Worldstarry

UniversityofWisconsinMilwaukeeUWMDigitalCommonsThesesandDissertationsMay2013TheStarryHeavensAboveMeandtheStarmakingPowerWithinMePhilipMackUniversityofWisconsin-MilwaukeeFollowthisandadditionalworksat:https://dc.
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RecommendedCitationMack,Philip,"TheStarryHeavensAboveMeandtheStarmakingPowerWithinMe"(2013).
ThesesandDissertations.
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https://dc.
uwm.
edu/etd/134THESTARRYHEAVENSABOVEMEANDTHESTARMAKINGPOWERWITHINMEbyPhilipT.
L.
MackAThesisSubmittedinPartialFulfillmentoftheRequirementsfortheDegreeofMasterofArtsinPhilosophyatTheUniversityofWisconsin-MilwaukeeMay2013iiABSTRACTTHESTARRYHEAVENSABOVEMEANDTHESTARMAKINGPOWERWITHINMEbyPhilipT.
L.
MackTheUniversityofWisconsin-Milwaukee,2013UndertheSupervisionofProfessorRobertSchwartzTheworldmakingthesisstandsasacontentiousviewofreality.
Itsprimarytenet,thatweplayaroleincognitivelymakingobjects,properties,facts,andtherebytheworld,isdismissedbymanyphilosophersasanincoherentandmisguidedposition.
InthispaperIcriticallydiscussthethesisanddefenditagainstseveralcriticisms:that(1)itiscosmologicallyincoherent,(2)raisesaproblemofcausation,(3)impliessubjectivism,(4)commitsause-mentionfallacy,and(5)itcommitstheproblemofdisagreement.
Ishowthatthesecriticismsarenotultimatelydeleterioustothethesis.
Furthermore,Iexplorewaysinwhichworldmakingconstitutesamoresatisfactoryaccountofobjects,properties,andfactsoverandagainstcompetingviews,viz.
,metaphysicalrealism.
iiiCopyrightbyPhilipT.
L.
Mack,2013AllRightsReservedivTABLEOFCONTENTSPARTPAGEIntroduction.
1I2AnExplicationoftheWorldmakingThesis2II.
12CriticismsandResponses12TheCosmologicalObjection12ResponsetotheCosmologicalObjection13AProblemofCausation.
15ResponsetotheProblemofCausation16WorldmakingImpliesSubjectivism17ResponsetotheObjectionthatWorldmakingImpliesSubjectivism17WorldmakingisCommittedtoaUse-MentionFallacy.
19ResponsetotheChargeofaUse-MentionFallacy.
23WorldmakingisCommittedtotheProblemofDisagreement.
25ResponsetotheProblemofDisagreement25III.
27ACompendiousOverviewofMetaphysicalRealism.
27AProblemRegardingObjectDifferentiation.
29AProblemRegardingProperties32AccountingforSatisfactory,YetContradictoryTheories34Conclusion36Bibliography381IntroductionThatweplayaroleincognitivelymakingtheworldisanexceedinglydifficultviewtodefend.
Onthefaceofit,theintuitionthatobjects,properties,andfactsdependonandemergethroughourcategorizationsandconceptualizationsmightstrikeoneasmanifestlyabsurd.
Surelytheworldisasitisindependentofus.
Itiscomposedofobjects,properties,andfactsoverwhichwehavenocontrolandwhichexistwithorwithoutus–themostwecanplausiblydoisnameanddescribethoseobjectsanddiscovertheirpropertiesandfacts.
Unsurprisingly,thethesisthatwemaketheworldisacontroversialoneandisbattedawaywheneveritisraised.
Iwillfocusonanapproachtoworldmakingwhichfindsexpressionintwoofitschiefproponents,WilliamJames,atthebeginningofthe20thcentury,andlaterbyNelsonGoodman,thoughmyfocuswillbealmostentirelyonGoodman,sincecontemporarycriticismisaimedathisposition.
1Briefly,JamesandGoodmanadvanceastrongontologicalclaim–thatwhatitistobeanobject,property,orfactatallistobecarvedoutfromthefluxofexperience.
Thatistosay,thereisnosensetobemade,priortoourdelineations,ofpre-existingobjects,properties,orfacts.
Thisclaimhasproveddistastefultomanyphilosophers,becauseitseemsutterlyimplausibletosaythatbecauseweconceptualizeandcategorizetheworldinsomeway(withascientifictheory,forexample)theworldactuallyisthewaywedescribeittobe.
InPartsIandIIofthispaperIshalldiscussthisontologicalclaimanddefenditagainstthefollowingcriticisms:(1)itiscosmologicallyincoherent;(2)itraisesaproblemofcausation;(3)itimpliessubjectivism;(4)itcommitsause-mentionfallacy;and(5)itcommitstheproblemofdisagreement.
Insodoing,Iwill1SeealsoRichardRorty,TruthandProgress,PhilosophicalPapers,Volume3(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998).
2elaboratetheworldmakingthesisandshow,whensounderstood,thesecriticismsarenotultimatelydetrimentaltoit.
InPartIIIIwillarguethatbecauseworldmakingsurvivesthesecriticisms,itshouldbeconsideredasaplausiblealternativetoothermetaphysicalpositions,viz.
,metaphysicalrealism.
PartIAnExplicationoftheWorldmakingThesisItisperhapsbesttounderstandworldmakingagainstametaphysicalrealistconceptionoftheworld.
Inbrief,aproponentofmetaphysicalrealismadvancesthenotionthattheworld'scontent,thatis,itsproperties,facts,andobjects,existsreadymade,externalto,andindependentofhumancognition,conceptualization,andcategorization.
2Furthermore,aproponentofrealismusuallyholdsthatobjects,properties,andfactsliewaitingforustodiscover.
Usingourpowersofinquiryanddiscovery,weextractthecontentfromwhatisgiveninreality,ratherthanconsideringthatwhatisgivencanonlymakesenseifwegiveitcontent.
Accordingtothisview,then,anyconstructivistpictureofrealityisfundamentallybackwards–weplaynoroleinconstructingobjects,properties,orfacts.
Instead,allwecandoisuncoverrealitybydiscoveringthecontentalreadyembeddedinit;wediscoverthecontentinreality,weplaynoroleinconstructingit.
Contrarealism,theworldmakingthesisholdsthatweplayaroleinmakingtheworldthroughourconceptualizationsandcategorizations.
Tothiseffect,Goodman2Cf.
PanayotButchvarov,"MetaphysicalRealism,"inTheCambridgeDictionaryofPhilosophy,2nded.
,ed.
RobertAudi(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1995),562-63.
SeealsoHilaryPutnam,Reason,Truth,andHistory(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1981),49-54.
3states,"wemakeworldsbymakingversions.
"3Theterms"construct"or"make,"however,mustbeclarified.
Thatweplayaroleinconstructingthecontentoftheworlddoesnotimplythatwephysicallyconstructobjectsoutoftherequisitebitsofmatter.
4Theterms"make"or"construct"simplymeanwehelpshapeobjectsbyshapingproperties,therebyconferringontologicalcontenttotheworldthroughourcognitivework.
BothGoodmanandJamescontendthatthehumancontributiontotheworld'scompositionisimpossibletoignore.
Anunderlyingprincipleofthispositionisthenotionthatwecannotseparatewhatisgiveninrealityfromhowwetakeittobe.
5Goodmanstates,"[t]alkofunstructuredcontentoranunconceptualizedgivenorasubstratumwithoutpropertiesisself-defeating;forthetalkimposesstructure,conceptualizes,ascribesproperties.
"6Thetrueorcorrectwayinwhichwecategorizeandconceptualizerealityisthewayinwhichrealitytakesoncontent;therearenointrinsicproperties,facts,orobjectsintheworld.
Goodmanfurtherstates,"[a]snothingisatrestorisinmotionapartfromaframeofreference,sonothingisprimitiveorisderivationallypriortoanythingapartfromaconstructionalsystem"7and"[modesoforganization]arenot'foundintheworld'butbuiltintoaworld.
"8Theargumentforworldmakingcan,thus,becharacterizedasfollows.
Whatitistobeanobject,property,orfactatallistobedelineatedfromthesensiblefluxofexperience.
Itfollowsthat,priortoourdelineation,realityhasnocontent–thatis,there3NelsonGoodman,WaysofWorldmaking(Indianapolis:HackettPublishingCompany,1978),94.
SeealsoNelsonGoodman,"OnStarmaking,"inStarmaking:Realism,Anti-Realism,andIrrealism,ed.
PeterJ.
McCormick(Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress,1996),144-45.
4Goodman,"OnStarmaking,"145.
5Goodman,WaysofWorldmaking,7.
6Ibid.
,6.
7Ibid.
,12.
8Ibid.
,14.
EmphasisisGoodman's.
4arenopre-existingorpre-conceptualizedobjects,properties,orfactsintheworld.
Metaphysicalrealism,asadumbratedabove,iscommittedtopre-existingandpre-discriminatedobjects,properties,andfacts.
Thus,realismisfalseandthebestexplanationofrealityisthatweplayaroleinconstructingit.
Worldmakersarguethatthereissomethingwithwhichmakingbegins–callitasensibleflux,particles,matter,oranunstructuredgiven.
Althoughthereisstuffwithwhichwebegin,thereisnospecifickindofstuff–noobjects,properties,orfactsinhereinit.
Whicheverwayweconceptualizeandcategorizethisstuffisthewayinwhichobjects,properties,andfactsemerge.
