schemewww.00271

Copyright2013bytheauthor(s).
PublishedhereunderlicensebytheResilienceAlliance.
Mauerhofer,V.
,K.
Hubacek,andA.
Coleby.
2013.
Frompolluterpaystoprovidergets:distributionofrightsandcostsunderpaymentsforecosystemservices.
EcologyandSociety18(4):41.
http://dx.
doi.
org/10.
5751/ES-06025-180441Synthesis,partofaSpecialFeatureonEcosystemServices,Governance,andStakeholderParticipationFromPolluterPaystoProviderGets:DistributionofRightsandCostsunderPaymentsforEcosystemServicesVolkerMauerhofer1,KlausHubacek2andAlastorColeby3ABSTRACT.
Shouldsocietyhavetherighttofreelyavailablecleanairandwater,orshouldpeopleberequiredtopayfortheseascommoditiesjustastheydoformanyothergoodsorservicesthattheyconsumeWiththisquestionandfurtherquestionsonenvironmentalgovernanceinmind,wereviewedtheparadigmshiftinnaturalresourcemanagementfromthepolluterpaysprinciple(PPP),whichfocusesonpollutersandenforcementofthresholds,totheprincipleofpaymentsforecosystemservices(PES),whichemphasizesprovider-basedeconomicapproaches.
Giventhatthereareconflictsofinterestovernaturalresourcesandecosystemservices(ESs),theseconflictscouldberesolvedthroughrightsand/orcostassignmentsviathird-partyintervention,i.
e.
,bythe"state,"orthroughprivatecompensationbeyondinitialregulationandstate-initiatedassignmentsofcost.
Ouranalysisincludesanin-depthliteraturereviewandadescriptionofexistingpoliciesonESs.
Wealsoexaminetheso-calledCoasetheorembasedona"neutral"situationwherenorightsorcostsaredistributedinadvance.
ThistheoremprovidesroomforthePPPapproachesandtheprovider-getsapproaches.
Bothoftheseapproachesshouldensure,givencertainassumptions,aneconomicallyefficientallocationofresources;however,theystillignoretwoindispensableissues,namely,theecologicallysustainablescaleandinherentqualitiesofecosystemsandthedistributionaleffects.
Withregardtotherelationshipbetweenthesetwosetsofapproachesandtheirrespectiverelationshiptothelegalframework,PESprogramscanevolveinsteadofPPPwherenoregulationsareinplace,existingregulationsaredeemedtobeinsufficientlyformulated,orregulationsarenotenforcedatall.
WealsofurtheraddresssomecriticalissuesthatcanarisewhenPESprogramsevolveinsteadofPPPinpractice,suchasthegeneralnecessityofPEStocoexistwithbasicrightsandlegalobligations,inappropriatelexicographicclaimsfromprovidersofESs,alongsideclaimsforpotentialdamagesandtherelationshipofPESwiththeintrinsicmotivationofserviceproviders.
Critically,insufficientattentionhasbeenpaidtothefactthatbyreplacingtheearlierPPPdoctrinewiththe"provider-gets"principle,rightsareredistributedfromthepublictotheserviceproviderwithimportantdistributionalimplicationsforsociety.
Therefore,thereplacementofPPPwithPESincludesobstaclesaswellasopportunities,inparticularfortherelationshipbetweenrichandpoor,anddevelopinganddevelopedcountries.
KeyWords:ecosystemservices;efficientallocation;environmentalprinciple;fairdistribution;humanright;propertyrights;sustainablescaleINTRODUCTIONTheecosystemservice(ES)frameworkseekstointegratethebiophysicalandsocialdimensionsofenvironmentalprotectiontoaddresstheenvironmentalcrisesthatwilllikelypeakinthe21stcentury(Dailyetal.
2000).
Thiswidelyacceptedframeworkprovidesthenexusbetweenecologyandeconomicsandhasbeenseenasaparadigmshiftinthewaypeoplethinkaboutthenaturalenvironment(TurnerandDaily2008).
Increasingly,ecosystemsarebeingseenascapitalassets,withthepotentialtogenerateastreamofvitallife-supportservicesandthusrequirecarefulevaluationandinvestmenttoaligneconomicincentiveswiththeneedforconservationofnaturalresources.
Fromthisparadigm,thepaymentsforecosystemservices(PES)conceptisevolvingandattractingconsiderableattentionamongenvironmentalscientistsandmanagers,andithasbeenextensivelyandcriticallydebated(see,e.
g.
,Gobbi2000,Pagiolaetal.
2004,Farley2008,Spash2008,RedfordandAdams2009,Norgaard2010,Vatn2010,Kinzigetal.
2011).
PESprogramsaregenerallydefinedasvoluntarytransactionsinwhichawell-definedESis"bought"byatleastoneserviceuserfromatleastoneserviceproviderbutinwhichonlytheprovidercanactuallysecureserviceprovision,akaconditionality(Wunder2005,Engeletal.
2008).
Incomparison,thepolluterpaysprinciple(PPP)iswheredamagetoanESshouldbepreventedorcompensatedforbythepersonwhoiseitherlikelytocausedamagetoanESorhasactuallycauseddamage(Frsund1975,Baldock1992,Seymouretal.
1992).
Bycontrast,thePESconceptshiftsthefinancialburdentotherecipientofacertainES.
Sincetheiremergence,PESprogramshavebeencategorizedinanumberofways:Thepaymentsthemselveshaveincludeduser-financedPESprogramsinwhichfundingcomeseitherfromserviceusers,suchasindividuals,companies,ornongovernmentalorganizations,orfromthirdparties,i.
e.
,government-financedprograms(Wunderetal.
2008).
Intermsoftheimplicationsthatthesehaveinlanduse,theliteraturedistinguishesbetweentwobroadcategoriesofland-diversionprograms:thoseinwhichlandsaredivertedfromagricultureorforestryorother1UnitedNationsUniversityInstituteofAdvancedStudies(UNU-IAS),2DepartmentofGeographicalSciences,UniversityofMaryland,CollegePark,3SustainabilityResearchInstitute,SchoolofEarthandEnvironment,UniversityofLeedsEcologyandSociety18(4):41http://www.
ecologyandsociety.
org/vol18/iss4/art41/suchextractiveusestootherusesandthoseinwhichagriculturalproductionactivitiesaremodifiedtoachieveenvironmentalobjectives,asinthecaseofworking-landprograms(Zilbermanetal.
2008).
AnothercategorizationofPESfocusesonresultsdeliveredbysuchsystems.
Themonitoringoftheseresultshasbeenbasedeitheroninputsthatfacilitatetheserviceprovisionorontheindicators,i.
e.
