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DT-IPR:DRAFTOFPOTENTIALPRINCIPLESANDREQUIREMENTSFOROWNEROFIANATRADEMARKSANDDOMAINNAMESDT-IPRhasbeendiscussingpotentialprinciplesandrequirementsforthepost-transitionowneroftheIANATrademarksandDomainNames.
ThisisadiscussiondraftthatreflectstheDT'sprogress.
ThereareseveralitemswherechoicesarepresentedfortheCWG'sdiscussionandresolution.
I.
PrinciplesandRequirementsforthePost-TransitionOwnerofboththeIANATrademarksandDomainNames1.
TheOwnermustbe"neutral.
"Thismeanseither:a.
Structuralneutrality:theOwnermaynothaveanystructuraltietoanyoperationalcommunitytotheexclusionofanyother.
(Thatis,ifthereisastructuraltietoanyoperationalcommunity,theremustbeanequivalenttietoeachoftheotheroperationalcommunities.
Alternatively,theOwnercouldhavenostructuraltiestoanyoperationalcommunity.
);ORb.
Functionalneutrality:theOwnermustoperatesuchthateffectivecontroloveritsactionswithrespecttotheIANAIPRisnotdominatedorsteeredbyanyoftheoperationalcommunitiestotheexclusionofanyother.
(Thatis,eachcommunitymusthaveapproximatelythesamefunctionalrelationshiptotheOwner.
)c.
Ineithercase,neutralityalsoimpliesthattheIFOcannotbetheowneroftheIANAtrademarksanddomainnames.
Decisionneeded:whattypeofneutralitydoestheCWGrequireThesearepresentedasstrictalternatives,buttheymaybepointsinaspectrum.
Consequences:achoiceforstructuralneutralitylikelyimpliesthatanewtrustwillberequired.
12.
TheOwnerwilltaketheformofaTrust,2either:a.
AnewlyformedTrust;ORb.
TheIETFTrust.
33.
TherelationshipofthenamescommunitytotheOwnerwillbedictatedbythetypeof"neutrality"thenamescommunityrequires.
IntheTrustcontextthismeans,asapracticalmatter4:1AndrewSullivanoftheIETFhasinformedusthathebelievestheIETFTrustwillnotchangeitsstructure.
2Alternatively,thenewOwnercouldbeanon-Trustentity,suchasacorporation.
However,theTrustistheformthathasbeenconsidered,asitbestreflectstheintendedrelationshipoftheOwnertotheIPRassets(i.
e.
,thattheIPRisbeingheldintrustfortheInternetcommunity).
3TheIETFTrustistheonlycurrentlyproposedownerandisacceptabletotheprotocolsandnumberscommunities.
2a.
ThenamescommunitywouldjointheotheroperationalcommunitiesinformingaTrustandeachwouldappointaTrustee(orTrustees)oftheTrustandtherebyhaveitsinterestsdirectlyrepresentedinTrustdecisions.
Presumably,allthreecommunitieswouldalsobenamedasbeneficiariesoftheTrust;ORb.
ThenamescommunityhasacontractualrelationshiptotheTrust,whichcouldincludeanadvisoryboardtoprovideadvicetotheTrustonmattersrelatingtotheIANAIPR.
i.
Onesuchsamplecontractualrelationshipisdescribedathttp://mm.
icann.
org/pipermail/cwg-stewardship/2015-October/004449.
htmlandthelinksfromthatmessage.
Itincludesacontractualmechanism,withdecisionsinformedbyanadvisoryboard.
ii.
InthecaseoftheIETFTrust,thenamescommunitywouldnotappointanyTrusteesandwouldnotbeabeneficiaryoftheTrust.
Instead,theIETFwouldcontinuetoappointallTrusteesandtheIETFwouldremainthesolebeneficiaryoftheTrust.
iii.
Presumably,thenumberscommunitywouldhaveaparallelrelationshiptotheTrust.
InthecaseoftheIETFTrust,itisunclearhowthiswouldworkfortheprotocolscommunity,takingintoaccounttheirexistingrelationshiptotheIETFTrust.
Decisionneeded:WhichrelationshipformwillthenamescommunityrequireConsequences:Asapracticalmatter,(a)meansthatanewTrustislikelytobeneeded,anditsnatureandtermsmustbeworkedoutwiththeotheroperationalcommunities.