9Toelucidatethisnotion,itishelpfultoinvoketheQuineanexpression,"[t]hereisnoentitywithoutidentity.
"10Goodman,onthisscore,writes,"[i]dentificationrestsuponorganizationintoentitiesandkinds.
"11Thereisnowaytodifferentiatebetweenthingswithoutcognitivemaking–ontologydependsonindividuation.
Tothiseffect,Jamesstates,"[w]ebreakthefluxofsensiblerealityintothings…Wecreatethesubjectsofourtrueaswellasofourfalsepropositions.
Wecreatethepredicatesalso.
"12Theworld'sobjects(thesubjects),therefore,emergethroughourconstructiveworkbybecomingindividuatedanddifferentiated.
Objectsbecomedelineatedoncewepredicatesomethingofthem–say,somepropertyorfactthatwealsoplayedaroleincreating.
Thus,objectsandtheirfactsdependonourconceptsandtheories.
Ifwedonotplayaroleinshapingtheirpropertiesandfacts,objectsarenotonlydevoidofcontent,butcannotproperlybecalledobjectsbecausethereisnowayto9Ibid.
,6.
Forarelateddiscussion,seeIrisEinheuser,"TowardaConceptualistSolutionoftheGroundingProblem,"Nos45,no.
2(2011):300-314.
AlthoughEinheuser'sdiscussionandrecommendationsregardingthenotionof"startingwithsomething"areinteresting,IwillfollowtheGoodmanianpicture,accordingtowhichwestartourworldmakingprocesswithanunstructuredgiven.
10W.
V.
Quine,TheoriesandThings(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1981),102.
11Goodman,WaysofWorldmaking,7-8.
12WilliamJames,Pragmatism,ed.
BruceKuklick(Indianapolis:HackettPublishingCompany,1981),114.
5differentiatethemfromtherestofthefluxofexperience.
Untiltheworldismadeinsuchaway,ithasnoobjects,properties,orfacts.
Goodmanprovidesahelpfulillustrationoftheabovenotion,whichisworthquotinginfull:Isitinaclutteredwaitingroom,unawareofanystereosystem.
GraduallyImakeouttwospeakersbuiltintothebookcase,areceiverandturntableinacornercabinet,andaremotecontrolswitchonthemantel.
Ifindasystemthatwasalreadythere.
Butseewhatthisfindinginvolves:distinguishingtheseveralcomponentsfromthesurroundings,categorizingthembyfunction,andunitingthemintoasinglewhole.
Agooddealofmaking,withcomplexconceptualequipment,hasgoneintofindingwhatisalreadythere.
Anothervisitor,freshfromalifetimeinthedeepestjungle,willnotfind,becausehehasnotthemeansofmaking,anystereosysteminthatroom.
Norwillhefindbooksthere;butinthebooksandplantsIfindhemayfindfuelandfoodthatIdonot.
Notonlydoeshenotknowthatthestereosetisone;hedoesnotrecognizeasathingatallthatwhichIknowtobeastereosystem–thatis,hedoesnotmakeoutormakeanysuchobject.
13Goodman'sillustrationnicelyexemplifiestheforegoing,especiallytheclaimthatobject-hooddependsonourconceptualwork.
Untiloursubjecthasdelineatedthespaceheispresentedwith,thereis,strictlyspeaking,nostereosystemoranyofitscomponentparts,justanundifferentiatedsensibleflux.
Thisillustrationalsomakescleartheworldmaker'sclaimthatweconstructtheworldwithsomethingthatisalreadypresent,somethingwetakeforgranted–although,this"something"isnotsomespecifickindofthing.
JustwhatisthisstuffwearetakingforgrantedTheansweristhatitiscontextsensitive–thatis,itisrelativetoourprojects,interests,norms,etcetera.
Forexample,justassomeoneneedsreedtoweaveabasket,theconstellation-makerneedsstarsandthestar-makerneedstherightkindofphysicalmatter.
Ineachcasesomethingisbeingconstructed,notfromnothing,butinstead,from13NelsonGoodman,"NotesontheWell-MadeWorld,"inStarmaking:Realism,Anti-Realism,andIrrealism,ed.
PeterJ.
McCormick(Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress,1996),155-56.
6whatevermaterialisappropriatefortheproject.
Thebasicideahereisthatthereisnotsomeonethingthateverythingismadeof,butratherthateverythingismadeofsomething.
Jamesputsthepointaptly:"[w]ereceiveinshorttheblockofmarble,butwecarvethestatueourselves.
"14Justasasculptorgivesformtoablockofmarbleaftercarvingandpolishingitsuchthatitresultsinasculpture,wedothesametotheworld.
Moreprecisely,muchlikethesculptorbeginswithaslabofmarbleandproceedstocarve,chipaway,andconstructthesculpturehehasinmindinordertogiveitaspecificform,wealsobeginwithaslabofmarble–thesensiblefluxofexperience–andproceedtoconstructobjects,properties,andfactsviaourcategorizations,conceptualizationsandtheories–ourchisels.
Withoutthesculptor'sartisticrendering,theblockofmarbleremainsjustthat,ablockofmarble.
Itwouldbeabsurdtosaythattheresultantsculpturewassomehowpre-existentintheslabofmarble,andthesculptorsimplychiseledhiswayarounditsoastomakemanifestthispre-existentform.
Analogously,withoutourconstructivework,thesensiblefluxremainsacharacterlesssensibleflux.
Thereexistnopre-conceptualizedobjects,properties,orfactswaitingtobediscovered,butrather,we,alongwiththemarbleorsensiblefluxitself,helpmakethesculptureorworldwhatitis.
Onemayobjectatthisjuncture,however,andpointoutthatthesculptedpieceofmarblewasactuallyintheblockbeforethesculptorsetouttowork,andinthissensethecomposition–theobjectanditspropertiesandfacts–wasalreadyintheblock,thusrefutingtheclaimthatindependentofourconstructivework,theworldisdevoidofcontent.
Itwouldseemasthoughwedo,afterall,discoverthefactsandpropertiesoftheworld,whichwerealreadypresent.
Inanuninterestingsensethisiscertainlycorrect,the14James,Pragmatism,112.
7pieceofmarblethatbecamethesculpturewascontainedinthemarbleblock.
However,evenifitwasalwaysthere,thesculptorbroughtitoutoftheblockofmarble;hedidtheconstructivework,andgavethemarbleitsshape,justasinthecaseofthestereosysteminthewaitingroomGoodmandescribes.
Thequestion,then,isasfollows:isthereanysignificantwayinwhichtheworldisanydifferentfromthesculptorandtheblockofmarbleTheanswer,accordingtotheworldmakerissimply,no.
ConsideralsoanillustrationbothJamesandGoodmanofferregardingconstellations.
15"Wecarveoutgroupsofstarsintheheavens,"Jameswrites,"andcallthemconstellations,andthestarspatientlysufferustodoso.
"16Welocateagroupofsevenstarsintheskyandappendtothemsomename,say,theBigDipper.
Althoughthiscollectionofstarsexistedasundifferentiatedextraterrestrialstuffpriortoourconstructivework,theydidnotexistastheBigDipper(i.
e.
,asadifferentiatedobjectwecallbythename'BigDipper')priortoourconceptualcreation.
17Itisinthissensethatweconstructanobject(i.
e.
,theBigDipperconstellation)fromthesensiblefluxofexperience.
Moreover,anystarfromthiscollectionnowhasthepropertyofbeingastarthatconstitutespartoftheBigDipper,whiletheBigDipper,too,nowhasthepropertyofbeingcomposedofsevenstars.
ThepropertyofbeingincludedintheBigDipper,andtheBigDipperitself,wasnotinherentintheworld,butrather,wemadeitthecasebycreatingtheconstellationwiththeparticularstarswechose.
Thisisthewayinwhichwemakethepropertiesofobjects(thattheBigDipperhassevenstarsandthestarsthatcomposetheBigDipperhavethepropertyofpopulatingit).
Finally,becauseweplaya15Goodman,"NotesontheWell-MadeWorld,"156.
16James,Pragmatism,113.
SeealsoWilliamJames,TheMeaningofTruth(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1975),56.
17Goodman,"NotesontheWell-MadeWorld,"156.
8roleinmakingthispropertyofthesestars,wetherebymakeitafactthatthisstarhasthatproperty.
Andthisisthesenseinwhichwemakefacts(itisafactthatthosesevenstarsconstitutetheBigDipperandthateachonehasthepropertyofbeingpartoftheBigDipper).
Whatistrueorfalseaboutstatementsconcerningthosestars–whetherthisorthatstarisorisnotaBigDipperstar–isindependentofusafterwehavedoneourconstructivework.
Butworldmakersdon'tstopatconstellations.
Thestarsthemselves,theyargue,areasmuchmadeastheconstellationstheypopulate.
18Justaswedelineateanddiscriminatecollectionsofstarsintheskytoshapetheconstellations,wealsodelineateanddifferentiatewhatitistobeastarfromtherestofthesensiblefluxofexperience.
Whatconstitutesstar-hooddoesnotcomereadymadeorpre-conceptualized;therearenoinherentpropertiesthatindicatetousthatsuch-and-suchisastar.
Instead,wedeterminewhatconstitutesstar-hood(withourscientifictheories,forexample).
Goodmancontends,"wemakestarsbydrawingcertainboundariesratherthanothers.
Nothingdictateswhethertheskiesshallbemarkedoffintoconstellationsorotherobjects.
