希尔巴菲特ibm

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1/45《2013年巴菲特致股东的信》ArKiller翻译Berkshire'sCorporatePerformancevs.
theS&P500伯克希尔业绩表现和标普500指数对比AnnualPercentageChangeYearinPer-ShareBookValueofBerkshire(1)inS&P500withDividendsIncluded(2)RelativeResults(1)-(2)196523.
810.
013.
8196620.
3(11.
7)32.
0196711.
030.
9(19.
9)196819.
011.
08.
0196916.
2(8.
4)24.
6197012.
03.
98.
1197116.
414.
61.
8197221.
718.
92.
819734.
7(14.
8)19.
519745.
5(26.
4)31.
9197521.
937.
2(15.
3)197659.
323.
635.
7197731.
9(7.
4)39.
3197824.
06.
417.
6197935.
718.
217.
5198019.
332.
3(13.
0)198131.
4(5.
0)36.
4198240.
021.
418.
6198332.
322.
49.
9198413.
66.
17.
5198548.
231.
616.
6198626.
118.
67.
5198719.
55.
114.
4198820.
116.
63.
5198944.
431.
712.
719907.
4(3.
1)10.
5199139.
630.
59.
1199220.
37.
612.
7199314.
310.
14.
2199413.
91.
312.
6199543.
137.
65.
5199631.
823.
08.
8199734.
133.
40.
7转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
2/45199848.
328.
619.
719990.
521.
0(20.
5)20006.
5(9.
1)15.
62001(6.
2)(11.
9)5.
7200210.
0(22.
1)32.
1200321.
028.
7(7.
7)200410.
510.
9(0.
4)20056.
44.
91.
5200618.
415.
82.
6200711.
05.
55.
52008(9.
6)(37.
0)27.
4200919.
826.
5(6.
7)201013.
015.
1(2.
1)20114.
62.
12.
5201214.
416.
0(1.
6)CompoundedAnnualGain–1965-201219.
7%9.
4%10.
3%OverallGain–1964-2012586817%7433%Notes:Dataareforcalendaryearswiththeseexceptions:1965and1966,yearended9/30;1967,15monthsended12/31.
Startingin1979,accountingrulesrequiredinsurancecompaniestovaluetheequitysecuritiestheyholdatmarketratherthanatthelowerofcostormarket,whichwaspreviouslytherequirement.
Inthistable,Berkshire'sresultsthrough1978havebeenrestatedtoconformtothechangedrules.
Inallotherrespects,theresultsarecalculatedusingthenumbersoriginallyreported.
TheS&P500numbersarepre-taxwhereastheBerkshirenumbersareafter-tax.
IfacorporationsuchasBerkshireweresimplytohaveownedtheS&P500andaccruedtheappropriatetaxes,itsresultswouldhavelaggedtheS&P500inyearswhenthatindexshowedapositivereturn,butwouldhaveexceededtheS&P500inyearswhentheindexshowedanegativereturn.
Overtheyears,thetaxcostswouldhavecausedtheaggregatelagtobesubstantial.
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3/45年份伯克希尔每股账面价值百分比变动(1)标普500指数百分比变动(2)相对变动(1)-(2)196523.
810.
013.
8196620.
3(11.
7)32.
0196711.
030.
9(19.
9)196819.
011.
08.
0196916.
2(8.
4)24.
6197012.
03.
98.
1197116.
414.
61.
8197221.
718.
92.
819734.
7(14.
8)19.
519745.
5(26.
4)31.
9197521.
937.
2(15.
3)197659.
323.
635.
7197731.
9(7.
4)39.
3197824.
06.
417.
6197935.
718.
217.
5198019.
332.
3(13.
0)198131.
4(5.
0)36.
4198240.
021.
418.
6198332.
322.
49.
9198413.
66.
17.
5198548.
231.
616.
6198626.
118.
67.
5198719.
55.
114.
4198820.
116.
63.
5198944.
431.
712.
719907.
4(3.
1)10.
5199139.
630.
59.
1199220.
37.
612.
7199314.
310.
14.
2199413.
91.
312.
6199543.
137.
65.
5199631.
823.
08.
8199734.
133.
40.
7199848.
328.
619.
719990.
521.
0(20.
5)20006.
5(9.
1)15.
62001(6.
2)(11.
9)5.
7200210.
0(22.
1)32.
1200321.
028.
7(7.
7)200410.
510.
9(0.
4)20056.
44.
91.
5转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
4/45200618.
415.
82.
6200711.
05.
55.
52008(9.
6)(37.
0)27.
4200919.
826.
5(6.
7)201013.
015.
1(2.
1)20114.
62.
12.
5201214.
416.
0(1.
6)复合增长率-1965至201219.
7%9.
4%10.
3%总回报-1964至2012586817%7433%说明:1965和1966年的财年截止日期为9月30日,1967年有15个月,截止至12月31日,其他年份财年与日历年截止日相同.
1979年开始,会计准则要求保险公司以市值计算所持有的权益类证券账面价值,而此前准则要求以市价和历史成本价孰低计量.
上表中,伯克希尔1978年前的数据已经追溯调整以符合准则的要求.
除此之外,所有结果依据原始数据进行计算.
标普500指数的变动是税前收益,而伯克希尔的数据是税后收益.
如果一个类似伯克希尔的公司拥有标普500指数的业绩,并缴纳相应税收,在标普500回报为正的年份,其业绩会落后于标普500,在标普500指数为负的年份,其回报会超过标普500指数.
多年下来,税收负担将导致总体回报显著落后于指数的变动.
(下图为ArKiller根据数据制作添加)(ArKiller的话:事实证明措别字完全不影响读阅和理解.
因为连业余的校对都没有,所以希望大家把注意力更多地放巴老的幽默机智之上,感谢!
)(40.
0)(20.
0)0.
020.
040.
060.
080.
0196519671969197119731975197719791981198319851987198919911993199519971999200120032005200720092011BRKBookvaluevs.
S&P500(1965-2012)相对变动(1)-(2)伯克希尔每股账面价值百分比变动(1)标普500指数百分比变动(2)转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
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5/45BERKSHIREHATHAWAYINC.
伯克希尔哈撒韦有限公司TotheShareholdersofBerkshireHathawayInc.
:致伯克希尔哈撒韦有限公司的股东:In2012,Berkshireachievedatotalgainforitsshareholdersof$24.
1billion.
Weused$1.
3billionofthattorepurchaseourstock,whichleftuswithanincreaseinnetworthof$22.
8billionfortheyear.
Theper-sharebookvalueofbothourClassAandClassBstockincreasedby14.
4%.
Overthelast48years(thatis,sincepresentmanagementtookover),bookvaluehasgrownfrom$19to$114,214,arateof19.
7%compoundedannually.
*2012年,伯克希尔为股东实现了241亿美元的回报.
我们花了13亿美元回购股票,因此公司净值增长了228亿.
A级和B级股票的每股账面价值增长了14.
4%.
过去的48年里(即从现任的管理层接手以来),我们的每股账面价值从19美元增长到了114,214美元,复合增长率19.
7%.
①AnumberofgoodthingshappenedatBerkshirelastyear,butlet'sfirstgetthebadnewsoutoftheway.
去年伯克希尔有一些好消息,但我们还是先从坏消息说起吧.
WhenthepartnershipIrantookcontrolofBerkshirein1965,Icouldneverhavedreamedthatayearinwhichwehadagainof$24.
1billionwouldbesubpar,intermsofthecomparisonwepresentonthefacingpage.
1965年我运作的合伙公司接手伯克希尔以来,我从来没有想过,一个回报241亿美元的年份相对业绩居然是低于平均水平的,请参见第一页的业绩比较.
Butsubparitwas.
Fortheninthtimein48years,Berkshire'spercentageincreaseinbookvaluewaslessthantheS&P'spercentagegain(acalculationthatincludesdividendsaswellaspriceappreciation).
Ineightofthosenineyears,itshouldbenoted,theS&Phadagainof15%ormore.
Wedobetterwhenthewindisinourface.
但去年的业绩的确低于平均水平.
这是48年来第9次伯克希尔的业绩落后于标普500指数的回报(计算包括的分红和股价上升).
需要强调的是,另外的8次落后中,标普500指数增长都超过15%.
我们在逆境里干的要好一些.
Todate,we'veneverhadafive-yearperiodofunderperformance,havingmanaged43timestosurpasstheS&Poversuchastretch.
(Therecordisonpage103.
)ButtheS&Phasnowhadgainsineachofthelastfouryears,outpacingusoverthatperiod.
