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AdministrativeConferenceoftheUnitedStatesSTAKEHOLDERCOLLABORATIONSFORMANAGINGLANDANDNATURALRESOURCESSeptember28,2017KarenBradshawArizonaStateUniversity,SandraDayO'ConnorCollegeofLawThisreportwaspreparedfortheconsiderationoftheAdministrativeConferenceoftheUnitedStates.
Theopinions,viewsandrecommendationexpressedarethoseoftheauthoranddonotnecessarilyreflectthoseofthemembersoftheConferenceoritscommittees,exceptwhereformalrecommendationsoftheConferencearecited.
2TABLEOFCONTENTSEXECUTIVESUMMARY.
3INTRODUCTION7I.
ANOVERVIEWOFSTAKEHOLDERCOLLABORATIONS.
10A.
TheDistinctiveChallengeofManagingLandscapes.
10B.
DefiningStakeholderCollaborations.
121.
DefiningaStakeholder.
122.
DefiningCollaboration.
143.
DefiningStakeholderCollaborations17C.
RelatedLiteratures16D.
ATypologyofStakeholderCollaborations19II.
LEGALLANDSCAPE20A.
FederalStatutes211.
FederalAdvisoryCommitteeAct.
212.
AdministrativeDisputeResolutionAct.
223.
Agency-andResource-SpecificCollaborationStatutes24B.
ExecutiveOrders.
27C.
AgencyRegulations,etc.
30D.
OtherSourcesofLegalAuthority31III.
BESTPRACTICESANDRECOMMENDATIONS.
32A.
AssessingStakeholderCollaborations331.
BenefitsofCollaboration332.
ProblemswithCollaboration36B.
BestPracticesandRecommendations.
411.
DecidingWhethertoEstablishaCollaboration412.
EstablishingaNewCollaboration.
473.
MaintainingStakeholderCollaborations.
524.
ExtensionsBeyondManagingLandandResources54V.
CONCLUSION.
55APPENDIXI:STATUTES56APPENDIXII:REGULATIONS76APPENDIXIII:CASESTUDY1:THEWACHWG81APPENDIXIV:CASESTUDY2:THE4FRI91APPENDIXV:INTERVIEWPROTOCOL…1003EXECUTIVESUMMARYTheUnitedStatesownsnearlyone-thirdofthelandwithinitsboundaries.
1Thirteenfederalagencies2managepubliclandsandnaturalresources.
3Agencyem-ployeesinteractdailywithdiversestakeholdersthatholdvariedperspectivesonhowpublicresourcesshouldbemanaged.
Someconflictsresultinlitigation,inwhichadisappointedstakeholderaskacourttooverturnadecisionreachedbyanagency.
4Otherconflictseruptintoproteststhatcapturenationalattention,aswiththemilitiatakeoveroftheMalheurNationalWildlifeRefugeinHammond,Ore-gon,5ortheStandingRockSiouxprotestoftheDakotaAccessPipeline.
6Internalandexternalstakeholdershavelongpressuredagenciestoidentifymoreeffectivetechniquesformanaginginevitableconflicts,sothatresourcemanagementprob-lemsdonotdevolveintolitigationorviolentprotests.
Collaboration—stakeholdersworkingwithoneanothertodevelopmanagementrecommendations,inpartnershipwithagencies—hasemergedasaleadingtool.
Althoughubiquitousinpractice,col-laborationisundertheorized,withlimitedlongitudinalanalysisofcurrentpractices.
ThisReportsidentifies,defines,andevaluatesstakeholdercollaborations—longstandingworkinggroupscomprisedofdiversestakeholderscommittedtoprovidinginputontheevolvingmanagementchallengessurroundingtheuseofpubliclandandnaturalresources.
Landowners,industriallandusers,nongovern-mentalorganizations,stateandtribalneighbors,hunters,conservationists,andoth-ersformcollaborationsasastructuralvehicleforcomingtogethertodiscussissuesrelatedtoparticularlandorresources.
Thecollaborationdevelopsrulesandnormsforinternalgovernance,suchmonthlymeetingsandhowinternaldisputeswillberesolved.
Overtime,thecollaborationidentifiesspecificareasofconcern,shares1CAROLHARDYVINCENT,LAURAA.
HANSON,ANDCARLAN.
ARGUETA,CONG.
RESEARCHSERV.
,R42346,FEDERALLANDOWNERSHIP:OVERVIEWANDDATA3(2017).
2Foralistingofagencies,seeinfraFigure3.
3"Naturalresources"includethingsthatrunwiththeland,suchasoilandgasreservesorwater-ways.
Overtime,thedefinitionexpandedtoincludeconservationandrecreation.
See42U.
S.
C.
S.
§9601(16)(2017).
4NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil,Inc.
v.
Hodel,865F.
2d288,319(D.
C.
Cir.
1988).
SeeThomasC.
Brown,GeorgeL.
Peterson,&BruceE.
Tonn,TheValuesJurytoAidNaturalRe-sourceDecisions,71.
2LANDECONOMICS250-260(1995).
5KirkJohnson,TrialtoBegininStandoffatOregonWildlifeRefuge,N.
Y.
TIMES(Sept.
12,2016),https://www.
nytimes.
com/2016/09/13/us/oregon-malheur-wildlife-refuge-bundy.
htmlmcubz=3.
11;JohnM.
Broder,GeographyIsDividingDemocratsOverEnergy,N.
Y.
TIMES(Jan.
27,2009),http://www.
nytimes.
com/2009/01/27/science/earth/27coal.
html.
6JulietEilperin,StandingRockSiouxWant'NoForcibleRemoval'ofProtestersfromDakotaAccessPipelineSite,WASH.
POST(Feb.
5,2016),https://www.
washingtonpost.
com/news/en-ergy-environment/wp/2017/02/05/standing-rock-sioux-want-no-forcible-removal-of-protesters-from-dakota-access-pipeline-site/utm_term=.
889d525da096.
4perspectives,createsreports,andhashesoutrecommendationsonhowtherelevantmanagementagencyshouldapproachaparticularproblem.
Agenciesworkcloselywithcollaborationsbutarenotthemselvesmembersofthecollaboration.
7Instead,agenciesplayasupportiverole,suchasinitiatingtheformationofacollaboration,providingmeetingspace,assigningpersonneltoactasliaisonsbetweenthecollaborationandagency,sharinginformation,andgener-atingfunding.
Agenciesalsoinformallyshareaportionoftheirdecision-makingauthoritywithcollaborationswhentheyengagestakeholdersinmeetingsandwork-inggroupstoreachmutually-agreeabledecisions.
Theagencyislegallyrequired,however,toretainthesoledecision-makingauthorityoverdecisions,evenwhenmadeinconsultationwithcollaborativegroups.
Decision-makingisaniterativeprocess,unfoldingoverdecadesandrepeatinginresponsetoever-changingnaturalconditions.
Stakeholdercollaborationsmayserveinaconsultativeroleovermanyyearsorforjustafewmonths.
Theyoftenworkwithagenciestoachievemultipleobjectivesand,throughoutitall,strivetobuildtrustandmaintainpositive,workingrelationships.
ThisReportemploysadefinitionofstakeholdercollaborationsthathasemergedfromreviewofqualitativedataandprimarydocuments:Astakeholdercollaborationisagroupofpeoplewithstrongin-terestsin,yetdifferingviewson,thepropermanagementofaparticular,localizedgroupoflandsorresources,committedinwritingtoworkingtogethertocreatemutually-agreeablerec-ommendationsformanagingtheresourceacrosschangingcon-ditionsanongoingbasis.
Thisdefinitiondoesnotcomefromscholarlyliterature,butinsteadreflectstheperspectivesofagencyemployeesandstakeholdersactivelyparticipatingincol-laborations.
87Oneagencyrespondentraisedtheimportantpointthatthisdefinitionexcludesformsofcollabo-rationsuchasregionalplanningbodies,inwhichvariousgovernmententitiescollaboratedtoex-ploreoptionsandshareinformation.
AlthoughsuchabodywouldbeoutsidethedefinitionofstakeholdercollaborationsasdefinedinthisReport,asitincludesongovernmentstakeholders,in-ter-governmentcollaborationsundoubtedlyexistamongfederal,tribal,state,andlocalgovern-ments,andplayanimportantroleinmanagingavarietyofresources.
8ThisReportdoes,however,situatestakeholdercollaborationsintherelevantlegal,publicpol-icy,andnaturalresourcesliteratures,includingcollaborativeadaptivemanagement,networkgovernance,andpolycentricgovernance.
Forthisdiscussion,seeinfraPartI.
C.
Foratypogra-phyofcollaborationsinthecontextofnaturalresources,thendifferentiatesstakeholdercollabo-rationsfromotherformsofcollaborativegovernance(suchaslisteningsessions),seeinfraPartI.
D.
5Congresshaspassedhundredsoflawsrequiringagenciestocollaboratewithstakeholderstomanageresourcesrangingfromwildlifetowaterways.
Alt-houghthecontentofthelawsvariesconsiderably,thefundamentalrequirementthatanagencymustconsultwithanexternalgroupisconsistentacrossstatute.
There-sulthasbeenmultiple,overlappingcollaborationsthatspantheentireUnitedStates,acomplicatednetworkofthousandsofnested,inter-connectedgovernancere-gimes.
9Atthesametime,theFederalAdvisoryCommitteeAct,10alawimposingrequirementsonagencies'interactionswithnon-agencyparties,remainsonthebooks11andcreatestensionbetweenlawsrequiringcollaborationandFACA'scer-tificationrequirement—atensionthatsomestakeholdersandagencyofficialsfindtroubling.
12ThisReportisthefirsttosurveytheproliferationoftheselaws.
13Inadditiontostatutoryrequirements,thelastseveralPresidentshaveissuedExecutiveOrdersrequiringagenciestoadoptcollaborativeapproaches.
14Similarly,SecretarialOrdershaveestablishedspecificcollaborations,andagencieshavepromulgatednumerousregulationsconcerningcollaboration.
15Agencypolicydoc-umentsprovideguidanceonhowagencyshouldinteractwithcollaborativegroups.
16Privategovernance,internaltothecollaboration,alsoplaysacrucial—althoughvirtuallyunstudied—role.
17Itisdifficulttoempiricallyassessboththebeneficialandtheharmfulpo-tentialofcollaborations,eitherforanindividualprojectorintheaggregate.
Quali-tativeanalysis,however,yieldsthreeroughcategoriesofbenefits,asidentifiedbyagencyofficialsworkingwithwell-functioningcollaborations.
First,agencies9SeeinfraFigure3andassociatedtext(displayingmapsofthreedifferentregionalcollabora-tionsoperatingundervariousagencies,withdifferentboundaries).
10Pub.
L.
92–463,86Stat.
770,reprintedin5U.
S.
C.
S.
app.
§3(2)(2017).
11Thathelpsavoidconfusionastoroles.
SeeNaturalResourcesDefenseCouncilv.
Johnson,488F3d1002(D.
C.
Cir.
2007)(holdingthatanenvironmentalorganizationwasnotrequiredtofileformalrequestwithEPAundertheFreedomofInformationActtohavestandingtomain-tainactionforallegedviolationsofFACAallegingthatEPAviolated5USCSapp.
2§3(2)byitsestablishmentandutilizationofadvisorycommittee);Manshardtv.
Fed.
JudicialQualifica-tionsComm.
,408F.
3d1154(9thCir.
2005)(holdingthatacommitteeformedtorecommendnomineesforcertainfederalappointmentswasnotadvisorycommitteewithinscopeofFACAasitwasnotestablishedbystatute,agency,orPresident;moreover,itwasnotutilizedbyPresi-dentforpurposesofFACA,particularlysinceitsrecommendationswerenotsolicitedbyPresi-dent).
12SeeinfraPartIII.
A.
1.
13SeeinfraAppendixI(statutes);AppendixII(regulations).
14SeeinfraPartII.
B.
15SeeinfraPartII.
C.
16Id.
17ThisReportfocusesonsolelyonagencyinteractionwithcollaborations,butflagstheinternalgovernanceofthecollaborationsasvital,butvirtuallyunstudied,aspectofthebroaderprojectofunderstandingthelegallandscapesurroundingstakeholdercollaborations.
SeeinfraPartII.
D.
6reachsubstantivelybetterdecisionsbecauseofthediverseviewpointsgeneratedthroughthecollaborativeprocess.
18Second,decisionsthatresultfromcollabora-tionshavegreatersocialacceptance;opponentsarelesslikelytosue.
19Third,agen-ciesbenefitwhenstakeholdersusetheirinternalresourcestosupporttheachieve-mentofsharedobjectives.
20Conversely,intervieweesidentifiedthreepointsofconcern,whichagenciesshouldbemindfulofwhenengagingwithcollaborations.
First,agenciesarelegallyrequiredtoretainfinaldecision-makingauthorityandshouldcontinuallyassesstheextenttowhichtheirincorporationofinputfromthecollaborationisconsistentwithFACA.
21Second,collaborationsmaydisadvantagelowersocioeconomicstatusstakeholderswholacktheresourcesnecessarytoengageincollaboration,therebyallowingthosewithtimeandmoneytohaveadisproportionateinfluenceoverlandandresources.
22Third,thereisapaucityofempiricaldatasupportingtheclaimthatcollaborationswork,oneitheranabsoluteorrelativebasis.
23Theseconsiderationsformthefoundationofacorrespondingsetofbestpracticesforagenciesengagingwithcollaborations.
Anagencydecidingwhethertoinitiateacollaborationshouldconsidersomepreliminarybestpractices.
Theagencyshouldbeginbyaskingwhetherthereisaproblemthatmattersdeeplytoarecognizablegroupofpeopleandwhetheritispossibleforengagementtogeneratemutually-agreeablesolutions.
24Forinstance,itisfutiletostartacollaborationiftheagencyisnotcommittedtosharingdecision-makingspacewithstakeholders.
25Situationsinwhichthereisbothtop-downandbottom-upsupportforcollaborationswithinanagencyprovidethebestlikelihoodofcreatingasuccessfulcollaboration.
26Giventheavailabilityofotherstrategiesthatcanincorporatecollaborativegovernancebutdonotrequireafull-fledgedstakeholdercollaboration,agenciesshouldalsoseektheleastformalmechanismforachievingthedesiredgoal.
2718SeeinfraPartIII.
A.
1(a).
19SeeinfraPartIII.
A.
1(b).
20SeeinfraPartIII.
A.
1(c).
21SeeinfraPartIII.
A.
2(a).
22SeeinfraPartIII.
A.
2(b).
23SeeinfraPartIII.
A.
2(c).
24SeeinfraPartIII.
B.
1(a).
25SeeinfraPartIII.
B.
1(b).
26SeeinfraPartIII.
B.
1(c).
27Id.
7Agenciesparticipatinginestablishinganewcollaborationshouldthende-terminewhetherFACAapplies28andwhichlawsorregulationswillgovernthecollaboration.
29Fromthere,experienced,on-the-groundagencyemployeesshouldidentifypotentialstakeholders.
30Employeesshouldseekfeedbackonthepotentialinterestofstakeholderstoparticipateinacollaboration,theninvitepotentialmem-bersofthegrouptomeetwithoneanotherastheyconsiderwhethertojointhegroup.
31Differentformsofinvitationmayworkbestfordifferentstakeholders;itisvitalthatinvitationsaremindfuloftheconstraintsonparticipationfacedbysomegroups,particularlythoseoflowersocioeconomicstatus.
32Afterbringingthegrouptogether,theagencyshouldprovideinformationabouttheagency'sroleandthenstepbacktoencouragethecollaborationtocreateitsownstructureandgroundrules.
33Theagencycan,however,guidethecollaborativetowardsproperly-sizedtasks,takingintoaccountthematurityandtrustofrelationshipswithinthegroup.
34Agenciesandcollaborationsshouldregularlyassessthegroup'ssuccessalongavarietyofdimensions,includingsubstanceandprocess.
35Althoughtheagencycannotcontrolthecollaboration,itmayprovidefundingforfacilitatorstoguidethecollaborationinassessingtherelevantmetricsforsuccessandfutureob-jectives.
INTRODUCTIONThisReportundertakesthefollowingfourtasks,eachwithrespecttostake-holdercollaborations:(1)definingtheterm;(2)surveyingthelegallandscape;(3)assessingharmsandbenefits;and(4)recommendingbestpractices.
Thisreportflagsbutdoesnotaddressseveraltopicsworthyoffurtherresearch.
Mostnotably,thisReportdoesnotempiricallyanalyzewhethercollaborationsworkwell,eitherabsolutetermsorrelativetoothermethodsofconflictresolution.
Italsoflags,butdoesaddress,theimportanceoffuturestudyontheprivategovernancesystemsthatrulecollaborations.
Further,thisReportdoesnotengagewiththedemocraticques-tionssurroundingtheextenttowhichcollaborationsdo—orshould—displaceotheradministrativetoolsforresourcemanagement.
Ipredictthatthisquestionthatwillbecomingincreasinglyurgentascollaborations'influenceincreases;indeed,this28ForaflowchartthatcanbeusedtoanalyzetheapplicabilityofFACAtoaparticularcollabo-ration,seePartIII.
B.
2,Figure5.
29AsurveyoflawsgoverningcollaborationareavailableinAppendixI;relevantregulationsarecontainedinAppendixII.
30SeeinfraPartIII.
B.
2.
31Id.
32Id.
33Id.
34Id.
35SeeinfraPartIII.
B.
8willlikelybecomeacentralquestionforcourtsconsideringenvironmental,publiclandsandnaturalresourcesissues.
AlthoughthisReportdoesnotdirectlyaddresstheseissues,itprovidesafoundationfordoingso,bysynthesizingthepracticesofcollaborationacrossfederalagencies.
PartIdefinesstakeholdercollaborationsandsituatesthetermwithinadministrativelawandpublicadministrationliteratures.
Itexplainswhylandscapesareuniquelysuitedtocollaborativegovernance,thendefines"stakeholder"and"collaboration.
"Despiteextensivestudiesofstakeholdercollaborationwithinagencies,thereisrelativelylimitedinformationonbestpracticesacrossagencies.
ThisReportsseekstofillthatvoidthroughalongitudinalanalysisoflandandresourcemanagementagencies'experiencesandpractices.
ThisPartconcludesbydistinguishingstakeholdercollaborationsfromothertypesofcollaborativegovernancetools.
PartIIsurveysthelegallandscapeofstakeholdercollaboration.
AnovelreviewrevealsthatCongresshasenactedoveronehundredstatutesdirectingagenciestocollaborate.
36Thesheervolumeofexistinglawanticipatingcollaborationisstriking.
Statutorymandatesvarywidelyalongdimensionsoftiming,scope,andformality.
Thispartalsoprovidesanoverviewofthebipartisannatureofcollaborativegovernanceforpubliclandsandnaturalresources,demonstratedbythefactthatPresidentsClinton,Bush,ObamaandTrumphaveallissuedordersdirectingagenciestocollaborate.
Finally,PartIIprovidesanoverviewoftheextensiveregulationsgoverningcollaborativepractices,andidentifiesothersourcesofgovernancethatinfluencecollaboration.
PartIIIexaminesthepotentialbenefitsanddownsidesofcollaborations,asexplainedbystakeholdersandagencyemployees.
PartAsuggeststhatcollaborationscanhelpagenciesproducebetter-informeddecisions,whicharemorelikelytobesupportedbythepublic,butmaycomeatthecostoflosingsomestakeholderswholacktheresourcestoparticipateincollaborations.
PartBtranslatestheseconcernsintoconcreterecommendationsforagenciesatallpointsalongthecollaborationspectrum,fromconsideringwhethertostartastakeholdercollaboration,tomanagingandassessinganexistingcollaboration.
ThisPartdrawsheavilyfromtheexperiences,includingdifficultlessonslearned,bytheintervieweesinthisproject.
PartIVconcludestheReportbyconsideringthefutureofcollaboration.
Itsuggeststhatastandardmetricforassessmentofcollaborationsissorelyneededalongseveraldimensions,includingrelativeeffectiveness,inclusion,andthecontentofprivategovernance.
PartIVfurtherconsidersthekeychallengesto36SeeinfraAppendixI.
9agencies'collaborativepractices,andidentifieswaysinwhichagenciescanprotectagainstlegalchallengesthatmayarise.
Finally,thereportconcludesbyconsideringotherareasoftheadministrativestatethatcanbenefitfromthelessonslearnedfromcollaboration.
Forinstance,disastermanagement—atopicwithnumerousparallelsandconnectionstonaturalresources—isanaturalextensionforstakeholdercollaborations.
MuchofthisReportimplicitlydrawsfromtwonovelcasestudiesofstakeholdercollaborations.
Idevelopedthesecasestudiesfromaseriesofinterviewswithagencyofficialsandotherstakeholders.
37ThisReportalsodrawsfromprimarydocumentsfromstakeholdercollaborations,includingguidancememoranda,reviews,andmanagementplans.
Thefirstcasestudy,containedinAppendixIII,studiestheWesternArcticCaribouHerdWorkingGroup,atwenty-year-oldcollaborationdevotedtomanagingacaribouherdwitharangeextendingacrossapproximatelyone-thirdoftheAlaska.
Tracingthehistoryanddevelopmentofthegroupovertimeprovidesinsightintoalong-standingorganizationthathassustainedseveralresourceshocks.
Thesecondcasestudy,containedinAppendixIV,explorestheFourForestResearchInitiative("The4FRI")inNorthernArizona.
Amongotherpoints,thiscasestudyhighlightsthevariousmetricsuponwhichsuccesscanbemeasured,thedistinctionbetweencompromiseandunanimity,andtheextenttowhichagenciesmustinvestatbothaninstitutionalandemployeeleveltomaintainproductiverelationshipswithcollaborators.
Thesecasestudieshighlightpreviouslyunrecognizedchallengestocollaborationandtheunexpectedwaysinwhichagenciesareusingcollaborations.
KeypointsfromeachcasestudyareincorporatedthroughouttheReport.
Readersinterestedinamoredetailedinstitutionalaccountoftwocollaborations,includingamorerobustviewofthedynamics,challenges,andlessonslearned,shouldbeginbyreadingAppendixIIIandIV.
37TheinterviewprotocoliscontainedinAppendixV.
10I.
ANOVERVIEWOFSTAKEHOLDERCOLLABORATIONSTherearemyriadcompetingdefinitionsofcollaboration,collaborativegovernance,andstakeholdercollaborations.
38InthisReport,Iusethewordsandexperiencesofintervieweestodefinestakeholdercollaborationsas:agroupofpeoplewithstronginterestsin,yetdifferingviewson,thepropermanagementofaparticular,localizedgroupoflandsorresources,committedinwritingtoworkingtogethertocreatemutually-agreeablerecommendationsformanagingtheresourceacrosschangingconditionsonanongoingbasis.
39Thegoalofcollaborationsisforadversaries—evenpotentiallitigants—togatheraroundatabletodiscovermutually-agreeablesolutions.
ThisReportfocusesuponstakeholdercollaborationsthatinteractwith—orarecreatedforthepurposeofinforming—theuseofpubliclandsandresourcesinconcertwithagencies.
40Toresolvesomeofthepotentialconfusionthatmayarisewhenconsideringthevariousmanifestationsofcollaborations,Ihavecreatedatypologyofcollaborativegovernancetools,suchasregionalcouncilsandlisteningsessions,andillustratehowtheydifferfromstakeholdercollaborations.
Forfurtherinsights,IalsoturnedtothebroaderpoolofliteratureonpublicprivateinteractionswithinAdministrativeLaw,whichhighlightswhystakeholdercollaborationsareadistinct,albeitfrequentlyrelated,phenomena.
A.
TheDistinctiveChallengeofManagingLandscapesAlllandownersmustcollaborate,tosomedegree,withtheirneighbors,orriskcostlylitigation.
Thegovernment,whenactinginalandmanagementcapacity,isnodifferent.
Asaresult,collaborationsplayaroleingoverningvirtuallyall38Nearlyeveryoneinterviewedforthisprojectcouldidentifyexamplesofspecificcollabora-tions,butnotedthatitwasanactivestruggletocategorizeother,less-obviousexamplesofagen-ciesworkingwithnon-agencyactorsonadefinedobjective.
Thisconfusionisconsistentwithbroaderlackofscholarlyconsensusincreatingtypologiesofcollaborations.
SeeRichardD.
Margerum,ATypologyofCollaborationEffortsinEnvironmentalManagement,41ENVTL.
MGMT.
487(2008).
39Adefiningfeaturestakeholdercollaborationsisthattheyarecentereduponmanagingthelandandresourcesinadefinedgeographicspace.
Otherscholarshavecorrectlynoted,however,thatthehuman-naturalinteractioncannotbelimitedtosimplyecologicalelements;socialandeco-nomicconsiderationsarenecessarilyembeddedincollaborations.
See,e.
g.
,Akhtar‐Schuster,M.
,Thomas,R.
J.
,Stringer,L.
C.
,Chasek,P.
andSeely,M.
,ImprovingtheEnablingEnvironmenttoCombatLandDegradation:Institutional,Financial,LegalandScience‐PolicyChallengesandSo-lutions,22(2)LANDDEGRAD.
&DEV.
299(2011);TianShi,EcologicalEconomicsasaPolicySci-ence:RhetoricorCommitmentTowardsanImprovedDecision-MakingProcessonSustainability,48(1)ECOL.
ECON.
23,24(2004).
40Theoretically,stakeholdercollaborationscanexistindependentlyofagenciesandgovernment.
11publiclandsandnaturalresourcesinthemodernadministrativestate.
41Everyacreoflandcontainsmultiplenaturalresources.
Theseincludeair,watersheds,wildlifehabitat,firesheds,and,potentially,oilandgasreserves,undergroundminerals,recreationalresources,viewsheds,andtimber.
42Collectively,theseresourcesoperateasanecosysteminwhicheachpartdirectlyorindirectlyinfluencestheotherparts.
43Effectivelymanaginganysingleresource,suchaswildfireriskreduction,mayrequiremanagementofotherresourcesliketimberandwatersheds.
44Oneeffectofmultipleoverlappingresourcesisthatthesesourcesmayoperateatdifferingscalesofmanagement.
Forinstance,landscape-levelresourcescannotbeeffectivelymanagedatanindividualparcellevelbecausetheyoperateatarangeofthousandsortensofthousandsofacres.
45Consideralsotheexampleofwildlife:Fewlandholdershavelargeenoughparcelstobeabletounilaterallyprotectawolfpackwitharangeof100,000miles.
46Sinceresourceboundariesdonotnecessarilycorrespondwithlandparcels,47effectiveresourcemanagementrequirescollaborationamongvariouslandownersorresourcerights-holderstoachievegoalspertainingtolandscape-levelresources,suchasoptimizingprofitabilityofoilandgasorcreatingwildlifehabitatcorridors.
48Therearethreewaystoeffectivelymanagealandscape-levelresource:(1)asingleownerowningtheentirelandscape;(2)lawsandregulationsgoverning41AsurveyofBureauofLandManagementemployeesindicatesthatover70%ofrespondentsbelievedconsideredallBLMissuestobe"somewhatsuitable"forcollaboration.
Between55and66ofrespondentsfelttheindividualissuesof"recreation,""landuseplanning/NEPA,""rangemanagement,"and"fishandwildlife"wereconducivetocooperationandcollaborativegovernance.
EMILYW.
RUELL,NINABURKARDT,&RYANM.