"19Althoughstars(orstarstuff)existedpriortoandindependentofourconceptsandtheoriesasundifferentiatedandunindividuatedmassesofphysicalparticlesinthesky,theydidnotexistasobjects,orstarsforthatmatter–theyhadnoinherentpropertiesthatenabledustodistinguishthemasdistinctstar-objectsfromothercosmicmatter.
20Thus,ifitwerenotforourcognitivemaking,starswouldnothavethepropertiesthatmakethemstars,andsotheywouldnotbestars,ontologicallyspeaking.
Theirobject-hood,properties,andthefactsaboutthemdependwhollyuponourconceptualmaking.
18Ibid.
19Ibid.
20Ibid.
9Moreover,ourconceptspertainingtostarsandconstellationscanaccountfortheirexistingbeforeweexistedandcarriedoutourconstructivework.
21Whenweformulateaconceptregardingstarsorconstellationsweincludewithinthatconceptthattheypredateus.
Thesefactsandpropertiesaboutstarsandconstellationswehelpconstruct,therefore,obtainexpostfacto.
Additionally,thatacertainstarpopulatingtheBigDipperhasmorevolume,shinesbrighter,andisfartherawayfromEarththantherestistruequiteindependentofus.
Justasworldmakerscanaccommodatethestarspredatingus,theycanconsistentlyclaimthataparticularstarhasmorevolume,shinesbrighter,andisfartherawayfromEarththantherest.
Theseclaimsarenotatvariancewiththeworldmakingthesis.
Inconjunctionwiththeabove,worldmakingincludesapluralisticcomponent.
BecauseGoodmanrejectsthenotionoftheworldasgiven,orashesometimesputsit,"thewaytheworldis,"22withoutitbeingonewayoranother,herejectsalsothenotionthatthereisanindependentstandardbywhichwecantesttheveridicalityofourconstructionsorversions.
Tothiseffect,Goodmanwrites,versions"canbetreatedasourworlds.
"23Goodmanpartiallyexplainswhathemeansbytherebeingmanyworldsasfollows:"manydifferentworld-versionsareofindependentinterestandimportance,withoutanyrequirementorpresumptionofreducibilitytoasinglebase.
"24Goodman'snotionthatworld-versionsarenotreducibletoa"singlebase"ismotivatedbyhisconvictionthatargumentsinsupportofsuchapositionare"vague,"have"negligible"21Ibid.
SeealsoNelsonGoodman,"OnSomeWorldlyWorries,"inStarmaking:Realism,Anti-Realism,andIrrealism,ed.
PeterJ.
McCormick(Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress,1996),166-67.
22NelsonGoodman,"TheWaytheWorldIs,"inStarmaking:Realism,Anti-Realism,andIrrealism,ed.
PeterJ.
McCormick(Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress,1996),9.
23Goodman,WaysofWorldmaking,4.
24Ibid.
10evidence,andthatthepopularcandidatebywhichreducibilitymightbepossible,physics,is"itselffragmentaryandunstable.
"25AnimportantmotivatingfactorofGoodman'spluralismstemsfromsituationsinwhichoneormoretheoriesarecontradictory,albeitadequate.
Theroughquestionraisedbysuchsituations,andaddressedbyGoodman,ishowcanweaccountforsituationsinwhichtwotheoriesaretrue,butnevertheless,conflictHeoffersseveralexamplestoillustratehisanswer,oneofwhichinvolvesmakingassertionsaboutpointsandlineswhenouruniverseofdiscourseis"limitedtoasquaresegmentofaplane,withtwopairsofboundarylineslabeled'vertical'and'horizontal.
"'26Assumingthereexistpoints,Goodmanasksustoconsidertwosentences,whichconflict,butareneverthelesstruewhenassertedundertheappropriateconditions:(14)Everypointismadeupofaverticalandahorizontalline(15)Nopointismadeupoflinesoranythingelse.
27Afterconsideringtwodistincttypesofspacesunderwhichwecanevaluatethetruth-valuesofthesesentences–oneinwhichlinesexistexclusively,andoneinwhichpointsexistexclusively,making(14)trueand(15)false,and(15)trueand(14)false,respectively–Goodmanconsidersatypeofspaceconsistingofbothlinesandpoints.
Inthisspace,ofcourse,neither(14)nor(15)isfalse,butitisnotthecasethatbothofthemcanbetrueatthesametime.
28Thus,Goodmanconcludes,ifbothsentencesaretrue,thentheymustbetrueindistinct"realms,"becausetheycannotbothbetrueinonerealm.
29Ultimately,Goodmanconcludesversionsarelikethetwosentencesaboveinthat"their25Ibid.
,4-5.
26Ibid.
,114.
27Ibid.
28Ibid.
,115.
29Ibid.
11realmsarethuslessaptlyregardedaswithinoneworldthanastwodifferentworlds,andeven…asworldsinconflict.
"30Goodman'spluralism,then,containstheideathatwecanhavecontradictorytheoriesorversions,bothofwhicharesatisfactorysolongasthetheoriesarenotembeddedinorconstructingoneandthesameworld.
Iftheywerebothconstructingthesameworld,then,ofcourse,theLawofNon-Contradictionwouldbeviolated,andoneorbothofthetheorieswouldhavetobejettisoned.
Thus,weusedifferentuniversesofdiscourse,whicharetantamounttodifferentworlds,sothatthecontradictoryversionsarenotconjoinedwithinthesameworldoruniverseofdiscourse.
Therefore,theLawofNon-Contradictionisnotviolated,andwecanmaintaintwoincompatibletheoriesatthesametime,theyaremerelyinreferencetotwodistinctworlds.
ConsiderthefollowingbroaderelucidationthantheonesGoodmanoffers.
IfProtagorasoccupiestheperspectiveofVersion-Δ,andaccordingtoVersion-Δ,Pistrue,thenhecanconsistentlyassertthatPinthisworld,callit"World-Δ.
"Ontheotherhand,ifProtagorasoccupiestheperspectiveofVersion-Σ,andaccordingtoVersion-Σ,not-Pistrue,thenhecanconsistentlyassertthatnot-Pinthisworld,callit"World-Σ.
"IfVersion-ΔandVersion-Σ–andaccordingly,World-ΔandWorld-Σ–overlap,thenProtagorascannotconsistentlyclaimthatP,becausethiswouldviolatetheLawofNon-Contradiction.
However,thisisnotanissuefortheworldmakingthesis.
Pluralismcanthriveunderthisposition,because,astheGoodmanianslogangoes,"wemakeworldsbymakingversions.
"31Hegoesontowrite,"[t]hemultipleworldsIcountenancearejust30Ibid.
,116.
31NelsonGoodman,WaysofWorldmaking,94.
12theactualworldsmadebyandansweringtotrueorrightversions.
"32Eachversionisadifferent,distinctworld,andso,aslongasProtagorasoccupiesoneworldortheotherhewillnotcontradicthimselfwhenassertingeitherthatPorthatnot-P,respectively.
Whatfundamentallycharacterizesworldmaking,then,istheclaimthatweconstructobjects,properties,andfactswiththeuseofourcognitivepowers,andmoreover,distinctworld-versionsmakedistinctworlds,givingthepositionapluralisticflavor.
Thenotionthattheworldconsistsofpre-conceptualizedobjects,properties,andfactsawaitingourdiscoveryismisguided.
Jamesnicelyarticulatesthisbydenying"thebeliefthatthereisan'eternal'editionof[theworld]ready-madeandcomplete'"andadvancingthepositionthat"theworldisstillintheprocessofmaking.
"33Theimplicationofsuchapositionisthatreality'scompositionandcharacterdependsonourcategorizationandconceptualization.
34Thepositionischaracterized,also,byitspluralisticcomponent.
Incompatibleworld-versionsdonotconflictwithoneanotherbecauseeachversionisaseparateworld.
Thus,satisfactory,yetcontradictoryworld-versionsarenotsusceptibleofviolatingtheLawofNon-Contradiction.
PartIICriticismsandResponsesTheCosmologicalObjectionFromnothing,nothingcomes.
Thismuchtheworldmakerwillconcede.
Worldmakingiscommittedtostartingitsconstructionoftheworldfromsomewhere–beitthesensiblefluxofexperienceorunstructuredgiven–anditisthiscommitmentthat32Ibid.
33WilliamJames,"TheAbsoluteandtheStrenuousLife,"TheJournalofPhilosophy,Psychology,andScientificMethods4,no.
20(Sep.
,1907):547.
34Ibid.
Cf.
Goodman,WaysofWorldmaking,132.
13criticstendtoattack.
PaulBoghossian,forinstance,arguesthatsinceworldmakersmustbecommittedtoabasicstartingpointinordertogetconstructionofftheground,worldmakingisincoherent.
Ifthereissomethinguponwhichconstructioncandoitswork,thenthatseemstoimplythatthereisareadymadeworld,thattherearesomebasic,intrinsicfactsandpropertiesbeyondourreach,independentofourconstruction.
35Boghossianargues,"itmustbeassumedthattherearesomebasicfacts–thebasicworldlydough–onwhichourredescriptivestrategiescangettowork.
Butthatispreciselywhatfact-constructivismdenies.
"36Inlikefashion,JohnSearlearguesthattheworldmakereffectively"presupposesrealism,becauseitpresupposesalanguage-independentrealitythatcanbecarvedupordividedupindifferentways.