,outputs,asidentifiedfortheserviceitself(Zilbermanetal.
2008,ZabelandRoe2009).
PEScanalsobedistinguishedinpaymentsperlandunits,paymentsperserviceprovided,andpaymentsbasedonavoidedcoststorestoretheESinquestion.
However,frequently,PESschemesdonotpaydirectlyforquantifiedenvironmentalservices,butinsteadforthelandusesorinputsthatprovidetheseservicesbyproxy(Wunder2007,Quinteroetal.
2009).
TheconceptofpayingfortheprovisionofESsisnotentirelynew;therearewell-establishedprecursorssuchasdebtfornatureswapsandconservationeasements.
Agri-environmentalpoliciesintheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanUnion(EU)havehistoricallypromotedPESprogramsthataimedtoreducethenegativeexternalitiesarisingfromagriculturalproductionwhileprovidingpublicsubsidiestofarmers(Baylisetal.
2008).
Indevelopingcountries,manyPESprograms,especiallyinpoorercountries,bringtogetherfarmersandinternationalaidagenciesseekingadoubledividend,i.
e.
,theprovisionofESsalongsidepovertyalleviation.
Subsequently,theseagencieshaveincreasinglyconsideredusingPESprogramsasawayofmeetingsocialandenvironmentalobjectives(Bulteetal.
2008).
However,criticismremainsstrongregardingtheabilityofPEStocreatesuchdoublewins,forexample,becauseofthelimitedscopeoftheservicespaidfor(RedfordandAdams2009)orbecausePESmightevencausetheoppositeofwhatwasintended(Vatn2010).
Atleastintheory,PESprogramshavethepotentialtomakecontributionstonaturalresourcemanagementandtosustainingrurallivelihoods.
Withasimilarthematicorientation,thePPPhasbeenpartoftheenvironmentaldiscoursesinceatleastthe1950sand,inparticular,hasbeenpromotedbytheOrganisationforEconomicCo-OperationandDevelopment(OECD)andindividualmemberstatessincethe1970s(OECD1972,Frsund1975).
ThePPPwasunderstoodasacost-allocationprincipleaccordingtowhichthepollutershouldbeartheexpensesofcarryingoutpollutionpreventionandcontrolmeasuresasdecidedbypublicauthoritiestoprotecttheenvironment(Frsund1975),anditwasalsoapplied,basedonitsdefinition,tocasesinwhichenvironmentaldamageoccurred.
TheinterpretationandtheimplementationofthePPPinindustrializedcountrieshavealsobeenextensivelydiscussedinrelationtoagriculturalactivitiesandtheeffectsoftheseontheenvironment(e.
g.
,Baldock1992,Seymouretal.
1992).
Inwhatarenowdiverseandfast-changingruralenvironments,thereisincreasinglyaneedforESmanagementregimesthattakemultiplestakeholderviewsintoconsideration,e.
g.
,theEuropeanWaterFrameworkDirectiveandtheAarhusConvention.
Anumberofthesestakeholdershavebeenalternativelydescribedasproperty-rightsholdersbecauseoftherightsthateachstakeholderhastodifferentESs(SchlagerandOstrom1992,Ostrom2000).
SchlagerandOstrom(1992)discusstheserightsbybeginningwithananalysisofthedistributionofbothrightsandcosts.
However,theyalsoemphasizethroughoutthat"allrightshavecomplementarydutiesandthattopossessarightimpliesthatsomeoneelsewillhaveacommensuratedutytoobservethisright"(SchlagerandOstrom1992:250).
OuraimistodetermineiftherehasinfactbeenaparadigmshiftfromthePPPtowardthemoreprecautionary,butofteninsufficientlymonitored,PESapproach(Pattanayaketal.
2010),wherebytheprovidersofESsgetfinancialincentivesfortheseservices,i.
e.
,followingtheprovider-getsprinciple(Hanleyetal.
1998,Hodge2000).
WecomparePESwiththePPPinsituationswherelegalframeworksaremissing,badlyformulated,orbadlyenforcedtoprovideinsightsintotheirdifferingoutcomes.
Finally,weaddressfouradditionalcriticalissuesthatPESprogramsarefacingintheirimplementation.
TheyconcernthenecessarycoexistenceofPESwithbasicrightsandlegalobligationsthatsitalongsidediversemotivationsandsometimesinappropriateclaimsofESproviders.
DISTRIBUTIONOFRIGHTSANDDUTIES,COSTSANDBENEFITSEfficientallocationandPESImportantly,thedistributionofrights,andassociatedduties,andcostsisacentralbutfrequentlyoverlookedaspectofPES.
BylookingcloserattheworkofCoase(1960),itcanbeshownthatPESprogramsfocusontheeconomicallyefficientallocationofresources.
Coase(1960,1987)arguedthattransactioncosts,suchasnegotiating,monitoring,andenforcement,constituteanirrevocableelementofeconomicrealityand,thus,mustbeincludedineconomicanalysis.
However,hisworkhasalsobeeninterpretedassuggestingthatmanyoftheproblemscausedbymarketfailurethroughexternalities,includingenvironmentalones,couldbeovercomebyusingeffectivelegalstructuresalongsidewell-definedandenforceablepropertyrightsthatwouldthusencouragevoluntarycontracts(Coase1987).
Theseargumentsapplymostreadilytothosecasesinwhichtransactioncostsarelowandinformationisreadilyavailable.
ThisoriginalCoasianapproachimpliedahierarchysimilartothethree-stageapproachassuggestedbyauthorssuchasDaly(1992)andCostanzaetal.
(1997),namely,thefollowing:(1)establishinganecologicallysustainablescale;(2)establishingasociallyfairandjustdistributionofresourcesusingsystemsofpropertyrightsandtransfers;and(3)oncescaleandEcologyandSociety18(4):41http://www.
ecologyandsociety.
org/vol18/iss4/art41/distributionissuesareresolved,theapplicationofamarket-basedmechanismtoreallocateresourcesfromaneconomicefficiencyperspective.
ThesimilaritybetweenCoaseandCostanzaetal.
concernsinparticularthefirstandsecondstages,whicharefocusedonestablishingscalesthatarebothecologicallyeffectiveaswellasfairandjustintermsoftheirdistribution.
However,Coase'sexpressedopinionhasbeenpopularizedsomewhatdifferentlyinmakingtheargumentthatiftransactioncostsdonotexistoraresmallerthantheresultingbenefits,thennoregulationbeyondtheinitialdistributionofpropertyrightsisnecessary,withthedistributionofappropriatepropertyrightsconsideredsufficientandachievablethroughnegotiation.
ThisishowtheCoasetheoremisoftendescribed,despitethefactthatCoase(1987)believedthathisconclusionswerebeingmisinterpreted.