Ifthemarketcontinuestoadvancein2013,ourstreakoffive-yearwinswillend.
迄今为止,我们从来没有在按5年衡量的业绩上落后于标普,已经实现了43连胜(记录参见103页).
但是标普指数过去4年连续取得正回报,并且超过了我们.
如果2013年市场继续实现超越,我们的5年期连胜记录就要终结了.
Onethingofwhichyoucanbecertain:WhateverBerkshire'sresults,mypartnerCharlieMunger,thecompany'sViceChairman,andIwillnotchangeyardsticks.
It'sourjobtoincreaseintrinsicbusinessvalue–forwhichweusebookvalueasasignificantlyunderstatedproxy–atafasterratethanthemarketgainsoftheS&P.
Ifwedoso,Berkshire'sshareprice,①Allper-sharefiguresusedinthisreportapplytoBerkshire'sAshares.
FiguresfortheBsharesare1/1500thofthoseshownforA.
报告中的每股数据均指A级股票的数据.
每股B级股票的数据是每股A级股票的1/1500.
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部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
6/45thoughunpredictablefromyeartoyear,willitselfoutpacetheS&Povertime.
Ifwefail,however,ourmanagementwillbringnovaluetoourinvestors,whothemselvescanearnS&Preturnsbybuyingalow-costindexfund.
但有一件事情你可以确信:无论伯克希尔最终业绩如何,我的合伙人查理·芒格,公司的副董事长,和我都不会改变业绩标准.
我们的工作就是以一个比标普指数更快的速度增加公司的内在价值——我们使用账面价值作为其近似值.
如果我们成功了,即使各年份的波动难以预测,伯克希尔的股价长期来看会超越标普指数.
如果我们失败了,我们没有给投资者带来任何价值,因为直接买一只低费率的指数基金也可以获得同样的回报.
CharlieandIbelievethegaininBerkshire'sintrinsicvaluewillovertimelikelysurpasstheS&Preturnsbyasmallmargin.
We'reconfidentofthatbecausewehavesomeoutstandingbusinesses,acadreofterrificoperatingmangersandashareholder-orientedculture.
Ourrelativeperformance,however,isalmostcertaintobebetterwhenthemarketisdownorflat.
Inyearswhenthemarketisparticularlystrong,expectustofallshort.
查理和我相信,伯克希尔的内在价值会持续以略高于标普指数的水平增长.
我们的信心来源于公司优秀的业务,能干的经理人团队,以及以股东利益为导向的公司文化.
我们的相对业绩在市场向下或者表现平平的时候要好一些.
在市场上涨强劲的年份,请预期我们将会暂时落后.
Theseconddisappointmentin2012wasmyinabilitytomakeamajoracquisition.
Ipursuedacoupleofelephants,butcameupempty-handed.
2012年第二件令人失望的事情是我没有能进行一笔大收购.
我瞄准了一些大象,但最终空手而回.
Ourluck,however,changedearlythisyear.
InFebruary,weagreedtobuy50%ofaholdingcompanythatwillownallofH.
J.
Heinz.
TheotherhalfwillbeownedbyasmallgroupofinvestorsledbyJorgePauloLemann,arenownedBrazilianbusinessmanandphilanthropist.
不过今年年初我们运气不错.
2月,我们达成协议购买一家全资拥有H.
J.
Heinz②公司的控股公司50%股份.
另外一半将会由以JorgePauloLemann③为首的少数投资者持有,他是巴西著名的商人和慈善家.
Wecouldn'tbeinbettercompany.
JorgePauloisalong-timefriendofmineandanextraordinarymanager.
HisgroupandBerkshirewilleachcontributeabout$4billionforcommonequityintheholdingcompany.
Berkshirewillalsoinvest$8billioninpreferredsharesthatpaya9%dividend.
Thepreferredhastwootherfeaturesthatmateriallyincreaseitsvalue:atsomepointitwillberedeemedatasignificantpremiumpriceandthepreferredalsocomeswithwarrantspermittingustobuy5%oftheholdingcompany'scommonstockforanominalsum.
我们买不到比这更好的公司了.
JorgePaulo长期以来都是我的好朋友,并且是一位卓越的经理人.
他为首的投资人团队和伯克希尔将会各自出资约40亿美元购买持股公司的普通股.
伯克希尔还会另外投资80亿美元购买分红率9%的优先股.
优先股的两个优势大大增加了它的价值:首先它将会在特定时刻以显著的溢价被回购,其次这些优先股还允许我们以象征性的价格购买持股公司5%的普通股.
②H.
J.
HeinzCompany(NYSE:HNZ),亨氏,纽交所上市公司,美国食品巨头,总部位于匹兹堡.
(资料来源:维基百科,亨氏中文官方网站).
③豪尔赫·保罗·雷曼/JorgePauloLemann,1939年生,巴西投资银行家,2012年彭博富豪指数排名第37位,身价189亿美元,巴西首富;曾涉足百威英博、汉堡王的投资,拥有私募股权投资基金3GCapital.
(资料来源:维基百科,福布斯中文网)转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
7/45Ourtotalinvestmentofabout$12billionsoaksupmuchofwhatBerkshireearnedlastyear.
Butwestillhaveplentyofcashandaregeneratingmoreatagoodclip.
Soit'sbacktowork;CharlieandIhaveagaindonnedoursafarioutfitsandresumedoursearchforelephants.
120亿美元的总投资吸收了伯克希尔去年利润的一大块.
但我们依然持有大量的现金,并在不断地累积.
所以,我们得继续干活;查理和我再次穿上远征服,继续猎象.
Nowtosomegoodnewsfrom2012:接下来是2012年的一些好消息:LastyearItoldyouthatBNSF,Iscar,Lubrizol,MarmonGroupandMidAmericanEnergy–ourfivemostprofitablenon-insurancecompanies–werelikelytoearnmorethan$10billionpre-taxin2012.
Theydelivered.
DespitetepidU.
S.
growthandweakeningeconomiesthroughoutmuchoftheworld,our"powerhousefive"hadaggregateearningsof$10.
1billion,about$600millionmorethanin2011.
去年我告诉大家,BNSF(伯灵顿北方圣特菲铁路公司)④、Iscar(伊斯卡)⑤、Lubrizol(路博润)⑥、MarmonGroup⑦和MidAmericanEnergy⑧(中美洲能源)——我们盈利最好的5家非保险公司——2012年税前利润将会达到100亿美元.
它们确实做到了.
尽管美国经济增长微弱,全球多数经济体都很疲软,我们的"五驾马车"总利润101亿美元,比2011年增加了约6亿.
Ofthisgroup,onlyMidAmerican,thenearning$393millionpre-tax,wasownedbyBerkshireeightyearsago.
Subsequently,wepurchasedanotherthreeofthefiveonanall-cashbasis.
Inacquiringthefifth,BNSF,wepaidabout70%ofthecostincash,andfortheremainder,issuedsharesthatincreasedtheamountoutstandingby6.
1%.
Consequently,the$9.
7billiongaininannualearningsdeliveredBerkshirebythefivecompanieshasbeenaccompaniedbyonlyminordilution.
Thatsatisfiesourgoalofnotsimplygrowing,butratherincreasingper-shareresults.
5家公司里,只有中美洲能源是伯克希尔8年前就拥有的,其税前利润3.
93亿.
后来,我们以现金购买了另外5家中的3家.
在收购第5家,也就是BNSF的时候,我们支付了70%的现金,剩下的部分增发股票,使得发行在外的股份增加了6.
1%.
最终结果是,5家公司为伯克希尔贡献了97亿美元利润但只产生了一点点摊薄.
这与我们的目标一致,既不仅仅是实现增长,而且是要实现每股价值的增长.
UnlesstheU.
S.
economytanks–whichwedon'texpect–ourpowerhousefiveshouldagaindeliverhigherearningsin2013.
ThefiveoutstandingCEOswhorunthemwillseetothat.
除非美国经济出现危机——我们预期不太可能——我们的"五驾马车"2013年将会贡献更高的利润.
5位优秀的CEO们将负责这个事情.
ThoughIfailedtolandamajoracquisitionin2012,themanagersofoursubsidiariesdidfar④BNSF(伯灵顿北方圣特菲铁路公司)是世界最大的铁路多式联运公司,拥有5.
2万公里运营里程,营业范围覆盖美国西部、中西部28个州和加拿大2个州,主要进行联合运输、煤炭、工业品、农产品、汽车的运输业务.
目前,BNSF每年运送超过500万个货柜量(相当于1000万标准箱),拥有火车机车超过5700辆,网络覆盖北美西海岸和墨西哥湾所有港口.