"37SearlesharesBoghossian'sconclusion,maintainingthattheworldmakermustbecommittedtoareadymaderealityindependentofourconstructivework–onethatcontainssomebasicfactorfacts–becauseifnosuchrealityexists,worldmakingcannotbegin.
Buttheworldmakerdeniesthis.
Thus,worldmakingisbothcommittedtoandnotcommittedtotherebeingsomebasicfactsindependentofourmaking.
ResponsetotheCosmologicalObjectionAlthoughworldmakingiscommittedtosomestartingpointfromwhichconstructionbegins,thiscommitmentdoesnotimplytheincoherencyBoghossianandSearlebelieveitdoes.
Itistruethatworldmakingmuststartwithsomething,butitisnot35PaulBoghossian,FearofKnowledge:AgainstRelativismandConstructivism(Oxford:ClarendonPress,2006),35-38.
36Ibid.
,37-38.
37JohnSearle,TheConstructionofSocialReality(NewYork:TheFreePress,1995),165.
ItmayseemoddtopresentSearleasanenemyofconstructivismwhenheisaconstructivistinanothersense–thatweconstructsocialfacts.
What'srelevanthereisthatherecognizesconstructivisminsomecases(thesocialfactscase,inparticular),butinothercaseshedoesn't(Derrida'sdeconstructionismandGoodman'sworldmaking,forexample)–hedoesn'tbelievethephysicalworldisconstructedthewayworldmakersdo.
14someparticular,determinatethingthatwestartwith.
Itdoesnotfollowthatthisbasicstuffuponwhichmakingcommenceshasinherentinitsomeprimitivefactsandpropertiesthatarerequiredformaking.
Consideraspacefilledwithparticles,atoms,matter,asensibleflux,orwhatever.
Callthisthebasicstuffwithwhichworldmakingcanbegin.
Thereare,then,multiplewayswecanstarttheworldmakingprocess–thatis,wehaveoptions.
Wecanorganizethestuffwechoose–say,wechoosesomeparticles,bearinginmindthatwecouldhavestartedwithatomsormatterorsomethingelse–inmyriadwaysdependingonandaccordingtoourinterests,projects,andneeds.
Thisisthewayinwhichworldmakingdoesitswork;wecategorizeanddifferentiatewhicheverstuffwechoosetoworkwithandtherebybeginmakingtheworld.
Asmentionedabove,thebasketweaverneedsreedtoweaveabasket,theconstellation-makerneedsstarsandthestar-makerneedswhateverphysicalmatterisdeemedappropriateformakingstars.
Theupshotoftheseconsiderationsistwofold.
First,itshowsthatBoghossianandSearlemischaracterizeworldmaking.
Whilemakingstartswithsomething,thereisnooneuniquestartingpoint,"noontologicallyprivilegedbasis"38likethe"basicworldlydough.
"Dependingonourprojectsandneeds,wemaystartwithdifferentbases.
Second,thespacefilledwithbasicstuffdidnotcomewithsomepre-establishedorganization.
Therewasnogivenontology,nobasicfactsorpropertiesinherentinthisspace;whatwasgiven,inotherwords,wascompletelyontologicallyunstructured.
Factsandpropertiesonlyemergedafterwecategorizedthestuffintodifferentgroupingsdependingonourpracticalinterests.
Thesamegoesfortheworld.
Itmakesnosensetotalkabouttheworld'sontologyasitisgiven,becausesuchanenterpriseisunachievable.
As38IrisEinheuser,"FearofKnowledge,"ThePhilosophicalReview117,no.
3(2008):453.
SeealsoGoodmanWaysofWorldmaking,6.
15mentionedabove,suchtalkisself-defeating–wecannottalkaboutthegivenwithouttakingittobesomeway.
The"basicworldlydough"towhichBoghossianrefersisnotabasicfact–itisnotafactinanysense.
Itis,ofcourse,yetanotheroptionforourstartingpointformaking,butthatitisanoptionalstartingpointdoesnotimplythatitcontainsorisabasicfact.
Again,thereisnosingleuniquebasisfromwhichmakingcommences.
Thus,BoghossianandSearlemischaracterizetheposition,andasaresult,misstheirtarget.
Moreover,worldmakingisnotcommittedtotherebeingpre-conceptualizedfactsindependentofourmaking,andaccordingly,isnotrenderedincoherentbythecosmologicalobjection.
AProblemofCausationAswehaveseen,worldmakersmaintainthatobjects,properties,andfactsdependonourconceptualmaking.
Butcriticsarguethatthispositionissusceptibletoanobviouscounterexample:whatofobjects,properties,andfactsthatpre-existhumansSurely,theyargue,itcannotbethecasethatmountainsandstarswereconstructedbyourcognitivemaking.
39Itwasandisafactthatmountainsandstarsexistedbeforehumanscouldconstructsuchafactorthoseobjectsthemselves.
40Boghossianasserts,"it'satruismaboutmostoftheobjectsandfactsthatwetalkabout…thattheirexistenceantedatesours,"andsubsequentlyasks,"[how],then,couldtheirexistencedependonus"41Helabelsthisthe"problemofcausation,"because,heargues,"[thisview]commitsustoabizarreformofbackwardscausation,wherethecause(ouractivity)comeslaterthanits39Boghossian,FearofKnowledge,26.
40Cf.
Einheuser,"FearofKnowledge,"452.
41Boghossian,FearofKnowledge,38.
SeealsoIsraelScheffler,"TheWonderfulWorldsofGoodman,"inStarmaking:Realism,Anti-Realism,andIrrealism,ed.
PeterJ.
McCormick(Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress,1996),138-39.
16effect(theexistenceofthedinosaurs).
"42Thus,criticsargue,worldmakingoffendsourcommonsenseintuitionthatcertainobjects,theirproperties,andfactsexistedbeforewedid.
Itseemsworldmakingwouldhavetocommititselfto"abizarreformofbackwardscausation"inorderforitsviewofobjectsandfactstobecoherent.
ResponsetotheProblemofCausationTheproblemofcausation,althoughintuitivelyattractive,isbaseduponamisunderstandingofworldmaking.
Worldmakersmaintainthatwecanincludeinourconceptsfactsandobjectsthatexistedbeforeus.
Goodmannotes,"ifstarslikeconstellationsaremadebyversions,howcanthestarshavebeenthereeonsbeforeallversionsPlainly,throughbeingmadebyaversionthatputsthestarsmuchearlierthanitselfinitsowntime-space.
"43Oncewehavemadeitthecasethatsomeparticularundifferentiatedandunindividuatedmassofextraterrestrialstuffconstitutesstar-hoodviaourconceptsortheories,itisconsistentfortheworldmakertoclaimthatstarspre-existedusandwouldhaveexistedwithoutusaslongasthistemporalclaimisincludedintheconceptortheory.
Thus,whileitseemstroublingtosaythatwemakeobjectsthatexistedbeforeus,allthismeansisthatafterwehavecompletedourconstructivework,objectslikestarsandthefactsandpropertiestheyhave,asmentionedabove,obtainexpostfacto.
Worldmakerscan,therefore,consistentlyclaimwithoutany"bizarreformofbackwardscausation"thatstarsandotherlikeobjectsexistedbeforeusandwouldhaveexistedwithoutus–thoughnotasinherentinareadymadeworld–andbecausethisisthecase,worldmakingavoidstheproblemofcausation.
42Ibid.
SeealsoMichaelDevitt,"WorldmakingMadeHard:RejectingGlobalResponseDependency,"CroatianJournalofPhilosophy6(2006):5;11.
43Goodman,"NotesontheWell-MadeWorld,"156.
17WorldmakingImpliesSubjectivismCriticsalsoraisetheconcernthatworldmakingleadstosubjectivismabouttruth,andimpliesan"anythinggoes"mentality.
Wecanimagine,theyargue,thatitiswithintheboundsofworldmakingthathumanscanmakeoftheworldwhattheywill–itscharacterandqualitiesaresubjecttoourarbitrarywhimsandfancies.
44Ifwemakeobjects,properties,andfacts,thenweruntheriskofengenderingradicallyrelativistic,counterintuitiveontologiescontainingnoobjectivetruthorfactsofthematter.
Butifthisisthecase,criticsargue,thentruthiscompletelydependentuponus,andworldmakingimpliessubjectivism.
ResponsetotheObjectionthatWorldmakingImpliesSubjectivismAlthoughitmayseemthatworldmakingimpliessubjectivism,thethesisdoesnotallowforarbitrarily"makingup"properties,facts,orobjectsatwill,nordoesitpushobjectivetruthbythewayside.
45Thereareconstraintsontheviewwhicherasethisdanger.
Forinstance,anyarbitrarily"madeup"accountsofrealitywouldeventuallybeeliminatedandreplacedbyaccountsthatbetteraccordwithourpurposesandpracticesintheworld–thosewhichenableustoactmoreproficientlyandwithbetterassurance.
Plus,wemustconstrainmakingwiththenormsofinquirycurrentlyinplace–forexample,ourbackgroundbeliefsandbestavailablescientifictheories.
Goodmanexplainsthatalthoughtruth"cannotbedefinedortestedbyagreementwith'theworld,'"worldmakerscanneverthelessadvanceadefinitionoftruth.
46"Aversionistakentobetrue,"Goodmanwrites,"whenitoffendsnounyieldingbeliefsandnoneofitsown44Searle,TheConstructionofSocialReality,158-59.
SeealsoDevitt,"WorldmakingMadeHard,"11.