54.
TheOwnermustmeettherequirementsoftheICANNBoardstatementassetforthinitsAugust15,20156statementrelatingtoneutrality:"ICANNispreparedtotransferfullownershipoftheIANA-relatedtrademarkstoaneutralthirdpartymutuallyagreedamongtheoperationalcommunities.
"i.
Wedon'tknowwhethertheBoardwouldaccepttheoperationalcommunities'determinationthataproposednewOwnerisa"neutralthirdparty,"orwouldmakeitsowndetermination.
5.
TheOwnermustberesponsive,responsibleandaccountabletothethreecommunities.
4WehavenotconsideredscenarioswherethecommunitysimplyacceptstheTrustdecisionswithoutanydirectinfluenceorwheretheIETFTrustdocumentsneedtobemodifiedinanysubstantialway.
Theseeachseemtopresentsufficientpoliticaldifficultiesthattheyarepresumablynotliveoptions.
5SettingupanewTrustwouldrequireaninitialinvestmentoftimeandeffortlikelytobegreaterthanusingtheIETFTrust.
Trustdocumentswouldneedtobedrafted,trusteesandbeneficiariesidentifiedandtheentitywouldneedtobeoperationalized.
Ontheotherhand,separateagreementswiththecommunitieswouldlikelynotberequired,sincetherelevantissueswouldbedealtwithinthenewTrustdocuments.
ICANNlegalhasbeenaskedtoprovideanestimateoftimeandcostsassociatedwithsettingupanewTrust.
6https://www.
icann.
org/news/announcement-2015-08-15-en.
3a.
HowresponsivedoestheOwnerneedtobeb.
HowmuchinfluenceshouldthethreeoperationalcommunitieshaveovertheactionsoftheOwnerc.
HowshouldtheOwnerbeaccountableto,andbeheldaccountableby,thenamescommunityandtheotheroperationalcommunities6.
Ownermusthavenecessaryfundingtocarryouttheseresponsibilities.
Decisionneeded:ShouldtheIPRbetransferredtotheOwneralongwithsufficientfundingtocoversomeorallofthecostsassociatedwithownership(qualitycontrol,policing&enforcement,maintenanceofregistrations),atleastforasetperiodoftimeAlternatively,shouldtheoperationalcommunitiesprovideongoingfundingtotheOwner(intheformofpre-agreedpaymentsorperiodicroyaltypayments)OrshouldtheOwnerberesponsibleforallsuchcosts7.
Ownermustbepreparedtofacilitateseparationifrequestedbyanyoperationalcommunity(seeSectionIIbelowfordetails).
8.
Sidleycitedseveraldisadvantages(aswellassomeadvantages)inconnectionwiththeuseofaTrustgenerally,andtheIETFTrustspecifically,initsmemoofAugust4,2015.
7TheCWGshouldreviewtheseconcernsanddeterminehowSidley'sadviceinfluencesanydecisionsbytheCWGtoproceed.
Theseconcernsinclude:8a.
TrustmustexertcontroloverthequalityofservicesdistributedundertheIANAIPR,eitherdirectly,orbydesignatingathirdpartytodosoonitsbehalf.
b.
ThecurrentbeneficiaryoftheIETFTrustistheIETFitself;thecommunitymaywantabroadermultistakeholderorganizationorassociation,or"thecommunity"asthebeneficiary.
c.
TherewouldneedtobesafeguardsagainsttransferoftheIANAIPRbytheIETFTrust,andspecificinstructionsregardingdispositionoftheIANAIPRintheeventofdissolutionoftheTrust.
d.
TrustwillneedtolicensetheIPRtoPTI.
e.
AgreementsmustbeenteredintoreflectingthedutiesandresponsibilitiesofthetrusteeswithrespecttotheIANAIPR.
7https://community.
icann.
org/download/attachments/52891634/Memo_IPR_4Aug.
pdfversion=1&modificationDate=1438956502000&api=v28NotethatthisisasummaryofSidley'sadvice,whichhasnotbeenreviewedbySidley.
NotealsothatSidley'sadvicecontemplatedamendingtheIETFTrustdocuments,whichappearstobeunrealistic;therefore,thesummarydoesnotrefertowhethersafeguardswouldbeimplementedthroughtheTrustdocumentsorbyagreement(s).
4f.