DONOVAN,BUREAUOFLANDMANAGEMENT,ASURVEYOFBUREAUOFLANDMANAGEMENTEMPLOYEESONCOLLABORATIONANDALTERNATIVEDISPUTERESOLUTION,OPEN-FILEREPORT2015-1015(2015).
42CurtisEaton,AllanIngelson,&RainerKnopff,PropertyRightsRegimesToOptimizeNaturalResourceUse–FutureCBMDevelopmentAndSustainability.
47NAT.
RES.
J.
469-496(Spring2007).
43KenJ.
Wallace,ClassificationofEcosystemServices:ProblemsandSolutions,139(3)BIOL.
CONS.
235-246(2007).
44KarenBradshaw&DeanLueck,ContractingforControlofLandscapes,100IOWAL.
REV.
2507,2511(2015).
45Id.
,at2516.
46SeegenerallyCHARLESE.
KAY,PREDATORYBUREAUCRACY:THEEXTERMINATIONOFWOLVESANDTHETRANSFORMATIONOFTHEWEST220(2007).
47KarenBradshaw&BryanLeonard,VirtualParceling(TheClassicalLiberalInstitute,NewYorkUniversitySchoolofLaw,WorkingPapersSeries,December13,2016),https://pa-pers.
ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.
cfmabstract_id=2885102.
48Bradshaw&Lueck,supranote44,at2525.
12resourceuse;or(3)landownerscooperatingortransactingtobundlecontroloverlandscape-levelresources.
49Withrespecttopubliclands,agencylandmanagersmaycontroltheentirelandscape,andthushavethelegalcapacitytoplanorregulateresourceusewithinstatutoryconfines.
Despitethis,agenciesalsocooperatewithnearbyandadjacentlandowners.
Asearlyas1920,ForestServiceemployeemanualsencouragedrangerstopromoteinformalcooperationbyemulatinglocalnorms—animplicitunderstandingofanowwell-developednotionthatlocalized,bottom-upcooperativeresourcemanagementcanavoidresourceexhaustion.
50Today,agencyofficialsgenerallybelievethatcollaborationsprovidenumerousbenefits,suchasreducinglitigationandimprovingdecision-making,51althoughsuchclaimslargelylackaquantifiablebasis.
52B.
DefiningStakeholderCollaborationsThedifficultyindefiningstakeholdercollaborationsemergesfromseveralfactors,including:(1)theexistenceofmultipleresourcesinsharedgeographicspace;(2)thenestednatureofcollaborations,rangingfromtheveryspecific(e.
g.
anindividualspeciesinasinglestate)totheverybroad(e.
g.
aninternationalconsortiumofcountriesandbotanicalgardensdefiningpoliciesforendangeredplantspecies);(3)thedifferencesinsemanticsandperspectivesonwhethersomethingisaconflictoracollaboration;(4)thedurationofacollaboration;and(5)thebreadthofthegroup'sobjective(e.
g.
thecreationofasingleplanorabroad,overarchingdirectivefromCongress).
Tounpackthesedifficulties,ourresearchteamsurveyedavarietyofagencyemployees,stakeholders,andstateofficialsontheirunderstandingsofstakeholdersandcollaborations.
1.
DefiningaStakeholderWhoisastakeholder"Anyonewhowantstobe"isafrequentresponsefromagencyofficials.
Althoughthisdefinitionattemptstohighlightthatagenciesaredemocraticandnon-discriminatoryintheirselectionofstakeholders,itfailstocapturetheimportantpointthatstakeholdersultimatelyself-select.
Intervieweesalsodescribedastakeholderas"anyonewhohasastakeintheoutcome.
"Thisdefinitioncapturestheneedforstakeholderstofeelmotivatedtoparticipate,butdeservesexpansion.
Stakeholderswhocareenoughtodedicatethetimeandemotionalenergyto49Id.
50ElinorOstrom,BeyondMarketsandStates:PolycentricGovernanceofComplexEconomicSystems,100AM.
ECON.
REV.
641(2010).
51PartIV.
A.
1.
52PartIV.
A.
2.
13acollaborationtendtohaveapecuniary,social,orculturalinterestintheresourcebeingmanaged.
Virtuallynoonecollaboratesforthejoyofparticipatinginagroupandthisrealitycanbechallengingandfrustrating.
53Considerthecircumstances:Insomecollaborations,theprocessunfoldsoverdecades.
54Itisfrequentlyconfrontational,withemotionally-chargedgroupdynamicsunfoldingincontentiousmeetings.
55Frustratedgroupmembersmayquit.
56Stakeholdersmustattendmeetingsandmaybepressedintoparticipatinginworkinggroup.
Noonewillemergewithexactlytheoutcometheydesire;compromiseistheforegoneconclusion.
Asaresult,theonlypartiesinvestedenoughtoparticipatetendtobethosewithaninvestmentintheoutcomeoftheprocess—thatis,astakeinthelandandresourcesbeingmanaged.
Afewroughexamplesillustratethispoint:57Governmentemployeescollaboratebecausetheyarepaidtodoso.
Nongovernmentalorganizationsparticipatetopromotelandandwildlifeconservationaims.
AlaskanNativeandNativeAmericancommunitiesmayseektopreserveproperty-rightstoresources,suchashuntingrightsonpubliclandsorculturalresourcesclaims.
58Commerciallandusers—suchascattlegrazersortimberoperators—seektopreserveorexpandhistoricresourceextraction,whichtheyperceiveasadefactopropertyrightpremisedonhistoricnorms.
Recreationallandusers—includingsportsmen,rockclimbers,andATVusers—similarlyseektoexpandormaintainwhattheyperceiveasadefactorighttousetheland,premisedonhistoricuses.
Stateandlocalgovernmentofficialsparticipatebecauseoftheeffectsofthelandorresourceuseontheintereststheyrepresent,suchasconstituentsorlocalindustrythatcontributestothetaxbase.
53Interview12.
54AppendixIII(describingsomeboardmembersofWACHWGservingthegroupinthesamerolefortwentyyears);MarkT.
Imperialetal.
,UnderstandingLeadershipinaWorldofSharedProblems:AdvancingNetworkGovernanceinLargeLandscapeConservation,14FRONTIERSECOL.
ANDENVT.
126,127(2016)(describingcollaborationsasrequiringthreeinterconnectedleadershiptypes:collaborativeleadership,distributiveleadership,andarchitecturalleadership).
55Interview12.
56TelephoneInterviewwithJimDau,WildlifeBiologistforAlaskaDepartmentofFishandGame(ret.
)(July25,2017).
57Theseexamplesareillustrativeandreductive—theydonotcapturethefullrangeofthecom-plex,interconnectedreasonswhypeoplemayparticipate.
Forexample,agovernmentemployeemayalsocollaboratebecausesherespectsthepeopleinhercommunityorbelievethatdoingsoisavitalpartofherjobfromamoralstandpoint.
Thepurposeoftheseveryroughexamplesistoexplainnaturalresourcesdynamicstothoseunfamiliarwiththefield;peopleoperatinginnatu-ralresourceswouldrightlysaythisisacrudesimplification.
58Importantly,differenttribeshavevastlydifferentmotivations—somemayseektoexploitre-sources,otherstoconserve.
14Ashighlightedbytheseexamples,theincentivesforjoiningacollaborationaremultipleandvaried.
Theunifyingthemeacrossstakeholders,however,isthateachhasahighlyvaluedcultural,economic,orsocialstakeintheuseofthelandorresourceatissue.
592.
DefiningCollaborationWhatroledocollaborationsplayinlandandresourcemanagementCollaborationcanbebroadandshifting.
Thegeneralaimofcollaborationistohavepotentiallyadversarialgroupsworktogethertoachievecommonobjectiveswithoutresortingtolitigationorviolence.
InthewordsofaNationalParkServiceWildlifebiologist:Whenyouhavedifficultproblems,communicationisveryhelpful.
Whenpeopleoperateintheirownboxesitisveryeasytogetstubbornandnotseeotherpeople'sperspectives.
Sopeoplegetentrenched.
Generally,whenpeopleareat[stakeholdercollaboration]meetingstheymightnotalwaysbefriendly,buttheygettohearotherpeople'spointsofviewandtheyarefacetofacesotheyarenottypicallysaidindemeaningormeanways.
SothemessageoftheothersidecomesacrossbetterratherthanaTwitterbattlewherepeoplearesayingextremethingsoneithersideandmakingeachsidemoreentrenchedratherthantryingtofindcommonground.
SoIthinkjustthatgettingtogetherfacetoface,havingawiderangeofopinions,havingthoughtfulpeoplethatwantsolutions,Ithinkisthebestlessontotakeoutof[collaborations].
60NOAAusesalineardiagramtoillustratetherelationshipbetweenanagencyandstakeholders'decision-makingauthoritywithinacollaboration.
Atoneendofthespectrum(1),theagencyactsunilaterally.
Attheotherendofthespectrum,thestakeholdersactunilaterally(4).
NeitheroftheseexampleswouldsatisfythedefinitionofcollaborationascontemplatedbythisReport.
Instead,Idefinestakeholdercollaborationaseitheragenciesgatheringinputfromstakeholdersbeforedecidinghowtoact(2)orstakeholdersdecidingandrecommendingactionortheagencytotake(3).
59Presumably,eachresourceonalandscapecouldcollectivelyorindividuallybethefocusofacollaboration.
Intheworldoffiniteattentionandresources,however,collaborationsemergewhengroupsdeempropermanagementofaparticularresourcetobeespeciallyimportant.
Thegivenlandorresourcemustmattertoseveralgroups.
(Ifthegivenlandorresourcemattersagreatdealbutonlytooneortwointerestedparties,suchasadjacentlandowners,onewouldex-pecttoseeinformalcooperationbetweentheagencyandstakeholdersor,perhaps,acontractingorco-managementrelationship.
)PartIV.
B.
1.
expandsuponthispoint.
60Interview1.
15Figure1:SimplifiedContinuumofStakeholderInfluenceAgency-ControlledStakeholder-Controlled1Agencyhasauthor-ity,makesthedeci-sion,andthenin-formsstakeholders.
2Agencygathersinputfromstake-holdersbeforedeciding.
3Stakeholdersde-cideandrecom-mendactionsforagencytotake.
4Stakeholdersdecidetoactandthenim-plement.
(AdaptedfromBens2005,recreatedinNOAAtrainingdocuments)61Anotherdefinitionalissueishowtodifferentiatecollaborationfromconflictresolution.
Oneofficialdescribedaseriesofsurveysthataskedin-the-fieldagencyemployeestodescribeanexampleoftheirinvolvementinacollaboration.
Severalrespondentsrepliedthattheengagementtheyidentifiedintheirresponseswasnot,infact,acollaboration,butinsteadforcedbythethreatoflitigation,andthereforeconflictresolution.
Inresponsetothatfeedback,thenextsetofsurveysaskedrespondentstodescribeaparticularexampleofconflictresolution.
Severalrespondentsrepliedthattheexampletheyidentifiedwasnot,infact,conflictresolution,butinsteadcollaborationbecausetheycooperatedwiththepotentialadversary.
Thethreatoflitigationisanunspokenfactorinmanyagenciesdecisiontoengagewithcollaboration.
Bystartingwithcollaboration,agenciesattempttoavoidhavingadisappointedstakeholderaskacourttooverturnthedecision.
Thisthreatmaybeovertorimplicit,butisvirtuallyalwayspresent.
Atthesametime,partiesaremotivatedtoworktogetherforavarietyofreasons,suchasthepotentialtoproducemorefavorablemanagementdecisions,achievelowersettlementcosts,and/ortopreservereputationsandrelationshipsbyfindingcompromisewithneighboringlandowners.
6261INGRIDBENS,FACILITATINGWITHEASE!
CORESKILLSFORFACILITATORS,TEAMLEADERSANDMEMBERS,MANAGERS,CONSULTANTS,ANDTRAINERS99(3rded.
2012).
62Foradiscussionofthereasonsthatmotivatecooperationratherthanlitigationamongprivateparties,seeROBERTC.
ELLICKSON,ORDERWITHOUTLAW:HOWNEIGHBORSSETTLEDISPUTES(1991);RobertH.
Mnookin,Public/PrivateDichotomy:PoliticalDisagreementandAcademicRepudiation,130U.
PA.
L.
REV.
1429(1981).
163.
DefiningStakeholderCollaborationsThefollowingdefinitionemergedfromsynthesizingperspectivesencounteredbyourresearchteam:Astakeholdercollaborationisagroupofpeoplewithstronginterestsin,yetdifferingviewson,thepropermanagementofaparticular,localizedgroupoflandsorresources,committedinwritingtoworkingtogethertocreatemutually-agreeablerecommendationsformanagingtheresourceacrosschangingconditionsonanongoingbasis.
Notably,thisdefinitionisnotuniversallyagreeduponbyinterviewees.
Itdoes,however,provideastartingpointthatreflectscross-agencyunderstandingsandwhichfutureconversationscanrefine.
TheremainderofthisReportreliesuponthisdefinitionwhenreferencingtheterm.
C.
RelatedLiteraturesCollaborativegovernanceofnaturalresourcesisatopicbeingconsideredbyscholarsfromseveraldisciplines,includingpublicadministration,administrativelaw,andnaturalresourceeconomics.
Forexample:Collaborativegovernancefocusesontheprocessofpublic-decision-makingengagingpeopleacrosspublicandprivatespheres.
63Polycentricgovernancedescribesmultiplelayersofgovernancearrangementsandinstitutionsthatmanagelocalizedconcernsandscaletoaddressbroadissues.
64Newgovernancefocusesonprivateactiondominatingaregulatoryspace,againstthebackdropofgovernmentlimits,whichcanincludesystemsofprivategovernance.
65Public-privatepartnershipsdescribesgovernmentworkingwithprivateorganizations,suchascompaniesandindustrygroups,toachievesharedobjectives.
Theserelationshipscantakeaplethoraofforms,rangingfromcontracting-for-goodsarrangementstonegotiatedrulemaking.
6663KirkEmmersonetal.
,AnIntegrativeFrameworkforCollaborativeGovernance,22J.
PUB.
ADMIN.
&THEORY1,2(2011).
64Ostrom,supranote50.
65OrleyLobel,NewGovernanceasRegulatoryGovernance,inOXFORDHANDBOOKOFGOVERNANCE(DavidLevi-Faured.
,2012);KarenBradshaw,NewGovernanceandIndustryCulture,88NOTREDAMEL.
REV.
2515,2515(2013).
66JODYFREEMAN,GOVERNMENTBYCONTRACT:OUTSOURCINGANDAMERICANDEMOCRACY(2009).
17Collaborativeadaptivemanagementfocusesonaniterativedecision-makingprocessinwhichpeoplelearnfromexperienceandincorporatenewinformationtocreateflexiblemanagementplanamidstchangingconditions.
67Contractingtocontrollandscapesfocusesonarrangementsbetweenparties–publicorprivate—toengageinsharedmanagementpractices,alocalizedformofprivategovernance.
68Administrativelawscholarshavewrittenextensivelyaboutagenciescraftingrelationshipswithexternalactorstoachievesharedpolicyaims.
69Withinthevariousrelationshipsscholarshaveidentified,thereareseveralthatarefaciallysimilarto,butultimatelydifferentfrom,thespecifictoolofstakeholdercollaborations.
Notably,stakeholdercollaborationsarenot:Inter-agencycooperation,thecooperationoffederalagencieswithotherfederalagencies;Cooperativefederalism,thedelegationbyfederalagenciestostateswhiletheagencyretainsanoversightrole;Contractingrelationships,inwhichagenciespaycompaniestoperformgovernmentfunctions;Privategovernance,orthecreationandenforcementbyprivateactorsofrulesgoverninganindustryorpractice,aswithinsuranceasregulatorsorsustainabilitycertifications;orNegotiatedrulemaking,inwhichagenciesworkingwitharegulatedindustrydevelopanagreed-uponregulation.
Insum,scholarsarebeginningarobusttheoreticalconversationsurrounding67RobinKundisCraig&J.
B.
Ruhl,DesigningAdministrativeLawforAdaptiveManagement,67VAND.
L.
REV.
1,28(2014).
Collaborationnowplaysawell-recognizedroleinpubliclandsandresourcemanagement.
Itisonecomponentofcollaborativeadaptivemanagement,atermthatcapturesthatthereisnosinglelegalorregulatoryfixtotheongoingandunpredictablechangesthathappeninanaturallandscape.
Adaptingtothesechanges,proponentsargue,re-quiresflexibilityandongoinginputfromavarietyofstakeholders.
68Bradshaw&Lueck,supranote44.
69Asmallsamplingofthisrobustliteratureincludes:JeffreyL.
Brudney&F.
TedHebert,StateAgenciesandTheirEnvironments:ExaminingtheInfluenceofImportantExternalActors,49.
1J.
POL.
186-206(1987);JohnChild,StrategicChoiceintheAnalysisofAction,Structure,Organiza-tionsandEnvironment:RetrospectandProspect,18.
1ORG.
STUD.
43-76(1997);YvesFassin,TheStakeholderModelRefined,84.
1J.
BUS.
ETHICS113-135(2009);JeffFrooman,StakeholderInfluenceStrategies24.
2ACAD.
MGMT.
REV.
191-205(1999);SusanKey,TowardaNewTheoryoftheFirm:ACritiqueofStakeholder"Theory,"37.
4MGMT.
DEC.
317-328(1999).
18collaboration,bothinnaturalresourcescontexts,andtheadministrativestatemorebroadly.
Asthefieldsmature,sotoowillterminologicalexactness,aprocessthatwillbeusefulfordifferentiatingphenomenathatlooksimilarbutmay,infact,operatedifferently.
Tothatend,thefollowingsectionsituatesstakeholdercollaborationsamongothercollaborativegovernancetools.
D.
ATypologyofCollaborativeGovernanceToolsImportantly,stakeholdercollaborationsarenottheonlycollaborativegovernancetoolusedtomanagelandandresources.
Severalexecutiveorders,forexample,instructagenciestouselisteningsessionsandpubliccommentperiodstoinformagencydecision-making.
70Thechartbelowcategorizesthemostcommonformsofcollaborativegovernancetools.
Itisimportanttorememberthatthisisaroughcutintendedtodistinguishdifferenttoolsfromstakeholdercollaborations.
Asnotedpreviously,thereisnoconsensusonthemeaningoftheseterms,eitherintheoreticalliteratureoramongagencyofficials.
Notably,thistypologyattemptstocategorizethethousandsofcollaborativegovernancestructuresinexistence,butanysinglecollaborationmayfallinmultipleboxes.
Further,acollaborationthatbeginsinonecategorymaytransitionintoanotherovertime.
Forexample,analternativedisputeresolutionbodymayeventuallytransitionintoapublic-privatebodydevotedtoundertakingandmonitoringthetermsofadecades-longsettlementagreement.
71Thechartservestoreinforcethatstakeholdercollaborationsdonotoperateinavacuum.
Forexample,inAlaskatherearecollaborationscentereduponindividualanimalspecies(i.
e.
,caribou)andwildlifegenerally.
Agencieshavealsocreatedmeta-collaborations,whichcoordinatepracticesacrossindividualcollaborationsbaseduponregion.
Suchnestedcollaborationisubiquitousgiventhemulti-layeredsystemofgovernance.
Collaborationsnotonlyinteractwithagencies,butalsowithoneanother,bothdirectlyandindirectly.
Collaborationsinfluenceandinteractwithothercollaborations,bothhorizontallyandvertically.
70PartII.
B.
71Suchwasthecasewiththenaturalresourcedamagesettlementprocess,inwhichB.
P.
andtrusteeshadalargelyadversarialrelationshippriortoreachingan$8.
1billionsettlementtore-storenaturalresourcedamages,butlatersoughtaunifiedrestorationefforttopromotecoordi-natedrecoveryefforts.
KarenBradshaw,SettlingforNaturalResourceDamages,40HARV.
ENVTL.
L.
REV.
211,217-18(2015).
19Figure2.
CollaborativeGovernanceStructuresforLandandResourceManagementNameActorsResourceLevelScopeofCollaborationConflictorCollaborationDurationofCollaborationBreadthofCollaborationExampleCollaborativeResourceGovernanceMajorinternationalbodiesornation-statesSingleresourceclusterInternationalornationalCollaborationamongalignedactorsOngoingDesignedtooperateasabodyformulaterulesandpolicytoeffectnationalorinternationalpracticeBotanicGardensConservationInternational;ForestStewardshipCouncilRegionalGovernanceCollaborationAgencies,non-governmentalorganizations,industry,statesMultipleresourceclustersMulti-stateorregionalCollaborativeOngoingVariableLandscapeConservationCooperationNetwork,BLMRegionalAdvisoryCounselsStakeholderCollaborations(sometimescalled"workinggroups")Federalagencies,stateagencies,non-governmentalorganizations,industry,citizensFocusedonsingleresourcecluster(focusresourcemayshiftovertime)Withinalandscape-level;5,000acresormore.
Vacillatesbetweenconflictandcollaboration;mayexisttoavoidlitigationOngoingMayuseplanningdocumentsasanorganizationtool,buttheoverarchingobjectiveismorethanasingledocumentWesternArcticCaribouHerdWorkingGroup;4FRIPublic-PrivatePartnershipsNon-governmentalorganizationsorindustryworkinginpartnershipwithfederalagenciesObjectivefocusedonasinglelandunit,resourceorresourceclusterLocalorregionalCollaborative;definingfeatureofgroupislargedegreeofideologicalalignmentOngoingAgencyandideologicallyalignedpartiespoolresourcestoincreaseefficacytowardsachievingasharedobjectiveUSFWSSpeciesRecoveryPlans,NationalParksFriendsAllianceAlternativeDisputeResolutionBodiesIndustries,non-governmentalorganizations,agenciesFocusedonasingleresource,orresourceclusterLandscapelevelAdversarial;definingfeatureofgroupishighdegreeoflikelinesstolitigateifresolutionisnotreachedFinite.
Inexistenceonlyaslongastheparticulardisputeisongoing.
Narrow–asingle-shotissue.
NaturalResourceDamagesCooperativeAssessmentsTaskforcesIndustries,non-governmentalorganizations,agencies,individualswithexpertise,Focusedonasingleresource,orresourceclusterLocal,regional,state,ornationalCollaborativeShortterm–thegrouponlyexistsfortheperiodoftimenecessarytoissueareportorVariableTheGovernor'sTaskforceonArizonaWildfire(precursorto4FRI)20NameActorsResourceLevelScopeofCollaborationConflictorCollaborationDurationofCollaborationBreadthofCollaborationExampleconsultantsrecommendationsListeningsessions,noticeandcommentperiodsIndustries,concernedcitizens,stateagencies,localmunicipalities,non-governmentalorganizationsFocusedonasingleresource,orresourceclusterLocalorregionalCanbecollaborativeoradversarialShorttermForumfortheagencytoheardifferentperspectivesonacontentiousissue;airoutdifferences.
PresidentObama'smemorandumonA21stCenturyStrategyforAmerica'sGreatOutdoors;NEPAandAPArequirementsfornoticeandcomment.
InformalrelationshipsIndustries,non-governmentalorganizations,agenciesFocusedonaparticulargeographicregionLocalCanbecollaborativeoradversarialLongtermEnormousbreadth,potentiallyspanninganyissueNationalParkSupervisorsandsubsistenceusersinAlaska.
II.
LEGALLANDSCAPETheUnitedStatesownslandandnaturalresources,whichthegovernmentmanagesonbehalfofthepublic.
TheConstitutiongrantsCongresscontroloverallpubliclands,72whichitlargelydelegatestotheexecutivebranch.
73Withintheexecutivebranch,13administrativeagenciesmanagemostfederallandandnaturalresources.
74Collectively,theseagenciesmanageapproximatelyone-thirdofthe72U.
S.
CONST.
art.
IV,§3,cl.
2.
73TheSupremeCourthasruledthatsuchdelegationisallowableifCongressprovidesan"intel-ligibleprinciple"toguideexecutiveaction.
J.
W.
Hampton,Jr.
,&Co.
v.
UnitedStates,276U.
S.
394,409(U.
S.
1928).
74Thislistexcludesagencieswithlimitedlandholdingsandnomanagementfunction,likeDepart-mentofEnergy.
Italsointentionallyexcludesagencies,liketheU.
S.
GeologicalSurveyandEnvi-ronmentalProtectionAgency,thatsupportslandmanagementagenciesbutdoesnothavearegula-toryormanagementmandateandarethereforeexcludedfromthislist.
TheU.
S.
GeologicalSurveyhasbeenquiteinvolvedinconversationssurroundingcollaborativeadaptivemanagementandjointfact-finding.
Forexample,seeNICOLASL.
ROFOUGARANANDHERMANA.
KARL,U.
S.
DEP'TOFTHEINTERIOR,U.
S.
GEOLOGICALSURVEY,SANFRANCISQUITOCREEK—THEPROBLEM21landintheUnitedStates.
75Figure3.
LandandResourceManagementAgenciesDepartmentofCommerceNationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministrationDepartmentoftheInteriorBureauofIndianAffairsBureauofReclamationUSFishandWildlifeServiceNationalParkServiceUSGeologicalSurveyDepartmentofAgricultureForestServiceNaturalResourceConservationServiceDepartmentofDefenseUSArmyCorpsofEngineersCongress,thePresident,andupper-levelagencyofficialsguideagencyactionthroughstatutes,executiveorders,regulation,andpolicyguidelines.
A.
FederalStatutes1.
FederalAdvisoryCommitteeActIn1972,CongresspassedtheFederalAdvisoryCommitteeAct("FACA"),whichoutlineshowfederalagenciesmaypartnerwithcitizensandprivateentities.
76FACAapplieswhenagenciescoordinatewithanorganized,cohesivegroupofnon-agencyactors—long-termconsultants,nongovernmentalorganizations,companies,orindustrygroups—forinputonagencypoliciesandOFSCIENCEINENVIRONMENTALDISPUTES,JOINTFACTFINDINGASATRANSDISCIPLINARYAPPROACHTOWARDENVIRONMENTALPOLICYMAKING,PROFESSIONALPAPER1710(2005).
75VINCENT,HANSON,&ARGUETA,supraNote1,at3.
76FordiscussionsontheinfluenceofFACAonstakeholdercollaborationsformanagingpubliclandsandcollaborations,seeSheilaLynch,TheFederalAdvisoryCommitteeAct:AnObstacletoEcosystemManagementbyFederalAgencies,71WASH.
L.
REV.
431(1996);StevenP.
Croley,PracticalGuidanceontheApplicabilityoftheFederalAdvisoryCommitteeAct,10ADMIN.
L.
J.
111(1996);StevenP.
Croley&WilliamF.
Funk,TheFederalAdvisoryCommitteeActandGoodGovernment,14YALEJ.
OFREG.
451(1997);ThomasC.
Bierle&RebeccaJ.
Long,ChillingCollaboration:TheFederalAdvisoryCommitteeActandStakeholderInvolve-mentinEnvironmentalDecison-Making,29ENVT'LL.
REP.
10399(1999);AllysonBarkeretal.
,TheRoleofCollaborativeGroupsinFederalLandandResourceManagement:ALegalAnalysis,23J.
OFLAND,RESOURCES&ENVT'LL.
,67(2003).
22decisions.
Itdoesnotapplytogovernment-to-governmentcoordination,aswhenafederalagencyworkswithtribal,state,orlocalgovernments.
TheapplicabilityofFACAisgovernedbyafewcourtdecisions,whichcollectivelysuggestthatiftheagencyconvenesorcontrolsanongoinggroupwithalimitedmembershipthatproducesconsensusandrecommendations,thenitmustseekFACAcertification.