(资料来源:网络新闻,2006年数据)⑤ISCAR(伊斯卡)公司是世界著名的金属切削刀具及切削技术的供应商.
总部设在以色列,是伊斯卡金属切削集团(IMC)的领头企业.
(资料来源:百度百科)⑥Lubrizol(路博润),一家为交通、工业和消费产品生产提供化学制品的公司,2011年产值61亿美元,总部位于俄亥俄州.
(资料来源:公司官方网站)⑦MarmonGroup,总部位于芝加哥的控股集团,拥有11个业务板块,主要3个业务板块是工业和金属部件、自然资源和运输、零售和终端技术.
(资料来源:维基百科和公司官方网站)⑧MidAmericanEnergy(中美洲能源),爱荷华最大的能源公司,服务于爱荷华、伊利诺伊、南达科他、内布拉斯加等多个州的客户.
(资料来源:路透新闻,公司官方网站)转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
8/45better.
Wehadarecordyearfor"bolt-on"purchases,spendingabout$2.
3billionfor26companiesthatweremeldedintoourexistingbusinesses.
ThesetransactionswerecompletedwithoutBerkshireissuinganyshares.
CharlieandIlovetheseacquisitions:Usuallytheyarelow-risk,burdenheadquartersnotatall,andexpandthescopeofourprovenmanagers.
尽管我去年一笔大额收购都没做成,但是我们各个分支的经理人比干的比我好多了.
去年是我们"补强型"收购创纪录的一年,我们花了23亿美元,收购了26家融入我们现有业务的公司.
这些交易没有让伯克希尔增发任何股票.
查理和我喜欢这样的收购:通常它们是低风险的,不让总部承受任何负担,并且扩展了我们的经理人施展拳脚的空间.
Ourinsuranceoperationsshotthelightsoutlastyear.
WhilegivingBerkshire$73billionoffreemoneytoinvest,theyalsodelivereda$1.
6billionunderwritinggain,thetenthconsecutiveyearofprofitableunderwriting.
Thisistrulyhavingyourcakeandeatingittoo.
我们的保险业务去年业绩喜人.
不但为伯克希尔贡献了730亿美元的浮存金用于投资,还贡献了16亿美元的承保利润,这是连续实现承保利润的第10个年头.
这简直就是一个吃掉了却还在的蛋糕.
GEICOledtheway,continuingtogobbleupmarketsharewithoutsacrificingunderwritingdiscipline.
Since1995,whenweobtainedcontrol,GEICO'sshareofthepersonal-automarkethasgrownfrom2.
5%to9.
7%.
Premiumvolumemeanwhileincreasedfrom$2.
8billionto$16.
7billion.
Muchmoregrowthliesahead.
GEICO⑨是保险业务里的领头羊,它继续扩张着其市场份额而且没有牺牲保单质量.
从1995年我们收购GEICO以来,它在个人车险的市场份额从2.
5%增长到了9.
7%.
保费收入从28亿增长到了167亿.
未来还有巨大的增长空间等着它.
ThecreditforGEICO'sextraordinaryperformancegoestoTonyNicelyandhis27,000associates.
Andtothatcast,weshouldaddourGecko.
Neitherrainnorstormnorgloomofnightcanstophim;thelittlelizardjustsoldierson,tellingAmericanshowtheycansavebigmoneybygoingtoGEICO.
com.
WhenIcountmyblessings,IcountGEICOtwice.
GEICO的卓越表现应归功于TonyNicely和他手下的27,000名员工.
另外,我们还要感谢我们的Gecko⑩.
我们的"小蜥蜴"一直坚守在岗位上,告诉大家如何到GEICO.
com买更便宜的保险,风雨无阻.
当我为大家祈福的时候,我为GEICO祈祷两次.
ToddCombsandTedWeschler,ournewinvestmentmanagers,haveprovedtobesmart,modelsofintegrity,helpfultoBerkshireinmanywaysbeyondportfoliomanagement,andaperfectculturalfit.
Wehitthejackpotwiththesetwo.
In2012eachoutperformedtheS&P500bydouble-digitmargins.
Theyleftmeinthedustaswell.
事实证明,ToddCombs和TedWeschler,我们的新投资经理,非常聪明,而且正直诚信,除了作为组合管理人外,在许多方面都有益于伯克希尔,并且他们与公司文化相融.
他们的加盟让我们中了大奖.
2012年,他们的业绩都以两位数的优势超过了标普500.
这让我相形见绌.
Consequently,wehaveincreasedthefundsmanagedbyeachtoalmost$5billion(someofthisemanatingfromthepensionfundsofoursubsidiaries).
ToddandTedareyoungandwillbearoundtomanageBerkshire'smassiveportfoliolongafterCharlieandIhaveleftthescene.
Youcanresteasywhentheytakeover.
⑨GovernmentEmployeesInsuranceCompany(政府雇员保险公司),美国第四大汽车保险公司,也被音译为盖克.
⑩GEICO.
com主页上,客服的卡通形象是一只"小蜥蜴"http://www.
geico.
com/.
转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
9/45我们已经将他们各自管理的资金增加到了约50亿(部分来自我们子公司的养老金).
Todd和Ted非常年轻,他们将会在查理和我离开后掌管伯克希尔巨额的投资组合.
他们接手以后大家可以安心睡觉.
Berkshire'syearendemploymenttotaledarecord288,462(seepage106fordetails),up17,604fromlastyear.
Ourheadquarterscrew,however,remainedunchangedat24.
Nosensegoingcrazy.
伯克希尔年末的雇员总数创记录地达到了288,462名(参见106页的详细信息),比上年增加17,604名.
我们总部的员工人数,依然维持在24名.
不过暂时还没有任何疯狂的迹象.
Berkshire's"BigFour"investments–AmericanExpress,Coca-Cola,IBMandWellsFargo–allhadgoodyears.
Ourownershipinterestineachofthesecompaniesincreasedduringtheyear.
WepurchasedadditionalsharesofWellsFargo(ourownershipnowis8.
7%versus7.
6%atyearend2011)andIBM(6.
0%versus5.
5%).
Meanwhile,stockrepurchasesatCoca-ColaandAmericanExpressraisedourpercentageownership.
OurequityinCoca-Colagrewfrom8.
8%to8.
9%andourinterestatAmericanExpressfrom13.
0%to13.
7%.
伯克希尔的四大投资——美国运通、可口可乐、IBM和富国银行——都经历了一个好年景.
我们在4家公司的持股比例都有所增加.
我们增持了富国银行(现在的持股比例达到8.
7%,2011年末为7.
6%),和IBM(6.
0%,之前为5.
5%).
同时,可口可乐和美国运通的股票回购增加了我们的持股比例.
我们在可口可乐的持股比例从8.
8%增加到8.
9%,在美国运通的持股比例从13.
0%增加到13.
7%.
Berkshire'sownershipinterestinallfourcompaniesislikelytoincreaseinthefuture.
MaeWesthaditright:"Toomuchofagoodthingcanbewonderful.
"伯克希尔在这四家公司的持股比例未来还会增加.
MaeWest11说的对:"好东西越多越精彩.
"Thefourcompaniespossessmarvelousbusinessesandarerunbymanagerswhoarebothtalentedandshareholder-oriented.
AtBerkshirewemuchpreferowninganon-controllingbutsubstantialportionofawonderfulbusinesstoowning100%ofaso-sobusiness.
Ourflexibilityincapitalallocationgivesusasignificantadvantageovercompaniesthatlimitthemselvesonlytoacquisitionstheycanoperate.
这四家公司运营着非凡的业务,并且由聪明、为股东利益考虑的经理人掌舵.
在伯克希尔,我们更愿意拥有一家优秀公司非控制性但是足够份额的权益,而不愿意拥有一家业绩平平的公司100%的权益.
相比于那些只能收购自己在行的业务的公司,我们在资本配置上的灵活性,使我们具备明显优势.
Goingbyouryearendsharecount,ourportionofthe"BigFour's"2012earningsamountedto$3.
9billion.
Intheearningswereporttoyou,however,weincludeonlythedividendswereceive–about$1.
1billion.
Butmakenomistake:The$2.
8billionofearningswedonotreportiseverybitasvaluabletousaswhatwerecord.
以我们年末的份额计算,2012年我们在"四大"上获得的权益利润应当是39亿.
但在报告给你的"利润"数据里,我们只计算了我们获得的分红——大约11亿.
请不用怀疑:没有计入"利润"的28亿和我们记录的"利润"一样值钱.