Agreementsshouldprovidefortheimmediatetransferoftitleawayfromthetrust,ifthetrusteebreachesitsdutieswithrespecttotheIANAIPR.
Thesewillbeveryimportantcommitmentsfromthetrusttothemultistakeholdercommunity,andwillneedtobeclearthatthetrusteeswilltakedirectionfromthecommunity.
g.
Considerationwillneedtobegivenastothetaxattributesofthetrust.
h.
FromtheperspectiveoftheUSPTO,9theIETFTrustisnotaseparatelegalentityandthetrusteesoftheIETFTrustcollectivelyowntheIANAIPR.
USPTOrecordsneedtobeupdatedasTrusteeschange.
i.
Ifnon-UStrademarkregistrationsarerequiredinforeignjurisdictions,thetrustmaynotberecognizedasalegalentity.
II.
PrinciplesandrequirementsoftheOwnerintheeventofseparation1.
Ownermustnotcreaterisktocontinuedoperations,stabilityandsecurityoftheIANAfunctionsintheeventofseparation.
2.
OwnermustfollowthedirectionsofthecommunityorcommunitiesinitiatingseparationtotheextentthoseinstructionsarecompatiblewiththeOwner'sresponsibilitiesandobligations.
3.
ClearguidelinesmustbeinplacesothatOwnercancomplywithordersfromoperationalcommunitiesincaseofseparationandrequiredtransferoflicenses(orterminationandgrantofnewlicenses).
a.
ThiscouldbeoperationalizedthroughcontractandbylawrequirementsaswellastheTrustdocumentitself.
4.
SeealsoSidleycommentsinrelationtoseparationandTrustdocumentationintheAugust4memo.
5.
SeealsodiscussionofspecificconsiderationsfordomainsandtrademarksinSectionsIVandVbelow.
6.
Question:HowtobalancetheOwner'sobligationasatrademarkownertoreviewandapprove(orreject)anynewlicenseewiththeoperationalcommunity'srighttochoosethenewlicensee(IFO)oftheirchoiceIII.
PrinciplesandrequirementsintheeventthatdisputesarisewiththeOwnerorbetweenoperationalcommunities1.
Thenamescommunity(andtheotheroperationalcommunities)shouldhaveaprocessormechanismtoresolveanydisputeswiththeOwner.
a.
Afairlystraightforwardprocedurecanbeadoptedtoaddressthesedisputes,usingtheStewardshipandAccountabilitygroups'escalationproceduresasinspiration.
9USPatentandTrademarkOffice.
5i.
Theseshouldbesimple.
ii.
ThisisnotaUDRP/IRPtypeprocedure.
iii.
Emphasisshouldbeondiscussionandresolution.
iv.
AnAdvisoryBoardcomposedofallthreecommunitiescouldbeasignificantpartofanyDRP.
v.
ThiscanbeimplementedaspartofthetransferoftheIPR.
Potentially,itcouldalsobeimplementedlaterintheprocess.
2.
ThereshouldalsobeaprocessormechanismtoresolveanydisputesbetweentheoperationalcommunitiesrelatingtotheIANAIPR.
3.
PotentialRemediesa.
MovingtheIANAIPRtoanewOwner("Divestiture")isapotentialultimateremedyi.
Thisshouldnotbeanoptionindisputesamongtheoperationalcommunities,onlyindisputesbetweentheOwnerandtheoperationalcommunities.
ii.
Thisisintendedtobeastable,long-termrelationship.
ThereshouldbeahighbartodivestingtheIPRfromtheOwner.
iii.
AnynewOwneroftheIANAIPRshouldbeapprovedbyallthreeoperationalcommunities,oratleastsubjecttoavetoundercertaincircumstances.
DecisionsNeeded:Should"divestiture"oftheIANAIPRbeanoptionintheeventofadisputebetweentheOwnerandthecommunitiesIfso,underwhatcircumstancesShoulddivestiturebeanoptionwherethereisadisputebetweenonlyoneoperationalcommunityandtheOwnerShoulddivestiturerequiretheapprovalofatleasttwo,orevenallthreeOCsIftheOwneristheIETFTrust,shouldtheprotocolscommunitybeabletoblockadivestitureConsequence:IfdivestitureoftheIANAIPRisnotanoption,thenthenextOwneroftheIANAIPRwillbetheownerinperpetuityunlesstheOwneragreestotransfertheIANAIPRtoathirdparty.