45Goodman,WaysofWorldmaking,94.
46Ibid.
,17.
18precepts.
"47WhatGoodmanmeansby"unyieldingbeliefs,"amongotherthings,arethe"lawsoflogic"andourperennialbeliefs,norms,andpractices.
48"Precepts"includewhateverframeofreferencewechoosetoregulateourconstructionwith.
49Thus,ifaworld-versionistobeposited,itmustnotonlyaccordwiththecurrentnormsofinquiry,butitmustalsoconformtolong-standingbeliefsandpracticeswhichinfluenceourconstructionofworlds.
Theversion,accordingly,mustnotconflictwiththeresistanceprovidedbythesecurrent,andhistorical,norms.
Thisisenoughtopreventunconstrained,arbitraryconstructionsofworlds.
Adecidedlypragmaticconstraintonworldmakingincludestherequirementthatwhateverweconstructmustbeusefulfornavigatingtheworldmoreeffectively.
50Ourconstructionscanbeuseful,forexample,insofarastheyhelpuspredictandexplainevents.
Ifwearetojudgeoneconstructionoftheworldbetterthananotherforthepurposeofeliminatingwildlyimplausibleconstructions,thenwelooktotheusefulnessofeachconstruction.
51Whicheverversionismoreuseful–forexample,inhelpingustopredictandexplaineventsfromtheperspectiveofthenormsofpractice,inquiry,and/orscienceataparticularpointintime–thananotherincertainsituationsandcontextsisthebetter,ormoresuccessful,ofthetwoversions.
Anotherconstraintconcernsoursensoryexperienceandthebackgroundbeliefswebringtoourinquiriesandconstructions.
Jameswrites,"[w]oetohimwhosebeliefsplayfastandloosewiththeorderwhichrealitiesfollowinhisexperience;theywilllead47Ibid.
48Ibid.
49Ibid.
50James,Pragmatism,114;seealso93-94;97-101.
51Ibid.
,115.
19himnowhereorelsemakefalseconnexions.
"52The"realities"towhichJamesrefersinthispassageare,amongotherthings,oursensoryexperience,backgroundbeliefs,andcurrentnormsofinquiry.
Wemustcomplywiththisexperience,elseourconstructionswillresultinincongruityandinappropriateness.
Thus,Jamesnotes,"[w]eplungeforwardintothefieldoffreshexperiencewiththebeliefsourancestorsandwehavemadealready;thesedeterminewhatwenotice;whatwenoticedetermineswhatwedo;whatwedoagaindetermineswhatweexperience.
"53Ourconstructionoftheworld'sontologyis,therefore,restrictedbythebackgroundbeliefswebringalongwithourselves–weareconstrainedbyandbuilduponwhatwealreadyhave.
Theseconstraintstogetherpreventourconstructionsfrombeingcompletelyarbitrary.
Finally,consideragaintheconstellationillustrationsetforthabove.
AfterwehavemadetheBigDipperbygroupingsevenstars,thefactsabouttheBigDipperandthestarsthatcomposeitareasmuchindependentofusastheyaredependentonus.
ThefactsaredependentonusinsofaraswemakeitafactthatthesesevenstarseachhavethepropertyofbeingincludedintheBigDipperandthattheyconstitutetheBigDipper.
Thefactsareindependentofusinsofarasafterwehavemadetheconstellation,propositionsabouttheBigDippercanhaveatruth-value–forexample,itcanbetrueorfalsethattheBigDipperhasnstarsandwhethersomestarsareorarenotstarsthatpopulatetheBigDipper.
Thesefactsortruths,onceconstructed,dependontheconstellationitself.
Thereisnosubjectivityabouttruthhere;itisasobjectiveasitgets.
Thus,worldmakingdoesnotimplysubjectivism.
WorldmakingisCommittedtoaUse-MentionFallacy52Ibid.
,94.
53Ibid.
,114-115.
20MichaelDevittcontendsthatworldmakerscommitause-mentionfallacy.
54Hearguesthatproponentsofworldmakingblur"thecrucialdistinctionbetweentheoriesoftheworldandtheworlditself.
"55Heillustratesthisasfollows:thecreationoftheword'rose'broughtwithita"conditionofreference:(1)'rose'refers…tosomethinginvirtueofitsbeingR(where…'R'expresseswhateverpropertysomethingmusthavetobereferredtoby'rose').
"56Thecrucialmoveinthisargumentcomesinwhere"[t]hemeaningof'rose'doesnotalonedetermine,forexample,that(2)'rose'referstob.
Toestablish(2),weneednotonly(1)butalso(3)bisR.
And(3)issomethingthatisrightoutsideourcontrol.
"57Thus,forsomething(binthiscase)tobereferredtobytheexpression'rose',it(b)mustalsobeR,whereRdenotes"whateverpropertysomethingmusthavetobereferredtoby'rose':"Somethinghastobearosetobereferredtoby'rose'.
"58But,Devittnotes,somethingbeinga'rose'isneithershapednordeterminedbyourpowerofreferenceordescription,itisinsteaddeterminedbyapropertyalreadyexistinginreality.
Devittarguesthatwehavenopowertoconstructthepropertiesofbsuchthatitsatisfiestheconditionsrequisiteforbeingreferredtobytheexpression'rose'.
Themostthatiswithinourpowerisbeingabletousetheword'rose'torefertosomethingthatisR.
Thus,Devittconcludes,becauserose-hoodiscontrolledbyreality,andnothumanconstruction,worldmakingisuntenable,becausethepositioniscommittedtoaconfusionbetweenusingwordstorefertoobjectswiththenotionthatwetakepartinmakingthe54Cf.
Searle,TheConstructionofSocialReality,166.
55MichaelDevitt,RealismandTruth,2nded.
(Oxford:Blackwell,1991),241.
SeealsoDevitt,"WorldmakingMadeHard"andPuttingMetaphysicsFirst:EssaysonMetaphysicsandEpistemology(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010).
56Ibid.
,242;myemphasis.
57Ibid.
,242-43;myemphasis.
58Ibid.
,244.
21propertiesofthoseobjects,andtheobjectsthemselves,suchthatthewordcanrefertothem.
Thisrelationsimplydoesnothold,Devittsays,andbecausethisisthecase,worldmakingisdeeplymisguided.
Devittprovidesaplayfulsupplementarydiscussionofthisargument,whichclarifiesitsmajorclaims:Consideroneofthekindsthatwehavesofaroverlooked:thekindofobjectthatstrainsthecredulityoftouristsfromPeoria.
Letusintroduceanameforthiskindofobject:'peorincred'.
Now,asamatteroffact,echidnasarepeorincreds.
Butourlinguisticdecisiondidnotmakethemso:theyalwayswerepeorincreds,andwouldhavebeenevenifpeoplehadneverintroducedtheword'peorincred'oranyotherword.
Peorincredsarepartoftheready-madeworld.
59Devittfurthermorenotesthatconstructivistsconfusethefreedomofreferencewith"onewedonothave:thefreedomtochoosewhichkindsobjectsaremembersof.
Wecanchoosetonamestonesandnotpeorincreds,butwecannotchoosewhethersomethingisastoneorapeorincred.
"60Heclaimsthatwesimplydonothavetheconstructivepowertocreatethepropertiesobjectshave,propertiesareinherentinobjectsalready.
Whatwecandoisdiscoverthosepropertiesand,subsequently,havetheabilitytouttercorrectreferentialpropositionsbetweenawordandthepropertyanindividualmusthaveinordertobereferredtobythatword.
Worldmaking'scrucialtenetis,accordingtoDevitt,simplyfalse.
Searlefurtherillustratesthiscriticismwhenhewrites,"[f]romthefactthatourknowledge/conception/pictureofrealityisconstructedbyhumanbrainsinhumaninteractions,itdoesnotfollowthattherealityofwhichwehavethe59Ibid.
,245;myemphasis.
60Ibid.
22knowledge/conception/pictureisconstructedbyhumanbrainsinhumaninteractions.
"61Searlenotesthatthisisanonsequitur,andindeeditis,astheconclusionsimplydoesnotfollowfromthepremise.
IsraelSchefflersharesSearle'sconviction.
Henotesthatfromthepremisethatrealitycannotbeunderstoodnormadesenseofapartfromhumancognitionitdoesnotfollowthatrealityistherebymadebyhumancognition.
62Thepithofhiscriticismisthatourwordsandconceptsmakeneithertheworldnoritsobjects,properties,andfacts.
Thus,SearleandSchefflerarguethatevenifitisthecasethathumancognitionplaysaroleinconstructinghowwetakerealitytobe,itdoesnotnecessarilyfollowthatrealityisactuallyconstructedbyhumancognition.
Searlefurtherarguesthatworldmakersfailtorecognizethatreality"doesnotcarehowwedescribeitanditremainsthesameunderthevariousdifferentdescriptionswegiveofit.
"63Heconsidersathoughtexperimentinwhichweimaginesomeportionoftheworlddescribedbyhumans.
Hethenasksustoimaginethathumansbecomeextinct.
What,then,happenstotheobjectsandfactsinthisportionoftheworldSearle'sansweris,"[a]bsolutelynothing.
Differentdescriptionsoffacts,objects,etc.
,cameandwent,butthefacts,objects,etc.
,remainedunaffected.
"64Searle'spointisthatobjectsandfactsexistevenifourdescriptionsofthoseobjectsandfactsneverexisted.
