2dat225,226,489N.
E.
2dat865.
85.
Brenizer,111111.
2dat222,223,489N.
E.
2dat864.
86.
Id.
at226,489N.
E.
2dat865.
TheBrenizerdecisionwasbasedontwoappellatecourtdecisionsinwhichaggregationwasdiscussed,butnotimplementedbecauseotheraspectsof111-4(c)werenotmet.
SeePeoplev.
Giles,35Ill.
App.
3d514,341N.
E.
2d410(4thDist.
1976);Peoplev.
Adams,26Ill.
App.
3d324,325N.
E.
2d71(4thDist.
1975).
TheBrenizercourtalsorelieduponanearlyIllinoisSupremeCourtcaseinwhichthefraudulenttakingofgasoveraperiodoftimeconstitutedonetakingandthedefendantwasprosecutedforgrandlarcenybasedontheaggregatevalueofthestolengas.
Woodsv.
People,222Ill.
293(1906).
ThecourtinBrenizeralsoreasonedthatthepurposeofsection111-4(c)wouldnotbeservedifthemergingofseveralmisdemeanorswouldcon-stituteonlyonemisdemeanor.
Brenizer,111Ill.
2dat228,489N.
E.
2dat866.
87.
Brenizer,111111.
2dat229,489N.
E.
2dat866.
88.
112Ill.
2d55,491N.
E.
2d1153(1986).
89.
Id.
at58,491N.
E.
2dat1154.
90.
Id.
91.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
16-1(b)(1985).
ThedefendantwasalsoconvictedoftwocountsofbriberyinviolationofILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
33-1(1985).
Davis,112Ill.
2dat57,491N.
E.
2dat1154.
92.
Davis,112Ill.
2dat57,491N.
E.
2dat1154.
93.
Id.
at63,491N.
E.
2dat1156.
94.
Id.
at63,491N.
E.
2dat1157.
95.
Id.
[Vol.
18CriminalLaw2.
ResidentialBurglaryInPeoplev.
Bales,96theIllinoisSupremeCourtdeterminedthattheresidentialburglarystatutewasnotvague,ambiguous,orviola-tiveofdueprocess.
97InBales,thetrialcourthadfoundthattherewasnodifferencebetweenresidentialburglaryandburglary,andthusheldthattheresidentialburglarystatuteviolatedduepro-cess.
98Thesupremecourtreversed,holdingthatthedefinitionof"dwelling"foundinsection2-6oftheCriminalCodecannotbereadinconjunctionwiththeresidentialburglarystatutewhichidentifies"dwellingplaceofanother.
"99Thesupremecourtde-fined"dwellingplaceofanother"asanyplaceofresidencewheretheownersactuallyreside,orintendtoresidewithinareasonableperiodoftime.
"°Thesupremecourtreasonedthatthephrase"dwellingplaceofanother"wasnotunconstitutionallyvaguebe-causeapersonofordinaryintelligencecouldunderstandit.
More-over,thecourtconcludedthattheresidentialburglarystatutepassedconstitutionalmusterbecauseitdidnotgive"law-enforce-mentauthoritiesunreasonableandarbitrarydiscretionoverwhethertochargeadefendantwithresidentialburglaryorburglary.
"''196.
108Ill.
2d182,483N.
E.
2d517(1985).
97.
Id.
at192,483N.
E.
2dat521.
TheBalescourtalsoheldthatthelegislativeclassi-ficationofresidentialburglaryasaClass1felony,whenburglaryisaClass2felony,doesnotviolateequalprotection,becausethereisagreaterchancethatbodilyharmwouldresult.
Id.
at192-94,483N.
E.
2dat522.
Moreover,thecourtinBalesconcludedthatthesentencingschemedoesnotviolatethelimitation-of-penaltiesprovisionoftheIllinoisConstitution,whichstatesthat"allpenaltiesshallbedeterminedbothaccordingtotheseriousnessoftheoffenseandwiththeobjectiveofrestoringtheoffendertousefulcitizen-ship.
"ILL.
CONST.
art.
I,§11.
98.
Bales,108Ill.
2dat188,483N.
E.
2dat519.
Theresidentialburglarystatuteprovides:Apersoncommitsresidentialburglarywhoknowinglyandwithoutauthorityentersthedwellingplaceofanotherwiththeintenttocommitthereinafelonyortheft.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
19-3(a)(1985).
Theburglarystatuteprovides,inrelevantpart:Apersoncommitsburglarywhenwithoutauthorityheknowinglyentersorwithoutauthorityremainswithinabuilding,housetrailer.
.
.
withintenttocommitthereinafelonyortheft.
.
.
.
ThisoffenseshallnotincludetheoffenseofresidentialburglaryasdefinedinSection19-3hereof.
Id.
at19-1(a).
99.
Bales,108Ill.
2dat189,483N.
E.
2dat520.
100.
Id.
at191,483N.
E.
2dat521ThislanguagewasusedinamendingthedefinitionofdwellinginILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
2-6(1985).
Seealso,Buser,TheIllinoisResidentialBurglaryStatute:WhenIsAnInvadedStructureA'Dwelling'73ILL.
B.
J.
262(1985).
101.
Bales,108Ill.
2dat192,483N.
E.
2dat521.
TheimpactoftheBalesdecision,1986]LoyolaUniversityLawJournal[Vol.
183.
AggravatedArsonInPeoplev.
Wick,112theIllinoisSupremeCourtheldthatsection(a)(3)oftheaggravatedarsonstatuteviolateddueprocess.
1°3Thesectionatissueprovidedthatapersoncommitsaggravatedarson,asopposedtosimplearson,ifafiremanorpolicemanisinjuredinthefire.
104InWick,thedefendantwaschargedwithaggravatedarsonforsettingfiretohistavern.
Thefireresultedinafiremanbeingtreatedasanoutpatientforsmokeinhalation.
5Onappealofthedefendant'sClassXconvictionforaggravatedarson,thesupremecourtheldthatsection(a)(3)oftheaggravatedarsonstatuteviolateddueprocessbecauseitdidnotsatisfythe"reasonablerelationship"test.
'Thecourtstatedthatthestatute,whichpunishedanyonewhocausedafireinjuringafireman,wasnotreasonablyrelatedtothelegislativepurposeofseverelypunish-however,hasbeenlimitedbyarecentlegislativeenactmentwhichredefines"dwelling"forthepurposesoftheresidentialburglarystatute.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
2-6(Supp.
1986).
Seealsoinfra,notes250-56andaccompanyingtext.
Theamendmentde-fines'dwelling'asa"house,apartment,mobilehome,trailerorotherlivingquarterinwhichatthetimeoftheallegedoffensetheownersoroccupantsactuallyresideorintheirabsenceintendwithinareasonableperiodoftimetoreside.
"ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
2-6(Supp.
1986).
102.
107Ill.
2d62,481N.
E.
2d676(1985).
103.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
20-1.
1(1985).
InPeoplev.
Johnson,114Ill.
2d69,499N.
E.
2d470(1986),theIllinoisSupremeCourtheldthatsubsection(1)ofsection20-1.
1(a)(1)oftheaggravatedarsonstatutewasunconstitutionalbasedonthereasoninginWick.
104.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
20-1.
1(a)(3)(1985).
Theprovisionoftheaggra-vatedarsonstatuteatissueinWickprovidesinrelevantpart:Apersoncommitsaggravatedarsonwhenbymeansoffireorexplosiveheknowinglydamages,partiallyortotally,anybuildingorstructure,and.
.