IV.
ProposedPrinciplesandRequirementsRelatingtoiana.
org1.
Theongoingstabilityofiana.
org10isofparamountimportance(becauseofitsdirectoperationalrelevance).
2.
Theregistrationmustbeheldby(inDNSregistryterms,theregistrantmustbe)theOwner.
(Thisiswhatitmeansto"own"adomainname,sincetheyareinfactonlyregistrations.
)3.
Atthetimeoftransition,thetechnicalandoperationalcontrolofthedomain(inDNSregistryterms,thetechnicalcontact)mustremainwithICANN.
10iana.
comandiana.
netwillalsobetransferredtotheOwner,butthesemerelyredirecttoiana.
org.
64.
Theregistrartobeusedmustprovidecontrolssuchthatthetechnicalcontactcannotbechangedbytheregistrantwithoutthetechnicalcontactbeingawareofthatchange.
5.
Theregistrartobeusedmustprovidecontrolssuchthattechnicalchangestothedomain'sdelegationcanbemadebythetechnicalcontactwithoutapprovalby,butwithnoticeto,theregistrant.
6.
ICANNmaymakeanyoperationalarrangementsitlikesintermsoftheoperationoftheiana.
orgname.
Itistobeanticipatedthat,forpracticalpurposes,ICANNwillhaveitsPTIaffiliateperformtheday-to-dayoperationofthedomain.
7.
Untilchangescontemplatedbelowareagreed,theoperationoftheiana.
orgdomainmustremainfunctionallystable.
a.
"Functionallystable"meanstoprovidethesamefeaturesandURIsasareavailablefromtheiana.
orgsiteasofthetransition.
Normaloperationaladjustments(suchassoftwareupgrades,bugfixes,networkrenumberingandsoon)arenottoberestrictedbythisprovision.
8.
Intheeventofseparation,itisnotpossibleformultipleIANAfunctionsoperatorstooperatethesamedomainatthesametime.
Therefore,inordertoarrangeforthefuturepossibilityofmultipleIANAfunctionsoperators,thetransferofiana.
orgtothenewOwnermustincludeastatementofunderstandingbyICANNthatitwillco-operateincreatingseparate(internal)delegationsbelowiana.
orgtoaccommodatethedifferentoperationalcommunities.
(ThecreationoftheseparatedelegationswillnotitselfbepartofthetransferofIANA.
ORGtothenewowner.
)Itisexpectedthatthedetailsofnewarrangementsshallbeworkedoutamongtheoperationalcommunitieswithinnolongerthan$period(suggestion:oneyear).
9.
AnydisputeresolutionamonganyoftheOwnerandtheoperationalcommunitieswillfollowthesameoveralldisputeresolutionmechanismasanyotherIANAIPR,withtwooverridingcaveats:a.
thecontinuedoperationalstabilityofanyregistryhostedatiana.
orgisparamount;b.
however,noIFOmaycontinuetopublishregistriesatiana.
orgoranywherebeneathitwhentheauthoritativesourcefortheregistrydatahasinstructedthatsuchregistriesberemoved.
V.
ProposedPrinciplesandRequirementsRelatingtoIANAtrademarks.
1.
Thetrademarksmustnotbecomeinvalid,unenforceable,subjecttocancellationorsubjecttoclaimsofabandonmentor"genericide"asaresultofthetransferofthetrademarksortheOwner'sactionsorinactions.
2.
Asaresultofthetransition,therewillbealicensetoICANN(andeitheralicenseorsublicensetoPTI)astheIANAfunctionsoperator(s)fortheoperationalcommunities.
3.
TheOwnermustbecapableofcarryingouttheresponsibilitiesexpectedofatrademarkownerandlicensor,including:7j.
QualityControloverservicesofferedbylicensee(s)underIANAtrademarks,11withtheunderstandingthattheabilitytoterminateanIFOandlicensethemarkanddomain.
k.
TerminatingthelicenseandgrantingrightstoanewIFO(ifrequested[orapproved]byanoperationalcommunity)istheultimateformofqualitycontrol.
l.
QualityControloverhowtheIANAmarkisusedanddisplayedbylicensee(s).
m.
Policing&enforcementofusesofthetrademarksbyunauthorizedthirdparties.
n.