However,user-financedPESprogramsthatarenegotiatedareconsideredinaccordancewiththeCoasetheorem(Pagiolaetal.
2008).
OtherauthorshavereferredtothesePESprogramsas"self-organized"(Perrot-MatreandDavis2001)or"private"(Wunder2005).
Engeletal.
(2008)havestatedthatuser-financedPESprogramsmaybemoreefficientthanthosethataregovernmentfinanced.
However,thesesameauthorsalsoconcedethat"thereareinstanceswheregovernment-financedprogramsmaybetheonlyoption"(Engeletal.
2008:667).
OtherconditionsforaCoasiansolutionincludeclearlydefinedpropertyrightsthatareenforcedwithlowtransactioncosts(PagiolaandPlatais2007).
Whenallofthesepreconditionshavebeenmet,anefficientorParetooptimalallocationissaidtohaveoccurredthroughnegotiationandmarkettransactionregardlessofwhoinitiallyownedthepropertyrights(PagiolaandPlatais2007).
Itshouldbenoted,however,thatfromthistheoreticalvantagepoint,PESdidnotinitiallyconsiderthesociallyfairdistributionofpropertyrights.
PESprogramsappeartofocusinsteadsimplyonalegallysounddefinitionofthoserightsthatshouldbeallocatedthroughthemarket.
Moreover,evenlessfocusseemstohavebeengiventowardlegallyeffectivestructuresthatestablishanecologicallysustainablescaleattheoutset.
Thus,therelationshipbetweenthisallocationapproachandthePPPrequiresfurtherdiscussion.
EfficientallocationandthePPPTodate,opinionstillvariesamongauthors(Glazyrinaetal.
2006,Fischhendler2007,Pannell2008)aboutthechoiceofthePPPandtheassociatedcostallocationsincomparisonwithotherprinciples,suchasthebeneficiary-paysorprovider-getsprinciples(Hanleyetal.
1998,Hodge2000).
However,thereappeartobenomajordifferencesbetweenthebeneficiary-paysprincipleandtheprovider-getsprinciplewhen,accordingtoPannell(2008),thegeneralpublicbesidesindividualsisalsothebeneficiary.
UnderthePPP,wherepropertyrightsareassignedtoconsumersofenvironmentalquality,andwhenthepolluterpaysenough,polluterscanmorethancompensatetheconsumersatcurrentmarketprices,withbothsaidtobe"betteroff.
"Oneexampleofthiswouldbeapollutingcompanythatpaysneighborsmorethanthemarketpricefortheirpropertytogetthemtomovesomewhereelse.
Thiscanbeseenasasimilarlynarrowproject-by-projectandmarket-basedviewsuchastheperspectivethatpredominateswithinPES(Norgaard2010,Vatn2010).
Thus,overalloutcomesmayormaynotbewithinecologicallimitsbecausethesewerenotpartoftheoveralldesign.
Theselimitsarealsonotachievablethroughindividualnegotiationsbecausethefocusofindividualsandtheirrespectivegoalsarebasedontheirfinancialinterestsandexistingdistributionofresources,money,andrights.
Thisisimportantbecausebothoftheapproaches,PESandthePPP,seemtobefocusedmoreonindividuallydrivenproject-by-projectefficiencyratherthanecologicallysustainablescalesorthesociallyfairdistributionofrights,atleastinthesenseofCostanzaetal.
(1997)andDaly(1992).
EcologicallysustainablescaleandinherentqualitiesofecosystemsTheconceptofecologicalsustainabilityisconcentratedonanecologicallysustainablescaleofthroughputofresourcesandenergyinsocioeconomicsystems(Boulding1966,Daly1992,Mauerhofer2008).
Ecologicalsustainability,therefore,dealswithsustainingenvironmentallimitsandiscloselyrelatedtocriticalnaturalcapital(CNC;Ekinsetal.
2003,Mauerhofer2008).
Farley(2008)notedthatCNCgeneratesbenefitsthatareessentialtohumanwelfarewithfew,ifany,substitutes.
If,astheESframeworksuggests,sustainabilityisultimatelydependentontheESsprovidedbynaturalcapital,thenenvironmentalmanagersmustmaintainviablestocksofnaturalcapitalthatmaintainviableESs(Hubaceketal.
2009).
Onlywhenconservationneedsaremetshouldtheremainingecosystemstructurebeavailabletosupplyanddemandandthepricemechanism:"Thusconservationneedsshouldbecomethedeterminantsofpriceandnotpricedetermined"(Farley2008:1406).
Therefore,conservationsciencehelpstodefineecologicallimits(Daly1992).
Wherethedefinitionsofsuchlimitsarenotpossible,thenatleastasafeminimumstandardshouldbeapplied(Ciriacy-Wantrup1952),withallocationofresourcestakingplacewithintheseboundaries(Mauerhofer2008).
Todate,thehumanuseofenvironmentalresourcesalreadyexceedsseveralenvironmentalboundaries(Rockstrmetal.
2009).
ThisexistingoverconsumptionmustthereforebetakenintoseriousconsiderationwhendefiningPESschemesorevenwhendecidingtograntapollutionpermitbasedonthePPP.
Evenwithintheseboundaries,pricesettingunderPESschemesorthePPPisverydifficulttoachieveandboundtomissimportantfactors,suchasinterdependencies,complexcausalinteractions,andinherentqualitiesofbiodiversityincludingecosystemfunctions.
Todate,theclearfocusofPESaswellasofthePPPhasnotconcentratedonthesequalitiesEcologyandSociety18(4):41http://www.
ecologyandsociety.
org/vol18/iss4/art41/butoneconomicallyefficientallocation.
EveninthecaseofthewidelycitedexampleofanearlyPESschemeinCostaRica,itscausalcontributioninstoppingorreducingfurtherdeforestationandrestoringanecologicallysustainablescaleremainsfarfromproven(Sánchez-Azofeifaetal.
2007,Danielsetal.
2010).
Pricesettingthroughmainstreammarginalvaluationhasbeenheavilycriticized(e.
g.
,O'NeillandSpash2000),andasanalternative,deliberativemethodshavebeencalledfor(Spash2008).
Thiscomesalongsidethecriticismthateconomicdecisionmakershaveuntilrecentdecadeslargelyignoredthenonmarketbenefitsprovidedbycriticalnaturalcapital(Farley2008).
RedfordandAdams(2009:785-786)refertotheinherentqualitiesofecosystemsandadvocatethat"inaworldofrelentlesspursuitofeconomiclogic,thereisariskthateconomicargumentsaboutservicesvaluedbyhumanswilloverwriteandoutweighnon-economicjustificationsforconservation,"andthat"thereisawidespreadbuterroneousassumptionthatecosystemservicesarenecessarilybenign.