Theearningsthatthefourcompaniesretainareoftenusedforrepurchases–whichenhanceourshareoffutureearnings–andalsoforfundingbusinessopportunitiesthatareusually11梅·韦斯特,1893年生,美国影星.
有一双非常丰满的乳房,后来在好莱坞,凭着天赋身材红极一时,是上世纪30年代中期美国薪酬最高的女人,人们称她为"银幕妖女".
(资料来源:百度百科)转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
10/45advantageous.
Overtimeweexpectsubstantiallygreaterearningsfromthesefourinvestees.
Ifwearecorrect,dividendstoBerkshirewillincreaseand,evenmoreimportant,sowillourunrealizedcapitalgains(which,forthefour,totaled$26.
7billionatyearend).
四家公司留存下的利润经常用于回购——这增加了我们未来所占的盈利比例——或者用于前景良好的投资.
我们预期将来会从"四大"投资上分得更多的利润.
如果我们是对的,伯克希尔收到的分红会增加,更重要的是,我们未实现的资本利得也会增加.
(去年年末,我们在"四大"上未实现的资本利得是267亿美元)Therewasalotofhand-wringinglastyearamongCEOswhocried"uncertainty"whenfacedwithcapital-allocationdecisions(despitemanyoftheirbusinesseshavingenjoyedrecordlevelsofbothearningsandcash).
AtBerkshire,wedidn'tsharetheirfears,insteadspendingarecord$9.
8billiononplantandequipmentin2012,about88%ofitintheUnitedStates.
That's19%morethanwespentin2011,ourprevioushigh.
CharlieandIloveinvestinglargesumsinworthwhileprojects,whateverthepunditsaresaying.
WeinsteadheedthewordsfromGaryAllan'snewcountrysong,"EveryStormRunsOutofRain.
"去年在做资本配置的决策时,苦恼于"不确定性"的CEO们一定非常纠结(虽然他们中的不少人所管理的公司盈利和现金都创纪录的好).
在伯克希尔,我们完全没有他们的担心,相反2012年我们在工厂和设备上投资了98亿美元,其中约88%投资在美国.
这比2011年增加了19%,而2011年是我们之前投资的历史高点.
不管智者怎么说,查理和我喜欢在物有所值的项目上大笔投资.
我们注意到GaryAllan的新歌里唱到,"暴风雨终会过去12".
Wewillkeepourfoottothefloorandwillalmostcertainlysetstillanotherrecordforcapitalexpendituresin2013.
OpportunitiesaboundinAmerica.
我们依然脚踏实地,而且基本确定2013年又会是资本开支创纪录的一年.
在美国,机会到处都是.
AthoughtformyfellowCEOs:Ofcourse,theimmediatefutureisuncertain;Americahasfacedtheunknownsince1776.
It'sjustthatsometimespeoplefocusonthemyriadofuncertaintiesthatalwaysexistwhileatothertimestheyignorethem(usuallybecausetherecentpasthasbeenuneventful).
送给我的CEO伙伴们的一点想法:毫无疑问,未来永远是充满不确定性的,美国从1776年开始就一直面对各种不确定性.
只不过有时候人们非常在意无以计数的、一直存在的各种不确定性,而另外一些时候,他们却无视不确定性(通常是因为那段时间太平无事).
Americanbusinesswilldofineovertime.
Andstockswilldowelljustascertainly,sincetheirfateistiedtobusinessperformance.
Periodicsetbackswilloccur,yes,butinvestorsandmanagersareinagamethatisheavilystackedintheirfavor.
(TheDowJonesIndustrialsadvancedfrom66to11,497inthe20thCentury,astaggering17,320%increasethatmaterializeddespitefourcostlywars,aGreatDepressionandmanyrecessions.
Anddon'tforgetthatshareholdersreceivedsubstantialdividendsthroughoutthecenturyaswell.
)美国公司前景光明.
股票也一定会表现良好,因为它们的命运是和公司的业绩联系在一起的.
周期性的困难在所难免,但是投资者和经理人处在一个由他们的喜好所影响的游戏中.
(道琼斯工业指数在20世纪里从66涨到了11,497,期间经历了四次损失惨重的12GarryAllan,1967年生,美国乡村音乐歌手.
歌曲EveryStorm(RunsOutOfRain),原歌词为"Everystormruns,runsoutofrain,Justlikeeverydarknightturnsintoday",大意为"暴风雨总会过去,总会过去,就像黑夜总会到天明".
(资料来源:网络介绍)转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
11/45战争,一次大萧条和多次的衰退,最终依然蹒跚上升了17,320%.
而且不要忘了,投资者还收到了不少的分红.
)Sincethebasicgameissofavorable,CharlieandIbelieveit'saterriblemistaketotrytodanceinandoutofitbasedupontheturnoftarotcards,thepredictionsof"experts,"ortheebbandflowofbusinessactivity.
Therisksofbeingoutofthegamearehugecomparedtotherisksofbeinginit.
因为这个游戏是如此的诱人,查理和我认为尝试依据塔罗牌的排列,"专家"的预测,或者商业周期进进出出是一个巨大的错误.
错过这个游戏的风险比呆在里面要大得多.
Myownhistoryprovidesadramaticexample:Imademyfirststockpurchaseinthespringof1942whentheU.
S.
wassufferingmajorlossesthroughoutthePacificwarzone.
Eachday'sheadlinestoldofmoresetbacks.
Evenso,therewasnotalkaboutuncertainty;everyAmericanIknewbelievedwewouldprevail.
我自己的故事就是一个戏剧性的例子:1942年春天,美国当时痛苦地经历着太平洋战争带来的损失,而我购买了我的第一支股票.
每天的新闻头条都在诉说更多的困难.
尽管如此,没有人谈论不确定性;每个美国人都坚信我们会挺过来.
Thecountry'ssuccesssincethatperiloustimebogglesthemind:Onaninflation-adjustedbasis,GDPpercapitamorethanquadrupledbetween1941and2012.
Throughoutthatperiod,everytomorrowhasbeenuncertain.
America'sdestiny,however,hasalwaysbeenclear:ever-increasingabundance.
我们的国家从那段痛苦到现在的成功让人吃惊:通胀调整后,人均GDP从1941年到2012年翻了4倍.
在这期间,每个明天都充满不确定性.
然而,美国的命运一直都非常清晰:长盛不衰.
IfyouareaCEOwhohassomelarge,profitableprojectyouareshelvingbecauseofshort-termworries,callBerkshire.
Letusunburdenyou.
如果你是一个CEO,因为短期因素的担忧,搁置了一个利润丰厚的巨型投资项目,请打电话给伯克希尔.
让我们来缓解你的担忧.
Insummary,CharlieandIhopetobuildper-shareintrinsicvalueby(1)improvingtheearningpowerofourmanysubsidiaries;(2)furtherincreasingtheirearningsthroughbolt-onacquisitions;(3)participatinginthegrowthofourinvestees;(4)repurchasingBerkshireshareswhentheyareavailableatameaningfuldiscountfromintrinsicvalue;and(5)makinganoccasionallargeacquisition.
Wewillalsotrytomaximizeresultsforyoubyrarely,ifever,issuingBerkshireshares.
总结来说,查理和我希望通过以下方式来增加我们的每股内在价值,(1)增强我们分支业务的盈利能力;(2)通过"补强型"的收购进一步增强盈利能力;(3)参与到我们投资对象的增长中去;(4)当伯克希尔的股价明显低于内在价值时,回购股票;(5)进行大额收购.
极少情况下,我们也会通过增发伯克希尔的股票来最大化最终业绩.
Thosebuildingblocksrestonarock-solidfoundation.
Acenturyhence,BNSFandMidAmericanEnergywillcontinuetoplaymajorrolesintheAmericaneconomy.
Insurance,moreover,willalwaysbeessentialforbothbusinessesandindividuals–andnocompanybringsgreaterresourcestothatarenathanBerkshire.
Asweviewtheseandotherstrengths,CharlieandIlikeyourcompany'sprospects.
这些方式具有坚实的基础.
一个世纪以后,BNSF和中美洲能源依然会在美国经济中扮转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
12/45演重要角色.
保险业务就更不用说,依然对机构和个人具有重要意义——而且没有公司比伯克希尔给这个领域投资带来更多资源.
当我们看到这些以及更多的优势时,查理和我就非常喜欢你们公司的前景.
IntrinsicBusinessValue内在价值AsmuchasCharlieandItalkaboutintrinsicbusinessvalue,wecannottellyoupreciselywhatthatnumberisforBerkshireshares(or,forthatmatter,anyotherstock).