.
afiremanorpolicemanwhoispresentatthesceneactinginthelineofduty,isinjuredasaresultofthefireorexplosion.
Id.
atpara.
20-1.
1(a)(3).
AggravatedarsonisaClassXfelony,punishablebynotlessthansixyearsandnotmorethan30yearsimprisonment.
Id.
atpara.
1005-8-l(a)(3)(1985).
Simplearson,ontheotherhand,isaClass2felony,punishablebyatermofnotlessthanthreeyearsandnotmorethansevenyearsimprisonment.
Id.
atpara.
1005-8-l(a)(5)(1985).
Thesimplearsonstatuteprovidesinrelevantpart:Apersoncommitsarsonwhen,bymeansoffireorexplosiveheknowingly:(a)Damagesanyrealproperty,oranypersonalpropertyhavingavalueof$150ormore,ofanotherwithouthisconsent;or(b)Withintenttodefraudaninsurer,damagesanypropertyoranypersonalpropertyhavingavalueof$150ormore.
Id.
atpara.
20-1.
105.
Wicks,107Ill.
2dat63,481N.
E.
2dat677.
106.
Id.
at66,481N.
E.
2dat678.
"Thequestionofwhetheralegislativeexerciseofthepolicepowermeetstheconstitutionalrequirementofdueprocessinvolvesidentifyingthepublicinterest,examiningwhetherthestatute'bearsareasonablerelationship'tothatinterest,anddeterminingwhetherthemethodusedtoprotectorfurtherthatinterestisreasonable.
"Id.
1986]CriminalLaw447ingarsonists,asopposedtonon-arsonists,forinjuringfiremen.
07Thecourtdeterminedthattheaggravatedarsonstatutewasuncon-stitutionalbecauseitimposedapenaltygreaterthanthatforsim-plearson,whilethemensrearequirementforaggravatedarsonwaslessthanthatforsimplearson.
08C.
CrimesAffectingPublicHealth,Safety,andDecency1.
DrivingUndertheInfluenceMostoftherecentchangesinthelawregardingdrivingundertheinfluence("DUI")weremadebytheIllinoisGeneralAssem-bly.
19TheIllinoisSupremeCourt,however,issuedtwoimportantopinionsinthisareaoflawduringtheSurveyyear.
InPeoplev.
Coleman,110thesupremecourtheldthatincreasedpenaltiesforrepeatDUIoffendersdidnotviolatetheconstitu-tionalprohibitionofexpostfactolaws.
"'InColeman,thedefend-antwaschargedwithDUI.
"2Threeyearsearlier,thedefendantwasarrestedforthesameoffense,andreceivedasentenceofsuper-visioninexchangeforaguiltyplea.
1'3Inbetweenthetwooffensescommittedbythedefendant,theGeneralAssemblyenactedsec-tion5-6-1(d)oftheUnifiedCodeofCorrections,whichprovidedthataDUIdefendantmaynotbesentencedtosupervisionforasecondoffensecommittedwithinfiveyearsofthedatethathere-ceivedsupervisionforthefirstDUIcharge.
"4Thedefendant107.
Id.
TheWickcourtnotedthat"[u]nderthisstatuteforexample,afarmerwhodemolisheshisdeterioratedbarntoclearspaceforanewoneisliableforaClassXpenaltyifafiremanstandingbyisinjuredatthescene.
"Id.
108.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
20-1.
1(1985).
AswiththeBalesdecisionregard-ingresidentialburglary,theeffectofWickhasbeenlimitedbylegislativeaction.
Theaggravatedarsonstatutehasbeenamendedsothatarsonisnowalesserincludedoffenseofaggravatedarson.
Seeinfranotes244-46andaccompanyingtext.
109.
Seeinfranotes204-15andaccompanyingtext.
110.
111Ill.
2d87,488N.
E.
2d1009(1986).
111.
Id.
Anexpostfactolawis"alawthatchangesthepunishmentorinflictsagreaterpunishmentthanthelawannexedtothecrimewhenitwascommitted.
"BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY520(5thed.
1979).
SeeU.
S.
CONST.
art.
I,§10;ILL.
CONST.
art.
I,§10,cl.
1.
112.
Coleman,111Ill.
2dat91,488N.
E.
2dat1011(citingILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
951/2,para.
11-501(a)(1985)).
113.
Coleman,111Ill.
2dat91,488N.
E.
2dat1011.
114.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
1005-6-1(d)(1985)provides:Theprovisionsofparagraph(c)shallnotapplytoadefendantchargedwithviolatingSection11-501oftheIllinoisVehicleCodeorasimilarprovisionofalocalordinanceifsaiddefendanthaspreviouslybeenconvictedorassignedsu-pervisionforaviolationofSection11-501oftheIllinoisVehicleCodeorasimilarprovisionofalocalordinancewithina5yearperiodcommencingonthedatethedefendantwaspreviouslyconvictedorassignedsupervision.
LoyolaUniversityLawJournalclaimedthatbecausethestatutewaspassedafterhisfirsttrial,itviolatedtheconsitutionalproscriptionagainstexpostfactolaws.
'15Thesupremecourt,however,disagreed,statingthatthepurposeoftheprohibitionagainstexpostfactolawswastoensure"thatpersonshavearighttofairwarningoftheconductwhichwillgiverisetocriminalpenalties.
""'6Thesupremecourtreasonedthatsincesection5-6-1(d)becameeffectiveJanuary1,1984,andthedefendantwasarrestedforthesecondoffensesevenmonthslater,hehadadequatenoticeoftherecidiviststatutebythetimeofthesecondarrest.
"i7ThedefendantinColemanalsoarguedthatsection5-6-1(d)vio-latedequalprotectionbecausethepreviouschargesagainsthimforDUIweredismissedafterhesuccessfullycompletedthesupervi-sion.
Thedefendantcontendedthat,asaresult,therewasnorea-sonablebasisfordistinguishinghimfromthosewhohadnotbeenconvictedofDUI.
"8Basedonthegeneralrulethatequalprotec-tionprinciplesdonotdenytheStatethepowertotreatdisparateclassesofpeopledifferently,"9thecourtconcludedthatareason-ablebasisexistedtotreatthedefendantdifferentlybecausehewasamemberofaclassofpeoplewhotenderedguiltypleastoDUIcharges.
20InPeoplev.
Murphy,"'2theIllinoisSupremeCourtheldthatthecertificationrequirementsforlabtechnicianswhoanalyzebloodalcoholcontentsarenotapplicabletocasesotherthanDUI.
122ThedefendantinMurphywasindictedforrecklesshomicideafterdrivingintoaguardrail,fatallyinjuringthepassenger.
23Atthehospital,abloodsamplewastakenfromthedefendantandana-lyzedforalcoholcontent.
24Thedefendantfiledamotiontoex-cludetheresultsofthechemicalanalysisonthebasisthatthelaboratoryandtechnicianshadnotbeencertifiedundersection11-Id.
115.
Coleman,111Ill.
2dat91,488N.
E.
2dat1011.
116.
Id.
at93,488N.
E.
2dat1012(quotingMarksv.
UnitedStates,430U.
S.
188,191-92(1977)).
117.
Coleman,11Ill.
2dat94,488N.
E.
2dat1012.
Arecidivistisahabitualcrimi-naloracriminalrepeater.
BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY1141(5thed.
1979).
Arecidiviststatuteisonethatimposesharsherpunishmentforarepeatingoffender.
Id.
118.
Coleman,111Ill.
2dat95,488N.
E.
2dat1013.
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
at96,488N.
E.
2dat1013.