AmorecrucialpointisSearle'sargumentthatthereisadistinctiontobemadebetweenfactsandobjectsanddescriptionsofthosefactsandobjects.
Theformer,Searlesays,arecompletelyindependentofourcognitivework,whilethelatteraredependentuponus,butdonothingtodelimit,andtherebyconstruct,thefactsandobjectsoftheworld.
61Searle,TheConstructionofSocialReality,159.
62IsraelScheffler"TheWonderfulWorldsofGoodman,"140.
63Searle,TheConstructionofSocialReality,163.
64Ibid.
,164.
23ResponsetotheChargeofaUse-MentionFallacyWhatisunsatisfactoryaboutthiscriticismisthatitsproponents,especiallyDevitt,haveatendencytopresupposerealismintheirargumentagainstworldmaking.
Thisresultsinbeggingthequestionagainsttheworldmaker.
Forthecriticismtobesuccessful,itneedstoworkfromwithintheposition,orattheveryleastappreciateittosomedegree.
Theworldmakeronlycommitstheuse-mentionfallacyifhepresupposesarealistpositionaboutpropertiesandobjects.
Butthisispreciselywhattheworldmakerdoesnotdo.
Devitt'scritique,forinstance,amountstoarguingthatconstructivismiswrong,becausetherealismDevittholdsiscorrect.
ButthereisacharitablewaytopresentDevitt'scriticismsuchthatitdoesnotpresupposerealismandwouldthusbemoregermanetothetaskofdemonstratingtheallegederrorsofworldmaking.
Considerascenarioinwhichwetakeawayourperspectiveanditseemssomefactstillexists65–forexample,thatsuch-and-suchmushroomhasthepropertyofbeingnoxioustohumans.
Thisparticularmushroomisgoingtobenoxiousnomatterhowweconstructtheworld.
Therewillalwaysbesomething"outthere"thatdespiteourconstructiveroleintheworld,itwillbethecase–itisafactnomattertheperspective.
InthespiritofDevitt,then,howeverweconceptualizeit,thisworldstillstaysthesameinsomeway–itdoesnotfollowthatourconceptualizationbringsaboutafact.
Thereissomebitofstuffthatdoesthesamething–itisafactthatthismushroomhasthepropertyofbeingnoxioustohumanbeings.
Butifthisisthecase,thenthereisapropertyandafactaboutthatpropertypre-constructionandevenpost-construction,becauseitremainsthesameundereachdescriptionofthe65Cf.
Searle,TheConstructionofSocialReality,163-64.
24world.
Andsotheworldisinthissensereadymade,andtheworldmakerhassomeexplainingtodo.
Theworldmakercanrespondbyclaimingthatthismushroom'spropertyofbeingnoxiousonlyemergesoutofaconceptualframework.
Theobjectionignoresthattherecannotbeconcept-transcendentpropertiesofthings.
Themushroomcanonlyhavethepropertyofbeingnoxiousafterwehavecategorizeditalongwithothernoxiousthings–andallthatafterwehavedelineatedthecriteriaforobject-hood.
Itisamistaketosaythemushroomhadthatpropertyinherently,andwepickeditout.
Ofcourse,justaswiththecaseconcerningstarsexplainedabove,oncewehavecomeupwiththeconceptofnoxiousnessthroughourcognitivework,wecancoherentlyincludeinthatconceptthatthemushroomwasalwaysnoxiousregardlessofourexistence.
Butforthemushroomtobenoxiousinthefirstplacerequiresourcognitivemakingandorganization.
Accordingly,that"bisR,"inDevitt'sexampleabove,makesnosensewithoutdelineatingwhatcountsas"R,"andbforthatmatter,inthefirstplace.
Withoutdoingso,noreferencecanevenoccur.
Devitthashispictureoftheworldbackwardsandsimplymissesthepointinhiscriticismofworldmaking.
WhatgoesformyresponsetoDevittgoesforthenonsequiturSearleandSchefflerpinonworldmaking'sprincipalclaim.
AsIarguedabove,thereisnosensetobemadeofpredeterminedobjects,properties,andfacts.
Havingaccesstoareadymadeontologyisimpossiblewithoutfirsthavingdelineatedtheboundariesofobjects,andtheirpropertiesandfacts.
Iftheworldistohaveanycharacteristicsatall,thenfromthenotionthatweplayaroleinmakingtheworld,wemustallowthatitdoesindeedfollowthatwe25constructtheworld.
Worldmaking,therefore,avoidstheproblemsposedbyboththeuse-mentionfallacyandtheallegednonsequitur.
WorldmakingisCommittedtotheProblemofDisagreementBoghossian,inadditiontohiscriticismssetforthabove,raisestheproblemofdisagreement,whichisaimedatworldmaking'spluralisticcomponent.
Hearguesthatworldmakingsuccumbstoacontradiction,andtherebyfailstocomplywiththeLawofNon-Contradiction–itisimpossibleboththatPandthatnot-P.
66Boghossianarrivesatthisassessmentbyarguingthatbecausetheconstructivistpositionincludestheprinciplethatourconstructionoftheworlddependsonourparticularprojectsandinterests,itispossiblethatweconstructcontradictoryontologies.
Toillustratehisargument,BoghossianaskshisreadertoconsiderascenarioinwhichSociety-ΔconstructsastateofaffairssuchthatPobtains.
Society-Σ,ontheotherhand,constructsastateofaffairssuchthatnot-Pobtains.
67Hethenarguesasfollows:1.
SincewehaveconstructedthefactthatP,P.
2.
Andsinceitispossiblethatanothercommunityshouldhaveconstructedthefactsthatnot-P,thenpossiblynot-P.
3.
So:ItispossiblethatbothPandnot-P.
68But,bytheLawofNon-Contradiction,itisimpossibleforPandnot-Ptoobtain.
Therefore,becausethisisthecase,Boghossianarguesconstructivisttheseslikeworldmakingmustbeabletoaccountforsuchincompatibilities.
But,hefurthernotesthatthisisaproblemtowhichworldmakinghasnoanswer.
Theobjection,accordingtoBoghossian,is"decisive.
"69ResponsetotheProblemofDisagreement66Boghossian,FearofKnowledge,40.
67Ibid.
68Ibid.
69Ibid.
,41.
26Althoughworldmakingpermitsconflicting,yettruesentencesorversions,itdoesnot,however,violatetheLawofNon-Contradiction,asBoghossianargues.
Asputforthintheforegoing,Goodmanarguesthatcontradictorysentencesorversionsthatarealternativelytruecannot,nevertheless,bothbetrueinthesameworld.
Thus,becausewemakeworldsbymakingversions,thecontradictoryversionsareembedded,respectively,indistinctworlds.
Butifeachversionisinadistinctworld,itfollowstriviallythattheyarenotinthesameworld.
Therefore,bothstatementsorversionscannotbeassertedormaintainedatthesametime,andso,theLawofNon-Contradictionisupheld.
Consider,justasBoghossiandoes,twosocietieswhichconstructincompatibleworld-versions.
Letuscallthemwhatwenamedthemabove,Society-ΔandSociety-Σ.
BoghossianconsidersasituationinwhichSociety-ΔandSociety-Σconstructcontradictoryworld-versions;Society-ΔconstructsastateofaffairssuchthatPobtainsandSociety-Σconstructsastateofaffairssuchthatnot-Pobtains.
Heiscertainlycorrectthatwhenconjoined,theseworld-versionsviolatetheLawofNon-Contradiction.
Heiswrong,however,inclaimingworldmakingcannotaccountforsuchascenario.
Theincompatibleworld-versionsaretrueofdistinctworlds,theworldmakerwouldargue,notoneandthesameworld.
Thus,thereisnodangerofbreachingtheLawofNon-Contradiction.
Ultimately,then,theinadequacyofBoghossian'scriticismislocatedinhisinterpretationofworldmaking'spluralisticcomponent.
Hismisunderstanding70ofthepositionleadshimtoarguethatdifferentsocietiespositingcontradictorytheoriesorworld-versionsareoperatinginthesameuniverseofdiscourseorthesameworld.
Thatbeingthecase,hedrawstheconclusionthatworldmakingviolatesafundamentallawof70Cf.
Einheuser,"FearofKnowledge,"453.
27logic.
But,asIhaveargued,thisisnottheworldmaker'sposition.
WorldmakingdoesnotviolatetheLawofNon-Contradiction,becauseoftheparticularbrandofpluralismbuiltintotheposition.
Moreover,becauseworldmakingcanaccountfortheincompatibilitiesBoghossianadvancesagainstit,itisthereforenotsusceptibletohiscriticism.
PartIIIOnbalance,Ifindthecriticismsadvancedagainstworldmakingunconvincingandunsatisfactory.
AsIhaveshown,criticismsofthepositioneithermisstheirtargetentirelyorfailtounderminethepositionsuccessfully.
Becausethisisthecase,worldmakingstandsasaplausibleposition.
Andalthoughitmayruncontrarytomostphilosophers'andevennon-philosophers'intuitionsaboutthewaytheworldis,Ibelievemyeffortsaboveshouldpersuadeopponentstoconsiderworldmakingmoreseriouslyasacredibleandviablealternativetocompetingviewsonthenatureofobjects,properties,andfacts.
Thus,Ishallhereafterargueinsupportofworldmakingagainstoneofitsmostdiehardcompetitors,metaphysicalrealism.
71Iwillproceedbyofferinganoverviewofmetaphysicalrealism.