77Atthetimeofthiswriting,over1,000FACAcertifiedcollaborationsexist.
78CongressenactedFACAbeforealternativedisputeresolutionandcollaborativegovernmentbecamewidelypopular,accordingtosomeagencies.
79Asaresult,someviewthestatuteasout-of-stepwithmodernimperativestocollaborate.
80FACAcertificationcantakeyearstocomplete,afactthatcanserveasamajorimpedimenttotheformationofanewgroup.
81Indeed,agenciesactivelycounselemployeesonhowtoconstructstakeholdergroupsthatdonottriggertheneedforFACAcertification.
82ThedangerofavoidingFACAcertificationisthatagencydecisionsmadeinconsultationwithnon-certifiedstakeholdercollaborationsmayrunafoulofthenon-delegationdoctrine,whichlimitsagenciesabilitytosharedecision-makingauthorityprovidedbyCongress.
2.
AdministrativeDisputeResolutionActTheAdministrativeDisputeResolutionAct83requiresthatFederalagenciesadoptapolicyforalternativedisputeresolutionacrossagencyfunctions.
In2005,77PublicCitizenv.
U.
S.
Dep'tofJustice,491U.
S.
440(1989);MiccosukeeTribeofIndiansv.
S.
EvergladesRestorationAll.
,304F.
3d1076(11thCir.
2002);Byrdv.
EPA,174F.
3d239(D.
C.
Cir.
1999);Calif.
ForestryAss'nv.
U.
S.
ForestServ.
102F.
3d609(D.
C.
Cir.
1996);Nw.
ForestRes.
Councilv.
Espy,846F.
Supp.
1009(D.
D.
C.
1994);Nat.
Res.
DefenseCouncilv.
Abraham,223F.
Supp.
2d162(D.
D.
C.
2002).
78SeegenerallyBUREAUOFLANDMANAGEMENT,NATIONALPOLICYFORTHEFEDERALADVISORYCOMMITTEEACT:WHATBLMSTAFFNEEDTOKNOWWHENWORKINGWITHADR-BASEDCOLLABORATIVECOMMUNITYWORKINGGROUPS(2005),https://www.
ntc.
blm.
gov/krc/up-loads/880/BLM%20Field%20Guide%20-%20Federal%20Advisory%20Committee%20Act%20-%202005-05-01.
pdf(hereinafterBLMFACAADRGuide);RebeccaJ.
Long&ThomasC.
Bei-erle,TheFederalAdvisoryCommitteeActandPublicParticipationinEnvironmentalPolicy(Re-sourcesfortheFuture,DiscussionPaper99-17,1999),http://www.
rff.
org/files/share-point/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-99-17.
pdf.
79SeeWENDYGINSBERG&CASEYBURGAT,FEDERALADVISORYCOMMITTEES:ANINTRODUCTIONANDOVERVIEW,CONG.
RESEARCHSERV.
,R44253(2016).
80Interview12.
81Interview3.
82SeegenerallyBLMFACAADRGuide,supranote78.
835U.
S.
C.
S.
§§571-584(2017).
23theOfficeofManagementandBudgetandthePresident'sCouncilonEnvironmen-talQualityjointlyissuedaMemorandumonEnvironmentalConflictResolution.
84ThememorandumdirectsfederalagenciestoensuretheeffectiveuseofECRcon-sistentwitheightprinciples:informedcommitment,balancedandvoluntaryrepre-sentation,groupautonomy,informedprocess,accountability,openness,timeliness,andimplementation.
85Arevisedmemorandumissuedin2012reinforcesthesecommitmentsandplacesgreateremphasisonearlycollaboration.
ImplementationoftheAdministrativeDisputeResolutionActledtheExecutivetoshiftitsfocusfromconflictresolutiontowardscollaboration,amoveillustrativeofthisReport'spriordiscussionaboutsituatingcollaborationsalongthespectrumfromconflicttocollaboration.
863.
Agency-andResource-SpecificCollaborationStatutesCongresshasalsoenactedhundredsofstatutoryprovisionsrequiringfederalagenciestocollaboratewithstakeholderstogovernspecificlandsandnaturalresources.
ThisReportprovidesanoveloverviewofstatutesencouragingorrequiringagenciestocollaborate.
AppendixIsummarizesthesestatutes,whichareprimarilycontainedwithinfourtitles:Conservation(U.
S.
C.
Title16),Indians(Title25)PublicBuildings,Property,andWorks(Title40),andPublicLands(Title43).
Congressionaldirectivestoagenciestocollaboratevarieswidelyalongthedimensionsofcollaborationoutlinedabove,includingthestructureofthecollaboration,thetimeperiodforwhichitwillexist,andthepartieswithwhomtheagencyistocollaborate.
Toprovideexamplesofthewidevariationamongstatutoryprovisions,considerthreestatutoryprovisionscontainedwithinTitle16,Conservation:1.
WhenestablishingtheGunnisonGorgeNationalConservationArea,CongressinstructedtheSecretaryoftheDepartmentoftheInteriortodevelopaprotectionandmanagementplan"incloseconsultationwithappropriateFederal,State,county,andlocalagencies.
"872.
InthedeclarationofpurposefortheProtectionandConservationofWildlife,Congressstated:ForthepurposeofrecognizingthevitalcontributionofourwildliferesourcestotheNation,theincreasingpublicinterestand84OFFICEOFMGMT&BUDGET,EXEC.
OFFICEOFTHEPRESIDENT,ANDTHEPRESIDENT'SCOUNCILONENVIRONMENTAL.
QUALITY,MEMORANDUMONENVIRONMENTALCONFLICTRESOLUTION(No-vember28,2005).
85Id.
86SeediscussionsupraPartII.
A.
2.
87EstablishmentoftheGunnisonGorgeNationalConservationArea,16U.
S.
C.
§410fff-5(2012).
24significancethereofduetoexpansionofournationaleconomyandotherfactors,andtoprovidethatwildlifeconservationshallreceiveequalconsiderationandbecoordinatedwithotherfeaturesofwater-resourcedevelopmentprogramsthroughtheeffectualandharmoniousplanning,development,maintenance,andcoordinationofwildlifeconservationandrehabilitationforthepurposesofsections661to666cofthistitleintheUnitedStates,itsTerritoriesandpossessions,theSecretaryoftheInteriorisauthorized(1)toprovideassistanceto,andcooperatewith,Federal,State,andpublicorprivateagenciesandorganizationsinthedevelopment,protection,rearing,andstockingofallspeciesofwildlife,resourcesthereof,andtheirhabitat,incontrollinglossesofthesamefromdiseaseorothercauses,inminimizingdamagesfromoverabundantspecies,inprovidingpublicshootingandfishingareas.
.
.
883.
IntheWildandScenicRiverAct,Congressspecified:TheSecretaryoftheInterior,theSecretaryofAgriculture,ortheheadofanyotherFederalagency,shallassist,advise,andcoop-eratewithStatesortheirpoliticalsubdivisions,landowners,pri-vateorganizations,orindividualstoplan,protect,andmanageriverresources.
Suchassistance,advice,andcooperationmaybethroughwrittenagreementsorotherwise.
89Eachofthesestatutescontainsadifferentdegreeofcollaboration.
TheGun-nisonGorgelegislationrequiresconsultation,essentiallytheactingagencyrunningideaspastoutsideentities.
TheProtectionandConservationofWildlifeStatute,incontrast,requirestheDepartmentoftheInteriortoplayasupportingfunctiontostateandpublicorprivateorganizationsprotecting,rearing,andstockingwildlife.
Thisrequirementissobroadastorequireregular,ongoingcommunicationbetweenfederalagenciesandanarrayofpublicandprivatepartners.
TheWildandScenicRiverActissimilarlybroadinrequiringtheDepartmentsofInteriorandAgricul-turetoworkwithvariouslevelofgovernment,landowners,privateorganizationsandindividualstocoordinatetheplanningandmanagementofriverresources.
Itbroadlyspecifiesthatthiscooperationcantaketheformofwrittenagreements—presumablycontractsormemorandumofunderstanding—ornot.
Ineachexample,Congressrequiresfederalagenciestoactinconcertwithstakeholderstomanagetheresourcesatissue(conservation,wildlife,andrivers),butprovidesforvaryingdegreesofinfluenceforexternalstakeholders.
8816U.
S.
C.
§661(2012).
89AssistancetoStateandLocalProjects,16U.
S.
C.
§1282(2012).
25Landandresourcemanagementagenciesaresubjecttomultiple,sometimescompeting,statutes.
Forexample,NationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministra-tion(NOAA)hasexclusivefederalmanagementoverfisheryresourcesintheU.
S.
ExclusiveEconomicZone90andretainsjurisdictionsoverwhales,dolphins,por-poises,seals,andsealions.
91NOAAoperatesundermultipleactsthatrequiresomedegreeofcollaborativegovernance,includingcooperativefederalism,92inter-agencycooperation.
93SeveralactsauthorizeorrequireNOAAtocollaboratewithnongovernmentalstakeholders,includingtheEstuaryRestorationActof2000,94FederalOceanAcidificationResearchandMonitoringActof2009,95GeophysicalSciencesAuthoritiesAct96andNationalAquacultureAct.
97NOAAreportssuggestthat"agency-drivendecision-makinginnaturalresourcemanagementhasgenerallymovedtowardsprocessesthatinvolvestakeholders,"thatparticipationhasbecomea"fundamentalcomponent"ofoperations,andthatvariousfederallegislation"mandatespublicparticipationinsomeform.
"98Itmaintainsarobusteducationalprogramondevelopingstakeholdercollaborationsforcostalmanagementareaswithacentralizedsupportteamforcollaborativeefforts.
Further,NOAAmaintainsstakeholderengagementexpertstohelptheagencysatisfyitsvariousobligations—anddesires—tocollaborate.
9990Magnuson-StevensFisheryConservation&ManagementAct(MSA),16U.
S.
C.
§§1801-1884(2012).
91MarineMammalProtectionAct,16U.
S.
C.
§§1361-1423h(2012).
92AtlanticCoastalFisheriesCooperativeManagementAct,16U.
S.
C.
§§5101-5108(2012);OFFICEOFPRIVACYANDOPENGOVERNMENT,DOO10-15,UNDERSECRETARYOFCOMMERCEFOROCEANSANDATMOSPHEREANDADMINISTRATOROFTHENATIONALOCEANICANDATMOSPHERICADMINISTRATION(2012)§3.
01(nn)(requiringacooperativestateandfederalman-agementregimeforintercostalfisheriesmanagementefforts)[hereinafterNOAADOO-10-15].
93FishandWildlifeCoordinationAct,16U.
S.
C.
§§661-666c(2012)(requiringseveralfederalagenciesandstateagenciestocoordinatewildlifemanagementwithmodificationstostreamsandbodiesofwater);CoastalWetlandsPlanning,Protection,andRestorationAct,16U.
S.
C.
§§3951-3956(2012);NOAADOO-10-15§3.
01(dd)(creatinganinter-agencytaskforcedevotedtocoastalwetlandsrestorationprojectsinLouisiana);MeteorologicalServicestoSupportAvia-tionAuthority,49U.
S.
C.
§44720(2012)(creatinganinter-agencypartnershipwiththeSecre-taryofCommercetoprovidemeteorologicalinformationtotheFederalAviationAdministra-tion).
9433U.
S.
C.
§§2901-2909(2012).
9533U.
S.
C.
§§3701-3708(2012).
9633U.
S.
C.
§§883d,883e(2012).
9716U.
S.
C.
§§2801-2810(2012);NOAADOO-10-15§3.
01(jj).
98NOAAOFFICEFORCOASTALMANAGEMENT,SOCIALSCIENCETOOLSFORCOASTALPROGRAMS:INTRODUCTIONTOSTAKEHOLDERPARTICIPATION(2015)(hereinafterNOAASOCIALSCIENCETOOLS).
99Id.
,at9.
26Statutessometimescreateoverlappingcollaborativestructuresinthesamegeographicspace,managedbydifferentagencies.
Forexample,NOAA,theBureauofLandManagement(BLM)andU.
S.
FishandWildlifeService(USFWS)main-tainthreedistinctregionalcollaborationbodies,eachwithdifferentguidelines.
100TheFigurebelowillustrateseachofthesecollaborationsandhowtheyoverlap.
100NOAAmaintainsaregionalcollaborationprogramintheformofRegionalCollaborationNet-work,whichconsistsofeightregionalteamscomprisedofNOAAstaffandexternalpartnerswithinaregion.
TheNetworkisdesignedtoshareinformationanddeveloprelationships,aswellastoprovidequickresponsetoenvironmentaldisasters.
SeeNOAA'SREGIONALCOLLABORATIONNETWORK,2015ANN.
REP.
(2015).
TheFederalLandPolicyandManagementActof1976,asamendedbythePublicRange-landsImprovementActof1978,requiredtheBureauofLandManagementtoestablishadvisorycouncil'srepresentativeofmajorcitizeninterestsconcernedwithresourcemanagementplanningorthemanagementofpubliclands.
BLMhasmorethan30ResourceAdvisoryCouncilscoveringtheWesternUnitedStates,inadditiontoamultitudeofless-formalstakeholdercollaborations.
43U.
S.
C.
§§1701-1787(2012).
TheSecretaryoftheDepartmentofInteriorcreatedtheLandscapeConservationCooper-ativeNetwork,aninteragency,tribalandnon-governmentalnetworkof26collaborations.
Thecouncilofthegroupincludes31participants,includingsevenfederalagencydirectors,threetribalparticipants,oneindigenousparticipant,fourstateagencydirectors,fourNGOparticipants,oneLCCparticipant,twomajorpartnershipparticipantsfourinternationalparticipantsandfiveatlargeparticipants.
LCCCOUNCILCHARTER(REVISED2015).
TheLCCsarecoordinatedbyateamattheU.
S.
FishandWildlifeService,withinputfromtheLCCCouncil,anadvisorygroupTheLCCsreceivedabout$11millionforsciencesupportduringthefiscalyears2014and2015.
Id.
27Figure4.
RegionalCollaborativeCouncilsBLMRegionalAdvisoryCouncilsUSFWSLandscapeCooperationCouncilNOAARegionalCollaborationNetwork28Inadditiontotop-downdirectivesfromCongresstocollaborateinaspecificarea,thePresident,states,orprivateentities,mayalsocreateorgoverncollabora-tions.
B.
ExecutiveOrdersPresidentsClinton,Bush,Obama,andTrumpeachissuedexecutiveordersrequiringagenciestoadoptsomeformofcollaborativegovernance.
Considerthefollowingexamples,whichfocusonthespecifictoolofstakeholdercollaborations:PresidentBillClintonsignedanexecutiveorderfortheNationalWildlifeRefugeSystemwhichnotedasaguidingprinciple:"ConservationpartnershipswithotherFederalagencies,Stateagencies,Tribes,organizations,industry,andthegeneralpubliccanmakesignificantcontributionstothegrowthandmanagementoftheRefugeSystem.
"101PresidentGeorgeW.
Bushsignedseveralexecutiveorderspromotingstakeholdercollaborations,includingtheEstablishmentofGreatLakesInteragencyTaskForceandPromotionofaRegionalCollaborationofNationalSignificancefortheGreatLakes,whichtaskedtheInteragencyTaskForcewithconveningandestablishing"aprocessforcollaborationamongthemembersoftheTaskForceandthemembersoftheWorkingGroup.
.
.
withtheGreatLakesStates,localcommunities,tribes,regionalbodies,andotherinterestsintheGreatLakesregionregardingpolicies,strategies,plans,programs,projects,activities,andprioritiesfortheGreatLakessystem.
"102PresidentBarackObama'sexecutiveorderonStewardshipoftheOcean,OurCoasts,andtheGreatLakesentrustedtheUnitedStateswith"ensuringacomprehensiveandcollaborativeframeworkforthestewardshipoftheocean,ourcoasts,andtheGreatLakesthatfacilitatescohesiveactionsacrosstheFederalGovernment,aswellasparticipationofState,tribal,andlocalauthorities,regionalgovernancestructures,nongovernmentalorganizations,thepublic,andtheprivatesector.
"103AlthoughPresidentTrumphasnotyetexplicitlycreatedastakeholdercollaborationthroughexecutiveorder,hedidrequireanInteragencyTaskForceonAgricultureandRuralProsperityto"provideState,local,andtribalofficials—andfarmers,ranchers,foresters,andotherruralstakeholders—withanopportunitytosuggesttotheTaskForcelegislative,regulatory,and101Exec.
OrderNo.
12996,61Fed.
Reg.
13647(1996).
102Exec.
OrderNo.
13340,69Fed.
Reg.
29043(2004).
103Exec.
OrderNo.
13547,75Fed.
Reg.
43023(2010).
29policychanges.
"104This,liketheotherexamples,highlightsapresidentrequiringagenciestocollaboratewithdiversestakeholdersoncomplexnaturalresourceissues.
Notably,eachofourrecentpresidentshavealsoissuedexecutiveordersrequiringcollaborativegovernanceinformsotherthanstakeholdercollaborations,includingcoordination,consultation,listeningsessions,andexpostreviewofstakeholderconsultationasamarkerofdecision-makinglegitimacy.
Consider:PresidentGeorgeW.
Bush'sCommitteeonOceanPolicy,whichincludedadirectiveto"facilitate,asappropriate,coordinationandconsultationregardingocean-relatedmattersamongFederal,State,tribal,localgovernmentsandtheprivatesector,foreigngovernments,andinternationalorganizations.
"105PresidentBarackObama'sA21stCenturyStrategyforAmerica'sGreatOutdoors,amemorandumdirectingtherelevantsecretariesto"listeningandlearningsessionsaroundthecountrywherelandandwatersarebeingconservedandcommunityparksarebeingestablishedininnovativeways.
"Thesesessionssoughttoengagearangeofinterestedgroups,including"triballeaders,farmersandranchers,sportsmen,communityparkgroups,foresters,youthgroups,businesspeople,educators,Stateandlocalgovernments,andrecreationandconservationgroups.
"106PresidentTrumpemphasizedtheshortcomingsofdecision-makingwithoutcollaboration,notingthat:"MonumentdesignationsthatresultfromalackofpublicoutreachandpropercoordinationwithState,tribal,andlocaloffi-cialsandotherrelevantstakeholdersmayalsocreatebarrierstoachievingenergyindependence,restrictpublicaccesstoanduseofFederallands,bur-denState,tribal,andlocalgovernments,andotherwisecurtaileconomicgrowth.
"107TrumpdirectedtheSecretaryofInteriortoreviewmonumentdesignationswithasizeofover100,000acres,whichhadbeendesignatedafterJanuary1,1996.
Theorderfocusedonmonumentsdesignatedorex-panded"withoutadequatepublicoutreachandcoordinationwithrelevantstakeholders.
"108104Exec.
OrderNo.
13790,82Fed.
Reg.
20237(2017).
105Exec.
OrderNo.
13366,69Fed.
Reg.
76591(2004),revoked,Exec.
OrderNo.
13547,75Fed.
Reg.
43021(2010).
106PresidentialMemorandumonCreatinga21stCenturyStrategyforAmerica'sOutdoors,75FR20765(APRIL20,2010).
107Notably,PresidentsarenotrequiredtoundergopublicprocesstodesignatemonumentundertheAntiquitiesAct,16U.
S.
C.
§§431-450ss-5(2012).
108ExecutiveOrder13792(April2,2017).
30Theseexamplesunderscorethevarietyofcollaborativegovernancetechniquesusedtomanagelandandnaturalresources,andillustratealternativestostakeholdercollaborations.
109C.
AgencyRegulations,SecretarialOrders,Policy/GuidanceDocuments,andSupportAgencieshavepromulgatednumerousregulationsgoverningcollabora-tions.
AppendixBprovidesanovelsummaryofagencyregulationspertainingtocollaborations.
SecretarialOrderscanalsocreateorinfluencecollaborations.
110Agenciesmayalsoguideemployeesoncollaborationthroughpolicydocuments.
Forexample,theBureauofLandManagementhasissuednationalpolicydocu-mentsontopicslikeengagingstakeholders,disputeresolution,andhowtoassesswhetheracollaborationrequiresFACAcertification.
111Severalagenciesmaintaincentralizedofficesforcollaborativegovernance.
TheBureauofLandManagementhasmaintainedaCollaborationandAlternativeDisputeResolutionProgramsince1997.
112TheForestServicemaintainsaNationalCollaborationCadre,"anetworkofpeoplefromaroundtheUSprovidecoachingandtrainingtoNationalForestsandtheircommunitieswhoareinterestedinunder-standinganddevelopingcollaborativeprocesses.
"113TheCadreoffersclassesandworkswithexistingcollaborativegroups.
114Additionally,agencieswithoutdirectlandandmanagementresponsibilitiessupportcollaborations.
Forexample,CongresscreatedtheU.
S.
InstituteforEnvi-ronmentalConflictResolutionwithintheUdallFoundationin1998.
115TheInstitutesupportseffortstoassessandmediateconflictssurroundingtheenvironment,nat-uralresources,andpubliclands.
116Agenciesalsoreviewcollaborationstodevelop109Foradiscussionofthevarioustypesofstakeholdercollaborations,seesupraPartI.
110See,forexample,U.
S.
DEP'TOFINTERIORSECRETARIALORDERNO.
3289(February22,2010).
111BUREAUOFLANDMANAGEMENT,NATIONALNATURALRESOURCESPOLICYFORCOLLABORATIVESTAKEHOLDERENGAGEMENTANDAPPROPRIATEDISPUTERESOLUTION:WHATBLM,COMMUNITIESANDTHEPUBLICNEEDTOKNOWFORPREVENTINGCONFLICTANDRESOLVINGDISPUTESINVOLVINGPUBLICLANDSANDRESOURCES(2009).
112U.
S.
FEDERALLABORRELATIONSAUTHORITY,COLLABORATIONANDALTERNATIVEDISPUTERESOLUTIONOFFICE,https://www.
flra.
gov/components-offices/offices/collaboration-and-alter-native-dispute-resolution-office-cadro(lastvisitedSeptember22,2017).
113U.
S.
DEPARTMENTOFAGRICULTURE,FORESTSERVICENATIONALCOLLABORATIONCADRE,https://www.
fs.
fed.
us/emc/nfma/collaborative_processes/default.
htm(lastvisitedSeptember22,2017).
114Id.
115AboutUs,UDALLFOUNDATION,https://www.
udall.
gov/AboutUs/MissionAndHistory.
aspx(lastvisitedAug.
27.
2017).
116Id.
31lessonslearnedandbestpracticesfromexistingandpastcollaborations.
117Theex-istenceofintra-agencyteamsdesignedtosupportcollaborationsdoesnot,however,necessarilytranslatetoindividualcollaborationsrelyinguponthesetools.
118D.
OtherSourcesofLegalAuthorityInternationallaw,statelaw,andlocallawsmayalsogoverncollaboration.
ThisReportflags,butdoesnotreview,theinfluencetheselawsmayhaveonhowagenciesandagencypartnerscollaborate.
Stateagencies,inparticular,canplayimportantrolesincollaborations.
Forexample,theWesternArcticCaribouHerdWorkingGroupwaslargelysupportedbytheStateofAlaskaDepartmentofFishandWildlifeinitsinfancy;itwasonlymuchlaterthattheNationalParkServicebecameaparticipantandfunderofthegroup.
119Stakeholdercollaborationsthemselvesareinternallygoverned—privatebodiessubjecttoprivaterules.
Atthelevelofanindividualcollaboration,thegovernancemighttaketheformofacharterormemorandumofunderstandinggoverningthebehaviorofstakeholders.
Atabroaderdegreeofgenerality,nongovernmentalorganizationsandcorporationsthatarepartofprivategroupsmayalsofollowinternalprivategovernancerules.
Further,facilitatorsofcollaborativegroupsmaybesubjecttoprivaterulesofagoverningbodyoruniversitywithwhichtheyarefacilitated.
Theboundariesencounteredbythirdpartiesseekingtojudiciallyenforcetheserulesislargelyunexplored,butmeritsfurtherresearch.
Sinceinteractionswithstakeholdercollaborationsaregovernedbyseveraloverlappinglaws,agencyemployeesshouldbeespeciallymindfulofFACAandlawsandregulationspertainingtothespecificlandsandresourcesbeingmanaged.
Occasionally,international,state,andlocallawsmayalsobecomerelevant.
Stakeholdercollaborationsthemselvesalwaysoperateunderasystemofprivategovernance,whichtheagencyisnotsubjectto,cannotcontrol,andmustconsider.
117Forexample,in2015theU.
S.
GeologicalSurveyconductedasurveyof3,161BureauofLandManagementemployeesaboutcollaborationandalternativedisputeresolution.
RUELL,BURKARDT,&DONOVAN,supranote41.
118Fifty-fourpercentofBLMsurveyrespondentsnotedthattheywere"unlikelyorveryun-likely"tousetheUdallFoundation'sU.
S.
InstituteforEnvironmentalConflictResolutionandbetween35-46%saidtheywere"unlikelyorveryunlikely"touseaBLMStateNaturalRe-sourcesADRAdvisor,acollaborationspecialistinDOIoranotheragency,BLM'sWashingtonOfficeofCollaborationandAppropriateDisputeResolution.
Id.
at43-44.
Insum,astrongpor-tionofBLMemployeessurveyedwereunlikelytorelyonintra-,inter-orpan-agencyofficesdevotedtocollaboration.
119SeeinfraAppendixIII.
32III.
BESTPRACTICESANDRECOMMENDATIONSThisSectionfocusesonlessonslearnedthatcaninformfutureagencyengagementwithcollaborations.
120Insub-SectionA,Iassessboththepotentialbenefitsandchallengesofstakeholdercollaborations.
Insub-SectionB,Iproviderecommendationsforagenciesconsidering,establishing,ormaintainingacollaboration.
ThisSectionisinformedbythemesthatemergedfrominterviewswithagencypersonnelandothernon-federalagencymembersofstakeholdergroups.
Theseinterviewsweresemi-structuredandconductedbymyselfandaPhDcandidatetrainedininterviewmethodology.
ThecasestudiescontainedinAppendixIIIandIVaredevelopedfromareviewprimarydocuments,suchasworkinggroupcharters,memorandaofunderstanding,strategicplans,andinternalreports.
ThefirstcasestudyistheWesternArcticCaribouHerdWorkingGroup,whichmanagesaherdof200,000caribouthatroamthroughoutAlaskaandprovidetheprimarymeansofsubsistenceforfortyAlaskanNativeCommunities.
Thegroupformedinresponsetonear-devastationoftheherdinthe1970sandaimstonavigateamongthecompetinginterestsofnativecommunities,subsistenceusers,recrea-tionalhunters,andoilandgasinterests.
TheWorkingGroup,nowinexistenceforovertwentyyears,hasastabletwenty-personboardthatvotesonrecommendationsconveyedtolocalsubsistenceboardsandtheBoardofGame.
121Thesecondcasestudyexploresthe4ForestRestorationInitiative(4FRI),whichmanages750,000acresinNorthernArizona,thelargestcontiguousremain-ingponderosapineforestecosystemintheworld.
122The"posterchild"ofForestServicecollaborations,thisstakeholdergrouphasreceivedhundredsofmillionsofdollarsinCongressionalfundingoverthepastelevenyears.
Despitethislargebudget,ithastreatedonly45,000acresoftimberlandthroughacombinationofmechanicalthinningandprescribedburnstomanagewildfireriskwhilespurringlocalindustry.