121.
108Ill.
2d228,483N.
E.
2d1288(1985).
122.
Id.
at234,483N.
E.
2dat1290.
123.
Id.
at230,483N.
E.
2dat1288.
124.
Id.
at230,483N.
E.
2dat1288-89.
[Vol.
18CriminalLaw501.
2oftheIllinoisVehicleCode.
125Thetrialcourtgrantedthedefendant'smotion.
126Onappeal,thesupremecourtreversed.
'27Thecourtheldthatbecausethedefendantwasindictedforrecklesshomicide,thecerti-ficationrequirementsestablishedinsection11-501.
2didnotapply.
Thecourtthusconcludedthattheordinarystandardsofadmissi-bilitygovernedtheadmissibilityofchemicalanalysisresultsinarecklesshomicidecase.
1282.
DrugsInPeoplev.
Harmison,129thecourtexaminedtheoffenseofcal-culatedcriminaldrugconspiracy.
Thiscrimeoccurswheneverapersonconspireswithtwoormorepersonstomanufacture,de-liver,orpossessacontrolledorcounterfeitsubstancewithavalueover$500.
11°ThepreciseissueinHarmisonwaswhethertheevi-dencewassufficienttoprovethatthedefendanthadconspiredwithatleasttwootherpersons.
131Theconspiracyatissueallegedlyinvolvedthreepersons,includ-ingthedefendant.
132Althoughtheevidenceshowedthatthede-fendantandoneotherpersonhadagreed,andathirdpersonhadparticipatedslightlyintheoffense,thesupremecourtheldthatthisevidencewasinsufficienttoestablishacalculatedcriminaldrugconspiracy.
33Thesupremecourtinterpreted"conspiracy"asem-ployedinthedrugconspiracystatutetohavethesamemeaningasinordinaryconspiracy,whichrequiresactualagreementbetweentheallegedco-conspirators.
134TheHarmisoncourtheldthatwith-outtheactualagreementofthreeormorepersons,therecannotbe125.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
951/2,para.
11-501.
2(1985).
Paragraph11-501.
2appliestoproceedings"arisingoutofanarrestforanoffenseasdefinedinSection11-501,"whichaddressestheoffenseofdrivingwhileundertheinfluence.
Murphy,108Ill.
2dat232,483N.
E.
2dat1289(citingILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
951/2,paras.
11-501,11-501.
2(1981)).
126.
Murphy,108Ill.
2dat230,483N.
E.
2dat1288.
127.
Id.
at234,483N.
E.
2dat1290.
128.
Id.
TheIllinoisSupremeCourtrecentlyheldthattheruleannouncedinMur-phyappliesevenwhenrecklesshomocidechargesaretriedwithDUIcharges.
Peoplev.
Emrich,113Ill.
2d343,498N.
E.
2d1140(1986).
129.
108Ill.
2d197,483N.
E.
2d508(1985).
130.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
56'/2,para.
1405(1985).
131.
Harmison,108Ill.
2d.
at202,483N.
E.
2dat510.
132.
Id.
at203,483N.
E.
2dat511.
133.
Id.
134.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
8-2(1985).
Paragraph8-2states"(a)Elementsoftheoffense.
Apersoncommitsconspiracywhen,withintentthatanoffensebecommit-ted,heagreeswithanothertothecommissionofthatoffense.
.
.
.
"Id.
1986]449450LoyolaUniversityLawJournal[Vol.
18acalculatedcriminaldrugconspiracy.
35InPeoplev.
Upton,136thesupremecourtheldthatthestatuteproscribingunlawfuldistributionofalook-alikesubstance137didnotviolatedueprocess.
38InUpton,thedefendantwasconvictedofunlawfuldistributionofalook-alikesubstance.
139Theappellatecourtreversedtheconviction,holdingthatthestatuteviolateddueprocess.
Theappellatecourtheldthestatuteunconstitutionalbe-causethefinefordeliveryofalook-alikesubstancecouldbegreaterthanthefinefordeliveryofanactualcontrolledsubstance.
"°Thesupremecourt,however,heldthatthenewlyamendedstatutedidnotviolatedueprocessbecausetheGeneralAssemblyjustifiedthelook-alikestatutebyrecognizingthe"uniquethreattopublichealth,safetyandwelfareposedbylook-alikesubstances.
"'141InPeoplev.
Dale,142theIllinoisSupremeCourtheldthatitisconstitutionalforlawenforcementpersonnelandthedefendanttotestifyastotheamountofdrugsseizedinordertodeterminetheir"streetvalue.
"143Thesupremecourtupheldthestatuteonthegroundthatsuchtestimonymerelyestablishestheamountseized,135.
Harmison,108I11.
2dat203,483N.
E.
2dat511.
InPeoplev.
Lane,133Ill.
App.
3d215,478N.
E.
2d1160(1stDist.
1985),thecourtheldthateventhoughconspir-acyrequiresthatthedefendantagreewithatleasttwopersons,threeconvictionsarenotrequiredunderthecalculatedcriminaldrugconspiracystatute.
Id.
at220,478N.
E.
2dat1164.
ApplyingLane,adefendantmaybeconvictedevenwhenhisallegedco-conspira-torsareacquitted.
Allthatisnecessaryisproofoftheconspiracyatthedefendant'strial.
Id.
136.
114Ill.
2d362,-N.
E.
2d-(1986).
137.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
561/2,para.
1404(b)(1985).
Paragraph1404(b)states"[i]tisunlawfulforanypersonknowinglytomanufacture,distribute,advertise,orpossesswithintenttomanufacturealook-alikesubstance.
Anypersonwhoviolatessubsection(b)shallbeguiltyofaClass3felony,thefineforwhichshallnotexceed$150,000.
"Id.
138.
Upton,114Ill.
2dat375,-N.
E.
2dat-.
139.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
561/2,para.
1404(1985).
140.
Upton,114Ill.
2dat364-66,-N.
E.
2dat-.
141.
Id.
at370-71,-N.
E.
2dat-.
Thespecialdangerscitedbythelegislaturewereasfollows:1)look-alikedrugs,particularappealtoandwidespreadmarketingamongyoungpeoplepromotesacceptanceofdrugabuse;2)misrepresentationastoingredientsandeffectsoflook-alikedrugsleadstounanticipatedreactionsandconfusionastotheeffectsanddosagelevelsofactualcontrolledsubstances;3)thewideavailabilityofcon-stituentingredientsresultsingreateaseinmanufactureandgeneratesimmenseprofitsformanufacturersanddistributors;and4)thepseudodrugs,actualingredients,thoughva-ried,createadditionalserioushealthhazardswhenthemannerofadministrationorin-gestionparallelsthatusuallyassociatedwiththesubstancesbeingimitated.
Upton,114Ill.
2dat370-71,-N.
E.
2dat-.
142.
112Ill.
2d460,493N.
E.
2d1060(1986).
143.
Id.
at466-67,493N.
E.
2dat1062-63(citingILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
1005-9-1.
1(1983)).
Paragraph1005-9-1.
1providesthatthestreetvalueofdrugsshallbedeter-minedbythecourtandtheamountseizedshallbedeterminedbytestimonyoflawen-forcementpersonnelandthedefendant.
Id.
1986]CriminalLawwhileothertestimony,perhapsincludingtestimonyconcerningthecurrentperunitgoing-rateforthesubstance,isrequiredtoprove"streetvalue"oftheamountseized.
'443.
GamblingInPeoplev.
Dugan,'45thesupremecourtheldtherecordingofbetsisnotanecessaryelementoftheoffenseofbookmaking.