Definitionsofecosystemservicescitepositivevaluesforhumansociety.
Onlycertainthingsinnaturearethereforeregardedasservices.
"Hence,inherentqualitiesofbiodiversity,includingecosystems,orcostsofthe"burdensome"naturalphenomenasuchasstormsorfloodsareoftennotincludedinsuchESevaluations.
Inaddition,seeminglynonbenignservicestohumanityshouldnotbeexcludedfromdecisionmakingregardingPESandthePPPbecausetheyalsohaveimportantecologicalfunctions.
DistributionaleffectsInadditiontoconservationgoals,bothPESandthePPPhavebeenwidelydiscussedinthecontextofpotentialandpracticalactionsaimedatasociallyfairandjustdistributionofresources(Coase1960,Daly1992,Costanzaetal.
1997).
Hanleyetal.
(1998),forexample,havepointedoutthatguidingprinciplessuchasthePPPmightbeviewedasdevicesreflectingsociety'sviewonthefairdistributionofincome;whereasFischhendler(2007:287)hashighlightedthatthe"PPPmayallowustousetheresourcemostefficiently,butmayalsoresultinaninequitabledistributionofthecostburden.
"Similartothisopinion,otherdivergingviewswithregardtodistributionalaspectsofPESalsooccur.
Thus,therearefrequentargumentsthatPESshouldalsoaimforsocialjusticeandpovertyreduction(Franco-Maassetal.
2008),whereasothersmaintainthattheprimefocusofPESshouldremainontheenvironmentratherthanonpovertyreduction(Bulteetal.
2008,Wunder2008,WunderandAlbán2008,Zilbermanetal.
2008).
Accordingtothelatterview,povertyreductioncanbeapositiveby-productofenvironmentalgoals.
ExamplesofthiscanbeseenintwoPESprogramsinEcuador,namely,thePimampiromunicipalwatershed-protectionschemeandthePROFAFORcarbon-sequestrationprogram(WunderandAlbán2008).
BothwererelativelyeffectiveintermsoftheirenvironmentalobjectivesandwereseentohaveimprovedthewelfareofPESrecipients,mostlythroughhigherincomes,althoughneitherschemehadtargetedpovertyalleviationorhadthisasanadditionalobjective(WunderandAlbán2008).
However,thisraisesethicalquestionsbecauseitcaninvolveutilizingtheadvantageoftheso-calledlowercostofconservationfoundinpoorercountrieswherelocalstakeholdersareonlycompensatedattheircurrentpovertylevel(Karsenty2007),leavingthemnobetteroffthantheywerebefore.
Evenwithinseveralalreadylong-establishedPESprograms,theredistributionofpropertyrightshasnotbeenimplementedinanadequateorsociallyjustmanner.
InCostaRica'sPagosdeServiciosAmbientalesPESprogram,largefarmsandforestownershavebeendisproportionatelyrepresentedamongprogramparticipants,therebyexcludingothermembersofsociety(ZbindenandLee2005).
SimilarobservationshavebeenmadeinChiapas,inMexico,wherethepoorestfarmersandwomenwereexcludedfromprojectdesignandimplementationinthetwocommunitiesthatwereinvolved,inthiscase,inaprojectforcarbon-sequestrationservicesthroughforests(Esteveetal.
2007).
Subsequently,thereisagrowingawarenessthatadministratorsofprojectsneedtoimprovetheircapacitytotargetpaymentswheretheyaremostneeded(SierraandRussman2006).
TheviewthatpovertyreductionshouldbeincludedintheformationofPESisgenerallybasedonanunderstandingthatmanyESsdohavethecharacterofapublicgoodforwhichpropertyrightshavenotbeenfullydefinedorallocated.
Moreover,destructionofESsthrough,forexample,deforestation,overgrazing,mining,andoverfishingareoftencarriedoutbythepoor.
Followingthislogic,Franco-Maassetal.
(2008)haveredefineddeliveryofESsasservicessuppliedbythelocalpopulationfortheprotectionofcommongoods.
Accordingtotheseauthors,"Contributingtolocaldevelopmentbypayingfornaturalresourceconservationandprotectionservicesthereforeimpliesmoreequityintermsofremunerationbecausewhatisbeingpaidforisnotonlytherighttouseaprivategood,butalsotheworkdonebythecommunityforthepreservationofacommongood"(Franco-Maassetal.
2008:24).
However,asalreadybrieflymentioned,anumberofauthorsclaimthatifPESprogramsattemptedtosolvebothpovertyandenvironmentalproblems,thismightreducetheirefficiencyinmeetingeitheroftheobjectives.
Thus,thoseauthorsarguethatPESshouldfocusonlyontheprotectionoftheESsforwhichPESprogramswerecreated(Bulteetal.
2008,Wunder2008,Zilbermanetal.
2008),butwiththehopethatsocialgoalsmightbeachievedasapositiveexternality.
Insummary,therearetwodirectionswithregardtoPESandsocialgoals.
BothrecognizethedualnatureofPES:Onegroupfocusesonenvironmentalaspects,whereastheotherarguesthatdespitetheirprimaryfunctiontomaintainorrestorebiodiversity,PESprogramsshouldbeusedasinstrumentsforasociallyandfair(re)distributionofnaturalcapital.
ThislatterviewemphasizestheneedforalegalframeworktoadequatelyEcologyandSociety18(4):41http://www.
ecologyandsociety.
org/vol18/iss4/art41/integratethesedistributionalsocialissues.
Withthisinmind,wediscusstheinterplaybetweenPPPandPESinalegalframework.
Byexaminingthreenotableexamples,itcanbeseenthatinadequaciesinthelegalframeworkhavereducedtheeffectivenessofPPPandcontributedtothepotentialofPES.
INTERPLAYOFPESANDTHEPPPWITHTHELEGALFRAMEWORKItiswidelyrecognizedthathavingtherightlegalandinstitutionalstructuresinplace(Coase1960)constitutesapreconditionforproperlyworkingPESprograms(Phametal.
2008,Brneretal.
2010,Muradianetal.
2010).
Moreover,theriseofPESschemeshasbeenpartlydrivenbyperceivedandrealproblemsofthePPPinthelegalcontext.
ReasonsforapplyingPESinsteadofthePPPThreereasonsforapplyingPESinsteadofthePPPcanbeidentifiedasfollows:First,abasicreasonisthesituationinwhichnoappropriateregulationsareinplacetoindicateanydutyonthepartofthepolluter.