Theindustrialusesofsmall-diametertimberhavefailedtomateri-alize,leadingtheForestServiceandNatureConservancytopayforrestorationac-120Thedozeninterviewsthatinformthissectionprovidequalitativedatadesignedtoprovideacross-sectionofexperiencesfromasmallanddiversegroup;theresultisnotacomprehensiveaccountnortheresultofastatisticallysignificantanalysis.
121SeeinfraAppendixIII.
122SeeUnitedStatesDepartmentofAgriculture,ForestService,RockyMountainResearchSta-tionProceedings,PonderosaPineEcosystemsRestorationandConservation:StepsTowardStew-ardship,ConferenceProceedingsRMRS-P-22,Flagstaff,AZ,April25–27,2000(September2001),https://www.
fs.
fed.
us/rm/pubs/rmrs_p022.
pdf.
33tivitythatconventionalcommercialtimberoperatescouldnotprofitablyunder-take.
123A.
AssessingStakeholderCollaborationsStakeholdercollaborationshavebecomeubiquitousinthemodernadministrativestate.
124Considertheextenttowhichvariousagenciesnotethatcollaborationsarewidespreadorimportant:C]ollaborationisverycommonifnotthenorminDOIinteractionswithstakeholders.
"-DisputeResolutionSpecialistattheU.
S.
DepartmentoftheInterior,hometothemostagencieswithamandatetomanagelandandnaturalresources125"ThereisalotthatIwouldconsidercollaborativeadaptivemanagement,"and"weactuallydoquitealot"ofstakeholdercollaborations.
-StakeholderCollaborationExpertatNOAA126"Wewouldn'tbeabletodoourjobswithoutcollaborations.
"-NationalParkServiceOfficial127"[P]ublicparticipationandcollaborationarebecominganintegralpartofourmission.
"-TheArmyCorpsofEngineers128Thesheernumberofstatutes,executiveorders,andregulationscontemplatingstakeholdercollaborationsindicatethatthesecollaborationshavebecomeatooluponwhichCongress,thepresident,andagenciesrelies.
1.
BenefitsofCollaborationThekeybenefitsofstakeholdercollaborationcanbegroupedintothreeroughcategories:(1)generatingsubstantivelybetterdecisions;(2)creatinggreatersocialacceptanceofcontroversialagencydecisions,aswellasaperceivedreductioninlitigation;and(3)advancingagencymandatesandgoalsbyorganizingandleveragingnon-agenciestoexpendresourcesonsharedobjectives.
Eachof123SeeinfraAppendixIV.
124SeeChristopherDeMuth,CantheAdministrativeStatebeTamed8(1)J.
LEG.
ANALYSIS121(June2016);OrlyLobel,TheRenewDeal:TheFallofRegulationandtheRiseofGovernanceinContemporaryLealThought,89MINN.
L.
REV.
342(2004-2005).
125Interview7.
126Interview6.
127Interview8.
128Collaboration&PublicParticipationCenterofExpertise,U.
S.
ARMYCORPSOFENGINEERS,http://www.
iwr.
usace.
army.
mil/Por-tals/70/docs/cpc/Added%202016/PI%20specialists.
Fact%20Sheet%20Summer%202016.
pdfver=2016-07-20-144453-433(lastvisitedSeptember22,2017).
34thesebenefitsisdiscussedbelow.
a.
Agenciesofficialsbelievethattheyreachsubstantivelybetterdecisionsbe-causeofthediverseviewpointsgarneredthroughcollaboration.
Stakeholdercollaborationscangeneratedifferentmanagementideasthatbecomepartofthediscussion,whichmayleadtobetterdecisionsthanwhattheagencywouldhavedevelopedonitsown.
Stakeholdergroupsbringawiderdiversityofopinionsandexperiencestothetable,whichcanshiftagencythinking.
AForestServiceemployeenoted,"Lefttoourowndevices,wewillgodownthenarrowpath.
"129Stakeholderscanpushforadifferentpath,aswithmembersofAlaskanNativeCommunitiesencouragingagenciestoincorporateindigenousknowledgeintotheirunderstandingofthecaribouherd.
130Amemberofthe4FRIstakeholdercollaborationdescribedtheinfluenceofthegrouponthecriteriathattheForestServiceusedfortheNEPAprocess:[T]heyhavecertaincriteriafordata,thatmightnotbethemostre-centlyavailabledata,butatthatagencybecauseoftheirlitigation,theyaremorecomfortablewithcertainkindsofdatathattheyfeelhasdefendedprotectiveactionsmore.
Ithinkthatiswherethecon-flictcomes.
Thestakeholderswouldliketobeinnovativeandusebestavailablescience.
TheForestServiceAgencyhasreluctancetoswitchdatamidstreambecauseithasn'tbeenprovenincourtandmightbemorevulnerable.
Wewouldarguethatusingbestavailablesciencewoulddobetterincourt.
It'sakindofaculturaldivide,butasastakeholderweareneversued,theyare.
SosometimesIhavetogiveittothem.
131Thisexampleillustratesanexampleofacollaborationpushinganagencytowardswhatmay,infact,beanobjectivelybetterdecision—usingthebestavailablesci-ence,insteadofthemoredefensivepositionofwhathasbeenacceptedincourtpreviously.
Itfurtherservestohighlightthebroaderpointthatcollaborationsforceagenciestothinkoutsidethebox,toconsidernewanddifferentideaswhenmakingdecisions.
b.
Agencyofficialsbelievethatdecisionstheymakethroughcollaborativeprocessesgaingreatersocialacceptance.
Naturalresourcecollaborationsgenerallyarisearoundcontroversialre-sourceuses.
Withinthisadversarialcontext,manyagencyemployeesbelievethatdecisionsinformedbycollaborationmayprovemoresociallyacceptablebecausetheyportraytheagencyasopentodiversityofopinions.
Insteadofstakeholders129Interview4.
130AppendixIII.
131Interview4.
35sittingbackandjudgingagencycompromises,thestakeholdersinsteadnegotiatethedealsthemselves.
Inthissense,anagencyofficialreportsthatstakeholdercol-laborations"doourworkforus"bybuildingsocialconsensusaroundcontroversialdecisions.
"132Onarelatedpoint,agenciesbelievetheyarelesslikelytobesued,ortolosealawsuit,foradecisionthataccordswithasetofrecommendationsfromastake-holdercollaboration.
Thesameofficialnotes,"Collaborationisnotthepanaceaforgettingridoflawsuits.
Butitsureashellmakes[thatrisk]alotlower.
"133Finally,relyingonacollaborationreflectsthemodernrealitythatunilateraldecisionsbygovernmentmaybeconsideredsuspect.
Anofficialreport:"Idon'tthinkanybodycandoanythingontheirownanymoreandbelegitimate.
"134Amonglandandresourcemanagement,collaboratingonsensitivelandandresourceman-agementdecisionsappearstohavebecomethenewnorm.
c.
Stakeholdersincollaborationscan,anddo,usetheirrelativestrengthstoadvancesharedobjectives.
Agenciesandstakeholdersarebothconfinedinwhattheycando.
Forexample,stakeholderscannotdirectlymanagepubliclands,andagenciescannotlobbyCongress.
135Yet,workingcollectively,stakeholdersandagenciescandevelopcommongoals,thendeploytheirrelativestrengthstoadvancetheobjectives.
Forstakeholdersincollaborations,thesestrengthsoftenincludefinancialresources,manpower,andthecapacitytolobby.
Thissynergisticrelationshipdisplacesthetraditionalnotionthataprincipal-agentrelationshipexistsbetweenagenciesandexternalactors,inwhichagenciesareessentialcontrollingexternalparties.
136132Id.
133Id.
134Id.
135Although4FRIlobbiesCongress(seeAppendixIV),anintervieweefromanotheragencynotedthat"weareprettycarefulnottoencouragestakeholderstolobbyCongress"andsuggeststhatlob-byingis"rare"andresistedtheimplication"thatFederalagenciesworkwithNGOstolobbyCon-gressonourbehalf.
"E-mailfromInterviewee6toauthor.
136Instead,asProfessorHannahWisemanhasobserveddevelopingelsewhereintheadministra-tivestate,therelationshipsnowseembi-directional.
HannahJacobsWiseman,DelegationandDysfunction,35YALEJ.
REG.
(forthcoming2017).
36Considerthefollowing:IthinkthereallygoodoutcomeoftheCFLRPActisthatthestakeholdershavemanagedtopulloffeitherregionalortwonationalworkshops.
Itisreallyvaluable,theForestServiceisanunderfundedagencyandoneofthethingsthattheycontinuetocutisthetravelandlessonslearnedsoyouendupwiththeseforestsanddistrictsthatendupinisolationandtheyareverysilo-ed.
Theydon'thavetheobviousauthorityorthebackingtoconsultwithoneanotherorcontributelessonslearned.
Theotherstakeholdernonprofitgroupsgetengaged,theyactuallycandevelopthoseworkshops,theycanfindfundingtosupportthetraveltothem.
137Agencyandnon-agencyactorswithdifferentcapacitiesandconstraintsusecollaborationsasastartingpointtopoolresourcestoadvancesharedobjectives.
Insodoing,decisionsbecomemoredefensibleincourt,andprivatefundscanbechanneledtowardspublicprograms.
Concernsarise,however,aroundtheneedtoensurethatsomestakeholdersarenotexcludedandthatthegoalsareconsistentwithagencymandates.
2.
ProblemswithCollaborationDespitewidespreadenthusiasmforcollaboration,theremaybeproblemswiththepracticethatremainlargelyundiscussed.
Threeissuesofconcernemergedfromthequalitativedata:(1)tosuccessfullycollaborate,agenciesmayviolateFACAorregulations,knowinglyorunknowingly;(2)participationincollaborationsisexpensiveandtime-consuming,meaningthatless-advantagedstakeholderswithstronginterestswhomaybeabletoengageinlessintensivepublicprocessessuchasnoticeandcommentmaybedisplacedbystakeholdercollaborations;(3)wedonotreallyknowifstakeholdercollaborationsareworthwhilerelativetootherapproaches.
Stakeholdercollaborationsmaycostmore,leadtoworseecological,economic,orsocialoutcomes,andtakelongerthanbothagencydecision-makingandthelitigationthatmightfollow.
Wesimplydonotknow.
Thisvoidofinformationcautionsagainstunquestionedenthusiasmforcollaborations.
a.
Collaborationsmayviolatetherequirementthatagenciesretainfinaldecision-makingauthority.
Avarietyofdoctrines,statutes,andcaseholdingsrequireagenciestoretainfinaldecision-makingauthorityovermanagementdecisions,evenwhenworkingwithcollaborations.
138Yet,agenciesmustsharedecision-makingspacetosome137Interview9.
138SeesupraPartII.
37degreetomotivatestakeholderstoparticipateinacollaboration.
Ifstakeholdersdonotbelievethatanagencywillimplementthecollaboration'srecommendation,theyhaveminimalincentivetocontinuecollaborating.
Forexample,leadersintwoAlaskanNativeCommunitiesrefusedtoparticipateintheWACHWGcollaborationwhenitbecameclearthattheAlaskaDepartmentofFishandGamewouldnotshareitsdecision-makingauthority.
139Inrequiringagenciestobothengagewithstakeholdersandretainsolefinaldecision-makingauthority,Congresshascreatedadifficultsituation.
Tonavigatethisbalance,collaborationsseemtobepayinglipservicetoretainingsoledecision-makingauthoritywhileinfactsharingsomeportionofdecisionspace.
140The4FRIcasestudyillustratesthispoint:ThedefiningnarrativeofthegroupcentersontheobjectionprocessforthefirstEnvironmentalImpactStatementinwhichthecollaborationparticipated.
141TheForestServiceRegionalForesterhandledtheobjectionprocessbyreferencingthegroupdecision-makingprocesswhenevaluatingtheobjectionsofanon-group-member,WildEarthGuardians.
Thissuggestsaspecialstatusforcollaborationsnotavailabletothepublic.
142The4FRIstakeholdersfeltvalidatedwhentheagencies'officialdecision-makingessentiallyrubberstampedthecollaboration'srecommendation.
143Remember,stakeholdersparticipateincollaborationsbecausetheyhaveapecuniaryorculturalinterestinthelandandresourcesbeingmanaged.
144Iftheycanprotectandadvancethoseintereststhroughparticipatinginastakeholdercollaborationthatanagencylistensto,theywillbehighlymotivatedtoparticipate.
Thelesslikelytheagencyistofollowtherecommendationofthecollaboration;thelessmotivatedstakeholderswillbecome.
ThisobservationshouldnotbemisunderstoodasacallforCongresstorelaxagencies'decision-makingauthorityoverpubliclandandresources.
Thenon-delegationdoctrineandrelatedlawsexistfornumerousreasons,includingtoensurethatagenciesmanageresourcesinthepublictrust—forthecollectivebenefitofallcitizens.
Andstakeholdercollaborationstendtobelocalinnature.
Agencyaccountabilitytoboththelocalstakeholdercollaborationsandthepoliticalinfluenceoftheexecutivebranchthereforeprovidesacheckonlocalizedpoweroverresources.
Thispointdoesunderscore,however,thechallengesagenciesfaceinretainingsoledecision-makingauthoritywhilemotivatingstakeholders.
More139SeeinfraAppendixIII.
140SeeinfraAppendixIV;Interview4.
141SeeinfraAppendixIV.
142SeeinfraAppendixIV.
143Id.
144SeesupraPartI.
A.
38importantly,thediscussionofthehighdegreeofinfluencethatsomestakeholdercollaborationsareexertingoveragencydecisionsshouldserveasareminderofstakeholderswhodonotparticipateinthecollaboration.
b.
Collaborations'influenceoveragencydecision-makingmaydisad-vantagelowersocioeconomicstatusstakeholderswholackthere-sourcesnecessarytoparticipatebuthaveaninterestintheresourcesatstake.
Participationincollaborationscanproveexpensiveandtime-consumingforstakeholders.
Stakeholderswithalowersocioeconomicstatusbutstronginterestsinthelandandresourcesatissuemaybedisplacedbystakeholdercollaborations,relativetoless-intensivepublicprocesses,suchasnoticeandcommentperiods.
Publiclandandresourcestendtobedisproportionatelylocatedinruralareas,someofwhich—liketheformertimbermilltownsofthePacificNorthwest—nolongerhavestrongindustrialinterests.
Accordingly,theburdenfallsuponlocalresidentstorepresentindustrialinterests(i.
e.
,"wewanttimberjobsback.
").
Thiscanprovedifficultandineffective,asmanystakeholdercollaborationsmeetingsoccurattimesthatareinconvenient,ifnotimpossible,forworkerswithlimitedworkplaceflexibilitytoattend.
Forexample,theannualWACHWGmeetingstakeplaceoveratwotothree-daytimeframeinalocationthatisseveralflightsawayfromvillagesinwhichtheCaribouisaprimaryfoodsource.
145The4FRImeetingstakeplacemid-morningonweekdays.
Hourlyworkersorstay-at-homeparentsmightfindeithermeetingdifficulttoattend,whichcontributestothelikelihoodthatonlywell-fundedstakeholdercollaborations,suchasindustrialinterestsandnongovernmentalorganizations,willbeabletoaffordtosendrepresentatives.
Manystakeholdersarepaidtoattendmeetings.
Agencyofficials,representativesofextractiveindustries,stateandlocalgovernmentofficials,andemployeesofenvironmentalnongovernmentalorganizationsareallreceivingtheirwagesforattendingmeetings—itispartoftheirjobs.
Thetimeinvestmentallowscareful,data-intensivedecision-making.
But,itcanserveasafunctionalbaragainsttheperspectivesofthosewhodonotbelongtosuchgroups,andareindividuallyunabletoattendaseriesofmeetings.
Collaborationputsinterestedstakeholderswithinsufficientresourcestoexpressthatinterestthroughmeetingattendanceatadisadvantage,relativetoaone-timelisteningsessionorpubliccomment.
Oneresponsetothisconcernmaybethatsufficiently-motivatedstakeholderswillpoolresourcestofundrepresentationincollaborations.
Thispositionmaybetrueincertaininterests—aswithsportinggroups—butfailstotakeintoeffecttheincomeeffectwithrespecttorural145SeeinfraAppendixIII.
39populationswithlowersocioeconomicstatus.
Asimilarsetofconcernsrevolvearoundtribalinterests.
Itisstrikingthat4FRI,themostlaudedstakeholdercollaborationintheForestService,doesnothavetribalrepresentativeswhobelongtothecollaboration.
Astakeholdernotes:Iwouldsayweclassicallymiss,andthisisacrossthewest,ourtribalpartners.
Wehavebeenlessthansuccessfulatengagingourtribalnations,andtherearealotofreasonsforthat.
146Severalfactorscangiverisetotribesnotbeingrepresented,althoughtheseconsiderationsdifferonatribe-by-tribebasisgiventhebroaddiversityoftribalresourcesandobjectives.
Further,tribesmayelecttobecomeinvolvedinresourcemanagementfromagovernment-to-governmentrelationshipinstead,undertheSection7ConsultationrequirementoftheNationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct.
147Tribeselectingtorelysolelyonthisoptionshouldnot,andlegallycannot,havetheirperspectivedismissedbecausetheydidnotparticipateinthecollaboration.
GiventhespecializedlegalstatusoftribesunderNEPA,agenciesshouldstrivetoincludetribesthatwanttoparticipateincollaborativeeffortswhileunderstandingthattribeshavespecializedlegaltreatmentunderNEPAthatshouldnotbeconflatedwithgeneralpublicparticipation.
c.
Claimsaboutthesuccessesofcollaborationsarenotrelative;thereisnoempiricalbasisfortheclaimthattheyworkbetterthanalternativeapproaches.
Whenaskedaboutsuccessfulandunsuccessfulcollaborations,theanswersofagencyofficialswereanecdotal—storiesofparticularcollaborationsthatproducedpositiveoutcomes,ornot.
Interestingly,thesamecollaborationcangeneratesharplydifferentassessmentsofsuccess,asillustratedbytheenthusiasmwithwhichagencyofficialsspeakof4FRIcontrastedwiththescathingnewspapereditorialonthesubject.
148Thisdivergencehighlightstheabsenceofdefinedmetricsbywhichtojudgeacollaboration,eitherinisolationorrelativetoothermeansofengagement.
ThisReportsoughttoidentifythefeaturesof,andreasonsfor,successandfailureincollaborationandillustrateeachthroughexamples.
Whileseveralintervieweessharedstoriescomparingsuccessfulandunsuccessfulcollaborations,146Interview7.
14742U.
S.
C.
§§4321-4370m–12(2012).
148SeeinfraAppendixIV.
40whentheirquoteswerecirculatedforreviewandinclusioninthereport,149someretractedthesestatementsoutoffearthatcritiquewouldunderminetheunsuccessfulcollaborations,stillinoperation.
Forthatreason,thisReportdoesnotprovidespecificinstancesofunsuccessfulcollaborations,butflagstheimportantpointthattheyexist.
150HowdocollaborationsperformrelativetoalternativeapproachesAnagencycould,forexample,makeadecisionwithonlytheminimumrequisitepublicinput,riskbeingsuedbyinterestgroups,andthen,intheeventofalawsuit,askacourttorenderthedecisionacceptable,ornot.
Litigationmayprovelessexpensivethanfundinganongoingcollabroation.
Itisdifficulttofullyquantifyacost-benefitanalysisonthispoint,however.
Thebenefitsandharmsofcollaborationmayextendbeyondspecificmanagementissues,toinfluenceageneralizedsensethatthepublichasofaparticularagency,orfederallandmanagementgenerally.
DocollaborationsproducethebestecologicalresultsSeveralexamplessuggestthatsomepeoplebelievethatagencies'emphasisoncollaborationleadstoover-cooperationwithgrazingorranchinginterestsattheexpenseofecologicalobjectives.
Aperniciouseffectofcollaborationinsuchinstancesisthatitgivestheappearanceofdemocraticprocessthatmakestheagencies'decisionmoredefensibleincourt.
Inoneexample,membersofthelocalenvironmentalcommunityrefusedtoparticipateinacollaborationbecausetheyfeltthatpreviouscollaborationsamountedtoaseriesofelaboratehand-wavingbytheagencytogivetheappearanceofappropriatedemocraticeprocesswhilegivingranchersthegrazingaccesstheywanted.
151Inanotherexample,whichtookplaceinadifferentstate,amemberofanindependentscientificreviewboardexaminingagencyactionwassurprisedtolearnthatthelocalagencypositionwasessentiallyacquiesencetolocalranchinginterests.
152Whenthememberofthereviewboardprotestedthatthiswas149Intervieweeswereprovidedwiththeopportunitytoreviewtheirrecordedcommentsusedinthisreportpertheinterviewprotocol.
SeeinfraAppendixV.
150Thesewithdrawalsshouldcausefutureresearcherstobethoughtfulabouttheincentivesforself-assessmentbyagencyofficialsandstakeholdersinevaluatingthesuccessofongoingcollaborations.
Theunwillingnesstoengagewithnegativeassessmentsofcollaborationsalsoraisesbroaderquestions—outsideofthecontextofthisReport—aboutthedegreetowhichnormsagainsttalkingaboutthechallengingaspectsofcollaborationhampersthepotentialforhealthycollaborations,limitstheabilitytomeaningfullyassesstherelativemeritofcollaboration,andmaybereflectiveofentrenchedagencycultureorlocation-specificnorms.
Importantly,theindividualintervieweesareoperatinginthepoliticalandsocialrealitiesofthesituation;theydonotpersonallybearresponsibilityforthelargerissues,theymerelyreflectthem.
151Interview13.
152Interview14.
41inconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheEndangeredSpeciesActandotherfederallaws,theagencyofficialacknowledgedthisastrue,butrefusedtobudge.
153Regardlessoftherelativeandempiricalsuccessofcollaboration,someagencyofficalsfeelthatitissimplytherightthingtodo.
Anagencybiologistreflectedthissentiment,saying,"Justasaperson,Ithinkitisvaluabletocollaboratewithpeoplewhoareinvestedindecisionsthatyoumake.
SoIthink[stakeholdercollaborations]areprettyimportant.
"154Thissenseofcollaborationasreflectiveofdemocraticprinciplesisalsodiscernableinthelanguageofthecongressionalactsandexecutiveordersrequiringcollaboration.
155Eventually,Congressoragenciesshouldconsidertestingtheintuitivesensethatcollaborationssatisfydemocraticandpracticalconsiderationsbyexplicitlystudyingandconsideringtherelativecostsandbenefitsofalternatives.
B.
BestPracticesandRecommendationsThisSectionprovidesagencieswithasetofrecommendationpointsofconsiderationwhendecidingwhethertoestablishacollaboration,throughtheprocessofcollaboration,andhowtomaintainacollaboration.
Itincorporateslessonslearnedfromvariousstakeholdersandagencyofficials,oftenintheirownwords.
1.
DecidingWhethertoEstablishaCollaborationTotheextentthatanagencyhastheflexibilityandauthoritytoconsiderestablishingacollaboration(i.
e.
,itisnotrequiredbyCongressorthePresident),theagencyshouldassessthesituationtodeterminewhichkindofcollaborativemodelbestaddressestheissueathand.
156Thefollowingfactorsweighinfavorofcreatinganewcollaboration:153Id.
154Interview10.
155SeesupraPartII.
A.
156NOAASOCIALSCIENCETOOLS,supranote98.
NOAAprovidesthefollowingguidanceondecidingwhentoestablishacollaborative:ProactiveengagementcanhelptoavoidproblemsAproblemhasbeenclearlyidentifiedThebestcourseofactioniscomplexornotapparentSupportofstakeholdersisnecessaryforthedecisiontobesuccessfulManypartiesareaffectedbythedecisionNosingleagencyhasclearorcompletejurisdictionNosingleagencyhastheresourcesorexpertisetomakeandimplementadecisionIssuesandsolutionsarenegotiablePartiesarewillingtocollaborate.
Id.
(AdaptedfromNOAAOFFICEFORCOASTALMANAGEMENT2012).
42a.
Thereisaproblem,orsetofproblems,inmanaginglandornaturalresourcesthatisaffectingthedeeply-valuedinterestsofmultiple,diversestakeholders.
Thereisstrongbottom-uppressuretomanagetheissueinanacceptableway,whichindicatesthatstakeholderswillbewillingtoparticipate.
Astakeholderinacollaborationdescribestheneedforparticipants'interestinaresourceinorderforthecollaborationtobesuccessful:Themostsuccessfulcollaborationsarenotstructuredbyagencies.
Whentheagenciessay'heyIneedacollaborationtogetthisprojectdone'itisjustafalsedichotomy.
.
.
.
Grassrootseffortsbythestakeholdersofourfederallandendupinthebestresultsforthefederallandscape.
Soyoucan'tforceit.
157Thisproblemmaybehighlightedwhenacrisisoccurs,especiallyiflandoraresourceadiversegroupofstakeholderscaredeeplyaboutwashandledpoorly.
Severalcollaborationsemergedfromcrisis:Inthecaseof----,populationcollapseincaribouherdsthatsupportedthousandsofpeople158andwildfirescausedmillionsofdollarsinlostpropertyvalues.
159ANOAAemployeerecallshowasimilarcircumstancecausedrenewedattentiontoanexistingcollaboration,saying:TherewasareallystressfulconfrontationaboutawhalethatstrandedinMorichesBayinLongIslandaroundThanksgiving[in2016].
Thewhalestrandedaliveandwasonthebeachaliveforacoupleofdays.
Maybethreedays.
Itwasonlyafewfeetfromswim-mablewater,butitwasgroundedanditcouldnotgetoff.
Whenthathappensawhaleprettyquicklydeteriorates.
Eventuallywe,NOAA,hiredaveterinariantoeuthanizetheanimal,butbeforethathap-penedpeoplewatchingthewhale'sstruggleswereterriblyupset,asyoucanimagine.
We,NOAA,andourpartnerswhoarepartofwhatwecalltheMarineMammalStrandingNetworkwerenotfullypre-paredforthisparticularevent.
IthappenedjustbeforetheThanks-givingbreakandpeoplewereonvacation.
Therewerealotofrea-sonswhywewerenotasalertasweshouldhavebeen,butthosereasonsdonotdiminishthefactthatpeoplewereterriblyupsetwiththeirgovernment'sresponse.
Idon'tblamethem.
157Interview4.
158SeeinfraAppendixIII.
159SeeinfraAppendixIV.
43Butoutofthatcamesomegood.
Peoplewerereallyfrustratedattheirgovernmentandwantedtodomoretohelpthewhale.
Wewerefrustratedwithourselvesthatwedidn'trespondasbestwecouldinwaysthatweknewwecouldrespondand,infact,inwayswetypi-callydorespond.
Wemetwiththecommunityafewmonthsaftertheevent,andweformedamuchbettercollaborativeprocessonLongIsland.
Peoplewhoweresoangryatthelossofthiswhaleareeagertohelpusrespondtothenextstranding.
TheMarineMammalStrandingCoordinatorsofLongIslandhavereceivedalotofexpres-sionsofsupportsaying,"Nexttimewe'llbethere,we'llhelpyou,we'llprovideyouwithinformation,I'vegotaboatyoucanuse,"allthatsortofstuff.
Sooftencollaborationcomesoutofcrisis.
Astheaftermathofsomethinglikethat.
160Ashighlightedbythisexample,anaturalresourcesdisaster—largeorsmall—thatnegativelyaffectspeopleattractsattention.
Itcanserveasacatalyzingevent.