146AlthoughthedefendantsinDuganhadacceptedmorethanfivebetsorwagersinexcessof$2,000,theyarguedthattheycouldnotbeconvictedbecausetheStatefailedtoproveanybetrecordingmethod.
147Thedefendantscontendedthatkeepingarecordofthebetsorwagerswasanessentialelementofthebookmakingof-fense.
148Thesupremecourt,however,rejectedthisclaim,holdingthatthegravamenoftheoffensewastheacceptanceoftherequisitenumberofbets.
'49Thecourtalsoclarifiedtheuseoftheword"business"inthesyndicatedgamblingstatute5°bystatingthatbookmakingneednotbethedefendant'soccupationforhimtobeguiltyofthatoffense.
15'Rather,thecourtconcluded,allthatisneededisproofofatleastfivebetsorwagerstotallingmorethan$2,000.
152D.
Sentencing153TheIllinoisSupremeCourthasissuedthreesignificantdecisions144.
Dale,112I11.
2dat466,493N.
E.
2dat1062.
145.
109Ill.
2d8,485N.
E.
2d315(1985).
146.
Id.
at14-15,485N.
E.
2dat318.
Thebookmakingstatuteprovides:Apersonengagesinbookmakingwhenhereceivesoracceptsmorethanfivebetsorwagersupontheresultsofanytrialsorcontestsofskill,speedorpowerofenduranceoruponanylot,chance,casualty,unknownorcontingenteventwhatsoever,whichbetsorwagersshallbeofsuchsizethatthetotaloftheamountsofmoneypaidorpromisedtobepaidtosuchbookmakeronaccountthereofshallexceed$2,000.
Bookmakingisthereceivingoracceptingofsuchbetsorwagersregardlessoftheformormannerinwhichthebookmakerrecordsthem.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
28-1.
1(d)(1985).
147.
Dugan,109Ill.
2dat13,485N.
E.
2dat318.
148.
Id.
at12,485N.
E.
2dat317.
149.
Id.
at13-15,485N.
E.
2dat317-18.
TheDugancourtalsoreasonedthatalthoughthelegislaturedidnotmakerecordkeepinganelementoftheoffense,itwasassumedthatabookmakerwithover$2,000inbetswouldrecordthem.
Id.
at14,485N.
E.
2dat318.
150.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
28-1.
1(b)(1985).
151.
Dugan,109Ill.
2dat15,485N.
E.
2dat318.
152.
Id.
153.
DuringtheSurveyperiod,thesupremecourtissuedothersignificantdecisionspertainingtosentencing.
ThosedecisionsarediscussedintheCriminalProcedurearticleofthisSurveyissue.
LoyolaUniversityLawJournalintheareaofsentencing.
Inthemostrecentdecision,Peoplev.
Ward,54thecourtheldforthefirsttimethatadefendant'scontin-uedassertionofinnocenceaftertrialcouldproperlybeconsideredasanaggravatingfactoratsentencing.
"'Thecourtalsoreaffirmeditspriorholdingsthatadefendant'slackofremorsecouldbecon-sideredasanaggravatingfactor,156andmadeitclearthatasen-tencingjudgehasbroaddiscretiontodeterminealackofremorse.
'57ThedefendantinWardhadbeenconvictedofburglaryinabenchtrial.
58Atsentencing,thedefendantmaintainedhisinnocence.
59Thetrialcourtfoundthatthedefendant'sstatementreflected"nocontrition"andthereforeelectedtoimposeaprisontermoftwicetheminimum.
'6°Onappeal,thedefendantarguedthatthetrialcourt'srelianceonhisassertionofinnocenceviolateddueprocessbypenalizinghimforrefusingtoincriminatehim-self.
16'Thesupremecourtrejectedthatargument.
Thecourtrea-sonedthatadefendanthasno"righttolie,"andthusconcludedthatasentencingjudgecouldlegitimatelyconsiderthetruthfulnessofthedefendant'sassertioninevaluatingthedefendant'scharacterandrehabilitativepotential.
62Thecourtrepeatedlyemphasizedthebroaddiscretionvestedinthesentencingjudge.
Thecourtcau-tionedthatanassertionofinnocenceandlackofremorse"mustnotbeautomaticallyandarbitrarilyappliedasaggravatingfac-tors,"butaddedthatasentencingjudgemustbefreetoconsider"anyrelevantinformationconcerningthedefendant'scharacter.
.
.
conveyedbyhiscontinuedprotestationofinnocenceandhislackofremorse,"viewedinlightofallthecircumstancesknowntothecourt.
63Thecourtalsoindicatedthatthesentencingjudgehasdiscretiontofindalackofremorsebasedonallthefactsintherecord,andnotsimplywhenthedefendantexpresslydeclaresanunrepentantattitude.
'Inadditiontoacontinuedassertionofin-nocence,otherfactorsnotedbytheWardcourtaspotentially154.
113Ill.
2d516,499N.
E.
2d422(1986).
155.
Id.
at529-32,499N.
E.
2dat427-28.
156.
Id.
at529,499N.
E.
2dat427.
TheWardcourtreaffirmeditsholdingsinPeoplev.
Albanese,102I11.
2d54,464N.
E.
2d206(1984),reh'gdenied,469U.
S.
1077(1985),Peoplev.
LaPointe,88Ill.
2d482,431N.
E.
2d344(1981),Peoplev.
Morgan,59Ill.
2d276,319N.
E.
2d764(1974),andPeoplev.
Gomez,29Ill.
2d432,194N.
E.
2d299(1963).
157.
Wardat530-31,499N.
E.
2dat428.
158.
Id.
at522,499N.
E.
2dat423.
159.
Id.
160.
Id.
at524-25,499N.
E.
2dat424-25.
161.
Id.
at525,499N.
E.
2dat425.
162.
Id.
at531,499N.
E.
2dat428.
163.
Id.
at529-30,499N.
E.
2dat427.
164.
Id.
at530-31,499N.
E.
2dat427-28.
452[Vol.
18CriminalLawshowingalackofremorseincluded"toneofvoice,facialexpres-sion,andgeneraldemeanor,"noneofwhicharenecessarilyre-vealedbythe"coldrecord.
"65Presumably,thedefendant'ssilencecouldnotbereliedupon.
TheimportofWardistoequateanassertionofinnocencewithalackofremorse.
Thedecisionthereforelikelywillsilencethoseconvicteddefendantswhohonestlybelievetheyareinnocentde-spiteacontraryverdict.
Theonlyothersafechoiceforsuchde-fendantswouldbetomakewhattheyconsidertobefalseconfessions,whichmightlaterbeusedagainstthemonappeal,re-trial,orcollateralproceedings.
Wardalsomightprovideapretextforatrialcourttoimposeaharshersentenceonadefendantwhoexercisedhisrighttotrialratherthanpleadingguilty.
66Inthesecondsentencingcase,Morrowv.
Dixon,67thedefendantwasconvictedofunlawfuldeliveryoftengramsofcocaine,aClass2felony,68andwassentencedtothreeyearsinprison.
169TheStatesubsequentlysoughteitherasupervisoryorderorawritofmandamustocompelthetrialjudgetosentencethedefendanttoaminimumofsixyearsasaClassXoffenderunderthestatutewhichincreasesthesentenceforaClass1orClass2felonytoClassXfelonyifthedefendantpreviouslyhasbeenconvictedofatleasttwoClass2orgreaterfelonies.