Inour2010annualreport,however,welaidoutthethreeelements–oneofwhichwasqualitative–thatwebelievearethekeystoasensibleestimateofBerkshire'sintrinsicvalue.
Thatdiscussionisreproducedinfullonpages104-105.
虽然查理和我不停谈论内在价值,但我们无法告诉你伯克希尔的股票精确的内在价值是多少(其他一些股票也很难).
在2010年的年报里,我们提出了三个要素——其中一个是定性的——我们认为这是衡量伯克希尔内在价值的关键.
相关分析完整复制在了104-105页.
Hereisanupdateofthetwoquantitativefactors:In2012ourper-shareinvestmentsincreased15.
7%to$113,786,andourper-sharepre-taxearningsfrombusinessesotherthaninsuranceandinvestmentsalsoincreased15.
7%to$8,085.
这里有两个关键量化要素的最新数据:2012年,我们的每股投资增长了15.
7%,达到113,786美元,我们除保险和投资外的每股税前利润也增长15.
7%,达到8,085美元.
Since1970,ourper-shareinvestmentshaveincreasedatarateof19.
4%compoundedannually,andourper-shareearningsfigurehasgrownata20.
8%clip.
ItisnocoincidencethatthepriceofBerkshirestockoverthe42-yearperiodhasincreasedatarateverysimilartothatofourtwomeasuresofvalue.
CharlieandIliketoseegainsinbothareas,butourstrongemphasiswillalwaysbeonbuildingoperatingearnings.
从1970年开始,我们的每股投资以每年19.
4%的复合速度增长,我们的每股盈利增速则是20.
8%.
伯克希尔的股价过去42年的增速和我们两个主要价值衡量指标的增速非常接近,这并非巧合.
查理和我乐于看到这两个方面都增长,但是我们的重点依然将是构筑坚实的盈利能力.
Now,let'sexaminethefourmajorsectorsofouroperations.
Eachhasvastlydifferentbalancesheetandincomecharacteristicsfromtheothers.
Lumpingthemtogetherthereforeimpedesanalysis.
Sowe'llpresentthemasfourseparatebusinesses,whichishowCharlieandIviewthem.
现在,让我们了解一下公司四个主要业务板块的运营情况.
它们具有差别巨大的资产负债结构,以及全然不同的营收情形.
因此把它们合并到一起将会影响分析.
我们将分别讨论各个业务,这也是查理和我看待它们的方式.
Insurance保险业务Let'slookfirstatinsurance,Berkshire'scoreoperationandtheenginethathaspropelledourexpansionovertheyears.
先来看保险业务,伯克希尔的核心业务,也是多年来驱动我们不断扩张的引擎.
转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
13/45Property-casualty("P/C")insurersreceivepremiumsupfrontandpayclaimslater.
Inextremecases,suchasthosearisingfromcertainworkers'compensationaccidents,paymentscanstretchoverdecades.
Thiscollect-now,pay-latermodelleavesusholdinglargesums–moneywecall"float"–thatwilleventuallygotoothers.
Meanwhile,wegettoinvestthisfloatforBerkshire'sbenefit.
Thoughindividualpoliciesandclaimscomeandgo,theamountoffloatweholdremainsquitestableinrelationtopremiumvolume.
Consequently,asourbusinessgrows,sodoesourfloat.
Andhowwehavegrown,asthefollowingtableshows:财产保险公司先收取保费,事后进行理赔支付.
在一些极端情况下,比如某些工伤保险,赔付可能发生在几十年之后.
这种现在收钱,将来赔付的模式让我们持有大量的现金——我们把它称作"浮存金"——最终它会支付到别人手中.
同时,我们可以使用这些浮存金为伯克希尔投资.
虽然单笔的保单和索赔有进有出,但是我们持有的浮存金总额和保费收入维持一个稳定关系.
所以,当我们的业务扩张时,我们的浮存金规模也扩张.
我们增长的速度,参加下面的表格:YearFloat(in$millions)197039198023719901,632200027,871201065,832201273,125年份浮存金(百万美元)197039198023719901,632200027,871201065,832201273,125LastyearItoldyouthatourfloatwaslikelytolevelofforevendeclineabitinthefuture.
OurinsuranceCEOssetouttoprovemewronganddid,increasingfloatlastyearby$2.
5billion.
Inowexpectafurtherincreasein2013.
Butfurthergainswillbetoughtoachieve.
Ontheplusside,GEICO'sfloatwillalmostcertainlygrow.
InNationalIndemnity'sreinsurancedivision,however,wehaveanumberofrun-offcontractswhosefloatdriftsdownward.
Ifwedoexperienceadeclineinfloatatsomefuturetime,itwillbeverygradual–attheoutsidenomorethan2%inanyyear.
去年我告诉大家,我们的浮存金可能保持平稳,甚至有可能会在将来略有下降.
但我们保险公司的CEO们最终证明我是错的,他们去年让我们增加了25亿浮存金.
我现在预期2013年还会有所增加.
但是更多的增长会越发困难.
好消息是,GEICO的浮存金基本上会保持增长.
但是在NationallyIndemnity的再保险部门,我们有一些流失的保单,它们的浮存金会下降.
如果我们未来确实出现了浮存金的下降,那它会是非常温和的——每年不会超过2%.
Ifourpremiumsexceedthetotalofourexpensesandeventuallosses,weregisteranunderwritingprofitthataddstotheinvestmentincomeourfloatproduces.
Whensuchaprofitis转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
14/45earned,weenjoytheuseoffreemoney–and,betteryet,getpaidforholdingit.
That'slikeyourtakingoutaloanandhavingthebankpayyouinterest.
如果我们的保费收入超过了总成本和最终的赔付支出,我们会在利用浮存金投资获得的投资收益之外,录得一个承保利润.
赚到这种利润的时候,我们是在享受持有这些免费资金的好处——更好的是,我们还因为持有资金而赚到钱.
这就好像你去银行贷款,银行还倒贴给你利息.
Unfortunately,thewishofallinsurerstoachievethishappyresultcreatesintensecompetition,sovigorousinmostyearsthatitcausestheP/Cindustryasawholetooperateatasignificantunderwritingloss.
Thisloss,ineffect,iswhattheindustrypaystoholditsfloat.
Forexample,StateFarm,byfarthecountry'slargestinsurerandawell-managedcompanybesides,incurredanunderwritinglossineightoftheelevenyearsendingin2011.
(Theirfinancialsfor2012arenotyetavailable.
)Therearealotofwaystolosemoneyininsurance,andtheindustryneverceasessearchingfornewones.
不幸的是,保险公司实现这个美好结果的强烈愿望导致了激烈的竞争,竞争如此惨烈以至于大多数年份,财产保险行业整体处在严重的承保亏损中运行.
这笔承保亏损,实质上就是整个行业为了获得浮存金而支付的成本.
举个例子,StateFarm,当前美国最大且管理良好的保险公司,截止到2011年前的11年里有8年都录得承保亏损(2012年的财务数据还没有公布).
保险行业有很多种亏钱的方式,而且这个行业从来不曾停止寻找新的亏钱方式.
Asnotedinthefirstsectionofthisreport,wehavenowoperatedatanunderwritingprofitfortenconsecutiveyears,ourpre-taxgainfortheperiodhavingtotaled$18.
6billion.
Lookingahead,Ibelievewewillcontinuetounderwriteprofitablyinmostyears.
Ifwedo,ourfloatwillbebetterthanfreemoney.
正如前一部分提到的,我们已经连续10年录得承保利润,我们这一时期内的税前承保利润累计达186亿美元.
预计未来大部分年份中,我们依然会保持录得承保利润.
如果确实如此,那我们的浮存金就比免费的资金更诱人.
SohowdoesourattractivefloataffectthecalculationsofintrinsicvalueWhenBerkshire'sbookvalueiscalculated,thefullamountofourfloatisdeductedasaliability,justasifwehadtopayitouttomorrowandwereunabletoreplenishit.
Butthat'sanincorrectwaytolookatfloat,whichshouldinsteadbeviewedasarevolvingfund.
Iffloatisbothcostlessandlong-enduring,whichIbelieveBerkshire'swillbe,thetruevalueofthisliabilityisdramaticallylessthantheaccountingliability.
那我们诱人的浮存金将会如何影响内在价值的计算当伯克希尔计算账面价值的时候,所有的浮存金都作为负债被扣除了,就好像我们明天就要兑现债务,并且再也无法补充回来.