Theriskoflosingvaluablepropertyisperhapstheprimarymotivatorforstakeholderstoinvestthetimetoparticipateoverthecourseofmanyyears.
b.
Thereislong-standingconflictabouthowaparticularlandorresourceclustershouldbemanagedamongnumerousdeeplyinvestedstakeholders.
Regardlessofwhethertheyusethetoolofcollaboration,agenciesmustmanagerelationshipswithseveralstakeholderscompetingformutually-exclusiveusesofafiniteresource.
IntheexampleoftheWesternArcticCaribouHerd,AlaskanNativehunters,trophyorsporthunters,huntingguides,transporters,andenvironmentalnongovernmentalorganizationshadsharplydifferingviewsaboutwhoshouldharvestcaribou,andappropriatemethodsforharvest.
161Inthe4FRIcasestudy,environmentalnongovernmentalorganizations,thetimberindustry,andlocalhomeownerswereatoddsabouthowtoreducewildfirerisks.
162Localagencyemployeestendtobepoignantlyawareofsuchresourceconflicts,andwhothekeyactorsare.
Thedifficultyinresolvingtheconflictisthatdesiredoutcomestendtobemutuallyexclusive:cutthetrees/don'tcutthetrees,issuecaribouhuntingpermitstonon-nativehunters/don'tissuehuntingpermitstonon-nativehuntingpermits.
Further,manystakeholdersconflateanagencynottakingtheirdesiredapproachasalackofunderstandingbyagencyofficials.
ANOAAofficialreports:160Interview6.
161SeeinfraAppendixIII.
162SeeinfraAppendixIV.
44KeystakeholdersoftheNationalMarineFisheriesServicethinkthatwedoaterriblejobatstakeholderengagement.
Fishermenfeelthatwedonotlistentothem.
Environmentalgroupsfeelthatwelistenonlytothefishermen.
.
.
.
Alargepartofthewhyispeoplearenotreallyusuallysatisfiedwithhavingprovidedinput.
Whattheywantistopersuadeustotheirposition.
That'sharder.
.
.
.
Butwehavereasonsformakingdecisionsthatgobeyondsimplyhumaninteractions,therearelegalrequirementsthatwehavetoadhereto.
163Undersuchcircumstances,startingastakeholdercollaborationputsstakeholderswithdivergentperspectivesinthesameroom.
Thisallowsstakeholderstocommunicatedirectly,butcanalsoexacerbateconflict.
Suchcommunicationhasatleasttwoeffectsthatmayemerge,regardlessofwhetherresolutionisachieved:humanizingtheothersideofaconflict,andpotentiallychangingunderstandingovertime.
Importantly,thesefeatureshappeninabi-directionalmannerinsuccessfulcollaborations.
Theagency,too,mayshiftitsthinkinginresponsetocollaboration.
IntheWesternArcticCaribouHerdexample,statewildlifebiologistsbegantheworkinggrouptoinformAlaskanNativesaboutbiologicalconditions,sothatpermittingdecisionswouldmakesenseagainstabackdropofscientificdata.
164Overtime,however,agencyofficialsdevelopedanincreasedfamiliaritywith,andrespectfor,indigenousecologicalknowledge—theintergenerationalculturalknowledgethatAlaskanNativeCommunitieshadabouthowcaribouactovertimeinresponsetochangingnaturalconditions.
165AgencyofficialsshiftedfromtellingAlaskanNativesaboutthescientificassessmentofcariboutoexchanginginformationdrawnfromvarioussources,eachviewedaslegitimate.
Thishighlightstheopportunityforbi-directionallearning,whichcanlessenconflict.
c.
Thereisstrongtop-downpressurewithintheagencyorfrompoliticalappointees,indicatingthatpolitically-connectedfigureswilldrawupontheirresourcestoprovidethenecessaryfundingandsupport.
Successfulcollaborationsrequirepolitically-connectedsupporterslinkedtotheregionatissues.
Govenors,senators,orhigh-rankingagencyofficialswhoarewillingtoexpendpoliticalcapitaltogetthecollaborativefundingandnecessaryregulatoryorlegalpermissionsseemvitalinthesuccessoflong-standingcollaborations.
The4-FRI,whichhasanoperatingbudgetof$33million,notonlybuiltuponacollaborationstartedbythegovenor,butalsofitintoafederalstatute163Interview6.
164SeeinfraAppendixIII.
165Id.
45requiringtheForestServicetocollaborate,andhadsupportfromwell-connectedsenatorswhoarewillingtointroducelegislationbeforeCongresstosupporttheorganization.
166Withoutahighdegreeofsupport,well-intentionedstakeholdersandagencyemployeesmaybecomedistractedwithfundraisingeffortstocoverbasicoperatingcosts.
d.
Thereisstronginternalpressurewithintheagencytoembraceacollaborativeapproach,includingwillingnesstosharedecisionspace.
Individualagenciescannotresolvethetensionbetweentruecollaborationandlimitsonnondelegation—thisisaCongressionaltask.
Regardless,agenuinewillingnessonthepartofagenciestosharewhatdecision-makingauthoritycanbesharedwithlocaldecision-makersiskeytosuccesssfulcollaborations.
Onestateagencyofficialexplained:I'veseenothercollaborativeeffortswheretheagency,becausethosewithinitaretoldtheyneedtodothiscollaboration,theyjustdoitasaproformachecktheboxexercisewithoutreallybeingwillingtogiveupthatpoweranddecision-making.
Inmymind,thisbecomesawasteofeveryone'stimebecausethiscan'tbeatruecollaboration,andifyoudon'twanttoempowerthepeopleyouareworkingwiththendon'tevengodownthatroad.
167Asapreconditiontocollaboration,theagencyshouldinternallyassessthedegreetowhichitiswilling—andable—tosharedecisionspace.
e.
Alessresource-intensiveformofcollaborativegovernanceexistsbutcannotmeettheinformationaland/orrelationalneedsofthesituation.
Agenciesshouldseektocreatetheleaststructurallycomplexcollaborativepossible.
Tothispoint,astategovernmentemployeenotes:I'minvolvedwithanumberofdifferentcollaborativeefforts.
OneofthemistakesIseepeoplemakeisthattheybuildhugecollaborativegroupsaroundrelativelysimpleprojects,andIthinkyouhavetoscaleyourcollaborationtoyourproject.
Thelargeritisthemorecontroversialitis.
Obviously,thataddsacomplexityandtheneedformoremanagement.
Collaborationsareinherentlydifficult,cumbersome,andtimeconsumingentities.
So,themorecomplexandlargeryourcollaborativeisthemoretimeyouaregoingtospendjustonthecollaborativeprocess.
.
.
,thelargeritgetsthegreatertheneedforprofessionalfacilitation,foradministrativesupport,thosesortsofthings.
168166SeeinfraAppendixIV.
167Interview3.
168Interview3.
46Moreover,the4FRIcollaborationevolvedfromnearlyadecadeofdifferenttaskforcesandworkinggroups.
169Groupswithaspecifictask(suchascreatingaplanorreport)andfinitetimelinemaycreatethecapacityofpeopletoworktogether,withoutthecommitmentorexpectationincumbentinacollaboration.
Gettingpeopleinaroomtodiscussaproblemgenerallygivesrisetoinformalrelationshipsandbrainstorming,whichcanbegintoreduceanimosityandmaybuildtrust.
Theyeastoftheserelationshipsisrepeatedinteractions,sometimescenteredaroundthegoalofproducingaparticulardeliverable,suchasproducingamanagementplanorreport.
Thus,listeningsessionsandtaskforces,mayprovidealow-costwaytotesttheamenabilityofstakeholderstomoreinvolvedcollaborationtools.
170Foravarietyofpracticalconsiderations,agency-initiatedcollaborationsshouldstartatthesmallestandleastformalscalefeasible.
Thereisnomagicintheterminologysurroundingcollaborativegovernance—ifaninformalrelationshipcanachieveanobjectivemorequicklyandatlessexpensethanacollaboration,theagencyshouldembraceit.
ANationalParkServiceemployeeunderscoresthispoint,saying:It'sreallyoneofthethingsthatcaneithermakeorbreakanew[NationalParkService]SuperintendentcomingtoasubsistenceparkinAlaska,howwelltheycanintegratethatandhowquicklytheycanestablishasenseoftrustwiththeircommunitiesandtoworkwiththemsothatiffolksneedbetteraccesstogettoanareathattheyuseforwoodcuttingbuttheycan'tusetheirsnowmachinestogettherebecausetheiceonthelakehasn'tfrozen,thattheSuperintendentisflexibleenoughtoaccommodatethatsomehowinsomeway.
Thisiswherepartnershipsontheground,thecollaborationsontheground,arereallymostpowerful,theyhappenonthatonetoone,neighbortoneighbor,typebasis.
Asopposedtojustbeingmoreofthelargeragencytalkingtoatribalgovernment,ortalkingtoavillagegovernment.
171ThisisanimportantpointforCongress,thePresident,andhigher-levelagencyofficialstoconsider:Informal,relationalconflictresolutionisdifficult,ifnotimpossibletorequire,quantify,orreward.
But,itcanbethemosteffectivemeansofmanagingmanyresourcechallenges.
Apushtowardscollaborationshouldnotbeapushtowardsformalism–relationshipsmatterandmaybeboththecheapest169SeeinfraAppendixIV.
170Id.
171NPSemployeeinterview.
47andmosteffectivecollaborativetoolavailable.
1722.
EstablishingaNewCollaborationAfteranagencydeterminesthatitwantstoworkwithstakeholderstoes-tablishanewcollaboration,itshouldtakethefollowingsteps:a.
DeterminewhetherFACAwillapply.
AgenciesdecidingwhetherFACAcertificationisnecessaryshouldconsiderthefollowingflowchart:Figure5.
FlowchartforDeterminingWhetherFACAAppliestoaCollaboration(CourtesyoftheU.
S.
ForestService,NationalForestFoundation,PartnershipResourceCenter)Generally,collaborationswithmoreinfluenceonagencydecision-makingaremorelikelytobesubjecttoFACA.
Totheextentthatanagencyhasaccesstoasolicitororotherlegalcounselavailableforsuchinquiries,theyshouldseekaninformalcheckontheneedforFACA—suchcounselcanserveasarepositoryofinformationregardingwhatothercollaborationswithintheagencieshavedoneinthepast.
172Foradiscussionontheimportanceofinformal,norm-basedrelationshipsinmanagingre-sourcesandsharedgeographicspace,seeELLICKSON,supranote62.
48b.
Identifytherelelvantlegalauthoritiesauthorizingcollaborationamongexistinglawsandregulations.
Agenciesshouldconsultwithastakeholderengagementcenterand/orin-agencylegaladvisortoidentifywhichlawsandregulationsgovernthecollabora-tion.
AppendixIandIIareusefultoolsinidentifyingsituationsinwhichcollabo-rationsarerequired,ormayalreadyexists.
Havingthisinformationpriortoformingthecollaborationallowstheagencytocommunicatethelegalstandardbywhichrecommendationsformthecollaborationwillbeincorporatedintoagencydecision-making,animportantfoundationforformingclearexpectationsandtrust.
c.
Identifystakeholderswhomaybewillingtoparticipate.
Thereexistsabroad,ifnotuniversal,groupofstakeholdersforeverypubliclandandresource,whichcanbeexplainedalongthedimensionsofexistancevalue,taxpayerinterest,andteleconnectivityofresources.
InAlaska,forexample,everyresidentofthestateislegallyconsideredapotentialsubsistanceuserofcaribou—regardlessofwheretheylive,theyhaveequalaccesstothenaturalresourcesofthestate.
173Withinthatbroadercategory,therearemanydifferingperspectivesabouttherelationshipbetweenpeople,theirareaofresidence,andtheirinterestinhuntingrights.
OneNationalParkServiceofficialnotes:Itjustgetstobeavery,verycomplexsystemofnotonlypoliticalrelationshipsbutcommunityrelationships,andrelationshipsbetweenpeoplethatliveinurbanareasaswellasthosethatliveinruralareas.
Thisgroupofdiffuseandloosely-interestedstakeholdersisnotthegroupwithrequisiteinteresttomaintainalong-termcommitmenttocollaboration.
174Similarly,aNOAAemployeespecializinginstakeholdercollaborationprovidedthefollowingresponsetowhocountsasastakeholder,saying:FortheNationalMarineFisheriesService.
.
.
reallyanybody[isastakeholder].
Ithinkanybodywhohasaninterestin,orisaffectedby,whatwedointheoceanisastakeholder,andIcan'timagineanyonewhodoesn't.
Whoisn'taffectedbywhatishappeningintheoceaninsomeways175Beyondthisbroadrecognition,agencyofficialsdrilldowntoidentifystakeholdersasthosewithaninterestintheresources.
Thisisthegroupthatwilllikelyhavethecapacityandinteresttoparticipateinacollaboration.
TheNOAAAcollaborationspecialistsdiscussesthiswithrespecttooceanresources,saying:173Interview8.
174Interview10.
175Interview6.
49Therearesomegroupsthatareclearlyaffectedinanimmediateandobviousway.
Peoplewhomaketheirlivingontheocean.
Forus,inparticular,fishermenareourprimarystakeholder,buttherearealsoothergroupswhoreallycareabouttheocean,theenvironmentalgroupscaredeeplyaboutwhatisgoingonintheocean.
Theycertainlywouldrepresentsomestakeholderswhoneedtobeinvolvedinthemanagementoftheoceans.
176Theheartofidentifyingkeystakeholderswiththerequisitedegreeofcommitmentttoenteracollaborationrequireslookingtothosewithaculturalorpecuniaryinterest—someonewhomakestheirlivingfromtheresourceorlandinquestion,whetherextractingtheresourceorprotectingit.
177Thisisthefirstlayerofstakeholders.
TheNOAAcollaborationspecialistalsomadethevaluablepointtoconsidernon-obviousstakeholders:TheNationalMarineFisheriesServicehasanumberofstakeholdersthatyouwouldn'tthinkof,likeinCaliforniathedamownersthepeoplewhomanagethehydraulicdamsintheSierraNevada.
TheyarestakeholdersbecausetheycontrolthewaterthatendangeredsalmonspeciesinCalifornianeedtosurvive.
Wedon'tdirectlyregulatethem,butweadvisetheFederalEnergyRegulatoryCommissionaboutdams.
Sotheoperationsofthedamsisdirectlyaffectedbyus.
LikewisefarmersinCalifornia'sCentralValleyareverymuchourstakeholders.
Ifthesalmonneedwatertomigrateupstreamtospawn,itmeansthatthereislesswateravailableforfarming.
Whenwaterisscarce,asitwasduringtherecentCaliforniadrought,youcanbetthatweneedtoengagewiththesestakeholders.
178Drawingupontheexpertiseofagencyofficialswhohaveoperatedintheregionforalongtimecanprovideinsightintonon-obviousstakeholders,throughinstitutionalmemoryofpreviousconflictsorcollaborations.
Itisalsoimportanttoconsiderstate,tribal,andlocalgovernmentstakeholders.
Importantly,thisdiscussionistopredictwhowillbeinterestedovertimeandwhereresoucesshouldbetargetedinearlyphases.
Differentstakeholdergroupsmayresponddifferentlytothesameinvitation,baseduponpreexistingrelationships(ordistrust)withagencies.
Asaresult,agencyofficialsshouldbemindfuloflocalnormsandcustom,whichmaymeandifferentformsofinvitationtodifferentstakeholdergroups(i.
e.
,sendingalettertoonegroupandhavingaknownagencyemployeevisitanothertodeliveraninformalin-personinvitation).
176Id.
177SeesupraPartI.
A.
178Interview6.
50Agencyofficialsshouldnotlimitaccesstomeetings;allmeetingsshouldbewell-publicized,andnostakeholdersshouldbediscouragedfromattendingorturnedaway.
Generally,interestwanesovertimeamongstakeholderswithsuperficialinterestinthelandorresource.
Thenaturalattritionofmeetingattendeescanfeeldisheartening,butisinfactanaturalandimportantpartoftheprogressionofbuildingtrustandrelationships.
d.
Encouragethecollaborativetocreateitsownstructureandgroundrules.
IfFACAdoesnotapply,thecollaborativemayneedtoestablishitselfstructually.
Creatingacharterormemoandumofunderstandingamongmemberscanbeagoodwaytobuildearly-stagetrustwithoutaddressingthedivisiveissues.
Outsidefacilitatorscanbeusefulinthisprocess,butintervieweesemphasizedtheimportanceofempoweringcollaborationstostructurethemselves:Agenciesthemselvescannotstructurethecollaborations.
Thecollaborationsthemselvesmustbuildtheirstructure.
Ifanagencystepsintothegameknowinghowitwantstostructureacollaborativethentheyhavestartedofffundamentallyinanon-collaborativemanner.
Ithinktherearealotoffactorsthathavetodeterminewhatthecollaborativestructurelookslike,butitshouldnotbealeadagency'sroleindeterminingthat.
179Astakeholderofthe4FRIcollaborationdescribedtheprocessofsettingitsownrules,saying:Oh,issuedregulationsforagovernmentcollaborationHeckno.
Ithinkthatdefeatsthepurposeofthecollaboration.
Butthecollaborationitselfcametoaconsensusonalotofgoverningdocuments.
So,wedecidedhowdoyoucometoconsensus,wedefinedwhatisconsensusforthe4FRI,wesetupsomedecisionrulesformakingrecommendations,whatdoesittaketogetarecommendationfromthe4FRIstakeholdergroup,wehavecommunicationguidelinesjusttosayifthe4FRIstakeholdergroupisreadytocommunicatethathastobeagreedupon,youcan'thaveonestakeholdergoingoutwilly-nillysaying,'The4FRIstakeholdergroupagreestothis,'ithastogothroughaprocesswiththestakeholdergroup.
180179Interview3.
180Interview9.
51AstakeholderfromNOAAhadadifferentperspective,however,saying:[Thestepofacollaborationorganizingitself]isnotalwaysgoingtobenecessary.
Ifwearenotseekingconsensusfromthegroup,itismyunderstandingthattheFederalgovernmentcanorganizeandconvenemeetingofthestakeholdercollaborationgroup.
Itdoesnotneedtoself-organize,and,inmyview,itisoftenmoreefficientifwedonotplacetherequirementofself-organizationuponthegroup.
Ultimately,forongoingcollaborations,theagencycanusetheopportunityofinitialrule-settingasanopportunitytoexhibittheroleitwillplayasthecollaborationunfolds:supportiveandinformative,butnotdictatorial.
Establishingtheserelationaldynamicsearlyestablishesafoundationoftrustuponwhichfuture,moredifficulttopicscanbebroachedinthefuture.
e.
Provideproperlysizedtaskstothecollaboration;avoiddoingtoomuchtoosoon.
Notably,bothcasestudycollaborationstookseveralyearsbeforetakingondifficultsubstantiveissues.
Thisisconsistentwiththeobservationfrommanagersthatthereisa"Goldilockselement"tothescopeofissuethatagenciesshouldputbeforecollaborations.
Ifayoungcollaborativetakesondivisiveissuesorlarge-scaleprojects—issuesthataretoobig—itmayfail.
Alternatively,amaturecollaborativethatdoesnotdomeaningfulworkwillfrustrateitsmembership.
Asaresult,agenciesshouldconsiderrampingtheissuesandtasksthatitproposestogivetoastakeholdercollaboration,startingwillsmallwins,thenexpandingtomoredifficultsubjectsandtasks.
f.
Buildtrustandrelationshipswithstakeholders,whichmayrequiretimeandtheinvolvementofthird-partyfacilitators.
Akeyelementofcollaboration—somewouldargue,theverypointofcollaboration—istheabilitytobuildtrustandrelationshipsamongformeradversaries.
Thismayalsoprovetobethemostdifficultaspectofthecollaboration.
Severalinterviewrespondentsaskedthattheircommentsaboutdifficultpersonalitieshamperingspecificcollaborationsbeoff-record.
But,itwasnotedinseveralinstancesthatdominantpersonalitiesunwillingtoconsiderotherperspectivesdiminishedtrustwithinagroup.
52Agencystructurecanbeanotherimpedimenttotrust-building.
Astakeholderfromthe4FRIcollaborationalsonotedthatthestructureoftheForestService,andthelegaldemandsuponit,hindercollaboration:ThesecondbarrierisjuststakeholderstoForestService.
Soit'saninterestinglackoftrustandtheForestServiceistoblameforthistoo.
IfeelliketheForestServiceresponds[to]toomanymasters.
TheyareahierarchicalorganizationandwhatthestakeholdergrouphasseenisthattheyhavedevelopedarelationshiplocallywiththeplannersherebuttheForestServiceregionalofficewillwadeinperiodicallyandkindofmessupthosestatedareasoftrustor,youknow,theagreementareas.
AndIdon'tunderstandwhattheregionalfolksthatdothatarethinking.
Becauseyouknowcollaborat[ion]succeedsonthesepersonalrelationships,soyoucan'tsitintheofficeinAlbuquerque,andcomeoveronceevery18monthsanddropthelaw,ordropthebomb.
181ThishighlightsthecentraltensionbetweenagenciesascollaboratorsandagenciesasadministratorsofotherlawspassedbyCongress.
182Also,theorganizationalstructureandhistoryofanorganizationcaninfluenceitsabilitytoadapttoacollaborativegovernance.
Arecurringthemewastheneedtousethird-partyfacilitatorstoovercomeinitialbarriersandbuildtrust.
4FRIusedatleastfourfacilitatorsbeforefindingonewhomanybelievedmovedthegrouptowardsamoretrustingplace.
183Despite4FRI'ssuccess,therecurringproblemsofdifficultpersonalitiesandhierarchicalconstraintspersist,provingthatitcanbedifficulttoachievethegoalofbuildingtrustsandrelationships.
Agenciesandstakeholdersalikeshouldtargetimprovingcontentiousrelationshipstotheextentthatcompromisecanbereached;itmayproveunrealistic—evencounterproductive—tostriveforfriction-freerelationships.
3.
MaintainingStakeholderCollaborationsOnceestablishedandoperative,stakeholdercollaborationsrequireongoingmaintenancebystakeholders,butdecreasedinvolvementfromagencies.
a.
Agencyofficialsdirectlyinvolvedincollaborationsshouldassignonepersontothetaskofensuringongoingcompliancewithrelevantlaws,includingabriefannualconsiderationofFACA.
Fromalegalperspective,agenciesshouldre-assesstheapplicabilityof181Interview9.
182SeesupraPartII.
A;PartIII.
A.
2.
183SeeinfraAppendixIV.
53FACAandchangestothelawsregardingcollaborationonarecurringbasis.
Theflexibleandadaptivenatureofcollaborationssuggeststhatinformalcollaborationscanbecomemoreinfluentialoveragencydecisionsovertime,leadingtodifferentresultsinthedecision-makingprocess.
AgenciesshouldalsobemindfuloftherelationshipbetweenstakeholdercollaborationsandthepublicparticipationconsiderationsundertheNationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct,alongwithotherrelevantfederallawsthatmightconflictwithcreatingahighdegreeofshareddecision-makingspace.
b.
Collaborationsandagenciesshouldestablishagreed-tometricsofsuccessjointlyandconductannualassessmentsonperformancealongthosemetrics.
Collaborationswilllikelybecomeself-assessingovertime.
Onestakeholderrelatesthewaysinwhichhergrouptriestocontinuallyimprove:Justthatconstantopenness,the4FRItriestodoanevaluationeveryyear,aself-evaluation,anditcomesupinthatself-evaluationwhoarewemissing.
Ithinkthat'sagoodprocesstoincludeinyourcol-laborationgroupsisthatannuallookaround.
WhoarewemissingWhowouldbegreat184Othercollaborationstaperovertime,usuallybecausetherelationshipsamonggroupmembersdidnotfullyform.
Also,"collaborationfatigue"cansetinifresultsareslowtoemerge.
Thereisnoconsensusonthemetricsofasuccessfulcollaboration.
Onecanimaginemanyvariables,suchasthelengthofthecollaboration,naturalresourcemetrics(suchasareductioninwildfiresornumberofporpoiseentanglements),orfeelingsofthememberstowardsthecollaboration.
Althoughsocialscientistshavedevelopedsomeratingsystems,thereremainsconsiderableambiguity.
Onestake-holdernotesthatheworksonseveralcollaborations,andhas"twoexperiencesandwhenthesocialscientistspublishpapersthosetwocollaborationsandscoreverydifferentlyintermsoftheireffectiveness.
"c.
Considerextensionsandinnovationincollaborativepractices,throughagency-to-agencylearningandcollaboration-to-collaborationlearning.
Peer-to-peerlearningaboutcollaborativeeffortsareimportanttostakehold-ersandagenciesalike.
Manyofthegroupsstudiedareengagedinattendingformalandinformaleventstospreadinformationandbestpracticesaboutcollaboration.
Others,however,operateinavacuum—insistingthattheirchallengesaredistinctfromotherexperiences.
Infact,therearecommon,ifnotuniversal,themesthat184Interview9.
54emerge.
Opennesstocandidlysharingnegativeaspectsofcollaboration,andlearn-ingfromexperienceacrossagenciesandresourcetype,appearstobeoneoppor-tunityforgrowth.
Agenciesmayalsolookinternallyatareasofcompetenceoutsideofnaturalresourceswherecollaborationmaybetakingplace.
Forexample,therearestatutesonthebooksrequiringsimilarcollaborationsfortribalrelationshipsbothinsideandoutsideofthenaturalresourceconflict.
TheBureauofIndianAffairs,theagencyresponsibleforadministeringmanyofthesestatutes,issituatedintheDepartmentoftheInterior,whichmanagesotherpubliclandandnaturalresources.
Ithasbeencollaboratingwithtribesoninitiativesrangingfromhealthcaretoeducationfordecades.
Anunansweredquestioniswhetherthelessonslearnedfromthatcontextarebeingusedtoinformnaturalresourcecollaborations,andviceversa.
Ifnot,thereexiststhepotentialforinformationsharingamongcollaboratorsandagencyoffi-cialstoimprovecollaborations.
4.
ExtensionsBeyondManagingLandandResourcesCongressandtheexecutivecanalsoconsidertheextenttowhichstake-holdercollaborationsinnaturalresourcesgovernancecaninformotherareasofgovernance.
Disasterresponsemayproveakeygrowthareaforstakeholdercollab-orations.
4FRI,forexample,iscenteredonwildfire.
Extendinglessonsfromthatcontexttohurricaneandfloodingresponsemayproveausefulexercise.
Inthewakeofanonslaughtofonce-in-onethousand-yearevents,suchastherecenthurricaneinHouston,thenewsreportsmirrortheconversationsurround-inglandmanagementduringcatastrophicwildfiresinArizona:Nosingleagencycandoitalone;thefederalgovernmentactingunilaterallyisnotsufficient,privateresourcesandalternativeapproachesneedtobeconsidered.
Againstthisbackdrop,itislikelythatearlyinteragencyandcooperativefederalismapproacheswillexpandtoincludeabroadergroupofstakeholders.
Thisprocesscouldproveespeciallyusefulforconnectingcommunitiesthatexperiencelesserpreparednessandevacu-ationreadinesswithofficialstoexchangeinformation.
Amidstpoliticalpressuretoformaresponsetolessonimpactsofinevitablefuturehurricanesandfloods,Con-gressmaybewell-servedtoturntoacollaborativemodel.
Lessonslearnedfromthepubliclandandnaturalresourcescontextmaymakedisasterreliefcollabora-tionsmoreeffectively.