70ThoughtheStatehadpresentedcertifiedcopiesoftherecordsofdefendant'stwopriorfelonycon-victions,'7thetrialjudgerefusedtosentencethedefendantasaClassXoffender.
72ThesupremecourtnotedthattheIllinoisGeneralAssemblyhastheauthoritytosetthenatureandextentofpenaltiesandthatastatutoryprovisionforaminimumsentenceismandatoryandmustbeobeyed.
73Becausethestatuteclearlymandatedtheimpo-sitionofaClassXsentence,thecourtheldthatthetrialjudgedidnothavethediscretiontosentencethedefendanttoatermoutside165.
Id.
166.
SeeWardat533-35,499N.
E.
2dat429-30(Simon,J.
,dissenting).
167.
108Ill.
2d223,483N.
E.
2d876(1985).
168.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
561/2,para.
1401(c)(1985).
169.
Dixon,108Ill.
2dat225,483N.
E.
2dat876.
170.
Id.
at225,483N.
E.
2dat876(citingILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
1005-5-3(c)(8)(1984)).
171.
Dixon,108IlL.
2dat225,226,483N.
E.
2dat876,877.
Thedefendantwascon-victedin1978ofburglaryandrobberycommittedin1978.
In1980,thedefendantwasconvictedofaburglarycommittedin1980.
Theoffenseunderconsiderationinthe1985DixoncasewascommittedonApril10,1984.
Id.
172.
Id.
at226,483N.
E.
2dat877.
173.
Id.
1986]LoyolaUniversityLawJournal[Vol.
18theparametersofthestatute.
74Therefore,thecourtconditionallyawardedawritofmandamuspendingappealoftheconviction.
ThethirdsentencingcasewasPeoplev.
Harden,175inwhichthesupremecourtheldthatasentenceundertheextendedtermstat-ute176couldbeimposedonthebasisofafederalconvictionenteredinIllinois.
77Thestatuteauthorizesanextendedtermsentence"[w]henadefendantisconvictedofanyfelony,afterhavingbeenpreviouslyconvictedinIllinoisofthesameorgreaterclassfelony,within10years.
.
.
.
.
I7'Thecourtnotedthat,whilethestatutedoesnotmentionconvictionsinIllinoisfederalcourts,itdoesnotexplicitlylimititsapplicationtoconvictionsinstatecourts.
179Re-lyingonthepurposeofthestatute,'publicpolicyconcerns,18andapriorIllinoisappellatecourtdecision,"2thecourtheldthatasentenceforanextendedtermcouldbebaseduponafederalcon-victionenteredinIllinois.
83III.
LEGISLATIONSinceJuly1985,therehavebeenmanysignificantchangesinIlli-nois'substantivecriminallawstatutes.
TheGeneralAssemblyen-actedmajorrevisionsintheDUIstatute,84abolishedthefeticidestatute85andreplaceditwithavarietyofoffenses,86andpasseda174.
Id.
at227,483N.
E.
2dat877.
175.
113Ill.
2d14,495N.
E.
2d490(1986).
176.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch,38,para.
1005-8-2(b)(1985).
177.
Harden,113Ill.
2dat20-21,495N.
E.
2dat493.
178.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
1005-5-3.
2(b)(1)(1985).
ThedefendantinHardenwasconvictedofarmedrobberyandhada1975convictioninfederalcourtforthatsameoffense.
Harden,113Ill.
2dat17,495N.
E.
2dat491-92.
179.
Harden,113Ill.
2dat21,495N.
E.
2dat494.
180.
Id.
Thepurposeofthestatuteistoimposeharshersentencesonoffenderswhoserepeatedconvictionshaveshowntheirresistancetocorrection.
Id.
181.
Id.
at22,495N.
E.
2dat494.
Thecourtreasonedthatasamatterofpublicpolicy,repeatoffendersshouldbetreatedmoreharshlythanfirsttimeoffenders.
Thecourtnotedthatthispublicpolicyhasnotbeenuniformlyregardedbyastatutewhichimposesextendedtermsentencesbasedonstatecourtconvictionsbutnotfederalcourtconvictions.
Id.
182.
Id.
(citingPeoplev.
Robinson91Ill.
App.
3d1128,414N.
E.
2d1335(1980)).
TheRobinsoncourtstated,"Notably,thephrase'previouslyconvictedinIllinois'isnotnecessarilylimitedtoaconvictionarisingsolelyintheIllinoisStatecourts,butcouldreasonablybeconstruedtocoveraconvictioninIllinoisinaFederalcourtforaFederaloffense.
.
.
.
[T]heActprovidesforextendedtermsforcrimescommittedinIllinois,anobjectivesupportedbygivingequalconsiderationtosimilarFederalcrimescommittedinIllinois.
"Robinson,91Ill.
App.
3dat1132,414N.
E.
2dat1338.
183.
Harden,113I11.
2dat20-21,495N.
E.
2dat494.
184.
Seeinfranotes204-15andaccompanyingtext.
185.
Seeinfranotes216-31andaccompanyingtext.
186.
Thenewoffensesincludeintentionalhomicideofanunbornchild,voluntary1986]CriminalLaw455lawradicallychangingthehomicidestatute.
187Thelegislaturealsoamendedstatutesgoverningunlawfuluseofweapons,88childab-ductionandsexualabuse,189aggravatedarson,190theft,19'residen-tialburglary,92andbribery.
193Finally,thelegislaturecreatedthenewoffensesofaggravatedunlawfulrestraint,94disarmingapeaceofficer,95publicaidwirefraud,96andmailfraud.
97A.
MajorRevisions1.
Murder/VoluntaryManslaughterPublicAct84-1450198changesthenameoftheoffenseof"mur-der"to"firstdegreemurder"andchanges"voluntarymanslaugh-ter"to"seconddegreemurder.
"Asinthepreviousstatute,thelessseriousoffenseofseconddegreemurderisdefinedasfirstde-greemurderwithmitigatingfactors.
ThecrucialaspectofthechangeisthattheburdenofprovingthemitigatingfactorsisshiftedfromtheStatetothedefendant.
Undertheoldlaw,theStatehadtoprovethemitigatingfactorsbeyondareasonabledoubtinordertoconvictthedefendantofvoluntarymanslaughter.
Underthenewlaw,thedefendantmustprovethemitigatingfac-torsbyapreponderanceoftheevidence,andiftheburdenisnotmet,thedefendantwillbeconvictedofmurderinthefirstdegree.
Thisnewlawrepresentsthelegislativeresponsetotheincreasingproblemoflegallyinconsistentjuryverdictsinhomicidecases.
'99Thisproblem,however,maybelessattributabletothecurrental-locationoftheburdenofproofthantoinartfullydraftedjuryin-structions.
2"Thislawhasengenderedmuchcontroversy.
Byshiftingtheburdenofprooftothedefendant,thenewlawmaymanslaughterofanunbornchild,involuntarymanslaughterofanunbornchild,batteryofanunbornchildandaggravatedbatteryofanunbornchild.
Seeinfranotes216-31andaccompanyingtext.
187.
Seeinfranotes198-203andaccompanyingtext.
188.
Seeinfranotes232-36andaccompanyingtext.
189.
Seeinfranotes237-43andaccompanyingtext.
190.
Seeinfranotes244-46andaccompanyingtext.
191.
Seeinfranotes247-49andaccompanyingtext.
192.
Seeinfranotes250-56andaccompanyingtext.
193.
Seeinfranotes257-58andaccompanyingtext.
194.
Seeinfranotes259-60andaccompanyingtext.
195.
Seeinfranotes261-63andaccompanyingtext.
196.