但这是一种看待浮存金的错误观念,它实际上应该被看做一笔循环基金.
如果浮存金是无成本并且是长期存在的,我相信对伯克希尔来说确实如此,那这项负债的真实价值就远比账面负债小得多.
Apartialoffsettothisoverstatedliabilityis$15.
5billionof"goodwill"thatisattributabletoourinsurancecompaniesandincludedinbookvalueasanasset.
Ineffect,thisgoodwillrepresentsthepricewepaidforthefloat-generatingcapabilitiesofourinsuranceoperations.
Thecostofthegoodwill,however,hasnobearingonitstruevalue.
Forexample,ifaninsurancebusinesssustainslargeandprolongedunderwritinglosses,anygoodwillassetcarriedonthebooksshouldbedeemedvalueless,whateveritsoriginalcost.
我们资产账面上记录的,对应保险公司的155亿"商誉"部分地抵消了负债账面价值的高估.
实际上,这些商誉代表着我们为保险公司产生浮存金的能力所支付的价格.
然而商誉转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
15/45的账面成本,和它的真实价值毫无对应关系.
比如说一家持续产生大额承保亏损的保险公司,其商誉应该为零,无论其历史成本是多少.
Fortunately,that'snotthecaseatBerkshire.
CharlieandIbelievethetrueeconomicvalueofourinsurancegoodwill–whatwewouldhappilypaytopurchaseaninsuranceoperationproducingfloatofsimilarquality–tobefarinexcessofitshistoriccarryingvalue.
Thevalueofourfloatisonereason–ahugereason–whywebelieveBerkshire'sintrinsicbusinessvaluesubstantiallyexceedsitsbookvalue.
幸运的是,伯克希尔的情况不是那样.
查理和我相信,我们保险公司的真实商誉——我们愿意为购买一家能产生类似质量的浮存金的保险公司所支付的价格——远超过账面上记录的历史成本.
浮存金的价值是我们认为伯克希尔的内在价值明显超过账面价值的一个原因——一个重要原因.
Letmeemphasizeonceagainthatcost-freefloatisnotanoutcometobeexpectedfortheP/Cindustryasawhole:Thereisverylittle"Berkshire-quality"floatexistingintheinsuranceworld.
In37ofthe45yearsendingin2011,theindustry'spremiumshavebeeninadequatetocoverclaimsplusexpenses.
Consequently,theindustry'soverallreturnontangibleequityhasformanydecadesfallenfarshortoftheaveragereturnrealizedbyAmericanindustry,asorryperformancealmostcertaintocontinue.
必须再强调一下,大家不能预期整个产险行业都能获得无成本的浮存金:在保险行业里像伯克希尔获得的优质浮存金非常之少.
2011年前的45年中,有37年整个行业的保费收入不能覆盖赔付支出和成本费用.
因此,整个行业的有形资产回报水平几十年来一直低于美国其他行业的平均水平,这是一个悲伤但基本注定还会持续的情形.
Afurtherunpleasantrealityaddstotheindustry'sdimprospects:Insuranceearningsarenowbenefittingfrom"legacy"bondportfoliosthatdelivermuchhigheryieldsthanwillbeavailablewhenfundsarereinvestedduringthenextfewyears–andperhapsformanyyearsbeyondthat.
Today'sbondportfoliosare,ineffect,wastingassets.
Earningsofinsurerswillbehurtinasignificantwayasbondsmatureandarerolledover.
另外一个让行业的暗淡前景更加不利的事实:保险公司的利润现在受益于之前"遗留"下的高收益债券,过些年,当资金需要重新进行投资时,不可能再获得如此高的收益率——也有可能还要过好些年.
今天的债券组合实际上是减耗资产.
保险公司的盈利在债券到期并重新配置时将会遭受重创.
Berkshire'soutstandingeconomicsexistonlybecausewehavesometerrificmanagersrunningsomeextraordinaryinsuranceoperations.
Letmetellyouaboutthemajorunits.
伯克希尔优越的经济特性之所以存在,是因为我们有一群卓越的经理人在运营着我们不同凡响的保险公司.
让我将给大家介绍一些主要的公司.
FirstbyfloatsizeistheBerkshireHathawayReinsuranceGroup,runbyAjitJain.
Ajitinsuresrisksthatnooneelsehasthedesireorthecapitaltotakeon.
Hisoperationcombinescapacity,speed,decisivenessand,mostimportant,brainsinamanneruniqueintheinsurancebusiness.
YetheneverexposesBerkshiretorisksthatareinappropriateinrelationtoourresources.
Indeed,wearefarmoreconservativeinavoidingriskthanmostlargeinsurers.
Forexample,iftheinsuranceindustryshouldexperiencea$250billionlossfromsomemega-catastrophe–alossabouttripleanythingithaseverexperienced–Berkshireasawholewouldlikelyrecordasignificantprofitfortheyearbecauseithassomanystreamsofearnings.
Allothermajorinsurersandreinsurerswouldmeanwhilebefarinthered,withsomefacinginsolvency.
转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
16/45首先,浮存金规模排在第一的是伯克希尔哈撒韦再保险集团,由AjitJain领导.
Ajit对其他人都不愿意承保,或者没有足够资本进行承保的风险进行承保.
他的公司集能力、速度、果断,以及最重要的,保险专业智慧于一身.
他从未让伯克希尔暴露于与我们的资源不相称的风险之下.
实际上,我们比多数大保险公司在规避风险方面都更加谨慎.
举例来说,如果保险行业因某项巨灾遭遇了2500亿美元的亏损——这是历史上所发生过最大规模亏损的3倍——伯克希尔当年整体上依然能够实现盈利,因为它有如此多的利润来源.
其他的大保险公司和再保险公司则会出现大额的亏损,有些甚至将面临破产.
Fromastandingstartin1985,Ajithascreatedaninsurancebusinesswithfloatof$35billionandasignificantcumulativeunderwritingprofit,afeatthatnootherinsuranceCEOhascomeclosetomatching.
HehasthusaddedagreatmanybillionsofdollarstothevalueofBerkshire.
IfyoumeetAjitattheannualmeeting,bowdeeply.
从1985年开始,Ajit已经创立了一个浮存金350亿美元,实现巨额累计承保利润的再保险公司,这是一项任何其他保险公司的CEO都难以望其项背成就.
他也为伯克希尔贡献了千百亿的利润.
如果你在年会上遇到Ajit,请深深鞠躬表示敬意.
WehaveanotherreinsurancepowerhouseinGeneralRe,managedbyTadMontross.
我们还有另外一驾再保险马车,它属于通用再保险,由TadMontross掌管.
Atbottom,asoundinsuranceoperationneedstoadheretofourdisciplines.
Itmust(1)understandallexposuresthatmightcauseapolicytoincurlosses;(2)conservativelyassessthelikelihoodofanyexposureactuallycausingalossandtheprobablecostifitdoes;(3)setapremiumthat,onaverage,willdeliveraprofitafterbothprospectivelosscostsandoperatingexpensesarecovered;and(4)bewillingtowalkawayiftheappropriatepremiumcan'tbeobtained.
最起码地,一家优秀的保险公司必须遵守四项原则.
它必须(1)理解所有可能导致保单形成损失的风险敞口;(2)保守地衡量风险敞口实际形成损失的概率以及可能的损失规模;(3)设定合理的保费,平均来看,要能在覆盖潜在的损失成本和运营成本后实现承保利润;(4)愿意在收取不了合意的保费时放弃保单.
Manyinsurerspassthefirstthreetestsandflunkthefourth.
Theysimplycan'tturntheirbackonbusinessthatisbeingeagerlywrittenbytheircompetitors.
Thatoldline,"Theotherguyisdoingit,sowemustaswell,"spellstroubleinanybusiness,butnonemoresothaninsurance.
很多保险公司顺利通过前三条,但在第四条上不及格.
它们无法在它们的竞争对手也争抢的业务上回头.
古话说,"别人这么干,我也得这么干",这在很多行业都造成了麻烦,但这在保险行业造成的麻烦尤其多.
Tadhasobservedallfouroftheinsurancecommandments,anditshowsinhisresults.
GeneralRe'shugefloathasbeenbetterthancost-freeunderhisleadership,andweexpectthat,onaverage,itwillcontinuetobe.
WeareparticularlyenthusiasticaboutGeneralRe'sinternationallifereinsurancebusiness,whichhasachievedconsistentandprofitablegrowthsinceweacquiredthecompanyin1998.
Tad非常明了保险行业的四条军规,他的业绩证明了这一点.