Examplesofsuchomissionsintheregulatorysystemincludealackofregulationsintroducinglimitstoenvironmentallydestructivenaturalresourcemanagementand,inthecaseofbreakingthoselimits,asanctionsystem,includingfinancialsanctionsorrestrictionstoactivities.
Despitethis,however,simplePESsystemsarestillpossibleevenifsolelyshapedbythedistributionofpowerbetweenthebeneficiaryandserviceprovider.
ThesecondreasonfortheineffectivenessofthePPPinenvironmentalprotectionisfoundinthosesituationsinwhichexistingregulationsarenotdeemed,especiallybytherecipientsofESs,tobesufficientlythoughtthrough.
EvenwhenrecipientsdonothavethepoliticalpowertochangetheregulationstoamorePPP-orientedsystem,theymaystillhavethefinancialpowertoofferthe"polluters"financialincentivesviaPEStobelessenvironmentallydestructive.
AthirdreasonforapplyingPESinsteadofthePPPisthatPESsystemsalsohavethebenefitofofferingincentivesforthebestenvironmentalpractice,especiallyinsituationsinwhichexisting,evenwell-formulated,regulationsarenotenforcedatall.
Thisistypicalforthoseregionsthatlacksufficientenvironmentalgovernanceandthathavehighlevelsofcorruption(Engeletal.
2008).
RecipientsofESs,iftheyarefinanciallypotentenough,couldtryinthissituationtoconvince"polluters"bymeansofPEStoreduceorchangetheirenvironmentallyharmfulactivities.
Thus,itcanbeseenthateventhoughthethreePPPsituationsdescribedlackedtheessentiallegalframeworkconditionsfortheirimplementation,theydidprovideanicheforPEStoevolve,albeitimperfectly,intheirplace.
Inmostofthelesseconomicallydevelopedandnewlyindustrializedcountries,thethreesituationscanbefoundtopartiallyorcompletelyoverlap.
Insuchsettings,command-and-controlapproachestoenvironmentalprotectionaregenerallyhamperedbyweakgovernance,hightransactioncosts,andinformationproblemsassociatedwiththedesignofeffectiverulesonnaturalresourceuse,monitoring,andenforcement(BalandandPlatteau1996).
However,evenasinglechangeinthedistributionofrightsandbenefits,iffullyimplementedthroughawell-balancedcommand-and-controlapproach,canfostertheprovisionofESsandreducepovertyandsocialconflictsevenwithoutcomplementaryPES.
Thiswasshown,forexample,inNepal'sCommunityForestProgram(Devkota2005),whichhelpedovercomeinsufficientprotectionenforcementoflocalauthority-ownedforestsbydistributinguserrightsandmonitoringdutiestolocalCommunityForestGroupsunderspecifiedconditionslaiddownbythegovernment.
However,monitoringandenforcementdonotnecessarilydependonlegalprovisionsbutcanalsobeimplementedamongprivatestakeholders.
MonitoringandenforcementCurrently,underthePPPapproach,resourceuserscanbefinedtoprovidecompensationfordamagethattheyhavedonetoecosystemsandtheservicestheyprovide.
Thiswouldbethecasewhenastandardhasclearlybeenexceeded,providedthatthepolluterwhohasviolatedthethresholdcanbeidentified.
Thisisonlyeffectiveifthedamageiscompensableatallandallthepollutershavesufficientmoneytopaythefines.
Therefore,thePPPapproachonlyworksifanumberofconditionsaremet,andtheseincludethatenvironmentalthresholdsareclearlyset;whenthresholdsareexceeded,thepollutersareidentified;and,whereliable,pollutersareabletopay,ifthepaymentisenforcedatallandispunitiveenoughtoactasadeterrent.
Ifthepaymentsandpunishmentsarenotpunitive,thepolluterwillcontinuetopolluteifthisis"financiallyaffordable"andtheeconomicbenefitsofdoingsoarehigherthanthefineimposed.
Incomparison,sanctionsconsistingofprisonsentencesareusuallymoredauntingandarethereforeappliedtomoreseriousoffenses.
However,fromanenvironmentalpointofview,thesanctionsystemmaystillnotbeeffectivebecausethecompensationmightnotbesufficienttoprotectorrestorethequalityoftheecosystemsinquestion(see,e.
g.
,Moreno-Mateosetal.
2012).
Regardlessofwhetherthepolluterpaysortheproviderreceives,monitoringandenforcementareessentialtoensurethatconditionsaremet.
InPESsituations,programmanagersrequirereliablemonitoringdatatomakeinformedpaymentdecisions,andthisincludeswithholdingpaymentsfromlandownerswhodonotmeettheagreedconservationobjectives(Honey-Rosésetal.
2009).
IftheprovisionofthisisnotsecuredbyacontractcoveringthePES,thentheprovisionsofanenforceablelegalframeworkcouldalsoadequatelycoverthis.
Withoutthisinformation,PESprogramshavefrequentlybeenfoundtooverpaynoncompliantparticipants(Honey-Rosésetal.
2009).
Forexample,Goldmanetal.
(2008)assessed34ESprojectsand26traditionalbiodiversity(BD)projectsandfoundthatEcologyandSociety18(4):41http://www.
ecologyandsociety.
org/vol18/iss4/art41/monitoringofconservationoutcomeshadbeensoinfrequentthatitwasimpossibletoassesstheeffectivenessofeitheroftheESorBDapproaches.
Inaddition,currentPESschemesfaceanumberofchallenges,namely,difficultiesevaluatingopportunitycostsandESdelivery,hightransactioncosts,andfurtherdifficultiesinensuringconditionality(Ghazouletal.
2009,Quinteroetal.
2009,ZabelandRoe2009).
Inanotherexample,inCostaRica,sincethelate1990s,paymentshavebeengiventoprivateforestownersinrecognitionoftheESstheirlandprovides.
However,becausePESprogramsweredistributedbroadlyacrossecologicalandsocioeconomicgradients,itwasfoundthatbetween1997and2000deforestationwasnotsignificantlyreducedinthoseareaswherelandownershadreceivedthepayments(Sánchez-Azofeifaetal.
2007).
Apartofthisistheimportanceofmonitoringandenforcement,whichisparticularlyrelevantiftheconditionshavenotbeenfulfilledandthePESalreadypaidthenneedtobereclaimed.
TheproblemofprovingthecausalityoflandmanagementandassociatedeffectsonESdeliveryalsoremains.
Amajorimpedimenttomonitoringthisisthefactthatthelinkbetweenactionandoutcomeisfrequentlydifficulttomakeinthatachangeinprovisioncouldbecausedbyachangeinbiophysicalfactors,e.
g.
,precipitation,temperature,andotherfactorsthatmaybebeyondthereachofthelandmanager.