Seeinfranotes264-68andaccompanyingtext.
197.
Id.
198.
1986Ill.
LegisServ.
84-1450(West)(tobecodifiedatILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,paras.
2-8,9-1,9-2).
199.
Seesupranotes14-35andaccompanyingtext.
200.
SeegenerallyHaddad,supranote17.
LoyolaUniversityLawJournalposeconstitutionalproblems.
2°"Moreover,underthenewlaw,prosecutorswouldnolongerbeabletochargethelesseroffense,butinsteadwouldberequiredtochargefirstdegreemurderevenwhentheevidencedidnotwarrantsuchacharge.
Anotheramendmentalsoreformsthehomicidelaw.
2"2Thisamendmentauthorizesanextendedtermsentenceforpersonscon-victedofvoluntarymanslaughter,involuntarymanslaughter,orrecklesshomicide,whenmorethanonepersonwaskilled.
203Fi-nally,forpersonsconvictedofvoluntarymanslaughter,involun-tarymanslaughter,orrecklesshomicide,whenmorethanonepersonwaskilled.
Thisnewlawauthorizesanextendedtermsentence.
2.
DrivingUndertheInfluencePublicAct84-272madeseveralchangesintheDUIlaw,2°themostimportantbeingtheimpositionofastatutorysummarysus-pensionofthedriver'slicense.
25Formerly,therewasanauto-maticlicensesuspensiononlyifthedriverrefusedtotaketheblood-alcoholtest.
206Underthenewlaw,automaticsuspensionwilloccurnotonlywhenthedriverrefusesarequesttotaketheblood-alcoholtest,butalsowhenthetestistakenandthedriverregistersabovethelegallimit.
207Thelicensesuspensiondoesnottakeeffectuntilthedriverreceiveswrittennoticeoftheimpendingsuspensionandisinformedthathemayrequestahearing.
208201.
InMartinv.
Ohio,107S.
Ct.
1098(1987),theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtrecentlyheldthatitwasnotaviolationofthedueprocessclauseforastatetoplacetheburdenofprovingself-defenseonadefendantchargedwithmurder.
SeealsoPattersonv.
NewYork,432U.
S.
197(1977)(upholdingastatuteinwhichthemitigatingfactorwasnotanelementoftheoffensebutinsteadanaffirmativedefense).
ButseeMullaneyv.
Wilbur,421U.
S.
684(1975)(strikingdownasimilarstatuteonthegroundsthatdueprocessrequiresthestatetoproveeveryelementofanoffense).
202.
1986I11.
Legis.
Serv.
84-1441(West)(tobecodifiedatILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
1005-5-3.
2).
203.
Id.
204.
1985Ill.
Laws84-272.
AnewparagraphwasaddedtoILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
951/2(1985),allowingtheSecretaryofStatetosuspendthedrivingprivilegesofpersonsar-restedinanotherstateforDUI.
Id.
atpara.
6-203.
1.
ThelawalsowasamendedtoprovidethatanypersonconvictedofdrivingonasuspendedlicenseforasecondtimewillbeguiltyofaClass4felonyifthelicensewassuspendedorrevokedforDUI,involuntarymanslaughterorrecklesshomicide.
Id.
atpara.
6-303.
Ifthesuspensionorrevocationwasforotherreasons,thecrimeisaClassAmisdemeanor.
Id.
205.
Id.
atpara.
1-203.
1.
206.
Id.
atpara.
11-501.
1(c).
207.
Id.
atpara.
1-203.
1.
Thelegallimitis0.
10.
Id.
208.
Id.
atpara.
2-118.
1.
[Vol.
18CriminalLawTherefore,suspensionisautomatic,butahearingisnot.
2°9Anypersonwhoselicensehasbeensummarilysuspendedshallnotbeeligibleforrestorationoftheprivilegeuntil:(1)sixmonthsfromtheeffectivedateofthestatutorysummarysuspension("SSS")ifherefusedtotakethealcoholtest;(2)threemonthsfromtheeffec-tivedateoftheSSSifachemicaltestwastakenandthedefendantregisteredoverthelegallimit;or(3)oneyearforallrepeatDUIoffenders.
21°TorelievetheburdenoftheSSS,thenewlawprovidesfortheestablishmentofJudicialDrivingPermits("JDP").
21'Thepermitsaregivenonlyinspecialcircumstances212andarelimitedtothepetitioner'sresidenceandplaceofemployment,andtospecificdaysoftheweekandhoursoftheday.
Anotherimportantchangemadebythislawwasthatthesen-tencingofrecklesshomicidewasincreasedfromaClass4felonytoaClass3felony.
213Also,incasesinvolvingrecklesshomicide,drivingundertheinfluenceofalcoholoranyotherdrugisnowprimafacieevidenceofarecklessact.
214Similarly,PublicAct84-899providesthatapersoninvolvedinamotorvehicleaccidentwhichresultsingreatbodilyharm,permanentdisability,ordisfig-urementtoanotherisguiltyofaClass4felonyiftheproximatecauseoftheinjuriesisaviolationofDUI.
253.
FeticidePublicAct84-1414repealedthefeticidestatute216andcreatedavarietyofoffensesagainstunbornchildren.
217Theseoffensesin-209.
SeeMackeyv.
Montrym,443U.
S.
1(1979),whichaddressedthedueprocessramificationsofsuchalaw.
210.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
951/2,para.
6-208.
1(1985).
211.
Id.
atpara.
6-206.
1.
PreviouslytheSecretaryofStatecouldissuedrivingper-mits,butunderthisnewlaw,thecourtscanordertheSecretarytodoso.
TheseJDP'sareonlyavailabletofirsttimeoffendersandcanonlytakeeffectaftera30daysuspen-sion.
RepeatoffenderscantrytoobtainapermitdirectlyfromtheSecretaryofState.
Id.
212.
Id.
atpara.
6-206.
1(b).
PriortotheissuanceofaJDP,thecourtwillconsider1)whetherthepersonisemployedandnoothermeansofcommutingisavailable,2)whetherthepersonmustdrivetosecurealcoholorothermedicaltreatmentforhimselforafamilymember,3)whetherthepersonhasbeenrepeatedlyconvictedoftrafficviolationsorinvolvedinmotorvehicleaccidentstoadegreewhichindicatesdisrespectforpublicsafety,4)whetherthepersonhasbeeninatrafficaccidentresultingindeathwithinthelast5years,5)whetherthepersonislikelytoobeythelimitedprovisionsoftheJDP,and6)whetherthepersonhasanyadditionaltrafficviolationspendinginanycourt.
Id.
213.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
9-3(1985).
214.
Id.
215.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
951/2,para.
11-501(e)(1985).
216.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
9-1.
1(1985).
217.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,paras.
9-1.
2,9-2.
1,9-3.
2,12-3.
1,12-4.
4(Supp.
1986).
1986]LoyolaUniversityLawJournalcludeintentionalhomicideofanunbornchild,21voluntaryman-slaughterofanunbornchild,219involuntarymanslaughterofanunbornchild,220recklesshomicideofanunbornchild,221batteryofanunbornchild,222andaggravatedbatteryofanunbornchild.
223Theoldfeticidelaw224requiredthesamemensreaasfoundinthemurderstatute.
25Inaddition,theformerlawdictatedthatthecriminalactbedirectedagainstthemother,withtheoffenderknowingthatshewascarryingthefetus.
226Underthenewlaw,acriminaloffenseexistseveniftheintentisdirectedtowardsomeotherindividual.
227Theonlyoffensewhichrequiresknowledgeofthepregnancyisintentionalhomicideofanunbornfetus.