在他的领导下,通用再保险的巨额浮存金比免费的资金还要诱人,并且我们预计这种情况依然会继续.
我们尤其对通用再保险的国际人寿再保险业务充满热情,从1998年我们收购公司以来,这项业务持续增长并不断盈利.
Finally,thereisGEICO,theinsureronwhichIcutmyteeth62yearsago.
GEICOisrunby转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
17/45TonyNicely,whojoinedthecompanyat18andcompleted51yearsofservicein2012.
最后,是GEICO,62年前让我开始入行时投资的保险公司.
GEICO由TonyNicely掌管,他18岁就加入了公司,到2012年,已经服役51年.
IrubmyeyeswhenIlookatwhatTonyhasaccomplished.
Lastyear,itshouldbenoted,hisrecordwasconsiderablybetterthanisindicatedbyGEICO'sGAAPunderwritingprofitof$680million.
Becauseofachangeinaccountingrulesatthebeginningoftheyear,werecordedachargetoGEICO'sunderwritingearningsof$410million.
Thisitemhadnothingtodowith2012'soperatingresults,changingneithercash,revenues,expensesnortaxes.
Ineffect,thewritedownsimplywidenedthealreadyhugedifferencebetweenGEICO'sintrinsicvalueandthevalueatwhichwecarryitonourbooks.
Tony的成就让我无法相信自己的眼睛.
必须说明的是,他的业绩远不是去年GEICO按美国会计准则报告的6.
8亿美元承保利润所能说明的.
因为年初的会计准成调整,我们在GEICO的承保利润中计入了4.
1亿的费用.
这和GEICO2012年的运营没有任何关系,不改变现金、收入、成本和税收项目.
实际上,这项减记只是进一步加大了GEICO的内在价值和其账面价值之间的差距.
GEICOearneditsunderwritingprofit,moreover,despitethecompanysufferingitslargestsinglelossinhistory.
ThecausewasHurricaneSandy,whichcostGEICOmorethanthreetimesthelossitsustainedfromKatrina,thepreviousrecord-holder.
Weinsured46,906vehiclesthatweredestroyedordamagedinthestorm,astaggeringnumberreflectingGEICO'sleadingmarketshareintheNewYorkmetropolitanarea.
尽管公司遭遇了历史上最大的单笔损失,GEICO依然实现了承保利润.
亏损的原因是飓风桑迪,它给GEICO造成了三倍于卡特里娜的损失,后者是之前的记录保持者.
风暴中损毁的车辆中46,906辆是由GEICO承保的,这个巨大的数字,这也反映了GEICO在纽约地区市场份额的领先地位.
LastyearGEICOenjoyedameaningfulincreaseinboththerenewalrateforexistingpolicyholders("persistency")andinthepercentageofratequotationsthatresultedinsales("closures").
Bigdollarsrideonthosetwofactors:Asustainedgaininpersistencyofabareonepercentagepointincreasesintrinsicvaluebymorethan$1billion.
GEICO'sgainsin2012offerdramaticproofthatwhenpeoplecheckthecompany'sprices,theyusuallyfindtheycansaveimportantsums.
(Giveusatryat1-800-847-7536orGEICO.
com.
Besuretomentionthatyouareashareholder;thatfactwillusuallyresultinadiscount.
)去年,GEICO在已有投保客户的复单率("粘度")和询价转化为保单的比例("转化率")上都有显著的提升.
这两项数据意味着一大笔利润:可持续地将客户粘度提高一个百分点,意味着内在价值增加超过10亿美元.
2012年GEICO实现的提升证明,大家查询公司的车险价格的话,通常可以发现购买GEICO的保险可以省下不少钱.
(打个电话到1-800-847-7536或者到网站GEICO.
com试一下.
记得申明你是伯克希尔的股东,这通常能让给你享受优惠价.
)Inadditiontoourthreemajorinsuranceoperations,weownagroupofsmallercompanies,mostofthemplyingtheirtradeinoddcornersoftheinsuranceworld.
Inaggregate,thesecompanieshaveconsistentlydeliveredanunderwritingprofit.
Moreover,asthetablebelowshows,theyalsoprovideuswithsubstantialfloat.
CharlieandItreasurethesecompaniesandtheirmanagers.
除了我们的三家主要保险公司外,我们还有一些小保险公司,它们的大部分专注于保险行业的一些细分领域.
整体上,这些公司一直为我们贡献承保利润.
另外,正如表格数据显转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
18/45示的那样,它们也提供了大量浮存金.
查理和我感谢这些公司和它们的经理人们.
Latein2012,weenlargedthisgroupbyacquiringGuardInsurance,aWilkes-Barrecompanythatwritesworkerscompensationinsurance,primarilyforsmallerbusinesses.
Guard'sannualpremiumstotalabout$300million.
Thecompanyhasexcellentprospectsforgrowthinbothitstraditionalbusinessandnewlinesithasbeguntooffer.
2012下半年,我们收购GuardInsurance扩大了这个大家庭.
它是一家威尔克斯-巴里的工伤保险公司,主要做一些小额的保单.
Guard的年保费规模大约3亿美元.
这家公司在它的传统业务和它即将提供的新业务上都有很大的发展潜力.
UnderwritingProfitYearendFloat(inmillions)InsuranceOperations2012201120122011BHReinsurance304-71434,82133,728GeneralRe35514420,12819,714GEICO680*57611,57811,169OtherPrimary2862426,5985,9601,62524873,12570,571*Aftera$410millionchargeagainstearningsarisingfromanindustry-wideaccountingchange.
承保利润年末浮存金(百万美元)保险公司2012201120122011伯克希尔哈撒韦再保险304-71434,82133,728通用再保险35514420,12819,714政府员工保险公司680*57611,57811,169其他保险公司2862426,5985,9601,62524873,12570,571*由于行业会计准则调整,减少了4.
1亿美元承保利润.
Amonglargeinsuranceoperations,Berkshire'simpressesmeasthebestintheworld.
Itwasourluckydaywhen,inMarch1967,JackRingwaltsoldushistwoproperty-casualtyinsurersfor$8.
6million.
在所有大型保险公司中,我认为伯克希尔的保险公司是全球最好的.
我们非常有幸在1967年3月以860万美元收购了JackRingwalt卖给我们的两家财产保险公司.
Regulated,Capital-IntensiveBusinesses受管制的、资本密集型业务Wehavetwomajoroperations,BNSFandMidAmericanEnergy,thathaveimportantcommoncharacteristicsdistinguishingthemfromourotherbusinesses.
Consequently,weassignthemtheirownsectioninthisletterandsplitouttheircombinedfinancialstatisticsinourGAAPbalancesheetandincomestatement.
这个版块主要有两家公司,BNSF(伯灵顿北方圣特菲铁路公司)和MidAmercianEnergy(中美洲能源),它们有一些重要共同特点区别于我们其他的公司.
所以,我们在这里把它们单独归为一类进行讨论,并在GAAP会计报表中单独列示它们的合并资产负债表和营收表.
Akeycharacteristicofbothcompaniesistheirhugeinvestmentinverylong-lived,regulated转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
19/45assets,withthesepartiallyfundedbylargeamountsoflong-termdebtthatisnotguaranteedbyBerkshire.
Ourcreditisinfactnotneededbecauseeachbusinesshasearningpowerthatevenunderterribleconditionsamplycoversitsinterestrequirements.
Inlastyear'stepideconomy,forexample,BNSF'sinterestcoveragewas9.
6x.
(Ourdefinitionofcoverageispre-taxearnings/interest,notEBITDA/interest,acommonly-usedmeasureweviewasdeeplyflawed.
)它们的一个重要特征是,两家公司都有巨额的长期受管制的资产投资,这些资产部分由大额长期账务支持,伯克希尔并不承担相关的债务责任.
它们实际上并不需要我们的信用支持,因为它们具备良好的盈利能力,即使在恶劣的环境下也能覆盖它们的债务利息.
比如在去年疲软的经济中,BNSF的利息覆盖倍数是9.
6倍.
(我们对覆盖倍数的定义应该是税前利润/利息,而不是EBITDA(息税折旧摊销前利润)/利息,一项我们认为被普遍使用的错误指标.
)AtMidAmerican,meanwhile,twokeyfactorsensureitsabilitytoservicedebtunderallcircumstances:thecompany'srecession-resistantearnings,whichresultfromourexclusivelyofferinganessentialservice,anditsgreatdiversityofearningsstreams,whichshielditfrombeingseriouslyharmedbyanysingleregulatorybody.