Arelated,butdistinct,questionexistsforadministrativelawscholarsandpoliticalscientists:towhatextentiscollaborationworkingasaregulatorytoolrelativetoformallegalapproaches,suchastop-downcommandandcontrolorlitigationIntheportfolioofapproachesthatagenciescantaketoachieveobjectives,whatistherelativevalueofstakeholdercollaborationsUnderwhich55circumstancesisitpreferabletoalternativeapproachesTheseandsimilarquestionsformanagendaforagencies,watchdogs,andscholarsaliketoconsiderinthefuture.
V.
CONCLUSIONThekeycontributionofthisprojectistoentertheconceptofstakeholdercollaborationsintothelexiconofadministrativelaw.
Despiterobustconversationaboutcollaborativeadaptivemanagementinenvironmentallawliteratureandex-tra-agencycooperationinadministrativelawliterature,thisisthefirstprojectinadministrativeorenvironmentallawtoprovideadetailedanalysisabouthowstake-holdercollaborationsoperateacrossagencies.
ThisReportbeginsbydefiningstakeholdercollaborations,andsituatingtheterminthebroadergroupofcollabo-rativegovernancetoolsusedtomanageresourceconflicts.
Itthenoutlinesthelegallandscapegoverningcollaborations,includinganoveloverviewoftherelevantstat-utes,regulations,andexecutiveorders.
Twocasestudiesofcollaborationsarepro-vided,givingdetailedinsightintohowcollaborationsformandoperateovertime.
Fromtheseaccounts,thisReportdiscussesthebenefitsandchallengesofcollabo-ration,asectionthatdrawsheavilyuponinterviewswithfederalagencyofficials,stakeholders,andstateagencyemployees.
Advocatesofcollaborationsuggestthatitimprovesagencydecision-mak-ing,increasessocialacceptanceofdecisions,andbuildstrustamongformeradver-sarieswhowillworktogetherinthefuture.
Collaborationsmayexacerbateenvi-ronmentaljusticeissues,however,byimposingacostlytimecommitmentuponthosewhoseektoinfluencetheuseoflandandresourcemanagement.
Assessmentthevalidityoftheseclaimsislimited,however,byastrikingapaucityofquantifi-ableinformationassessingtherelativebenefitsandharmsproducedbycollabora-tionrelativetoalternativetools—anareamuchinneedoffutureresearch.
Ulti-mately,stakeholdercollaborationsareanimportanttoolusedbyvirtuallyeverylandandresourcemanagementagency.
ThisReportdocumentshowstakeholdercollaborationsarebeingusedbyagenciestoday,andhowtheycanbeimproved.
56APPENDIXI:STATUTESANTICIPATINGSTAKEHOLDERCOLLABORATIONSTitle16U.
S.
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Conservation:Chapter1.
NationalParks,MilitaryParks,Monuments,andSeashores16U.
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§410ddd.
NewBedfordWhalingNationalHistori-calPark16U.
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EstablishmentoftheGunnisonGorgeNationalConservationArea.
16U.
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ManhattanProjectNationalHistoricalPark16U.
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§469e.
Planforcontinentalglaciation.
16U.
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§470jj.
Cooperationwithprivateindividuals.
16U.
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§470ii.
Rulesandregulations;intergovernmentalcoordination.
Chapter1C.
PaleontologicalResourcesPreservation16U.
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§470aaa-1.
ManagementChapter3B.
SoilConservation16U.
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Cooperationofgovernmentalagencies;of-ficersandemployees,appointmentandcompensation;expendi-turesforpersonalservicesandsupplies.
Chapter5A.
ProtectionandConservationofWildlife16U.
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§661.
Declarationofpurpose;cooperationofagen-cies;surveysandinvestigations;donations16U.
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§668dd.
NationalWildlifeRefugeSystemChapter5B.
WildlifeRestoration16U.
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CooperationofSecretaryoftheInteriorwithStates;conditionsChapter5C.
ConservationProgramsonGovernmentLands16U.
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§670h.
Comprehensiveplansforconservationandrehabilitationprograms.
16U.
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Publiclandmanagementareastampsforhunting,trapping,andfishingonpubliclandssubjecttopro-grams.
5716U.
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§670c-1.
Cooperativeandinteragencyagreementsforlandmanagementoninstallations.
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Cooperativeplanforconservationandre-habilitation.
Chapter6.
GameandBirdPreserves;Protection16U.
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ConservationofelkinWyoming.
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CooperationofSecretariesoftheInterior,AgricultureandDefensewithStateofCalifornia.
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Planforelkrestorationandconservation;coordinationofSecretaryoftheInteriorwithFederal,Stateandotherofficers;integrationwithStateplans.
16U.
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Cooperationwithpublicandprivateagen-cies;contributionsandgiftsforRobertS.
KerrCenter.
16U.
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§698.
BigThicketNationalPreserve.
16U.
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Hunting,fishing,andtrappinginBigCy-pressPreserveandAdditionauthorizedinaccordancewithap-plicableFederalandStatelaws;consultationwithappropriateStateagencypriortoimplementationofregulationsrestrictingactivities;landuseandretentionrightsofMiccosukeeandSem-inoleIndianTribes.
16U.
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§698m-2.
Establishmentofrecreationalaccesspoints,roads,etc.
,inconjunctionwithcreationofBigCypressNationalPreserveAddition;cooperationamongagencies.
16U.
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Oilandgasexploration,development,andproductioninBigCypressNationalPreserveandAddition.
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StatusofBigCypressNationalPreserveandAddition;reporttoCongress;plan.
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AdministrationofNationalPreserve.
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Specialmanagementrequirementsforfed-erallandsrecentlyaddedtoCratersoftheMoonNationalMon-ument,Idaho.
Chapter7.
ProtectionofMigratoryGameandInsectivorousBirds16U.
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§715p.
CooperationofStateinenforcementofpro-visions58Chapter9.
FishandWildlifeService16U.
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CooperationwithStateDepartment.
16U.
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Enforcementauthorityfortheprotectionoffishandwildliferesources16U.
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§753a.
CooperativeresearchandtrainingprogramsforfishandwildliferesourcesChapter9A.
PreservationofFisheryResources16U.
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§757.
UtilizationofStateservices;expenditureoffunds.
16U.
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Cooperationwithagencies,organizations,andothers.
16U.
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ConsultationandcooperationbetweencertainFederalofficers,affectedStates,etc.
,incarryingoutpro-gram16U.
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§758e-1a.
Cooperativeprogramfordevelopmentoftunaandotherlatentfisheryresourcesinarea;establishment;availabilityofprojectinformationChapter10B.
FishRestorationandManagementProjects16U.
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§777k.
PaymentsoffundstoandcooperationwithPuertoRico,theDistrictofColumbia,Guam,AmericanSamoa,CommonwealthoftheNorthernMarianaIslands,andVirginIs-lands16U.
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§777.
Federal-Staterelationships16U.
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Stateuseofcontributions16U.
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§839b.
RegionalplanningandparticipationChapter16A.
AtlanticTunasConvention16U.
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§971g.
CooperationincarryingoutConventionChapter18.
WatershedProtectionandFloodPrevention16U.
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§1005.
Worksofimprovement16U.
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Cooperativeprograms16U.
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§1003.
AssistancetolocalorganizationsChapter26.
EstuarineAreas5916U.
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§1225.
Stateconsiderationofprotectionandresto-rationofestuariesinStatecomprehensiveplanningandpro-posalsforfinancialassistanceundercertainFederallaws;grants:termsandconditions,prohibitionagainstdispositionoflandswithoutapprovaloftheSecretary16U.
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§1223.
AgreementswithStatesandsubdivisions;equitablesharingofcosts;developmentimprovements;availa-bilityofappropriations;Statehuntingandfishinglawsapplica-ble.
Chapter28.
WildandScenicRivers16U.
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§1282.
AssistancetoStateandlocalprojects.
Chapter29.
WaterBankProgramforWetlandsPreservation16U.
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§1309.
ConsultationwithSecretaryoftheInterior;conformityofprogramwithwetlandsprogramsadministeredbySecretaryoftheInterior;consultationwithandutilizationoftechnicalservicesofappropriatelocal,State,Federal,andpri-vateconservationagencies;coordinationofprograms.
Chapter30.
WildHorsesandBurros:Protection,ManagementandCon-trol16U.
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§1336.
Cooperativeagreements;regulations.
Chapter32.
MarinSanctuaries16U.
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§1442.
Cooperativeagreements,donations,andac-quisitions.
16U.
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§1445b.
EnhancingsupportfornationalmarinesanctuariesChapter33.
CoastalZoneManagement16U.
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§1456.
CoordinationandcooperationChapter35.
EndangeredSpecies16U.
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§1531.
Congressionalfindingsanddeclarationofpurposesandpolicy16U.
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§1535.
CooperationwithStates16U.
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§1537.
InternationalcooperationChapter36.
ForestandRangelandRenewableResourcesPlanning6016U.
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§1604.
NationalForestSystemlandandresourcemanagementplans16U.
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§1644.
Forestryandrangelandcompetitivere-searchgrantsChapter38.
FisheryConservationandManagement16U.
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§1867.
Cooperativeresearchandmanagementpro-gram16U.
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§1891b.
FisheriesConservationandManagementFundChapter41.
CooperativeForestryAssistance16U.
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§2101a.
State-wideassessmentandstrategiesforforestresources16U.
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§2106c.
Enhancedcommunityfireprotection16U.
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§2113.
Federal,State,andlocalcoordinationandcooperationChapter49.
FishandWildlifeConservation16U.
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§2904.
ApprovalofconservationplansandcertainnongamefishandwildlifeconservationactionsChapter51.
AlaskaNationalInterestLandsConservation16U.
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§3181.
AlaskaLandUseCouncil16U.
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§3183.
BristolBayCooperativeRegionChapter56.
NorthAtlanticSalmonFishing16U.
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§3605.
Cooperationwithotheragenciesandinsti-tutionsChapter56A–PacificSalmonFishing16U.
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§3634.
InteragencycooperationChapter57B.
PartnersforFishandWildlife16U.
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§7611.
PurposesChapter70.
NorthPacificAnadromousStocksConvention16U.
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§5007.
CooperationwithotheragenciesChapter71.
AtlanticCoastalFisheriesCooperativeManagement6116U.
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§5103.
State-FederalcooperationinAtlanticcoastalfisherymanagement16U.
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§5104.
Stateimplementationofcoastalfisherymanagementplans16U.
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§5105.
StatenoncompliancewithcoastalfisherymanagementplansChapter84.
HealthyForestRestoration16U.
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§6501.
Purposes16U.
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§6511.
Definitions16U.
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Prioritization16U.
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Environmentalanalysis16U.
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§6591b.
AdministrativereviewChapter86.
SouthwestForestHealthandWildfirePrevention16U.
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§6702.
Purposes16U.
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§6705.
CooperationbetweenInstitutesandFederalagenciesChapter87.
FederalLandsRecreationEnhancement16U.
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§6805.
CooperativeagreementsChapter88.
ImplementationofWesternandCentralPacificFisheriesConvention16U.
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§6907.
CooperationincarryingoutconventionChapter90.
SecureRuralSchoolsandCommunitySelf-Determination16U.
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§7125.
ResourceadvisorycommitteesChapter92.
ForestLandscapeRestoration16U.
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§7301.
Purpose16U.
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§7303.
CollaborativeForestLandscapeRestora-tionProgramChapter95.
Eliminate,Neutralize,andDisruptWildlifeTrafficking16U.
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§7611.
Purposes16U.
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§7631.
PresidentialTaskForceonWildlifeTraf-ficking6216U.
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§7641.
Anti-poachingprograms16U.
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§7642.
Anti-traffickingprograms16U.
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§7644.
CommunityconservationChapter96.
NorthPacificFisheriesConvention16U.
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§7707.
CooperationincarryingoutConventionChapter97.
ConventionontheConservationandManagementofHighSeasFisheryResourcesintheSouthPacific16U.
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§7807.
CooperationincarryingouttheConventionTitle25.
IndiansChapter4.
PerformancebyUnitedStatesofObligationstoIndians25U.
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§166.
ApplicabilityofFederalAdvisoryCommit-teeActChapter12.
Lease,Sale,orSurrenderofAllottedofUnallottedLands25U.
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§398b.
Proceedsfromrentals,royalties,andbo-nuses;dispositionChapter23.
DevelopmentofTribalMineralResources25U.
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§2107.
Regulations;consultationwithIndianor-ganizations;pendingagreementsChapter24.
IndianLandConsolidation25U.
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§2206.
Descentanddistribution25U.
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Fractionalinterestacquisitionprogram25U.
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§2213.
Administrationofacquiredfractionalinter-ests;dispositionofproceeds25U.
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§2217.
ReportstoCongressChapter26.
IndianAlcoholandSubstanceAbusePreventionandTreat-ment25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2411.
Inter-departmentalMemorandumofAgree-ment25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2412.
TribalActionPlans25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2413.
Departmentalresponsibility25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2453.
Juveniledetentioncenters63Chapter29.
IndianGamingRegulation25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2719.
GamingonlandsacquiredafterOctober17,1988Chapter30.
IndianLawEnforcementReform25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2802.
Indianlawenforcementresponsibilities25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2804.
Assistancebyotheragencies25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2810.
AssistantUnitedStatesAttorneytriballiai-sons25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2811.
NativeAmericanIssuesCoordinator25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2814.
Policiesandprotocol25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2815.
State,tribal,andlocallawenforcementco-operationChapter31.
NativeAmericanLanguages25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2905.
EvaluationsChapter32.
NativeAmericanGravesProtectionandRepatriation25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3002.
Ownership25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3003.
Inventoryforhumanremainsandassoci-atedfuneraryobjects25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3004.
Summaryforunassociatedfuneraryob-jects,sacredobjects,andculturalpatrimony25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3005.
Repatriation25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3006.
ReviewcommitteeChapter32A.
CulturalHeritageCooperationAuthority25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3053.
ReburialofhumanremainsandculturalitemsChapter33.
NationalIndianForestResourcesManagement25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3104.
ManagementofIndianforestland25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3111.
AssessmentofIndianforestlandandman-agementprograms25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3112.
AlaskaNativetechnicalassistanceprogram25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3113.
EstablishmentofIndianandAlaskaNativeforestryeducationassistance6425U.
S.
C.
A.
§3115.
CooperativeagreementbetweenDepart-mentoftheInteriorandIndiantribes25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3115a.
TribalforestassetsprotectionChapter34.
IndianChildProtectionandFamilyViolencePrevention25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3207.
Characterinvestigations25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3209.
IndianChildResourceandFamilyServicesCenters25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3210.
IndianChildProtectionandFamilyVio-lencePreventionProgramChapter37.
IndianEnergy25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3502.
IndiantribalenergyresourcedevelopmentChapter38.
IndianTribalJusticeSupport25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3612.
SurveyoftribaljudicialsystemsChapter38A.
IndianTribalJusticeTechnicalandLegalAssistance25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3662.
Tribalcivillegalassistancegrants25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3663.
Tribalcriminalassistancegrants25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3665a.
OfficeofTribalJusticeChapter39.
AmericanIndianAgriculturalResourceManagement25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3711.
ManagementofIndianrangelandsandfarmlands25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3714.
AssessmentofIndianagriculturalmanage-mentprograms25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3733.
CooperativeagreementbetweenDepart-mentoftheInteriorandIndiantribesChapter41.
IndianLandsOpenDumpCleanup25U.
S.
C.
A.
§3904.
AuthorityofDirectorofIndianHealthSer-viceChapter48.
IndianTrustAssetReform25U.
S.
C.
A.
§5633.
UnderSecretaryforIndianAffairs25U.
S.
C.
A.
§5635.
Appraisalsandvaluations25U.
S.
C.
A.
§5634.
OfficeofSpecialTrusteeforAmericanIn-dians65Title40.
PublicBuildings,Property,andWorksChapter5.
PropertyManagement40U.
S.
C.
A.
§549.
DonationofpersonalpropertythroughstateagenciesChapter13.
PublicProperty40U.
S.
C.
A.
§1315.
LawenforcementauthorityofSecretaryofHomelandSecurityforprotectionofpublicpropertyChapter33.
Acquisition,Construction,andAlteration40U.
S.
C.
A.
§3306.
AccommodatingfederalagenciesChapter35.
Non-FederalPublicWorks40U.
S.
C.
A.
§3502.
PlannedpublicworksChapter67.
PennsylvaniaAvenueDevelopment40U.
S.
C.
A.
§6715.
CoordinationwithDistrictofColumbiaChapter69.
UnionStationRedevelopment40U.
S.
C.
A.
§6903.
AgreementsandcontractsChapter83.
WashingtonMetropolitanRegionDevelopment40U.
S.
C.
A.
§8302.
Necessityforcoordinationinthedevelop-mentoftheWashingtonmetropolitanregionChapter87.
PhysicalDevelopmentofNationalCapitalRegion40U.
S.
C.
A.
§8701.
FindingsandpurposesChapter141.
GeneralProvisions40U.
S.
C.
A.
§14101.
FindingsandpurposesChapter143.
AppalachianRegionalCommission40U.
S.
C.
A.
§14303.
Functions40U.
S.
C.
A.
§14304.
Recommendations40U.
S.
C.
A.
§14305.
LiaisonbetweenFederalGovernmentandCommission40U.
S.
C.
A.
§14322.
Approvalofdevelopmentplans,strategystatements,andprojectsChapter145.
SpecialAppalachianPrograms40U.
S.
C.
A.
§14525.
Statedevelopmentplanningprocess66Chapter2.
RegionalCommissions40U.
S.
C.
A.
§15307.
Tribalparticipation40U.
S.
C.
A.
§15303.
Functions40U.
S.
C.
A.
§15304.
AdministrativepowersandexpensesChapter3.
FinancialAssistance40U.
S.
C.
A.
§15502.
Comprehensiveeconomicandinfrastruc-turedevelopmentplans40U.
S.
C.
A.
§15505.
Localdevelopmentdistrictsandorganiza-tionsTitle43.
PublicLandsChapter2.
GeologicalSurvey43U.
S.
C.
A.
§36d.
Cooperativeagreements43U.
S.
C.
A.
§36c.
Acceptanceofcontributionsfrompublicandprivatesources;cooperationwithotheragenciesinprosecutionofprojectsChapter8A.
GrazingLands43U.
S.
C.
A.
§315.
Grazingdistricts;establishment;restrictions;priorrights;rights-of-way;hearingandnotice;huntingorfish-ingrights43U.
S.
C.
A.
§315a.
Protection,administration,regulation,andimprovementofdistricts;rulesandregulations;studyoferosionandfloodcontrol;offenses43U.
S.
C.
A.
§315h.
CooperationwithassociationslandofficialsandagenciesengagedinconsChapter12.
ReclamationandIrrigationofLandsbyFederalGovern-ment43U.
S.
C.
A.
§373d.
GrantsandcooperativeagreementswithIndiantribesandorganizations43U.
S.
C.
A.
§373e.
BureauofReclamationsitesecurity43U.
S.
C.
A.
§373f.
Partnerships,grants,andcooperativeagree-mentswithlocaljointpowersauthorities43U.
S.
C.
A.
§390g-1.
PhaseIofgroundwaterrechargedemon-strationprogram6743U.
S.
C.
A.
§390h-1.
Appraisalinvestigations43U.
S.
C.
A.
§390h-14.
Groundwaterstudy43U.
S.
C.
A.
§419.
Contractforirrigationproject;noticeastolandsirrigable,unitofentry,andconstructioncharges43U.
S.
C.
A.
§418.
Privatelandswithinprojectagreementastodisposalofexcessoverfarm43U.
S.
C.
A.
§423e.
Completionofnewprojectsornewdivi-sion;executionofcontractwithdistrictasconditionprecedenttodeliveryofwater;contentsofcontract;cooperationofStateswithUnitedStates;limitationsonsaleofland43U.
S.
C.
A.
§509a.
Projectbeneficiaries43U.
S.
C.
A.
§524.
Cooperationwithirrigationdistricts,etc.
,inconstructionofreservoirsandcanals43U.
S.
C.
A.
§617r.
ConsentgivenStatestonegotiatesupple-mentalcompactsfordevelopmentofColoradoRiverChapter28.
MiscellaneousProvisionsRelatingtoPublicLands43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1181b.
Cooperativeagreementswithotheragen-ciesorprivateownersforcoordinatedadministration43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1181a.
ConservationmanagementbyDepartmentoftheInterior;permanentforestproduction;saleoftimber;sub-division43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1181e.
Rulesandregulationsgenerally;consulta-tionandagreementswithotheragenciesregardingfireregula-tions43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1195.
NegotiationsforcessionoflandsChapter29.
SubmergedLands43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1345.
Coordinationandconsultationwithaf-fectedStateandlocalgovernments43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1337.
Leases,easements,andright-of-wayontheouterContinentalShelf43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1344.
OuterContinentalShelfleasingprogramChapter32.
ColoradoRiverBasinProject43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1501.
Congressionaldeclarationofpurposeandpolicy6843U.
S.
C.
A.
§1511a.
CooperationandparticipationbySecre-taryoftheArmywithFederal,State,andlocalagencies43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1551.
ConstructionofColoradoRiverBasinAct43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1552.
Criteriaforlong-rangeoperationofreser-voirsChapter32A.
ColoradoRiverBasinSanityControl43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1592.
Authorizationtoconstruct,operate,andmaintainsalinitycontrolunitsandsalinitycontrolprogram43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1576.
InteragencycooperationChapter32B.
ColoradoRiverFloodway43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1600c.
ColoradoRiverFloodwayChapter33.
AlaskaNativeClaimsSettlement43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1611.
Nativelandselections43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1616.
JointFederal-StateLandUsePlanningCommissionforAlaska43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1629g.
OpenseasonforcertainAlaskaNativeVeteransforallotments43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1629f.
ClaimsarisingfromcontaminationoftransferredlandsChapter35.
FederalLandPolicyandManagement43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1702.
Definitions43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1712.
Landuseplans43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1711.
Continuinginventoryandidentificationofpubliclands;preparationandmaintenance43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1714.
Withdrawalsoflands43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1716.
ExchangesofpubliclandsorintereststhereinwithintheNationalForestSystem43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1737.
Implementationprovisions43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1751.
Grazingfees;feasibilitystudy;contents;submissionofreport;annualdistributionanduseofrangebet-termentfunds;natureofdistributions43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1752.
Grazingleasesandpermits6943U.
S.
C.
A.
§1786.
PiedrasBlancasHistoricLightStation43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1787.
JupiterInletLighthouseOutstandingNatu-ralAreaChapter37.
PublicRangelandsImprovement43U.
S.
C.
A.
§1904.
RangeimprovementfundingChapter39.
AbandonedShipwrecks43U.
S.
C.
A.
§2104.
PreparationofguidelinesChapter40.
ReclamationStatesEmergencyDroughtRelief43U.
S.
C.
A.
§2222.
Droughtcontingencyplans43U.
S.
C.
A.
§2226.
Technicalassistanceandtransferofprecip-itationmanagementtechnologyChapter42.
RuralWaterSupply43U.
S.
C.
A.
§2403.
Ruralwaterprogramsassessment43U.
S.
C.
A.
§2404.
Appraisalinvestigations43U.
S.
C.
A.
§2405.
FeasibilitystudiesTitle54.
NationalParkServiceandRelatedProgramsSubtitleI.
NationalParkSystemDivisiona.
EstablishmentandGeneralAdministration54U.
S.
C.
A.
§100505.
PeriodicreviewofSystem54U.
S.
C.
A.
§100506.
BoundarychangestoSystemunits54U.
S.
C.
A.
§100804.
Improveduseofpartnersandvol-unteersininterpretationandeducation54U.
S.
C.
A.
§101702.
CooperativeagreementsSubtitleII.
OutdoorRecreationPrograms54U.
S.
C.
A.
§200305.
FinancialassistancetoStates54U.
S.
C.
A.
§200502.
FederalassistanceSubtitleIII.
NationalPreservationProgramsDivisiona.
HistoricPreservationSubdivision1.
GeneralProvisions54U.
S.
C.
A.
§300101.
Policy7054U.
S.
C.
A.
§300303.
CouncilSubdivision2.
HistoricPreservationProgram54U.
S.
C.
A.
§302108.
Reviewofthreatstohis-toricproperty54U.
S.
C.
A.
§302301.
Regulations54U.
S.
C.
A.
§302302.
Programevaluation54U.
S.
C.
A.
§302701.
ProgramtoassistIndiantribesinpreservinghistoricproperty54U.
S.
C.
A.
§302702.
IndiantribetoassumefunctionsofStateHistoricPreservationOfficer54U.
S.
C.
A.
§302703.
Apportionmentofgrantfunds54U.
S.
C.
A.
§302705.
Agreementforreviewun-dertribalhistoricpreservationregulations54U.
S.
C.
A.
§302706.
EligibilityforinclusiononNationalRegister54U.
S.
C.
A.
§303901.
LoaninsuranceprogramforpreservationofpropertyincludedonNationalRegister54U.
S.
C.
A.
§302906.
GrantsandloanstoIndiantribesandnonprofitorganizationsrepresentingethnicorminoritygroups54U.
S.
C.
A.
§303903.
Preservationeducationandtrainingprogram54U.
S.
C.
A.
§302904.
DirectgrantsforthepreservationofpropertiesincludedonNationalRegisterSubdivision3.
AdvisoryCouncilonHistoricPreserva-tion54U.
S.
C.
A.
§304101.
Establishment;vacancies54U.
S.
C.
A.
§304108.
Regulations,procedures,andguidelinesSubdivision4.
OtherOrganizationalPrograms7154U.
S.
C.
A.
§305103.
Selectionofeligibleen-tityandconveyanceofhistoriclightstationsSubdivision5.
FederalAgencyHistoricPreservationRe-sponsibilities54U.
S.
C.
A.
§306101.
Assumptionofresponsi-bilityforpreservationofhistoricproperty54U.
S.
C.
A.
§306102.
Preservationprogram54U.
S.
C.
A.
§306122.
Contractsformanage-mentofhistoricproperty54U.
S.
C.
A.
§306113.
Anticipatorydemolition54U.
S.
C.
A.
§306121.
Leaseorexchange54U.
S.
C.
A§306131.
StandardsandguidelinesSubdivision6.
Miscellaneous54U.
S.
C.
A.
§307103.
AccesstoinformationDivisionB.
OrganizationsandProgramsSubdivision1.
AdministeredbyNationalParkService54U.
S.
C.
A.
§308706.
Regulations54U.
S.
C.
A.
§308903.
Grants54U.
S.
C.
A.
§308902.
EstablishmentSubdivision2.
AdministeredJointlywithNationalParkService54U.
S.
C.
A.
§311102.
Establishment54U.
S.
C.
A.
§311103.
DesignationofPreserveAmericaCommunitiesSubdivision3.
AdministeredbyOtherthanNationalParkService54U.
S.
C.
A.
§312506.
Administration54U.
S.
C.
A.
§312504.
ProgressreportsbySec-retaryonsurveysandworkundertakenasresultofsurveysChapter42.
AmericanIndianTrustFundManagementReform7225U.
S.
C.
A.
§4043.
AuthoritiesandfunctionsofSpecialTrus-tee25U.
S.
C.
A.
§4046.
AdvisoryboardChapter43.
NativeAmericanHousingAssistanceandSelf-Determina-tion25U.
S.
C.
A.
§4116.
Regulations25U.
S.
C.
A.
§4152.
AllocationformulaChapter44A.