Maintenanceoftrademarkregistrations(andpotentiallyfilingadditionaltrademarkapplications).
2.
OwnershipandmanagementoftheIANAtrademarksisdifferentthanitwouldbeforanormalcommercialentity,inthatthetrademarksarebeingheldbytheOwnersolelytobelicensedexclusivelytotheIFO(orpotentially,oneormoreIFO's)forthenarrowfunctionsoftheaffectedoperationalcommunities.
Beyondthis,theOwnerwillnotexploitthetrademarkinthetraditionalsense,i.
e.
,theOwnerwillnotitselfprovideservicesundertheIANAtrademarks,norwillitlicensethetrademarkstothirdpartiesotherthantheIFO(orIFOs)(e.
g.
,thereshouldbenolicensesforproducts(apparel,electronicgoods,etc.
)orotherservices).
3.
TheOwnermusthaveexperienceinowningandmanagingtrademarks,butalsoexperiencewithissuesrelatingtotheInternet.
Employeesoradvisorsmayprovidesuchexperience.
a.
TheOwnermusthaveaccesstoemployee(s)withexperienceandtooutsidetrademarkcounsel.
4.
QualityControloverLicenseesa.
Atrademarkownerhasalegalobligationtoexercisecontrol/oversightoverthemarksandthebusinessconductedunderthemarks,sothismustbeaguidingprinciple/requirement.
b.
However,thisshouldnotbetheprimarypriorityfortheOwner.
c.
PrimaryfocusshouldbetoensurethattrademarksarebeingusedinamannerconsistentwiththeIANAFunction.
d.
Qualitycontrolneedstobefitforpurpose-needstomeetminimumrequirements(legalrequirements),butshouldnotdomore.
Qualitycontrolhastomeettherequirements/needsofallthreecommunities.
IfanycommunityhasaconcernabouthowIANAisperforminginrelationtotrademark,amechanismneedstobeinplacetoaddresssuchconcerns.
e.
Couldqualitycontrolalsobeoutsourced/delegated/subcontracted11The"IANATrademarks"consistof(a)IANA,(b)INTERNETASSIGNEDNUMBERSAUTHORITY,and(c)theIANALogo,consistingofIANAinstylizedletters(sometimesaccompaniedby"InternetAssignedNumbersAuthority").
8i.
Certainamountofoperationalcontrolcouldbesubcontracted,forexampletooperationalcommunities,butultimatecontrol/responsibilityiswiththetrademarkowner.
ii.
Brandownerisrequiredtoexerciseactivequalitycontroltomeetminimumrequirements.
f.
Isitacceptabletothenamescommunityifqualitycontrolisdelegatedtotheoperationalcommunities(accordingtoeachOC'sresponsibilities)g.
Question:HasICANNhadtoexercisequalitycontroloverusesoftheIANAinanykindoflicensor/licenseerelationshipIfso,howhasthisbeendonei.
Question:HowhasIETFTrustexercisedqualitycontrolwithlicensees5.
PolicingandEnforcementofUnauthorizedUsesa.
Ownershouldbeabletosetupandmonitora"policing"processtolookoutforunauthorizedthirdpartyusesofthetrademarks(e.
g.
,watchingservices)b.
Ownershouldhavethecapabilitytoevaluateand,whereappropriate,pursueandstopunauthorizedusesthroughenforcementofthetrademarks6.
BeingalicenseeofthetrademarksdoesnotconveyarighttopublishanyparticularIANAregistry,independentoftherelevantoperationalcommunity'sdecisiontomakethatlicenseetheoperatorofthoseregistries.
IfacommunityismoveditsregistriesfromanIFO,thelicensetothatentityshouldbetransferredorterminatedsimultaneouslywithsuchmove.
VI.
ExpectationsofICGandOtherOperationalCommunities1.
ItisthepreferenceoftheInternetNumberCommunitythatallrelevantpartiesagreetotheexpectationsoftheNumbersCommunityaspartofthetransition.
2.
TheICGnotesthattheoperationalcommunitiesarecoordinatingthesedetails,andtheICGexpectsthiscoordinationtocontinueduringtheimplementationphasetoensurethattherequirementsaremet.
SomeofthequestionsthattheICGreceivedduringthepubliccommentperiodrelatetotheimplementationdetails.
Thesedetailswillbecomeclearasthecommunitiesproceedtoplantheimplementation.