PESschemeshavealsobeenfrequentlyintroducedinsituationswherethePPPprinciplewasthoughttoaddresscertaindamagebutwasnotfoundtobeeffectiveforseveralreasons,includingthoserelatedtoalackofmonitoringandenforcement,encouragingaparadigmshiftfromthePPPtothemoreprecautionaryPESapproach(Bulteetal.
2008).
AhigherlevelofprecautionisachievedwhenPESprogramsareintroducedtopreventharmtoecosystemsandtheservicestheyprovide.
Moreover,thesesituationsofPESintroductionareoftenespeciallydependentonaneffectivelegalframeworkensuringmonitoringandenforcement,whichremainscrucialformaintainingecologicalsustainability.
Restoration,PES,andthePPPTheroleofsanctionsandrelated,potentiallyinsufficient,compensationfortheprotectionorrestorationofecosystemqualityhasalreadybeenbrieflydiscussed.
Moreover,insomeinstances,farmerswhohaddestroyedprimaryforestsweregivenPEStoprovidetothebeneficiaryESsfromtheexistinglandusebasedonrestorationtowardasecondarylandcover.
InthecaseofBragantina,inthesoutheasternBrazilianAmazon,onlysuch"second-orderPES"werepossiblebecausetheprimaryforestecosystemfunctionshadalreadybeendestroyed(Brneretal.
2007).
Hence,pollutersreceived,afterthefirstshort-termbenefitfromthedestructionoftheforest,PESfrombeneficiariestopreventthemfromdoingevenmoredamage(Vatn2010)insteadofaskingthemtopaycompensationasrequiredunderthePPP.
ItisherethatPESactuallycontradictsthePPPinthecasethatthepriordestructionoftheprimaryforestisillegal.
Inpractice,mostrestorationsandattemptstosupplylostservicesthroughotherspeciesorecosystemcomponentshaveturnedouttobeexpensivefailures(EhrlichandMooney1983).
However,recently,severalattemptshavebeenmadetousePESforrestorationpurposes(SierraandRussman2006,Gutman2007,Blignautetal.
2008,Aronsonetal.
2010).
UndercurrentlegislativesystemsintheEU,PESlandholdershavenolong-termobligationtoletlandreverttonaturalecosystems(Mauerhofer2010).
Ifpaymentswereprovidedforrestoration,thiscouldatleastprovideincentivesforlandholderstorestorenaturalhabitats(SierraandRussman2006).
SubstantivelegaldifferencesbetweenPESandthePPPBasedonthethreereasonsdescribed,thesubstantialdifferencebetweenapaymentbythepolluter(PPP)andthereceiptofPESbytheprovideristhatinthePPP,thelegalframeworkconstitutesaninitialnecessitybecauseitstatesthedutyforthepollutertopay.
Anothersubstantialdifferencebetweenapaymentbythepolluter(PPP)andpaymentreceivedbytheprovider(PES)isthatfortheformer,thethresholdconditionasnotedpreviouslyneedstobemet,whereasthePESapproachdoesnotnecessarilyneedtofulfillsuchacondition,e.
g.
,voluntaryset-asideschemesinfarming.
Therefore,theiroutcomeintermsofconditionalitystillremainsuncertainunlessproofcanbeprovidedofanenvironmentalresult,athresholdkept,oraparticularbehavioraimingatabeneficialresult(Quinteroetal.
2009,ZabelandRoe2009).
Importantly,thedeterringeffectoffinancialfinesandothersanctionscancontributetothesuccessofthePPPthroughpreventionofdamagetoESs.
However,alimitationisthatpolluterscandecidetopolluteinanycaseiftheycanaffordtopaythefineinsituationsinwhichthisistheonlynegativesanctionandnoprisonsentenceisthreatening.
ThePESapproach,ontheotherhand,usestheprecautionaryprincipletoconditionallybindapotentialpollutertoacertainconstructivebehaviorordesiredoutcomethroughadditionalincentivestowardbuildingenvironmentalawareness.
Atpresent,PESschemescontinuetoemerge,partlydrivenbyanincreasingfocusonprecautionarypoliciesfosteredbyrecognitionofhumanrightsrelatedtobothwell-beingandtheenvironment.
TheemergenceofPEShasbeenenhancedbythefactthatcentralgovernmentpoliciesshowshortcomingsinpreventivelyimplementingthePPP.
Examplesoftheseshortcomingsincludealackofeffectivecommand-and-controlinstruments,alackofpublicrecognitionoftheimportanceofESs,andthebeliefinthesupremacyofmarket-basedapproaches.
Itis,however,importanttogobeyonddiscussingthelegalproblemsandfocusonthefourcriticalissuesinrelationtotheimplementationofPESinpractice.
EcologyandSociety18(4):41http://www.
ecologyandsociety.
org/vol18/iss4/art41/CRITICALISSUESFORTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFPESWehaveanalyzedthedifferencesbetweenPESandPPP,andtheinterplaybetweenlegalcontextsandtheoperationalizationofPESandthePPP.
Threesituationsinparticularhavebeenassessed:(1)ifnoregulationswereinplace,(2)ifexistingonesweredeemedtobeinsufficientlyformulated,and(3)wheresufficientregulationswerenotenforced.
However,evenwherenoneofthesesituationsoccur,othercriticalissuesstillremainwithPES,andthesecanbesummarizedasfollows:(1)thegeneralnecessityforPEStocoexistwithbasicrightsandlegalobligations;(2)theinappropriate,i.
e.
,lexicographic,claimsofanESprovider;(3)theinappropriateclaimsforpotentialdamages;and(4)therelationshipofPESwiththeintrinsicmotivationofserviceproviders.
PESincoexistencewithbasicrightsandlegalobligationsTheissueofbasicrightsisrepresentedbythesimplequestionofwhethersocietyhasthebasicrighttothenaturalcapitalofcleanairandcleanwaterorwhetheritshouldhavetopayfortheseasitdoesforanyothergoodorserviceAtleasttwocriticalissuesareinherentinthisquestion,butbecausetheyhavebeenextensivelydiscussedbyotherauthors,theyneedonlybebrieflymentioned.
Thefirstissuerelatestotheextentofbasichumanrightsinthesenseofneeds,butnotwants,regardingtheconsumptionofnaturalresources(WorldCommissiononEnvironmentandDevelopment1987,Alkire2002,Guha2006).
Theotherconcernsthenumberofhumansthattheworldcansustain(Ehrlichetal.
1989,EhrlichandEhrlich1990).
Patternsofconsumptionandhumansettlementarebothreciprocallyinterrelated,andcrucialtrade-offshavebecomeindispensable(see,e.
g.