NativeAmericanTourismandImprovingVisitorExperi-ence25U.
S.
C.
A.
§4302.
Definitions25U.
S.
C.
A.
§4351.
Purposes25U.
S.
C.
A.
§4353.
IntegratingFederaltourismassetstostrengthenNativetourismopportunities25U.
S.
C.
A.
§4354.
NativeAmericantourismandbrandingen-hancementChapter46.
IndianSelf-DeterminationandEducationAssistance25U.
S.
C.
A.
§5303.
TribalandFederaladvisorycommittees25U.
S.
C.
A.
§5309.
Useofexcessfunds25U.
S.
C.
A.
§5321.
Self-determinationcontracts25U.
S.
C.
A.
§5324.
Contractorgrantprovisionsandadmin-istration25U.
S.
C.
A.
§5325.
Contractfundingandindirectcosts25U.
S.
C.
A.
§5328.
Rulesandregulations25U.
S.
C.
A.
§5354.
Rulesandregulations25U.
S.
C.
A.
§5365.
Reports25U.
S.
C.
A.
§5381.
Definitions25U.
S.
C.
A.
§5394.
Reports25U.
S.
C.
A.
§5614.
Forestlandmanagementandsurfaceleas-ingactivities73Statutescontemplatingcollaborationnotinvolvingpubliclandandnaturalre-sources:Title25:IndiansChapter15.
ConstitutionalRightsofIndians25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1302.
Constitutionalrights25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1311.
ModelcodeChapter17.
FinancingEconomicDevelopmentofIndiansandIndianOrganizations25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1542.
Agencycooperation;privatecontractsformanagementservicesandtechnicalassistanceChapter18.
IndianHealthCare25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1602.
DeclarationofnationalIndianhealthpolicy25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1616f.
Tribalcultureandhistory25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1616l.
Communityhealthaideprogram25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1621.
IndianHealthCareImprovementFund25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1621c.
Diabetesprevention,treatment,andcon-trol25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1621d.
Otherauthorityforprovisionofservices25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1621m.
Epidemiologycenters25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1621n.
Comprehensiveschoolhealtheducationprograms25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1621r.
Contracthealthservicespaymentstudy25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1621h.
Mentalhealthpreventionandtreatmentservices25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1621y.
Contracthealthserviceadministrationanddisbursementformula25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1631.
Consultation;closureoffacilities;reports25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1632.
Safewaterandsanitarywastedisposalfa-cilities25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1637.
Indianhealthcaredeliverydemonstrationprojects7425U.
S.
C.
A.
§1641.
TreatmentofpaymentsunderSocialSecu-rityActhealthbenefitsprograms25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1645.
SharingarrangementswithFederalagen-cies25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1647.
EligibleIndianveteranservices25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1663.
OfficeofDirectServiceTribes25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1665a.
Behavioralhealthpreventionandtreat-mentservices25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1665f.
Indianwomentreatmentprograms25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1665g.
Indianyouthprogram25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1665i.
Trainingandcommunityeducation25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1665k.
Fetalalcoholspectrumdisordersprograms25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1665n.
Behavioralhealthresearch25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1667c.
Substanceabuseandmentalhealthser-vicesAdministrationgrants25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1672.
Regulations25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1677.
Nuclearresourcedevelopmenthealthhaz-ards25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1680t.
OtherGAOreports25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1684.
EmergencyplanforIndiansafetyandhealthChapter20.
TriballyControlledCollegesandUniversitiesassistance25U.
S.
C.
A.
§1815.
RulesandregulationsChapter22.
BureauofIndianAffairsPrograms25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2001.
AccreditationforthebasiceducationofIn-dianchildreninBureauofIndianAffairsschools25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2002.
Nationalcriteriaforhome-livingsituations25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2004.
Schoolboundaries25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2005.
Facilitiesconstruction25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2008.
Administrativecostgrants25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2009.
DivisionofBudgetAnalysis7525U.
S.
C.
A.
§2011.
PolicyforIndiancontrolofIndianeduca-tion25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2017.
Regulations25U.
S.
C.
A.
§2018.
Regionalmeetingsandnegotiatedrulemak-ing76APPENDIXII:REGULATIONSANTICIPATINGSTAKEHOLDERCOLLABORATIONSTitle7.
Agriculture7C.
F.
R.
§3430.
304ProjectTypesandpriorities.
7C.
F.
R.
§2.
38Director,OfficeofTribalRelations.
7C.
F.
R.
§1980.
1020Scoring.
7C.
F.
R.
§761.
103Farmassessment.
Title18.
ConservationofPower18C.
F.
R.
§50.
4Stakeholderparticipation.
18C.
F.
R.
§35.
28Non-discriminatoryopenaccesstransmissiontariff.
18C.
F.
R.
§50.
2Purposeandintentofrules.
18C.
F.
R.
§380.
13CompliancewiththeEndangeredSpeciesAct.
18C.
F.
R.
§4.
38Consultationrequirements.
18C.
F.
R.
§16.
8Consultationrequirements.
18C.
F.
R.
§2.
1cPolicystatementonconsultationwithIndiantribesinCommissionproceedings.
18C.
F.
R.
§5.
7Tribalconsultation.
18C.
F.
R.
§5.
1Applicability,definitions,andrequirementtoconsult.
Title25.
Indians25C.
F.
R.
§170.
100Whatdotheterms"consultation,""collaboration,"and"coordination"mean25C.
F.
R.
§170.
101WhatistheTTPconsultationandcoordinationpol-icy25C.
F.
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§170.
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7840C.
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81APPENDIXIII:CASESTUDY1:THEWESTERNARCTICCARIBOUHERDWORKINGGROUPCaribou,aNorthAmericansubspeciesofreindeer,haveplayedacentralroleinthecultureandlifeofAlaskanNativeCommunitiesforthousandsofyears.
185Traditionally,caribouwereaffordedculturalandspiritualstatus,andwereaprimarysourceoffood.
Cariboucontinuetoprovidetheprimarysourceofsuste-nanceforbetween40and50remoteAlaskanNativeCommunitiestoday,wholiveinremotevillageswithanaveragepopulationsizeof581andarereachableonlybyair,boat,andsnowmachine.
186TheUnitedStatesgraduallybeganregulatingwildlifeinAlaskaafterpur-chasingtheterritoryfromRussia.
AnearlyandpervasiveconflictemergedbecausetraditionalAlaskannativehuntingpracticesdifferedfromthoseendorsedbystatefishandgameagencieswithinthecontinentalUnitedStates.
187Forexample,Alas-kanNativeCommunitieshistoricallytookmanyanimalsduringabriefperiod,con-sistentwiththemigratorypatternsoftheWesternArcticcaribouherd.
Inanotherexample,thehuntersfromsomevillagesstationthemselvesbyariver,thenwaituntiltheanimalsareswimmingacrosstherivertoharvestthem,tomaximizethetake.
188AnthropologistsreportoneInupiaqelderdescribinghisfatherashuntinginthefollowingmanner:Hewentdownwithhisbowandarrowstointerceptthecaribou.
Theboyswatchedastheirfatherproceededtowalkdirectlytowardthecaribouherd,whichasheapproachedbegantomoveawayfromhiminafilebehindtheleadbulls.
Yetthefatherkeptwalkingopenlytowardtheherd.
Thishadthetwobrothersscratchingtheirheadswonderingwhytheirfatherwaschasingthecaribouawayfromhim.
Oncethefatherreachedtheareawherethecaribouhadbeengrazing,hestoppedandlaidhisbowandarrowsontheground.
Astheeldertoldthestory,hedemonstratedhowhisfatherthengotintoacrouchingpositionandslowlybegantomovehisarmsupanddown,slappingthemagainsthislegsasthoughheweremimickingagiantbirdabouttotakeoffinflight.
Thebrotherswatchedintentlyastheleadbullsinthecaribouherd185ERNESTS.
BURCHJR.
,CARIBOUHERDSOFNORTHWESTALASKA1850-200044(IgorKrupnikandJimDau,eds.
,2012).
186Villagerstodayhuntcaribouusingsnowmachinesinthewinterandpowerboatandall-terrainvehiclesinthesummerandfall.
BURCH,supranote185,at45(AlaskanresidentsandwrittensourcesrefertowhatisknownintherestoftheUnitedStatesasa"snowmobile"asa"snowmachine.
").
187Therewere,ofcourse,traditionalNativeAmericanpracticeswithinthecontinentalUnitedStateswhichwesternsettlersviolated,supplanted,andeventuallyoverwrote.
188Interview16.
82stoppedandlookedbackcuriouslyattheirfather'smovements.
Slowlyatfirst,thecariboubegantocirclebackinawidearcwatch-ingthefigureflappingitswingsoutonthetundra,andthentheybeganrunning,encirclingtheirfatherinaclosingspiraluntileven-tuallytheyweretheywerecloseenoughthathereacheddown,pickeduphisbowandarrowsandmethodicallyculledoutthechoicecaribouoneatatimeuntilhehadwhatheneeded.
189SuchhuntingpracticesofAlaskanNativecommunitiesreflectindigenousecologi-calknowledge,aformofinformationandgovernanceofhumanrelationshipwiththenaturalworldthatisonlyrecentlybeingrecognizedasvalidbyWesternscien-tistsandcourts.
190AlaskanNativehuntingpracticeswerepoorlyunderstoodandactivelydis-couragedbyearlyAmericansettlersinAlaska.
Inthe1900s,Alaskangamewardensusedfines,arrest,andgunconfiscationtopunishtraditionalhuntingpractices.
SuchenforcementmechanismsbreddistrustbetweenAlaskanNativeCommunitiesandDepartmentofficials,which,alongwithdifferingperspectivesonwildlifemanage-mentandethicalhuntingpractices,persistsintomoderntimes.
Againstthebackdropofsharplydifferentperspectivesandacenturyofdis-trust,stateandfederalagenciesinAlaskacontinuetomanagewildlifeuponwhichthelivesofsomeruralAlaskanNativecommunitiesdepend.
Aseriesoflawsen-actedbyCongressinthe1970s,suchastheAlaskanNationalInterestLandsCon-servationAct,embeddedsubsistencehuntingrightsforAlaskannativesandnon-nativeruralAlaskansintofederallaw.
TheserightsaremanagedbytheSubsistenceResourceCommission,whichreportstoFederalSubsistenceRegionalAdvisoryCouncilsandtheFederalSubsistenceBoard.
Alaskamaintainsaparallelsystem,whichcentralizesauthorityintheBoardofGameandFishandincorporatesabroaderfocusonnon-nativeusersincludinggamehuntersfromotherstatesorcountries.
TheWesternArcticCaribouHerdisthelargestherdinAlaska,withpeaksizeof500,000animalsandarangeof157,000squaremiles.
191Atypicalannualmigrationbeginsinthewinterranges,whichareonthesoutherlySewardPeninsula189RayBarnhardt&AngayuqaqOscarKawagley,IndigenousKnowledgeSystemsandAlaskaNativeWaysofKnowing,36ANTHRO.
ANDEDUC.
Q.
8,8-9(2005).
190Id.
,at9("Untilrecently,therewasverylittleliteraturethataddressedhowtogetWesternscientistsandeducatorstounderstandNativeworldviewsandwaysofknowingasconstitutingknowledgesystemsintheirownright,andevenlessonwhatitmeansforparticipantswhensuchdivergentsystemscoexistinthesameperson,organization,orcommunity.
")191WESTERNARCTICCARIBOUHERDWORKINGGROUP,WESTERNARCTICCARIBOUHERDCOOPERATIVEMANAGEMENTPLAN4(revisedDecember2011)(hereinafterWESTERNARCTICCARIBOUHERDWORKINGGROUP).
83andtheNulatoHills.
TheanimalsmigratenorthwardinApril,andreachthecalvinggroundsintheBrooksRangeMountainsinlateMaytoJune.
Aftercalving,theherddispersestohabitatwithrelieffromtherelentlessinsects.
Itspreadsacrossthenorthernportionoftherangeduringthesummer,thenmigratessouthduringthefall.
TheherdspendsSeptemberintheBrooksRange,thenheadssouthtothewinterrange.
192Figure6.
WesternArcticCaribouHerdRangeMapCourtesyAlaskanDepartmentofFishandGameTheWesternArcticCaribouHerdoccupiesalandscapethatisapatchworkofownershipamongfederal,state,native,corporate,andprivatelandholders.
193Eachlandownerhasindividual,andsometimesconflicting,approachestowildlifemanagement.
194Thisassortmentoflandmanagementagencies,publicandprivateowners,andadministrative/jurisdictionalissuescreatesaplethoraofissueswith192Interview1.
193WESTERNARCTICCARIBOUHERDWORKINGGROUP,supranote191,at6.
194Id.
84respecttotheWesternArcticCaribouHerd.
Thefiguresbelowillustratethesea-sonalrangesoftheherd,andthevariedownershipandadministrationoftheland-scapeonwhichtheherdlives.
195Figure7.
LandownerswithintheRangeoftheWesternArcticCaribouHerdTheblacklinemarkstheapproximaterangeoftheherd.
[CourtesyWesternArcticCaribouHerdWorkingGroup]Caribouwerethecenterpieceof"oneoftheworstmanagementdebacleseverinthestateofAlaska,ever.
"196In1970,theWesternArcticHerdnumbered243,000,butdroppedto75,000in1976.
ThepopulationcollapsehaddevastatingeffectsonruralAlaskanNativevillages,whichdependeduponherdsasaprimaryfoodsource.
Inthe1970s,AlaskaDepartmentofFishandGame("ADFG")offi-cialsbecameconcernedthatthecaribouherdsweredeclining.
Theyattemptedtocurbcaribouharvest—andthusincreaseherdnumbers—byimposinglimitsonhowmanyanimalshunterscouldharvestinaspecifiedperiodoftime.
ADFGreliedonimperfectsurveymethodologiesanddiscountedthenumberofcaribouseenbyAlaskanNativeswholivedonthelandfull-time.
ADFGheldaseriesofhearingsfocusedontheproblemandissued3,000permitstoAlaskanNativeCommunities.
195Id.
196Dau,supranote5685TheDepartmentfailedtonotifyorinviterepresentativesfromtheAthabascanCom-munitiestothehearing,andlaterrefusedtoissuepermitstotheoverlookedcom-munities.
Longstandingdistrustexacerbatedthepoorrelationshipsduringatimeofcrisis.
Intheperiodafterthepopulationcollapse,acomplexarrangementbetweenFederalSubsistenceAdvisoryBoardsandtheAlaskanBoardofGameemergedtogovernhuntingandfishingregulations.
VariousstakeholderswouldarguebeforetheStateBoardofGame,whichwas"notveryproductive"becausethegroupshaddifferentinterests,essentiallyleavingmanagementtothegameboards.
197TheWesternArcticCaribouHerdsubsequentlybecamethelargestherdinAlaska,peakingatroughly500,000caribou.
In1994,ADFGhostedathree-tofour-dayworkshoptodetermineobjectivewaystoassesscaribouharvestlevels.
Afterhoursandinthehallwaysbetweenses-sions,participantsbegantodiscusscreatingaworkinggroupdevotedtotheissue.
CollaborativestrategieswereintheirinfancyinAlaska.
SomestateemployeeswerefamiliarwiththeconceptfromtheirexperienceengagingwithCanadians,whomaformerstatewildlifebiologistdescribedas"adecadeaheadofAlaskansintermsofworkinggroups.
"198AsmallgrouphammeredouttheconceptandstructureoftheWesternArc-ticCaribouHerdWorkingGroup("WACHWG"),thefocusofwhichwastohavefieldbiologistsandusersfromthemajorinterestscometogether.
Thegroupsoughttoconnectresearchersandthosereliantoncariboutohaveaninformal,"nutsandbolts"discussionofthepopulation,withthegoalofofferingaunifiedsetofrec-ommendationstotheBoardofGamethatwouldimprovetheirdecision-making.
AfoundingmemberofWACHWGnoted,"Weneverenvisionedanythingformal.
Wewantedittobeinformal,becausethat'sthewayvillageswork,that'swhatpeo-plewerecomfortablewith.
"199TheWACHWGintentionallydidnothaveachair,seekingtoavoidhierarchy.
Italsometinvariousruralvillages,whichallowedthelocalvillagerstoattendmeetings.
Forseveralyears,agroupofuptoninepeoplewouldgatherforadayinKotzebueoranotherrurallocationtodiscusswhetherandhowtoformagroup.
Astheideasolidified,itfoundareceptivesourceinJohnCoady,theSupervisorforRegion5oftheADFG,wholivedthroughthecariboupopulationcollapsedebacleinthe1970s.
Coadyallocatedamodestamountoftheexistingregionalbudgetto197Interview1.
198Dau,supranote56.
199Id.
86convenemeetings,assignedanemployeetothecollaboration,andasoneofficialnoted,"hadenoughmoxieforpeopletotakethisseriously.
"200Earlymembersofthecollaborationwerepoignantlyawareaboutformingacrediblegroup.
AformerADFGemployeerecalls:Itwasreallytoughearlyon.
Wewereacutelyawareoftheproblemswithuspickingandchoosingrepresentativesofthevarioususergroups,indigenouspeople,guides,transporters,industry.
Wereal-izedthatifwepickedtherepresentativesonthegroup,itwouldlosealotofitscredibility.
Ourhand-pickedrepresentativeswouldjustbeseenaspeoplefriendlytoFishandGame,whichwouldunder-minethegroup.
201Thegroupeventuallydecidedtoinclude20votingchairsrepresentativeofthepublic.
Itrecognizedthatitcouldnotgiveaseatatthetabletoeveryinterest,sobeganwiththegroupsmostdirectlydependentonthecaribouandworkedoutfromthere.
Therewere40-50communitiesthatdependeduponcaribou,sotheBoardadoptedtheadvisorysystemdevelopedbythestateofAlaskamanyyearsbefore,asamodeltostructurenativesubsistenceusers'representation.
Duringinitialdiscussionsonestablishingsometypeofco-managementgroup,someNativeAlaskanparticipantsexpressedtheirdesiretohavelegalau-thoritytopromulgateregulations.
202TheywantedtobeequalpartnerswiththestateofAlaskaandfederalagenciesinmanagingthecaribouherd.
Thatwasimpossible,astherewasnowaythatstateorfederalagenciescouldcedeorsharelegalman-agementauthoritywiththemoranyotherentity.
203Becauseoftheinabilityforagenciestoshareauthority,twoleadersoftheAlaskanNativecommunityusersdroppedoutofthegroup,explainingthattheydidnothavetimetomerelyattendmeetingswithoutmorethanadvisoryauthority.
204Therewasalsointernalresistancewithintheagency,assomeemployeesfearedthatWACHWGcouldbecometooinfluentialandundermineagencyinflu-ence.
"Thiswasn'tallsmilesandhighfivesandgoldstars.
Itwasn'tatallcertainwecoulddothis.
"205Initially,somefederalagenciesweremildlysupportive,but200Id.
201Id.
202Id.
203Id.
204Id.
205Id.
87didnothavetimeormoneytoparticipatefullyinthe1990s;itwasallstateem-ployees.
206OneintervieweeremembersthataU.
S.
FishandWildlifeServiceman-ager"cametoeverymeeting[withtheattitude]'Wecan'tdothis.
Wecan'tdothis.
Thereisnolegalwaytoshareauthority.
Thereisnowaytodothis.
'"207Ratherthanriskthecollapseofthebuddinggroupbytakingonsensitiveissues,theorganizersfocusedinitiallyonaddressingsmallissuestobuilduptrust.
Forthefirstfiveyears,itavoidedmanagementissuesaltogethertoavoid"rockingtheboat.
"208Instead,thefocuswasonfacilitatinganenvironmentinwhichthegroupcouldbuildtrustandfinda"grudging"consensusovertime.
Thecaribouherdwaslargeandgrowingatduringthisperiod,sotherewasnorealcontroversialmanagementissuerequiringWACHWG'sattention.
WACHWGeventuallycreatedasubcommitteetodraftacooperativeman-agementplan,whichwasreleasedin2003andcontinuestobeperiodicallyre-viewedandupdated.
Thecurrentplancontainssevenelements:Cooperation,Pop-ulationManagement,Habitat,Regulations,Reindeer,Knowledge,andEducation.
209Theplanenvisionsallstakeholders—includingstate,federal,corpo-rate,andprivatelandownersandresourcemanagers—workingtogethertocarryoutthegroup'sgoalsbydevelopingcooperativeagreements,sharingresources,andprovidingsupportinimplementation.
210Today,WACHWGisacollaborationbetweenstakeholdersinterestedinthelong-termconservationoftheWesternArcticcaribouherd,theecosystemuponwhichtheherdisdependent,andthetraditionalandotherusesthereof.
211Stake-holdersinclude"subsistenceusers,otherAlaskanhunters,reindeerherders,huntingguides,transporters,andconservationists"alongwithagencystaffmanagers,natu-ralresourcemanagers,andbiologistswhoactasconsultantstothegroup—allofwhomareknowledgeableabout,interestedin,andcareforthemanagementandconservationoftheWesternArcticCaribouHerd.
"212Thegroupholdsmeetingonceayear,allowingbiologiststoupdatestake-holdersonthestatusofthehealthandpopulationofthecaribou,therangecondi-tion,andothermattersaffectingtheherd.
213Meetingsfocusonmanagementand206Id.
207Id.
208Id.
209WESTERNARCTICCARIBOUHERDWORKINGGROUP,supranote191,at6.
210Id.
,at6,30.
211Mission,WESTERNARCTICCARIBOUHERDWORKINGGROUP,https://westernarcticcari-bou.
net/mission/(lastvisitedJuly21,2017).
212About,WESTERNARCTICCARIBOUHERDWORKINGGROUP,https://westernarcticcaribou.
net/(lastvisitedJuly21,2017).
213Id.
88informationtransfer,withpeopletalkingabouttheissuestheyobservewithrespecttocaribou.
Atypicalmeetingmightincludeaspecialistpresentinginformationontheimpactofclimate,transportation,orpubliclanduseplanning,oreldersaddress-ingthegroupdrawingupontraditionalecologicalknowledgedisseminatedthroughthegenerations.
214Thereisatechnicalcommitteethatmeetsadaypriortothemeetingtodiscuss"nutsandbolts,biologyandecology,"215alongwithothersub-committees,whichmeetasneededthroughouttheyear.
216OnefoundernotesthatWACHWGhasshiftedawayfromtheoriginalcon-ceptionofconnectingfieldbiologistswithresourceuserstowardsincludingagencystaffmemberswithlittleon-the-groundexperience:Now,theremaybe75-100agencystaffattheannualmeetings,someadministratorsandsomebiologists—noneofwhommorethanoc-casionallydofieldworkonthiscaribouherd.
Ithasbecomeamust-attendannualmeetingpopulatedmostlybyagencystaffwhohavelittledirectinvolvementworkingwiththiscaribouherd,exceptforadministrativestuff.
217Theinformaltenorofearlymeetingsbecamemorestructuredovertime:todaythereisachair,co-chair,facilitator,andseveralnote-takersforthemeeting.
218WACHWGoperatesonanuncertainbudget.
Itisnotfundedbythefederalgovernmentinthesamewaythatvariousmarinemammalgroupshavebeenfundedinrecentdecades(e.
g.
,AlaskaEskimoWhalingCommission,BelugaWhaleCom-mittee,andPolarBearCommission).
Overtheyears,thegrouphasattemptedtosolicitindependentfundingtomakeitautonomousfromagenciesandlessvulner-abletobudgetshifts.
ItreceivedaChallengeGrantfromtheU.
S.
FishandWildlifeService,whichlastedfortwotothreeyears,timeenoughtohireadirector;how-ever,thegrantwasnotrenewed.
Fundinghasbeenamajorimpairmentforthegroup,whichcouldnotsustainstafftimetoprepareformeetingsorabsorbthecostofbi-annualmeetings.
AlthoughWACHWGhasover100peopleattendingmeetings,aNationalParkServicebiologistfeelsthatthe"delicatebalancebetweenbeingunwieldyandeveryonehavingavoice"isstrucklargelythroughhavingafacilitatorandco-chairswhoareadeptatmovingtheballforward.
219ThelocationshiftedfromarotatingscheduleofruralvillagestoAnchoragetolimittheexpensesofagencyofficials214About,WESTERNARCTICCARIBOUHERDWORKINGGROUP,supranote212.
215Interview1.
216About,WESTERNARCTICCARIBOUHERDWORKINGGROUP,supranote212.
217Dau,supranote56.
218Id.
219Interview3.
89attending.
TheWorkingGrouphascollaboratedwithdifferentfederalagenciestoimplementacooperativemanagementplantoeffectuatecooperationresourceman-agementagenciesandallpeoplewhovalueanddependonthecaribou.
220Today,thegroup—andcaribouatthecenterofit—arefacingchallengingtimes.
Between2003and2011,thepopulationoftheWesternArcticcaribouherddeclinedyearlyatanaverageof4-6%.
Asof2011,thepopulationoftheherdwasrecordedat325,000.
221Thecaribouweretraditionallyusedprimarilyforsubsist-ence,andtodayaround10,000to15,000cariboueachyeararekilledforthatpur-pose.
Additionally,nonresidentandnonlocalskillapproximately500to800cari-boueachyearinhuntingexpeditions.
222TheNewYorkTimesrecentlyreportedthatacontroversialpredatorcontrolregimeimplementedbythestate—killingwolves,withthehopeofincreasingthenumberofcaribou—hadfailed.
223Additionalconcernsariseduetoresourcedevelopmentandminingexpan-sionwestwardfromPrudhoeBayintotheNationalPetroleumReserve-Alaska.
Continuedexpansionwouldrequireatransportationcorridortobecutthroughtherangeofthisherd.
Theseactivitieslikelywouldaffectthemigrationanddistribu-tionoftheherd.
Additionally,thereareconcernsthatincreasedtouristaircraftover-flightmaystressthecariboupriortothewintermonthsatatimewhentheyshouldbegainingfatreserves.
224TheprimarybenefitofWACHWGislargelyunderstoodasbuildingstrongandtrustingrelationshipsamongthemembers.
Villageresidentsfeelmoreposi-tivelyaboutagencyofficialswhoparticipateinthegroup.
225Thestructuraldesignthatfacilitatedthattrust,however,isimperfect.
Becausemanygroupmembershaveservedformanyyears,thereisinfrequentturnover,whichreducesitspotentialforinformationsharing,wheregroupmembersreturntotheirvillagestosharewhattheyhavelearned.
Thegroupalsocomesataprofessionalcosttothebiologistswhoparticipatebecauseitlessensthetimetheycanspenddetractsfrombiologists'timeinthefield.
"Weinvestedtremendoustimeandenergytoinitiallyestablishandlatersupportthisgroup,andwepaiddearlyintermsofinternalpoliticalcapital.
"226Theworthinessofthisinvestmentwillbetestedintheyearsahead,giventhemany220WESTERNARCTICCARIBOUHERDWORKINGGROUP,supranote191,at2.
221Id.
at4-5.
222Id.
at1.
223JoannaKlein,PopulationControl:WolvesFacePerilEvenWithinaPreserve,N.
Y.
TIMES,July14,2017,atD2.
224WESTERNARCTICCARIBOUHERDWORKINGGROUP,supranote191,at5.
225Dau,supranote56.
226Id.
90threatstotheherd.
91APPENDIXIV.
CASESTUDY2:THE4FORESTRESTORATIONINITIATIVEManyenvisionArizonaasanariddesertlandscape,howeverasignificantpartofthesouthwesternstateis,infact,forest.