228TheActalsoabandonstheterm"fetus"forthebroaderterm"unbornchild.
"Undertheformerfeticidestatute,"fetus"wasde-finedasafetusthatcouldhavesustainedlifeoutsidethewomb.
229Thenewlawdefines"unbornchild"asanindividualofthehumanspeciesfromfertilizationuntilbirth.
PublicAct84-1414thusexpandstheapplicationoftheformerfeticidestatute.
TheActprovidesapotenttoolfortheprosecu-tion.
Forinstance,theStatewillnowbeabletoprosecuteanyonewhocausesthedeathofanunbornchild,regardlessofitsstageofdevelopment,andevenwhentheactscausingthedeathwereper-formedrecklessly;underprovocation,orunderabeliefthatforce218.
Id.
atpara.
9-1.
2(d)).
Thesentenceforintentionalhomicideofanunbornchildwillbethesameasformurder,exceptthatthedeathpenaltymaynotbeimposed.
Id.
219.
Id.
atpara.
9-2.
1(c).
VoluntarymanslaughterofanunbornchildisaClass1felony.
Id.
220.
Id.
atpara.
9-3.
2(b)(1).
InvoluntarymanslaughterofanunbornchildisaClass3felony.
Id.
221.
Id.
atpara.
9-3.
2(b)(2).
RecklesshomocideofanunbornchildisaClass3fel-ony.
Id.
222.
Id.
atpara.
12-3.
1(c).
BatteryofanunbornchildisaClassAmisdemeanor.
Id.
223.
Id.
atpara.
12-4.
4(b).
AggravatedbatteryofanunbornchildisaClass2felony.
Id.
224.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
9-1.
1(1985).
Theformerfeticidestatuteprovidedthattheoffender"[e]itherintendedtokillordogreatbodilyharmtothemothercarryingthefetusorknewthatsuchactswouldcausedeathorgreatbodilyharmtothemother.
.
.
or.
.
.
heknewthathisactscreatedastrongprobabilityofdeathorgreatbodilyharmtothemother.
"Id.
225.
Id.
atpara.
9-1(1985).
Themurderstatuteprovidesthattheoffender"[e]itherintendstokillordogreatbodilyharmtothatindividualoranotherorknowsthatsuchactswillcausedeathtothatindividualoranother.
.
,or.
.
.
knowsthatsuchactscreateastrongprobabilityofdeathorgreatbodilyharmtothatindividualoranother.
"Id.
226.
Id.
atpara.
9-1.
1(1985).
227.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,paras.
9-1.
2,9-2.
1,9-3.
2,12-3.
1,12-4.
4(Supp.
1986).
228.
Id.
atpara.
9-1.
2.
229.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
9-1.
1(b)(1985).
[Vol.
181986]CriminalLawwasjustified.
23°Thenewlawalsomakesitpossibletoprosecuteonewhocausesbodilyharmtoanunbornchildbutdoesnotcausethechild'sdeath.
231B.
OtherAmendmentstoExistingStatutes1.
UnlawfulUseofWeaponsTheamendmentstotheunlawfuluseofweaponsstatute232("UUW")wereundoubtedlyinresponsetotheprevalentproblemofstreetgangrelatedcrimes.
233PublicAct84-721augmentedtheUUWstatutebymakingitanoffensetopossessweaponsonschoolgrounds.
234PublicAct84-1074convertedthecrimeofsellingorgivingaconcealablefirearmtoapersonundereighteenyearsofagetoaClass4felony.
235Previously,thisoffensehadbeenaClassAmis-demeanor.
ThenewlawalsomakesitaClass4felonytosellorgiveafirearmofanysizetoapersonundereighteenyearsofage.
2362.
ChildAbductionandSexualAbusePublicAct84-234expandstheoffenseofchildabduction.
Underthenewlaw,itisacrimeforamothertoabductandinten-tionallyconcealherownchildwhomshehadabandonedorofwhomshehadrelinquishedcustody.
237230.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,paras.
9-1.
2,9-2.
1,9-3.
2,12-3.
1,12-4.
4(Supp.
1986).
231.
Id.
232.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
24(1985).
233.
Id.
atpara.
24-1.
AminoramendmenttotheUnlawfulUseofWeaponsStatuteaddedthe"throwingstar"tothelistofprohibitedweapons.
Id.
234.
Id.
Theamendmentmakesitacrimetocarryaweapononthepremisesofanyelementaryorsecondaryschool,communitycollege,orcollegeoruniversity.
Id.
235.
Id.
atpara.
24-3(a).
236.
Id.
Thisnewlawonlyappliestoapersonunder18whodoesnotpossessavalidFirearmOwner'sIdentificationCard.
Id.
237.
Id.
atpara.
10-5.
Otheradditionstothechildabductionstatuteprovidethatapersoncommitschildabductionwhenheorshe:[l]Intentionallyconcealsorremovesthechildfromaparentafterbeingservedwithprocessinanactionaffectingmarriageorpaternitybutpriortotheissu-anceofatemporaryorfinalorderdeterminingcustody;or[2]AttheexpirationofvisitationrightsoutsidetheState,intentionallyfailsorrefusestoreturnorimpedesthereturnofthechildtothelawfulcustodianinIllinois;or[3]Beingaparentofthechild,andwheretheparentsofsuchchildareorhavebeenmar-riedandtherehasbeennocourtorderofcustody,concealsthechildfor15days,andfailstomakereasonableattemptswithinthe15dayperiodtonotifytheotherparentastothewhereaboutsofthechildortoarrangereasonablevisitationorcontactwiththechild.
ItisnotaviolationofthisSectionforapersonfleeingdomesticviolencetotakethechildwithhimorhertoservicesprovidedbyadomesticviolenceprogram;or[4]Beingaparentofthechild,andLoyolaUniversityLawJournalPublicAct84-160alsoexpandsthechildabductionstatutebymakingitacrimetointentionallylureachildundertheageofsixteenintoamotorvehiclewithouttheconsentoftheparent.
238Inaddition,PublicAct84-1281providesthatattemptingtolureachildisasseriousacrimeasactuallyluring.
239TheHabitualChildSexOffenderRegistrationActwaspassedbytheIllinoisGeneralAssemblyasapreventativemeasureintheareaofchildabuse.
240Thisactrequiresapersonwhohasbeenconvictedtwoormoretimesforcertainsexoffensestoregisterwiththelocalchiefofpolice.
241Thepersonwillbeinformedofhisdutytoregisteruponreleasefromaprisonorhospital.
242Anyper-sonwhoviolatestheregistrationrequirementwillbeguiltyofaClassAMisdemeanor.
2433.
AggravatedArson24PublicAct84-1100changesarsonintoalesserincludedoffenseofaggravatedarsonbydeletingthewordsfromthelatterstatute"bymeansoffireorexplosive"andadding"inthecourseofcom-mittingarson.
'ThischangeisinaccordwiththeIllinoisSupremeCourt'srecentopinioninPeoplev.
Wick.
2464.
Theft247Anamendmenttothetheftstatuteincreasestheclassificationof"theftofproperty,otherthanafirearm,notfromthepersonandwheretheparentsofthechildareorhavebeenmarriedandtherehasbeennocourtorderofcustody,conceals,detains,orremovesthechildwithphysicalforceorthreatofphysicalforce;or[5]Conceals,detains,orremovesthechildforpaymentorpromiseofpaymentattheinstructionofapersonwhohasnolegalrighttocustody;or[6]RetainsinthisStatefor30daysachildremovedfromanotherstatewithouttheconsentofthelawfulcustodianorinviolationofavalidcourtorderofcustody.