,Tisdell2005,Colebyetal.
2012).
Asdiscussedearlier,theintroductionofPESwaspartlydrivenbyanincreasingfocusonpreventivepoliciesfosteredbyrecognitionofhumanrightsinmanagingbothhealthandtheenvironment.
ThisislikelytocontinuebecausethehumanrightsinpropertyandownershipcontinuetoplayadominantroleinPESschemes.
ThemainquestioniswhetherallESsthatprovideforbasichumanneeds,aswellasotherssuchaslife-supportingESs,shouldbepaidforbythepeoplewhoneedthemorwhethertheyareabasicright.
Usually,however,legalnormsaddressthequestionsofbasichumanrightsonaconstitutionallevel,providingobligationstofulfilltheserightsbystatesorotherpublicorprivatestakeholders.
Incomparison,issuesofotherobligationsthatPEShavetocoexistwithareusuallythoselegalobligationsmandatedbelowtheconstitutionallevelofhumanrights.
Currently,PESprogramsoftenoperateincontextsinwhichvariouscommand-and-controlregulationsalreadyexist(Engeletal.
2008),wherebymanyPESprogramspayforforestconservationincountrieswheredeforestationisalreadylegallyprohibited.
Inthesesituations,themoneyisbestusedincontributingtoenforcementofexistinglawsratherthansolelypayingPESforcompliance.
Otherwise,thePESsystemcanencouragenoncompliancewiththelegalframeworkandundermineitsimplementation.
Thus,financialsanctionsinthatframeworkwouldneedtobeincreasedto"compete"withPES.
Thiswillinfactbenecessarytopreventpoliticallyunwiseorperverseincentivesthataredifficulttoremoveoncelocalcommunitiescometodependonthem.
Complementaryapplicationsoffinancialconservationinstruments,whetherasvoluntaryormandatoryinstruments,canalsobeusefulwherethePEScan"bethoughtofasprovidingthecarrotthatmakesthestickofPPPregulationsmorepalatable"(Engeletal.
2008:669).
InappropriatelexicographicclaimsofanESproviderInappropriatelexicographicclaimsrefertospecificsituationsinwhichprovidersofESsraiseinappropriateclaimsforPES,knowingthattheESsareneeded.
Thissituationoccurs,forexample,innatureconservationprogramswhereanationalauthorityisobligedunderEUregulationstoconservesitesforcertainspeciesandhabitattypes(Mauerhofer2010).
ThisdutycanevenbeenforcedbytheEUagainstanEUmemberstatebymeansofcourtruling,suchastheEuropeanCourtofJustice.
Forsuchcases,thepossibilityforexpropriationoflandexistsinmanynationallegalframeworks,withorwithoutappropriatefinancialcompensationasdecidedbyexternaladjudicators.
Nevertheless,anationalorprivateauthoritymay,apartfromitslexicographicclaims,oftennothavethefinancialresourcestoofferappropriatefinancialcompensation.
Thiscanevenbevalidwithintheinternationalcommunity.
Forexample,theinternationalcommunitydidnotpayoutintheYasuníIshpingoTambocochaTiputinicase(Rival2010)whentheEcuadoriangovernmentclaimedcompensationforhalfoftheprospectiveoilrevenuesconsideredtobeobtainablefromexploitationoftheEcuadorianYasuníterritory.
ThisclaimwasmadeasapriceforleavingtheareauntouchedtoprovideESstoEcuadorandbeyond.
InappropriateclaimsforpotentialdamagesThepreviouspointiscloselyrelatedtothethirdissueinhighlightingthefocusofPESonpotentialdamages.
Itisofcrucialimportancetodistinguishpaymentstotheproviderforaproximatebehavior,i.
e.
,assumedtoleadtoESoutcomes,fortheprovisionofESs,i.
e.
,inthesenseof"conditionality,"andforincurredopportunitycosts.
ThisisofparticularsignificancewithinnatureconservationwherecompensationsrelatedtositedesignationoftenincludecompensationforopportunitycoststoanextentthatcouldmakeESsunaffordablebecauseanowneroftheESscouldclaimexcessiveopportunitycostsandthusevenaskforexorbitantintrinsicvaluesfromtheactivitythatwoulddiminishtheESsinquestion.
Colebyetal.
(2009)showthisinanexampleofcompensationpaymentsrequestedbysomeruralpropertyEcologyandSociety18(4):41http://www.
ecologyandsociety.
org/vol18/iss4/art41/ownersintheUnitedKingdomadjacenttowindfarms.
ThishasbeenthecaseinanumberofrenewableenergydevelopmentsintheUnitedKingdomandelsewherewhendisputesbetweenstakeholdersaremoreoftenbasedonaestheticsratherthanecology.
However,excessiveclaimsdonothavetobeacceptedinanywaywhenregulatorylimitsareprovidedforbyasoundlegalframeworkinwhichexpropriationisusedasameansofenforcingconservationtargets.
Evenweaklyenforcedregulationsareabletoreduceexpectedgainsfromnoncompliance,andindoingsocomplementPESprogramsbyincreasingincentivestoparticipate,andreducerequestsforpayment(WunderandAlbán2008).
Thisisofoverallimportance,especiallyif,andthisisoftenthecase,opportunitycostsarelargerthanthePEStobepaid(Karsenty2007,Kosoyetal.
2007).
OneexampleofamethodusedtoclarifyopportunitycostscanbefoundinIndonesia(Jacketal.
2009),whereaPESprogramonmitigationofsoilerosionfromcoffeeplantationsusedanauction-basedapproachtorevealprivateinformationonthepriceofthePES;however,whetherthisapproachisreallyadequaterequiresfurtherresearch.
Forexample,comparedwiththemaximumresultprovidedbyanauction,somecontingentvaluationanalysesundertakeninEcuadorandGuatemalaonpotentialPEShavefoundthattheminimumcompensationdemandedbyruralhouseholdswasfarfromuniform(Southgateetal.
2010).
Theopportunitycostsdependedinparticularonindividualstrategiesforraisingincomesanddealingwithlocalrisks(Southgateetal.
2010).
Thesethreecriticalissuesindicatethatthereisaclearneedforanunderlyinglegalframeworkpredetermininganecologicallysustainablescalealongsideasociallyjustdistribution.
ThishasbeenshownincountrieslikeBrazilwherePESsystemscouldnotsubstituteforlegalmeasures(Brneretal.
2010).
InBrazil,PESprogramsdependedonlegislationforbasicgovernancesystemstosecureeffectiverightsofexclusion,whichlandmanagersneededtobecomereliableserviceproviders.