Theforestecosystemscontainseveraldifferenttypesofforestswithinthem,comprisedprimarilyofponderosapine,conifer,pinionjuniper,andjunipersavannah.
227Arizonaforestshavelongbeensubjecttodisputesregardingpropermanagement,whichpeakedin1980s,anerasomecalltheTimberWarsbecauseitwasdefinedby"prolongedanduglybattles.
"228Duringthe1980sand1990s,the"veryaggressiveoldgrowthtimberindustrystartedtobumpupagainstpressurefromtheenvironmentalsideoftheequation,"includingthelistingofendangeredspecies,suchastheMexicanSpottedOwl.
Ultimately,wide-scaletimberharvestacrossArizonaandNewMexicocametoahalt.
Aninvisible,butentrenched,outcomeoftheconflictwasdeepdistrustbetweenenvironmentalgroups,theforestryindustry,andstateandfederalagencies.
Althoughby2000large-scaletimberharvesthadeffectivelystoppedwithinthestate,thetimberedlandscapesofArizonaremained.
Theabruptshiftfromintensivelymanagedforestsinwhichtreeswerefrequentlyharvestedtounmanagedforestswithlimitedtreeandbrushremovalcreatedriskforcatastrophicwildfires.
Aseriesofhigh-profilefiresraisedpublicandpoliticalconcernwithinthestate.
In1996,threelargewildfiresburnedintheCoconinoNationalForest.
TheforestsupervisorandtheFlagstafffirechiefbegantoadvocateforanewmodelofwildfiresuppression,claimingthattheForestServicecouldnotdoitontheirown.
Inresponse,theGrandCanyonPartnershipstartedperformingfieldtreatments(suchastimberthinning)toreducewildfirerisk.
In2002,theRodeo-ChediskiFireburnedfromJune18untilJuly7,andbecamewhatwasthenthelargestrecordedwildfireinArizonahistory.
229Theneedforexantewildfireriskreductionstrategieswasbecomingclear,butthetreatmentsnecessary—essentiallythinningsmalltreesandbush—werecontroversialamongenvironmentalnongovernmentalorganizationsthathadsuccessfullyorganizedaroundthemanagementcontroversiesthatdefinedthe1980sand90s.
In2003,GovernorJanetNapolitanoformedgroupstodiscusshowtofixforests,whichwereincreasinglyrecognizedasvitaltowatersheds,communities,227Interview3.
228Id.
229In2011,theWallowFirebecamethebiggestfireinArizonahistory.
MarcLacey,WildfireIsNowtheLargestinArizona'sHistory,N.
Y.
TIMES(June14,2011),http://www.
ny-times.
com/2011/06/15/us/15wildfires.
htmlmcubz=3.
92tourists,andrurallivelihoods.
NapolitanostartedtheGovernor'sForestHealthCouncil,whichranparallelwithotherforestandwildfiremanagementgroups.
Thegroupbegandiscussingtheemergingpracticeofforestrestoration—creatingforestsoflarge,widelyspacedtrees,whichcouldsustainwildfire—ratherthanthetraditionalfocusonfueltreatments.
Overtime,additionalcollaborativegroupsemergedtoaddresstheissue,suchastheNorthernArizonaWoodsSupplyStudyandtheGreaterFlagstaffForestPartnership.
Whenitbecameclearthatthesamestakeholderswereinmultiplegroups,thegroupscoalescedintowhateventuallybecamethe4ForestRestorationInitiative("4FRI").
The4FRIisanorganizationthatjoinsthreeoverlappinggroupsofstake-holderswhoworkinconcerttomanageforestresourcesinawaythatencourageshealthydevelopmentofnationalforestsinArizona.
230Theeffortspansfourna-tionalforests:Coconino,Kaibab,Apache-Sitgreaves,andTonto,allofwhicharelocatedalongtheMogollonRim.
231Figure8.
LandSubjectto4FRICourtesyUnitedStatesForestService230FOURFORESTRESTORATIONINITIATIVE(4FRI)STAKEHOLDERGROUPCHARTER1-2(Feb.
27,2013),http://www.
4fri.
org/pdfs/4FRI_charter_amended_022713.
pdf[hereinafter4FRICharter].
231Id.
at1.
93Notably,4FRIisacollaborativethatinformsmanagementpracticesonlargelycontiguouspubliclandsmanagedbyasingledecisionmaker.
Fortheserea-sons,itavoidsmanyoftheownershipandadministrativechallengesthatarepresentinlandscapeswithmorediverseownershipandadministrativeregimes.
(Toillus-tratethispoint,compareFigure7withFigure8).
The4FRIstakeholdercharteroutlineseightspecificactionsthatareneces-sarytoachieveitsmission,including:workingcloselywiththeForestServicedur-ingtheNEPAprocess,developingmoreefficientcollaborativeprocesses,leverag-ingindustrycontractstocontributetoforestthinning,supportingprivateandpublicfinancialinvestments,andinfluencingpolicychangewhereappropriate.
232TheForestServiceisnotaformalmemberofthegroup,butinsteadservesinanadvisorycapacityandasaliaisontotheagency.
ThegroupwasdesignedwiththisstructuretoavoidtheneedforFACAcertification,whichwasdescribedbyoneofficialashaving"toomanyrequirementsandroadblocks"andbeing"notinclu-sive.
"233The4FRIandForestServiceoperateunderaMemorandumofUnder-standingthatdelineatestheroleandauthorityofthecollaborationininformingde-cision-makingprocesses.
234OneForestServiceofficialnotedthat"youhavetoconstantlyremind[thestakeholdergroup]thattheyarenotmakingthedecision;theForestServiceisthedecision-maker.
"Yetthesameofficialexplainedthat"wetakealotthatthegroupsaysandprettyliterallyjustputitinthe[EnvironmentalImpactStatement].
"235Heconcludedthatthereis"afinelinebetweenFACAandcollaboration.
"236AttheJuly26,2017stakeholdermeeting,thisrelationshipwashighlightedthroughdiscussionofanEnvironmentalImpactStatementforforestrestorationwork.
TheNationalEnvironmentalPolicyActrequiresanagencytoconsidersev-eralalternativesinandEnvironmentalImpactStatementbeforeundertakingmajorfederalactionthatwillaffectthehumanenvironment.
TheForestServicewaspre-paringanEnvironmentalImpactStatementforrestorationactivitieson15,000acres.
237Theagencyhaddecidedtoeliminateoneoptionfromtheproposealterna-tivesfromconsiderationintheEnvironmentalImpactStatementanddescribedthat232Id.
at1-2.
233Interview4.
234USDAFORESTSERVICE,MEMORANDUMOFUNDERSTANDINGBETWEENTHE4FORESTRESTORATIONINITIATIVE(4FRI)COLLABORATIVESTAKEHOLDERGROUPREPRESENTATIVESANDTHEU.
S.
FORESTSERVICE,FSAGREEMENTNO.
1O-MU-11031600(February22,2011).
235Interview4.
236Interview4.
237UNITEDSTATESDEPARTMENTOFAGRICULTURE,FINALENVIRONMENTALIMPACTSTATEMENTFORTHEFOUR-FORESTRESTORATIONINITIATIVECOCONINOANDKAIBABNATIONALFORESTS(NOVEMBER2014).
94decision-makingprocessto4FRI.
Severalstakeholdersobjectedtotheremovaloftheoption.
Onesaidthataworkinggroupmember"withlitigationintheirbackpocket"stronglyadvocatedagainstdroppingthealternative.
TheCoconinoForestSupervisorresponded:Iftherewasaconsensusamongthisgroup,wehonorthat.
Ifthisgroupcomestogetheraroundthatalternativeandcandosointhenexthour,theboardisopentorevisitingthat.
Itisnotourintenttoclosedownwhattheconsensusofthisgroupis.
Ifthat'ssomethingyouwanttomoveforwardwith,wewilldoit.
238Similarly,inthemeeting,theSupervisornoted:What'sbeautifulaboutthisgroup,andwhatitoffersus,isthatwedon'thavetodotraditionalNEPA.
That'sthenicethingaboutagroupandthesocialcontextaroundit.
Ideally,wewouldjusthaveonealternativeandcompareittothenoactionandbegoodtogo.
239Thissentimentreflectedastorythatnumerouspeopletoldresearchersatandafterthemeeting.
Previously,4FRIhadworkedforyearstoreachconsensusonanEIS.
AtthepublicmeetingssurroundingtheEIS,agroupthatdidnotpartic-ipatein4FRIraisedserious,strongobjectionstothedocument.
Witheveryobjec-tion,theForestServiceSupervisorwhowasrunningtheobjectionprocesswouldturntothe4FRIrepresentativeandask,"didyouconsiderthispoint"Whenthecollectiveresponded"yes,"theSupervisorwouldsay"thatpointhasbeenconsid-ered"anddismisstheobjection.
TheclearimplicationfromtheSupervisor'sresponsewasthat4FRIwastheappropriateforumforpublicinvolvement—thatifagrouporindividualcaredabouttheoutcome,theappropriateforumwasthecollaborative,nottheNEPAprocess.
Thegeneralsensefromtheretellingofthisstorywasthatitwasadefiningmomentforthegroup—acatalyzingmomentwherestakeholderunderstoodthattheirworkwasdirectlyandovertlyinfluencingForestServicedecision-making.
AForestSer-viceemployeenotedthatthesupervisor"usedthecollaborativeasabuffer.
"240Fivefull-timeForestServiceemployeesaredevotedto4FRI.
TheForestServiceprovides4FRIwithanannualbudgetofapproximately$33million,241com-prisedofseveraldifferentfundingsourcesrangingfromregionalrestorationfundsthatgotoCFLRprojectstodirectmatchesforfundsfromothersourcesthatcover238Notesfromstakeholdermeeting.
239Id.
240Interview4.
241USDAFORESTSERVICE,FY2014BUDGETJUSTIFICATION(April2013).
95timespentinstakeholderparticipationorcapitalinvestmentsinsawmills.
242The4FRIisunusualamongCFLRprojectsinthatonlyapproximately10%ofitsfund-ingcomesfromthatsource.
Thisdiversifiedfunding,pairedwith4FRI'sstatusasahigh-profile"posterchild"oftheForestService'srequiredstakeholdercollabo-rations,protectsitfromfundingdeficits.
Further,thegroupiswell-representedpolitically.
RepresentativesfromtheofficesofArizonaSenatorsMcCainandFlakeoccasionallyattendmeetings,andhaveintroducedridersonCongressionalbillstoassist4FRIatitsrequestinthepast.
243Moreover,thestakeholderslobbyCongresseachyearforfunding,withfourorfivemembersofthestakeholdergroupgoingofficethroughofficeofWashing-tonpoliticians.
Inthissense,oneForestServiceemployeedescribed4FRIas"apoliticalarm"and"lobbying"fortheForestService,withmorefunds.
244Interestingly,astakeholdergroupisfundingaprivatepartytocreatepoliciesregardinglowvaluetimberregulations,consideringputtinglanguageinabilltoallowtheregiontobeapilotprograminlowvaluetimberregulations.
Becauseoftheresourcescontrib-utedbystakeholders,theNationalForestinNorthernArizona"isinareallyuniqueplacetobeabletoinfluencenationwide"andnotesthatnationalworkinggroupsarefeedingoffeffortsproducedbythecollaboration.
245The4FRIisorganizedintothreedistinctgroupswithuniquefunctions,op-eratingintandemtoachievetheinitiativessetoutby4FRIstakeholders.
Membersareorganizedintothreegroups:(1)thestakeholdergroup,(2)thesteeringcommit-tee,or(3)theworkgroups.
246Thestakeholdergroupservesastheprimarydecision-makingbodyandismadeupofbothindividualsandorganizationswhilealsobeingopentothepublic.
247Thesteeringcommitteeactsasagoverningbodyforadmin-istration:theycoordinatemeetings,recordkeeping,andsuggestionsforwork242SeealsoEmeryCowan,4FRIgets$10millionboostfromForestService,ARIZONADAILYSUN(Feb2,2016),http://azdailysun.
com/news/local/fri-gets-million-boost-from-forest-service/arti-cle_05995ac6-e70b-5647-9444-a20b357ceffe.
html.
243PressRelease,SenatorJohnMcCain,SenatorsMcCain&FlakeUrgeForestServicetoIm-proveEffortsToPreventCatastrophicWildfires(Nov.
06,2015),https://www.
mccain.
sen-ate.
gov/public/index.
cfm/2015/11/senators-mccain-flake-urge-forest-service-to-improve-efforts-to-prevent-catastrophic-wildfires(lastvisitedSeptember23,2017);PressRelease,SenatorJeffFlake,FlakeandMcCainUrgeForestServicetoOpenMoreArizonaAcresforForestThinning(Mar.
25,2014),https://www.
flake.
senate.
gov/public/index.
cfm/2014/3/flake-and-mccain-urge-forest-service-to-open-more-arizona-acres-for-forest-thinning(lastvisitedSeptember23,2017).
244Interview4.
245Id.
2464FRICharter,supranote233,at2.
247Id.
96groups.
248Thesteeringcommitteeisalsosubjecttoothercharterrules,detailingtheirresponsibilities,termlength,andspecificdemographicrepresentationthatmustbepartofthecommittee.
249The4FRIhasformalrulesaboutthecollaborativeprocess,withspecific"decisionrules"andprescribedstakeholdermeetinggroundrules.
250Thedecisionrulesguidethedecision-makingprocessbyofferingstakeholdersfourvaryinglev-elsofagreementtoexpress:(1)agreementwithoutreservations;(2)agreementwithreservations;(3)agreementbyacquiescence;and(4)disagreement.
251Eachlevelofagreementcomeswithdifferentproceduralrequirements,ensuringthatallreser-vationsandoppositionsarerecorded.
252ThissystemreflectsaForestServiceemployee'sobservationthat"togetsocialconsensus,youhavetoagreenottoagree.
"253Thecollaborativevotingpro-cessincludesthingslike'agreewithreservation'becauseweunderstandyoucannotget100percentconsensus.
Yougoto100percentconsensus,andyou'llnevergetthere.
"254Whenapartydisagrees,atimelineisestablishedtoallownegotiationandcompromise,andanothersetofproceduralrequirementstakeeffectifnoagreementisreachedwithinthattimeframe.
255Inadditiontotheseprocedures,theentirepro-cessisgovernedbygroundrules,specifyingpreparedness,respect,andcandidcol-laborationandparticipation.
256Somestakeholdersarenotpartofthegroupdespitehavingstronginterestsinthelandandresourcesbeingmanaged.
Forexample,theWhiteMountainApacheTribe,whichsharesaboundarywithApacheSitgravesNationalForest,isnotastakeholdergroup.
257Cattleinterestsarealsonotrepresented,whichissurprising248Id.
249Thesteeringcommitteemustconsistofeightmembers,withonememberactingonbehalfofthefollowinginterestgroups:(1)a501(c)(3)environmentalnonprofitgroup;(2)acommercialforestuser(suchaswoodproducts);(3)awood-workerorganizationorrestorationeffortem-ployer;(4)astateorfederalagency;(5)atribe;(6)anacademicinstitution;(7)thelocalgovern-ment;and(8)an"at-large"memberfromthe4FRIstakeholdergroup.
Id.
at10-11.
250Id.
at3,7.
251Id.
at4.
252Id.
253Interview4.
254Id.
2554FRICharter,supranote230,at4-5.
256Id.
at7.
257AboutUs,APACHE-SITGREAVESNATIONALFORESTS,https://www.
fs.
usda.
gov/de-tail/asnf/learning/history-culture/cid=fsbdev7_012567(lastvisitedSeptember23,2017).
97becausetherestorationworkopenstreestandswhichproducesmoreforagepro-duction.
258AttemptstogettheArizonaCattleGrowersgroupandlocalranchersinvolvedhaveprovedunsuccessful.
259Avarietyofnongovernmentalenvironmentalorganizationsalsochosenottoparticipate.
TheSierraClubdoesnotparticipate,afactthatForestServiceem-ployeesexplainasoriginatinginanorganizationalmandatethattheSierraClubcannotbeapartofacollaborationthatcutstrees;itparticipatesinformally,how-ever.
260Otherconservationgroups,suchastheJohnMuirProjectandWildEarthGuardians,alsodonotparticipate.
Astakeholderin4FRInotedthatsomeconser-vationgroupsfeelthatstakeholdercollaborationsarealong,formalwayofgivingindustrygroupswhattheywant,anotionreinforcedbytheirexperienceswithsomeearliercattlegrazingstakeholdergroupsinthestate.
Thiscritiqueisbolsteredwithrespectto4FRIgiventhehistoryandcultureoftheForestService.
TheForestServiceisalinestafforganizationwithacentury-oldcommandandcontrolorganizationalstructuredesignedtomaximizetimberharvest.
Astheagencyobjectivesshifted,itsstructureandmanyguidingregulationsdidnot.
Asaresult,thereistensionbetweentruecollaboration—definedbyastateagencystake-holderas"shareddecisionspace"261andtheauthorityintheagencies'model.
Topromotecollaborationunderthisstructure,aForestServiceemployeecitesthewordsofaRegionalForester,noting,"Wecannotviolatelaw,butwetrytobendregulationandpolicy.
"262Whenaskedwhatwouldhappenifhewasreprimandedfordoingso,heresponded,"I'llretire.
ButtheForestServicedoesn'thavegoodaccountability.
"263Thiscommitmenttothecollaborativeandflexibilitywithre-specttopolicyhasallowedthecollaborativetoflourishwithinanorganizationthatwasnotdesignedwithcollaborativegovernanceinmind:258SeeUNITEDSTATESDEPARTMENTOFAGRICULTURE,FINALENVIRONMENTALIMPACTSTATEMENTFORTHEFOUR-FORESTRESTORATIONINITIATIVECOCONINOANDKAIBABNATIONALFORESTS(NOVEMBER2014).
259SeeArizonaCattleGrowers'Association,SaveArizona'sForestEnvironment(SAFE)11(July29,2011),http://azcattlemensassoc.
org/CMDocs/ArizonaCG/SAFE/SAFE%20PLAN-for%20email.
pdf("The4FRIisanobleeffort,butinandofitselfitisnotofsufficientsizeorscopetoreturnourforeststohealthortoinviteenoughprivateinvestmentofwoodharvestingin-frastructureintotheseruralresourcebasedcommunities.
").
260LetterfromTaylorMcKinnon,CenterforBiologicalDiversity&SharonGalbreath,SierraClubGrandCanyonChapter,toHenryProvencio,4FRITeamLeader,FourForestsRestorationInitiativeProposedAction(March14,2011),http://4fri.
org/pdfs/docu-ments/NEPA/CBD_SC%20_PA_Comments_3_11_11.
pdf(lastvisitedSeptember23,2017).
261Interview3.
262Interview4.
263Interview4.
98Ontheadministrativeside,probablythegreatestchallengewastheForestServicelearningtobeabletoworkinacollaborativeway,andIcanseethatthiswouldalsobeonthesocialsidebutit'sbringingthesocialandtheadministrativetogether.
It'stheForestServiceactuallylearningtooperateinacollaborativeenvironment.
Thatisaparadigmchangeforthem,itwasenormouslychallenging.
Therewerealotoftripsandstumblesontheway,whichweretobeexpected.
Theyhavedonequitewell,butwearestillbumpingupagainstit.
Theybasicallyhadtomovefrombeinganorganizationthattoldpeoplewhattheyweregoingtodo,thentookfeedback,thenjustwentaheadanddidwhattheyweregoingtodo.
Tobecominganenvironmentwherepoweranddecision-makingisshared.
264Toovercomeinstitutionalboundaries,thegroupusedmultiplefacilitators.
OneForestServiceofficialnotedthattheUdallInstitutesentthreedifferentfacilitatorsduringtheformativestageswhenpeoplewerestandoffishthatthefacilitatorswerenoteffectivebecausetheyallowedafewpeopletodominatetheconversation.
265TheForestServiceputoutafacilitationcontract,andfoundaprivatefacilitatorwhowasveryeffectiveatintegratingpeople.
266Heusedaphoneappwhenpeoplewereuncomfortablespeaking,whichseveralpeoplefeltwaseffectiveinencouragingparticipationandreducingtension.
267Now,thegroupisself-facilitatedandthereislittlementionofbringinginfacilitators,althoughtherecontinuetobestrongpersonalitiesthatdominatethegroup.
Today,4FRIislargelyseenasasuccessstory,bothwithinthegroupandwithintheForestServicemorebroadly.
The4FRIservesasalaboratoryforcollaborationideasthroughoutthecountry,forboththeForestServiceandstakeholderslikeTheNatureConservancy,whichisworkingondigitalprescriptionsthatarebeingpickedupnationally.
268Dedicatedstaff,expertincollaborations,canfocusonthecollective.
"Wehavesomereallyfertilemindsandwethinkupsomereallyneatshit.
"269Asaresult,severalintra-agencyrepresentativesvisitandstudy4FRI.
Despitethisgeneralsenseofrelativeexcellence,someexternalstakeholders264Interview5.
265Id.
266Id.
267Id.
268DevinColdewey,NatureConservancyGivesForestManagementaDigitalMakeover,TECHCRUNCH(Apr19,2017),https://techcrunch.
com/2017/04/19/nature-conservancy-gives-forest-management-a-digital-makeover/.
269Interview4.
99challengethepurportedsuccessofthegroup.
In2015,theEditorialBoardoftheArizonaRepublicnoted:Launchedin2010asthelargestforest-thinningmissioninAmericanhistory,4FRIhasaccomplishedafractionofitsgoals,whichini-tiallyenvisionedthinning50,000acresofgrosslyover-chokedfor-estlandayearthroughthefirst10years.
Ithascomenowherenearthatgoal…The4FRIprogressreportfromtheForestServiceisdisheartening,inaway.
Itlookslikethefedsaretryingtofoolusontheprogram'srealprogress…theU.
S.
DepartmentofAgricultureandlocal4FRIpublic-sectorpartnersarepayingmillionsofdollarsayeartocon-ductthinningprojectsinthefournationalforestsinvolved…Thewholeideaof4FRI,remember,isasaprivateinitiative….
Asenvi-ronmentalistToddSchulketoldPeteAlshireofthePaysonRoundupinDecember,promotingforestthinningpaidforbythefedsasevi-denceof4FRI'ssuccess"isnotgoodforanybody.
Inflatingtheac-complishmentstothepointwhereit'sunbelievabletaxesthecredi-bilityofthewholeprogram,"Schulkesaid.
270Ultimately,activestakeholdersandmembersoftheForestServicegenerallyher-aldedthecollaborationasasuccess,pointinglargelytometricsoutsideofacresthinnedandlookinginsteadtobridgingdifficultrelationshipstoachieveenviron-mentalobjectiveswithoutlitigation.
270EditorialBoard,TheForestServiceShouldn'tPatItselfontheBackYet,(April22,2015),THEREPUBLIC,http://www.
azcentral.
com/story/opinion/editorial/2015/04/22/fri-deal-struck-last-get-thinning/26212565/.
100APPENDIXV:INTERVIEWPROTOCOLAcademicConsultantKarenBradshawandPh.
D.
CandidateChallieFacemireinterviewedoveradozenfederalagencyofficials,stateofficials,andstakeholdersforthisReport.
Inadditiontoinformationgatheredfromtheformalinterviews,Bradshawalsoincorporatedcommentsandeventssheobservedatstakeholdermeetings,aswellasinformalconversationsandemails,asindicatedthroughoutthetext.
Interviewsweresemi-structured.
Eachintervieweewasaskedtheques-tionsbelow;sometimesadditionaldiscussionareasemergedduringtheinterview.
QuestionswerevettedinadvancebyACUSstaff,severalenvironmentallawschol-ars,aprominentmemberofanongovernmentalorganizationwithsignificantexpe-rienceatafederalagency,tworesearchassistantswithtraininginqualitativemeth-odology,andAlisonCook-Davis,theAssistantDirectorofProgramEvaluationattheArizonaStateUniversityOfficeofEvaluationandEducationalEffectiveness.
Intervieweesweregiventwoopportunitiestoreviewtheaccuracyofthecommentsinthisreport.
First,BradshawandFacemireemailedeachpersonquotedanindividualizedcopyofeachoftheirstatementsthatwouldappearinquotationsinthereport.
Second,Bradshawemailedallparticipantsadraftreport,uponwhichintervieweeswerewelcomedandencouragedtocomment.
SomeintervieweesaskedthatthetranscriptoftheirinterviewnotbequotedinthisReport;othersaskedthatgeneric,non-identifyingdescriptors(suchas"Na-tionalParkServiceemployee"or"Interview1")beusedwiththeirquotes.
Whentherewasnotspecificinstructiononthispoint,theauthordefaultedtoanonymous,non-identifyingreferences.
Insomecases,genderandinterviewnumberswerechangedtoobscuretheidentityofpeoplemakingcommentstheyfeltwereespe-ciallysensitive.
OneintervieweeaskedthatsignificantportionsofherinterviewberetractedfromtheReportandheavilyeditedcommentsprovidedintheinterview;thisrequestwasgranted.
Thedefaultinterviewtranscriptisincludedbelow;theinterviewsoftenvar-iedfromthisstructuretocaptureotherideasandpointstheintervieweeswantedtomake.
101InterviewerName:IntervieweeName:Date:Location:Recorded(y/n):Disclosure(Readexactlyaswritten):Thankyoufortakingthetimetodothisinterview.
Thisprojectisdonebyanaca-demicconsultantfortheAdministrativeConferenceoftheUnitedStates.
Asthisisworkproductforafederalreport,youranswersmaybepublicorusedinthisreportorotherfuturepublications.
Thisisacollaborativeproject–notanexposé.
Ifyousaysomethingthatyouwishyouhadnot,tellmeandIwillnotincludeitinthetranscript.
Ifwedirectlyquoteyouinthereport,wewilltrytogiveyouadraftpriortopublicationtoensuretheaccuracyofthequote.
Wewillalsosendacopyofthefinalreporttoallparticipants,whicharewelcometosharewithothersinyouror-ganization.
102Questions:1.
Describeyourcollaborationnameandpurpose2.
Whatistheresource(s)beingmanaged3.
Whoarethestakeholderparticipants4.
WhatisabriefhistoryoftheorganizationHowdiditform5.
Whatfederalstatutesandexecutiveordersaswellasstateandlocallawsapplytothiscollaboration6.
Hasyouragencyissuedregulationstogovernthiscollaboration7.
Whatchallengeshaveyouencounteredwhenconductingthesecollabora-tions8.
Arethereanybestpracticesdevelopedatspecificagenciesthatcouldbeusefullyadoptedbyotheragencies9.
Whatfactorsshouldagenciesconsiderindecidinghowbesttostructurethesecollaborations10.
Howwouldyouadviseotheragenciestoensurethatthey'veincludedallthekeystakeholderswithoutconveningagroupthatissolargeastobecomeunwieldy11.
WhatistheresultofthecollaborationDoyoucreatedocuments,tangibleresultsHowdoyoumeasureyoursuccess(Doagenciestypicallyissuearule,reachsomesortofagreementwithastateorlocalgovernment,contractwithaprivateentitytocarryoutsomefunction,ordosomethingelse)12.
ArethereanyinsightsemergingfromNRCsthatmightbegeneralizabletootherareas,suchasadvisorycommittees,negotiatedrulemakings,andin-formalstakeholderoutreachbeforerulemakingCouldcollaborativeadap-tivemanagementbeappliedtootherareasofgovernmentattemptingtoad-dress"wickedproblems"