Thereafter,Ishallraisethreeissuescovering(1)objects,(2)properties,and(3)satisfactory,yetcontradictorytheories,allofwhichwillshowthatwheremetaphysicalrealismprovesinadequate,worldmakingprevailsasamoresatisfactory,andplausible,position.
ACompendiousOverviewofMetaphysicalRealism71Thereare,ofcourse,othermetaphysicalpositionstowhichworldmakingisopposed,andinvaryingdegrees–Scheffler's"plurealism,"forexample(SeeIsraelScheffler,"APleaforPlurealism,"TransactionsoftheCharlesS.
PeirceSocietyXXXV,no.
3(1999):425-436).
Mydecisiontofocusonmetaphysicalrealismismotivatedbythefactthatitisthepositionagainstwhichworldmakingismostadamantlyopposed.
28IntheaforementionedIadumbratedthemetaphysicalrealist'sposition,butInowwishtofocusonaparticulararticulationofmetaphysicalrealism72expressedbyPutnam,andanargumentDevittsetsforthinsupportoftheposition.
First,Putnam'scharacterizationofrealismisasfollows:Onthisperspective,theworldconsistsofsomefixedtotalityofmind-independentobjects.
Thereisexactlyonetrueandcompletedescriptionof'thewaytheworld'is.
Truthinvolvessomesortofcorrespondencerelationbetweenwordsorthought-signsandexternalthingsandsetsofthings…itsfavoritepointofviewisaGod'sEyepointofview.
73Putnam'sdescriptionisnot,ofcourse,thesolewayofrepresentingrealism,butitservestoprovideuswithageneralflavoroftheposition'smajortenets.
Theworld'sontology,accordingtorealism,doesnotdependatallonourcognitivepowers,muchlessourexistence.
Objects,properties,andrelationsobtainingbetweenobjectsallexistindependentlyofhowweconceptualizeandcategorizetheworld.
Stars,mountains,trees,rocks,etcetera,andthepropertiesconstitutiveoftheirbeingtheobjectstheyareexistreadymade.
Themostwecandowithregardtotheseobjectsisdiscovertheirinherentpropertiesandfigureoutwhichofthemisessentialto,andtherebyconstitutiveof,theirbeingobjectsofaparticularkind.
Objectsareastheyarenomatterwhatwethinkaboutthem.
Staunchproponentofrealismandfamiliaropponenttoworldmaking,MichaelDevitt,advancesanargumentinsupportoftherealistpositionpredicateduponwhathecallscommonsense,andthenotionthatobjectsexistevenwhenwearenottheretoperceivethem.
74Devitt'sargumentisworthquotinginfull,andisasfollows:72Hereaftersimply"realism.
"73Putnam,Reason,Truth,andHistory,49.
74Cf.
Searle,TheConstructionofSocialReality,164.
29Fromanearlyagewecometobelievethatsuchobjectsasstones,cats,andtreesexist.
Furthermore,webelievethattheseobjectsexistevenwhenwearenotperceivingthem,andthattheydonotdependfortheirexistenceonouropinionsnoronanythingmental.
ThisRealismaboutordinaryobjectsisconfirmeddaybydayinourexperience.
Itis…theverycoreofcommonsense.
GiventhisstrongcaseforRealism,weshouldgiveituponlyinthefaceofpowerfulargumentsagainstitandforanalternative.
Therearenosucharguments.
ThatconcludesthecaseforRealism.
75Initially,ItakeissuewithDevitt'sconvictionthatfromtheideathatcommonsensetellsusobjectsexistindependentlyofus,itdoesnotnecessarilyfollowthattheydoinfactexistindependentlyofus.
Ishallargueforthismorethoroughlyinwhatfollows,butIwouldliketotakenotethatcommonsense,orday-by-dayexperience,isnotaparticularlystrongprincipletoabideby.
Commonsensetellsusthatweoughtnottoeatfoodthathasfallenonadirtyfloor,becauseitcouldbeinimicaltoourhealth.
However,itdoesnotfollowwithnecessitythateatingdirty-floor-foodwillmakeussickifingested–wemaygetlucky,muchtoourmothers'dismay.
Analogously,becausecommonsensetellsusobjectslikestones,cats,andtreesexistindependentlyofuswhetherweperceivethemornot,itdoesnotfollowthatitisthecasethatobjectsarenotdependentuponourcognition.
MytaskhenceforthistoshowDevitt,andthereader,thatthereareconvincingargumentsagainstrealism,whichshouldinfluenceustoreconsideritsplausibility.
Moreover,IshallfulfillDevitt'ssecondrequest,thedemandforanalternative,byarguingthatworldmakingstandsasaviablealternativetorealism.
TotheseargumentsIshallnowturn.
AProblemRegardingObjectDifferentiation75Devitt,"WorldmakingMadeHard:RejectingGlobalResponseDependency,"3.
Cf.
Devitt,RealismandTruth,60.
30Asdiscussedintheexplicationabove,worldmakersmaintainthatobject-hooddependsuponourcognitiveconstructions.
Ofcourse,worldmakersarenotmerelyspeakingofobjectslikeartifacts–forexample,tablesandchairs.
Thesearetrivial,uncontroversialcasesinwhichweareclearlymakingtheobjectsunderconsideration.
Onthecontrary,theideaisthatuntilwedifferentiate,say,starsfromothercelestialstuffusingwhateverprincipleofindividuationwefindappropriatetothetask,thereare,strictlyspeaking,noobjectscalled'stars'.
Now,whenrealismispittedagainstworldmakingitmaybearguedthateither(1)objectsexistindependentlyofusor(2)theirexistencedependsonus.
Ifweconsiderthefirstdisjuncttrue,thenrealismisvindicated.
Nomatterhowmuchwethinkwearecarvinguptheworldthroughourcategorizationsandconceptualizations,wearesimplymisledifwethinktheworldtakesonthecharacterweimposeonitthroughtheseprocesses.
Objectsintheworldarenotaproductofourcognitivemaking,butinstead,theymerelyexistforustodiscoverandmakesenseof.
ToreiterateSearle'sandScheffler'spoint,thattheworldisactuallyconstructedviaourconceptsisnotanecessaryconsequenceofthefactthatweuseconceptstounderstandormakerationalsenseoftheworld.
Takehumansoutofthepicture,andtheworld'sobjects–say,itsrocksandtrees–remainactuallydistinctobjects.
Thus,onemightobjectthattheworldmakerhasputthecartbeforethehorse.
Thatweareabletodetermineobject-hoodforsomethingdoesnotdependonourconceptualmaking,butinstead,object-hoodisacharacteristicofsomethingbecauseitcomestouspre-delineatedandpre-conceptualized.
Weareabletodifferentiatebetweenarockandatreenotbecausewehaveconceptualizedandcategorizedtheseobjectsfromthesensiblefluxof31experience,butrather,becausetherockandthetree,independentlyofourdoings,aresimplydistinctentities–theseobjectsarereadymade.
Thus,objectsarenotdependentonhumancognitivemakingfortheirexistence.
Althoughrealismhasstrongintuitiveorcommonsensicalappealformostphilosophersandnon-philosophersalike,itis,Ithink,deceptivelyconvincing.
Positingthatobjectsexistindependentlyofusbecause,asSearleargues,ifweimaginehumansbecomingextinct,thenobjectswillremain,doesnotnecessarilyentailthatobjectsdoinfactexistindependentlyofus.
TheforceandsignificanceofSearle'sthoughtexperimentisnotsomuchthatifweweretobecomeextincttomorrow,thenobjectswouldcontinueexisting.
Ithinkthisisbestunderstoodasarhetoricalflourishintendedtopersuadethecarelessreader.
Instead,ItakeSearletosuggestthatifwedidnotexistatall,objectswouldstillexist.
IfwereadSearleasIjustsuggested,andignorehisrhetoricalflourish,thenhisargumentbecomesabitsuspicious.
Itisamistaketoconsiderobject-hoodindependentlyofhumancognition,becauseifwewerenottoexistatall,thenthereisnosenseinwhichobjectsexist,either.
Itcanbeadmittedthatanunspecified,characterlessstuffexistsindependentlyofus,butuntilwecarveitupbydelineatingcertainboundaries,andtherebydifferentiatethis"stuff,"thereareproperlyspeakingnoobjects.
Forinstance,pickingoutstarsinthefirmamentrequiresthatwefirsthavetherelevantconceptswhichconstitutestar-hoodandtheappropriatecategoriestoputthemin–say,largebrightcelestialobjects.
Onceagain,asQuineteachesus,"[t]hereisnoentitywithoutidentity.
"76Thus,theremaybeasensiblefluxofexperience,acharacterlessrealityconsistingofnoobjects,independentofourcognitivemaking,butthisismostcertainly76Quine,TheoriesandThings,102.
32nottherealityenvisagedbytherealist.
Indeed,itisbleakandbland.
Objectssimplydonotexistwithoutourfirstdemarcatingthesensibleflux.
Thefirstdisjunctis,therefore,false–objectsdonotexistindependentlyofhumans.
Accordingly,itfollowsthatobjectsdependuponusfortheirexistence.
Worldmaking,therefore,betterexplainshowwecanmakerationalsenseofobjectsandwhatisconstitutiveofobject-hoodthanrealism,becauserealismdoesnotprovideuswithadequatetoolstodistinguishbetweenobjectswhenwearefirstconfrontedwiththeworld.
Itsimplymakesnosensetodesignatesomethingwiththename'object'untilwehavetheproperconceptsandcategoriesinplace.