Similarly,economicincentivesfortropicalforestmanagementandconservationhavesubsequentlyrevealedtheevolutionfrommarketincentivestoincreasingemphasisongovernanceandregulatoryincentives(Richards2007).
TheseincludedregulationstocreatePESmarkets,identifythevalueofpublicgoods,andsecurepropertyrights(Richards2007).
PES,localempowerment,andintrinsicmotivationOtherexamplesofexistingPESsystemscontinuetoindicateaneedformorelocalempowermentaswellasinstitutionalandorganizationalimprovements.
InCameroon,theimplementationofCleanDevelopmentMechanismprojectswithintwocommunityforestexamplesshowedthatcommunitycapacitywasgenerallyinsufficientformeaningfulparticipationandimplementationofPESprojects(Minangetal.
2007).
Similarly,inMexico,marketingforestcarbonwashamperedbyalackoforganizationalcapacityingovernmentandcivilsociety,whichwascompoundedbyuncertaintiesininternationalpoliciesandbetweenexistingcommonpropertyinstitutionsinruralareas(CorberaandBrown2008).
SuchalackofcapacityhasalsobeenfoundinruralCambodiawherethreePESprogramswerethoughttobemoresustainableiftheyempoweredlocalinstitutions(Clementsetal.
2010).
TheseauthorsemphasizetheneedforPESprogramstoreinforceintrinsicmotivations.
Thismorealtruisticaimcan,ofcourse,somehowcontradictaPESprogramwithitsfocusoneconomicincentives.
CONCLUSIONSEcosystemservicesrepresentaparadigmshiftinenvironmentalpolicyfromtheperceivedfailure,ordislike,ofthetop-downcommand-and-controlpoliciesofthe1960sto1980s.
Subsequently,alongsidethevarioussubsidyschemes,theemergenceofmoremarket-drivenapproachescanbeobserved.
WehaveenteredaphaseinwhichmarketsforESsarebeingcreatedwiththeaimofencouragingownersoflandorpropertyrightstoprovideESsbybeingpaidforthem.
TheearlierdoctrineofthePPPhasincreasinglybeenreplacedby"provider-gets"principles,inwhichitisoftenthepublicthatindirectlypaysforenvironmentalbenefits.
Forexample,thepublicpayseitherthroughtaxreductionsorthroughhigherproductpricesifthePESdidnotpaypartlyorfullyfortheESbenefitsinquestion.
Alternatively,thesecostsincurredbythecompany,e.
g.
,awatercompanypayingsubstantialamountsofmoneytofarmersforlessintensivefarmingpractices,couldleadtoareductionofshareholdervalueandcouldthusconstituteacost.
Inthissituation,aredistributionofpropertyrightstakesplacefromthepublictotheprovideroftheES.
Morerecently,thedebatehaswidenedtoquestionthemarketphilosophyofPESbasedonnotionsoflegitimacy,justice,andempowerment.
Therefore,itisimportanttolooknotonlyathowproperty-rightsownerscanbegivenincentivetoprovideESsbutalsoathowinpayingforsuchservicesthelistofpropertyrightshasbeenextendedfromownershipofnaturalresourcestovitalpublicgoods.
Inresponsetothis,aprocessisneededthatattemptstointegratetheseconcernsmorefully,onethatconsidersthesocial,economic,andpolitical-culturalcontextsofESsandthedistributionaleffectsthatPEScancause.
DifferentstakeholdersarelikelytovalueESsinvariousways,whichmayvaryindifferentcontexts,andthusthereisaneedtoemphasizetheimportanceofstakeholderperceptions(Colebyetal.
2009)andtheirpropertyrights,aswellasidentifyinstitutionsforthemanagementofESs.
This,inturn,highlightstheneedforparticipatoryapproachesandgreaterdecentralizationofcontroloverESmanagement.
FromthepracticeofthePPPandPES,itcanbeseenthataparadigmshifthastakenplacefromthePPPtowardthemoreprecautionary,butalsooftenmorepoorlymonitoredandEcologyandSociety18(4):41http://www.
ecologyandsociety.
org/vol18/iss4/art41/enforced,andmainlyallocation-focusedPESapproachinwhichprovidersreceivemoneyinexchangeforESs.
ThedecisiontomovefromthePPPtoPESis,inparticularinlesseconomicallydevelopedcountries,drivenbythelowerfeasibilityofpracticalenforcementofthePPP.
Thishasbeenbecauseofthepoliticalinfluenceofpolluters,theabsenceofpollutersintheareaspollutedbythem,andalackofcausalevidenceneededtostopthem.
ThetransitionfromPPPtoPEShasalsobeenmoreinfluencedinthiswaybynotionsofinter-andintragenerationalequitybetweensmall-scalepotentialpollutersinlesseconomicallydevelopedcountriesandexistinglarge-scalepollutersinmoreeconomicallydevelopedcountries;indeedtheauthorsowethisthoughttooneoftheanonymousreviewersofthejournal.
Inthissense,astrongerfocusofPESinthefuturetowardmoresociallyfairredistributioncanbeconsideredanexpressionoftheprincipleofcommonbutdifferentiatedresponsibility(e.
g.
,Mauerhofer2008).
PEScouldsatisfyboththegoalsofconservationandpovertyalleviation,andnowthisdualobjectiveinPESisgrowingbothinpopularityandimportance.
Therefore,PES,similartothePPP,willrequirestrengthenedformalgovernance,includingalegalframeworkwitheffectiveenforcementandmonitoring.
Inaddition,lessformalizedgovernancemeasuresthatdealwithbuildingcapacityandraisingawarenessneedtobeimplementedonappropriategeographicscales.
Inthisway,theESspaidforarethenprovided,whichmeansthatPESprogramobjectivescanbemetintermsofconservationofnaturalresourcesandbiodiversityandcanempowerthecommunityasastakeholder.
Moreover,asolelyvoluntaryapproachtoPESwillnotbeenoughtoconserveESsthatarepublicgoodsbecauseofthecriticalissuesofbasicrightstocleanwaterandmore,differinglexicographicclaimsandinappropriateopportunitycosts.
Finally,itisbecauseoftheseobstaclesthatPESshouldnotbeseenasthesoleinstrumenttoensureconservationofESs,butratherasacomplementarytooltotheproperlyenforcedandmonitoredPPPalongsideincreasedpublicawarenessandstrongerintrinsicmotivationsonbehalfoftheenvironment.
Responsestothisarticlecanbereadonlineat:http://www.
ecologyandsociety.
org/issues/responses.
php/6025Acknowledgments:TheauthorsaregratefultoChristinaPrellandthreeanonymousreviewersfortheirhelpfulcommentsonearlierpartsofthepaper,aswellasNicholasOuelletteforcheckingtheEnglish.
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