Id.
238.
Id.
atpara.
10-5(b)(4).
Thisnewlawchangestheagerequirementofthevictimfromthirteentosixteen.
Id.
239.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
10-5(b)(10)(Supp.
1986).
Bothluringandat-temptingtolureareClass4felonies.
Id.
atpara.
10-5(d).
240.
Id.
atparas.
221-230.
241.
Id.
242.
Id.
243.
Id.
244.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
ch.
38,para.
20-1.
1(1985).
Seesupranotes102-08andaccompanyingtext.
245.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
20-1.
1(1985).
246.
107Ill.
2d62,481N.
E.
2d676(1985).
Seesupranotes102-08andaccompanyingtext.
247.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,par.
16-1(e)(1)(1985).
460[Vol.
181986]CriminalLawnotexceeding$300invalue"fromamisdemeanortoaClass4felony.
248Thenewamendmentwillapplyonlyiftheoffenderpre-viouslyhasbeenconvictedofrobbery,armedrobbery,burglary,residentialburglary,orhomeinvasion.
2495.
ResidentialBurglary250InresponsetoPeoplev.
Bales,25itheGeneralAssemblyredefined"dwelling"forpurposesoftheresidentialburglarystatute.
Eventhoughtheformerstatute'sdefinitionof"dwelling"appliedtobur-glary,252theIllinoisSupremeCourtinBales253declinedtoapplythatdefinitionof"dwelling"toresidentialburglary.
254Thenewlawdefinesdwelling,forthepurposesoftheresidentialburglarystatute,emphasizingthepossibilityofpeoplebeingpresentintheirhomes.
255Thisamendmentthushighlightstheresidentialburglarystatute'spurposeofensuringthesafetyofpeopleintheirhomes.
2566.
Bribery257Thelegislaturealsoexpandedthescopeofthebriberystatute.
Previously,theactofattemptingtoinfluencethefunctionofanypublicofficer,publicemployee,orjurorwasnotincludedinthedefinitionofbribery.
258Thestatute,however,nowencompassestheactofattemptingtoinfluence.
248.
Id.
249.
Id.
Underformerparagraph16-1(e)(1),theoffensewasenhancedonlywhenthedefendanthadapreviousconvictionfortheft,otherthantheftofafirearm.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
16-1(e)(1)(1985).
BoththeformerandamendedtheftstatutesarecodifiedinILL.
REV.
STAT.
(1985).
250.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
2-6(Supp.
1986).
251.
108Ill.
2d182,483N.
E.
2d517(1985).
Seesupranotes96-101andaccompany-ingtext.
252.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
2-6(1985).
Formerparagraph2-6andnewpara-graph2-6(a)definedwellingas"abuildingorportionthereof,atent,avehicle,orotherenclosedspacewhichisusedorintendedforuseasahumanhabitation,homeorresi-dence.
"ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
2-6(a)(Supp.
1986);ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
2-6(1985).
253.
108Ill.
2d182,483N.
E.
2d517(1985).
Seesupranotes96-101andaccompany-ingtext.
254.
Seesupranotes96-101andaccompanyingtext.
255.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
2-6(b)(Supp.
1986).
Paragraph2-6(b)provides,"[florthepurposesofSection19-3ofthisCode[residentialburglary],'dwelling'meansahouse,apartment,mobilehome,trailer,orotherlivingquartersinwhichatthetimeoftheallegedoffensetheownersoroccupantsactuallyresideorintheirabsenceintendwithinareasonableperiodoftimetoreside.
"256.
Seesupranotes96-101andaccompanyingtext.
257.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
33-1(e)(1985).
258.
Id.
LoyolaUniversityLawJournalC.
NewOffenses1.
AggravatedUnlawfulRestraint259ThenewlyenactedaggravatedunlawfulrestraintstatutemakesitaClass3felonytocommitunlawfulrestraintwhilearmedwithadeadlyweapon.
2°2.
DisarmingaPeaceOfficer261Disarmingapeaceofficeroccurswheneveroneknowinglydis-armsapeaceofficerwhiletheofficerisengagedinhisofficialdu-ties.
262Thestatutealsorequiresthattheoffenseoccurswithouttheofficer'sconsent.
2633.
PublicAidWireFraud264andPublicAidMailFraud265Twooffensesconcerningpublicaidfraudwerecreatedtopre-ventpeoplefromunlawfullyobtainingstatepublicaidpayments.
Publicaidwirefraudoccurswhentheoffenderutilizesatelephone,wire,radioortelevisioninfurtheranceofaplantodefraudastatepublicaidprogram.
266Publicaidmailfraudoccurswhenapersonutilizesthepostalservicetofurtheranunlawfulschemetodefraudastatepublicaidprogram.
267BothoffensesareClass4felonies.
268IV.
CONCLUSIONThejudicialdecisionsandnewlegislationdiscussedinthisarti-clerepresentthemajordevelopmentsinIllinoissubstantivecrimi-nallawsinceJuly,1985.
Duringthattime,boththeIllinoisSupremeCourtandtheIllinoisGeneralAssemblymadesignificantcontributionstothatbodyoflaw.
Althoughthecourtandtheleg-islaturewereindependentlyactiveinanumberofareas,therewere259.
Id.
atpara.
10-3.
1.
Apersoncommitstheoffenseofaggravatedunlawfulrestraintwhenheknowingly,withoutlegalauthority,detainsanotherwhileusingadeadlyweapon.
AggravatedunlawfulrestraintisaClass3felony.
Id.
260.
Id.
atpara.
10-3.
Theunlawfulrestraintstatuteprovides,"Apersoncommitstheoffenseofunlawfulrestraintwhenheknowingly,withoutlegalauthority,detainsan-other".
Id.
UnlawfulrestraintisaClass4felony.
Id.
261.
Id.
atpara.
31-1(a).
262.
Id.
263.
Id.
264.
ILL.
REV.
STAT.
ch.
38,para.
17-9(Supp.
1986).
265.
Id.
266.
Id.
267.
Id.
268.
Seesupranotes266-67.
462[Vol.
18CriminalLawalsoimportantareasofcommonconcern.
BoththecourtandthelegislaturetookactionstocurbtheproblemofDUIandassisttheprosecutionofsuchcases.
269Thecourtandthelegislaturealsoun-dertooktoaddressthevexingproblemoflegallyinconsistentver-dictsinhomicidecases.
27°Intwoareas,residentialburlaryandaggravatedarson,thecourtfirstruledupontheconstitutionalityoftheparticularstatute,andthelegislaturerespondedwithamend-mentstoreflectthecourt'sdecisionsandadoptedaconstructiondeemedbythecourtasnecessarytomakethestatuteconstitu-tional.
27'Thus,therecentdevelopmentsinthisareahaveinmanyrespectsbeentheproductofadialoguebetweenthejudiciaryandthelegislature.
WiththeenactmentofsweepingnewreformsintheareasofDUI,272feticide,273andhomocide,274andthelitigationsuchdevelopmentsarelikelytospawn,thedialoguebetweenthecourtandthelegislaturepromisestocontinue.
Seesupranotes109-28,204-15andaccompanyingtext.
Seesupranotes14-35,198-203andaccompanyingtext.
Seesupranotes96-108,244-46,250-56andaccompanyingtext.
Seesupranotes204-15andaccompanyingtext.
Seesupranotes216-31andaccompanyingtext.
Seesupranotes198-203andaccompanyingtext.
1986]