Object-hood,consequently,dependsonconceptualization.
Becauserealismdoesnotaccountforthis,worldmakingtakesprimacyoverandagainstrealismwithregardtomakingsenseofhowobjectscomeintoexistence.
AProblemRegardingPropertiesWorldmakersarecommittedtotheideathatweplayaroleinmakingthepropertiesobjectshave.
Forinstance,whenwearetryingtodistinguishbetweenastarandothercelestialmatter,weshapethepropertiesbywhichstar-hoodisdetermined,asGoodmanwrites,"drawingcertainboundariesratherthanothers.
"77Therearenoreadymade,inherentpropertiesessentialtostar-hoodinreality,whicharediscoveredbyhumans,givingustheappropriatesignifiersbywhichwecanrecognizestars.
Thesamegoesforourmorefamiliarterrestrialobjectsliketreesorflowers.
Realists,ontheotherhand,believethatthepropertiesconstitutiveofobject-hooddoexistreadymade.
Suchpropertiesdonotdependonusfortheirexistence.
Rather,we77Goodman,"NotesontheWell-MadeWorld,"156.
33aremerelycapableofdiscoveringwhattheyare.
ItwillbehelpfultoreconsidersomeofDevitt'sillustrationsfromhisargumentagainstworldmaking,ashetakesthem,also,tosupportrealism.
Inparticular,Iwanttofocusonhisargumentregardingrosesandthepropertytheymusthaveinordertobedenotedbytheexpression'rose'.
Toreiterate,hereisDevitt'sargument:"(1)'rose'refers…tosomethinginvirtueofitsbeingR(where…'R'expresseswhateverpropertysomethingmusthavetobereferredtoby'rose')…Themeaningof'rose'doesnotalonedetermine,forexample,that(2)'rose'referstob.
Toestablish(2),weneednotonly(1)butalso(3)bisR.
And(3)issomethingthatisrightoutsideourcontrol.
"78ThatbisR,accordingtoDevitt,iscontrolledanddecidedbytheworld,notbyhumancognition.
WemustdiscoverwhetherbisRinordertosuccessfullyrefertobwiththeexpression'rose'.
Devitttakesitthatanyviewtothecontraryissimplyfalse.
WhatDevittandotherproponentsofrealismfailtorecognizeisthatthereisnosensetobemadeofpairingexpressionstoobjectswithoutfirstdeterminingwhatcountsasaparticularobjectinthefirstplace.
Forinstance,borrowingDevitt'sexample,thatbisRmustfirstbeestablishedbywhateverconceptisrelevantandappropriatetothetask.
ThatbisR,inotherwords,fallsunderthepurviewofhumanconceptualization,anddoesnotcomeintheworldreadymade.
Ifitdoesnotfallunderourpurview,thenwewouldmerelyattendtotheobject,sincebwouldbedevoidofanycharacter–thatis,properties–indicatingtouswhatkindofobjectitis;wemust,inotherwords,determineitscharacterinorderforreferencetooccur,muchlessbesuccessful.
78Devitt,RealismandTruth,242-43.
34Considerafurtherexample.
Thatxisanobjectreferredtobytheexpression'hard'isdeterminedbyourplacingitintherelevantkind'hardness'.
Butthekind'hardness'doesnotexistreadymadeintheworld.
Sayingthatitdoeswouldbeakintosayingthepredicate'isMrs.
Jones'sdog'inthesentence'RufusisMrs.
Jones'sdog'existsreadymadeintheworld.
Wecreatethekind'hardness'throughconceptualization.
Andoncethisisestablished,wecanthenfurtherdeterminewhichentitiesareappropriatelygroupedunderit.
Thisisthewayinwhichwedecidewhatcountsashavingthepropertyhardness.
Anduntilthisoccurs,xdoesnothavethepropertyofbeinghard.
Thus,referringtoxasbeinghard,aswellasxhavingthepropertyhardness,dependsonourconceptualizationandcategorization.
AlthoughIbelieveDevittiscorrectinassertingthattheexpression'rose'cannotbyitselfestablishthat'rose'referstosomeobject,heiswrongtothinkthatthepropertyRisoutsideourcontrol.
Quitethecontrary,wedeterminethereferencerelation(that'rose'referstoanobjectthatisR),thatbisR,and,accordingly,that'rose'referstob.
Realismcannotsatisfactorilyaccountforsuchcases,whileworldmakingcan.
Thus,worldmakingstandsasamoresatisfactory,andplausible,alternativetorealismwithregardtopositinganadequateaccountofproperties.
AccountingForSatisfactory,YetContradictoryTheoriesWeoftenencountercontradictorytheoriesandontologies–forexample,theworldasflatandtheworldasround,andEuclideangeometryandnon-Euclideangeometry.
Realists,asIhavecharacterizedthem,believethatsuchattemptsatmakingsenseoftheworldareattemptsatdescribingitveridicallyordiscoveringfactsinherentinit.
Thus,althoughrealistscouldallowforincompatibleversionsordescriptionsofthe35world79,theynonethelessremaininconflictsincetheyrefertooneandthesameworld.
Conversely,worldmakingcanallowforincompatibleworld-versionsthatdonotconflictinoneandthesameworldsinceeachworld-versioncanbetakenasadistinctworld.
Thus,itisnottheversionsthatareinconflictperse,butrather,asGoodmanputsthepoint,itisworldsthatareinconflict.
Considerasituationinwhichtwoequallysatisfactorytheoriesorworld-versionsareincompatiblewitheachother.
Furthersupposebothhavethesamepredictivepowerandequaldegreesofsatisfactorinesswhenitcomestotheirexplanatorypower,buttheybothdosoindivergent,incompatibleways.
Underoneconceptionofrealism,analogoustoPutnam'sdescriptionabove,onetheorymustbeeliminated.
Thereseemstobenoharmdoneinthisscenario,asboththeoriesaresatisfactory.
However,theeliminationisliabletocreatecontroversy,generatingnotonlyaconflictoftheoriesbutalsoaconflictofpersonalities.
Underaslightlymodifiedrealism,onewhichallowsforrelativism,boththeoriesmayremainintact.
Butthisallowsforincompatibilitywithinthesameworld.
Ifwethinkoftheworldandeverythingitcontainsasouruniverseofdiscourse,thenweareallowingforincompatibilitywithinouruniverseofdiscourse,whichisanunacceptableconsequence.
Thus,evenifrealistsallowforrelativism,contradictorytheoriesstillconflictwithinthesameuniverseofdiscourse.
Theadvantageofworldmaking,ontheotherhand,liesinitsprinciplethatcontradictorytheoriesarebestunderstoodasfallingunderthescopeofdistinctuniversesofdiscourse–thatis,distinctworlds,asdifferentworld-versionsconstitutedistinctworlds.
Worldmaking,therefore,betteraccountsforincompatibletheoriesandworld-versions,bothofwhicharenonethelesssatisfactoryor79SeeSearle,TheConstructionofSocialReality,155.
36true,andrealismsimplycannotdothisinvirtueofitsprinciples.
Thus,again,weseethatworldmakingconstitutesaviableandmoreattractivepositionoverandagainstrealism.
ConclusionIbelieveIhaveaccomplishedatleasttwofeatsintheforegoing.
Thefirstofwhichconcernsmydefenseofworldmaking.
AsIhavearguedalready,Ithinktheargumentsleveledagainstworldmakingmisstheirmarkeitherbyfailingtoshowthepositiontobeimplausibleorbymisunderstandingitentirely.
Second,becauseIhavedemonstratedthatworldmakingdoesnotfallpreytotheabovecriticisms,Ithenshowedthatitshouldberegardedasaplausiblemetaphysicalpositionamongitscompetitors,namely,metaphysicalrealism.
Worldmakingprovidesabetteraccountoftheworldthanrealism,andbecausethisisthecase,standsasaviablealternativetorealism.
Thepositionis,therefore,notasillyone,butrather,aplausiblewayinwhichwecanmakerationalsenseoftheworldandourplaceinit.
Asaresult,Ibelievemyattemptsshouldinfluencephilosopherstotaketheworldmakermoreseriously,andtoconsiderthewaysinwhichworldmakingstandsasatenablepositionandanalternativetoso-calledintuitivemetaphysicalperspectiveslikerealism.
Arecentcommentatorandcontributortothepolemicconcerningworldmaking,IrisEinheuser,writes,Thefactsarewhattheyareandwedoourbesttodiscoverthem,someofuswithmore,somewithlesssuccess.
Departurefromthiscommonsensepicturerequiresbothastrongmotivationthatstemsfromreflectiononthenatureofthefactsinquestion…andadetailedenoughaccountofhowthesefactsaresupposedtobesociallyconstructed.
TherighttoaconstructivistpositionhastobeearnedandIexpectthatoncetheyhavebeenshownjusthowharditistoformulateacoherent,letaloneplausible,version…manypeoplewillretreattomodesty.
8080Einheuser,"FearofKnowledge,"455.
37IhopeIhaveconvincedthereadertosomedegreenottoretreattomodesty,butinstead,thatthereisgoodreasontoforgeahead.
Einheuser'sobservationiscertainlyaperspicaciousoneinsofarasthetaskwillnotbeeasy.
However,IbelieveIhaveshownhereinthatworldmakingstandsupinthefaceofcriticismandonthatscoreitshouldbetreatednotonlyasaplausiblepositiononitsown,butasareasonableandseriousalternativetorealism.
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