在中美洲能源,另外有两个因素保证它在各种情形下还本付息的能力:公司抗周期的盈利特性,这源于公司垄断性地提供一项必需服务,以及它多元化的盈利来源,这保护它不会由于某个监管部门的措施而遭受致命冲击.
Everyday,ourtwosubsidiariespowertheAmericaneconomyinmajorways:每天,我们的两家公司都在驱动着美国经济:BNSFcarriesabout15%(measuredbyton-miles)ofallinter-cityfreight,whetheritistransportedbytruck,rail,water,air,orpipeline.
Indeed,wemovemoreton-milesofgoodsthananyoneelse,afactmakingBNSFthemostimportantarteryinoureconomy'scirculatorysystem.
BNSF承担了全国15%(以吨-英里衡量)的城际间货运量,包括公路、铁路、水路、航空以及管道运输.
BNSF的吨-英里运量超过其他任何公司,这个事实意味着BNSF是全国经济循环系统最重要的大动脉.
BNSFalsomovesitscargoinanextraordinarilyfuel-efficientandenvironmentallyfriendlyway,carryingatonoffreightabout500milesonasinglegallonofdieselfuel.
Truckstakingonthesamejobguzzleaboutfourtimesasmuchfuel.
BNSF还以一种非常节约能源和环境友好的方式在运输着货物,它运输一顿货物500英里只需一加仑柴油.
卡车实现同样的运力大约要使用4倍的能源.
MidAmerican'selectricutilitiesserveregulatedretailcustomersintenstates.
Onlyoneutilityholdingcompanyservesmorestates.
Inaddition,wearetheleaderinrenewables:first,fromastandingstartnineyearsago,wenowaccountfor6%ofthecountry'swindgenerationcapacity.
Second,whenwecompletethreeprojectsnowunderconstruction,wewillownabout14%ofU.
S.
solar-generationcapacity.
中美洲能源的电力设施为10个州的零售客户服务.
只有一家公用事业持股公司同时为多个州服务.
另外,我们是再生能源方面的领导者:第一,9年前开始涉足,到目前我们已经占全国风力发电量的6%.
第二,在建的三个项目完成后,我们将占有全美太阳能发电量的14%.
Projectsliketheserequirehugecapitalinvestments.
Uponcompletion,indeed,ourrenewablesportfoliowillhavecost$13billion.
Werelishmakingsuchcommitmentsiftheypromisereasonablereturns–andonthatfront,weputalargeamountoftrustinfutureregulation.
转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
20/45类似的项目需要巨额的资本投资.
到项目建成为止,我们的再生能源项目将耗资130亿美元.
我们进行这样的投资是因为我们认为它可以提供合意的回报——在这方面,我们给予了未来的监管策略极大的信任.
Ourconfidenceisjustifiedbothbyourpastexperienceandbytheknowledgethatsocietywillforeverneedmassiveinvestmentinbothtransportationandenergy.
Itisintheself-interestofgovernmentstotreatcapitalprovidersinamannerthatwillensurethecontinuedflowoffundstoessentialprojects.
Anditisinourself-interesttoconductouroperationsinamannerthatearnstheapprovalofourregulatorsandthepeopletheyrepresent.
我们的信心来源于过往的经验,也来源于社会在交通和能源方面会一直需要大量投资的认识.
政府为了自己的利益将会合理对待资本提供者,以保证有持续的资金来满足必须的公共项目.
从我们自身的利益出发,我们愿意去争取监管者和它们所代表的人民的认可和批准.
Ourmanagersmustthinktodayofwhatthecountrywillneedfardowntheroad.
Energyandtransportationprojectscantakemanyyearstocometofruition;agrowingcountrysimplycan'taffordtogetbehindthecurve.
Wehavebeendoingourparttomakesurethatdoesn'thappen.
Whateveryoumayhaveheardaboutourcountry'scrumblinginfrastructureinnowayappliestoBNSForrailroadsgenerally.
America'srailsystemhasneverbeeninbettershape,aconsequenceofhugeinvestmentsbytheindustry.
Wearenot,however,restingonourlaurels:BNSFwillspendabout$4billionontherailroadin2013,roughlydoubleitsdepreciationchargeandmorethananyrailroadhasspentinasingleyear.
我们的经理人必须在今天就考虑我们的国家明天会需要什么.
能源和交通项目需要很多年才能见到效益;但一个增长的经济体不能后知后觉.
我们则完成自己的角色以防止未来供应不足的情况发生.
大家可能听到过关于我们国家阻碍基础设施建设的言论,但对BNSF和多数的铁路来说都不是这样.
美国的铁路系统正处于一个不能更好的状态,这是行业巨大投资的结果,但我们没有满足于现状:BNSF将会在2013年支出40亿美元,大约是其折旧额的2倍,并且超过任何铁路公司历史上的单年投资额.
InMattRose,atBNSF,andGregAbel,atMidAmerican,wehavetwooutstandingCEOs.
Theyareextraordinarymanagerswhohavedevelopedbusinessesthatserveboththeircustomersandownerswell.
Eachhasmygratitudeandeachdeservesyours.
Herearethekeyfiguresfortheirbusinesses:BNSF的MattRose,中美洲能源的GregAbel,是我们两位优秀的CEO.
他们是杰出的经理人,创立了为客户提供良好服务,为股东创造良好回报的公司.
我非常感谢他们,他们也应该得到大家的感谢.
下面是他们公司的主要业务数据.
Earnings(inmillions)MidAmerican(89.
8%owned)20122011UKutilities429469Iowautility236279Westernutilities737771Pipelines383388HomeServices8239Other(net)9136Operatingearningsbeforecorporateinterestandtaxes1,9581,982Interest314336Incometaxes172315Netearnings1,4721,331转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
21/45EarningsapplicabletoBerkshire1,3231,204Earnings(inmillions)BNSF20122011Revenues20,83519,548Operatingexpenses14,83514,247Operatingearningsbeforeinterestandtaxes6,0005,301Interest(net)623560Incometaxes2,0051,769Netearnings3,3722,972净利润(百万美元)中美洲能源(持股89.
8%)20122011UK公用429469Iowa公用236279Western公用737771管道383388住房服务公司8239其他(净额)9136息税前运营利润1,9581,982利息314336所得税172315净利润1,4721,331归属于伯克希尔的净利润1,3231,204净利润(百万美元)BNSF20122011收入20,83519,548运营成本14,83514,247息税前运营利润6,0005,301利息(净额)623560所得税2,0051,769净利润3,3722,972Sharp-eyedreaderswillnoticeanincongruityintheMidAmericanearningstabulation.
WhatintheworldisHomeServices,arealestatebrokerageoperation,doinginasectionentitled"Regulated,Capital-IntensiveBusinesses"眼尖的读者可能已经注意到中美洲能源的利润表格中的怪异.
住房服务公司(HomeSevicesofAmericaInc.
)是怎么回事这样一家公司怎么会被划分到"受管制的,资本密集的业务"中Well,itsownershipcamewithMidAmericanwhenweboughtcontrolofthatcompanyin2000.
Atthattime,IfocusedonMidAmerican'sutilityoperationsandbarelynoticedHomeServices,whichthenownedonlyafewrealestatebrokeragecompanies.
实际上,2000年我们获得中美洲能源控制权的时候,它的就在公司中.
那时我主要关注公司的公用业务,没有关注到住房服务公司,它包括几家房地产经纪公司.
Sincethen,however,thecompanyhasregularlyaddedresidentialbrokers–threein2012–转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
22/45andnowhasabout16,000agentsinastringofmajorU.
S.
cities.
(Ourrealestatebrokeragecompaniesarelistedonpage107.
)In2012,ouragentsparticipatedin$42billionofhomesales,up33%from2011.
然而,从那时起,住房服务公司就不断地增加地产经纪公司——2012年增加了3家——目前它在美国主要的大城市拥有大约16,000名代理人.
(我们的房地产经纪公司列示在107页).
2012年,我们的代理人参与的房屋销售额达420亿美元,比2011年增长了33%.
Additionally,HomeServiceslastyearpurchased67%ofthePrudentialandRealLivingfranchiseoperations,whichtogetherlicense544brokeragecompaniesthroughoutthecountryandreceiveasmallroyaltyontheirsales.
Wehaveanarrangementtopurchasethebalanceofthoseoperationswithinfiveyears.
Inthecomingyears,wewillgraduallyrebrandbothourfranchiseesandthefranchisefirmsweownasBerkshireHathawayHomeServices.
另外,房屋服务公司去年购买了PrudentialandRealLiving67%的特许权业务,它在全国一共有544家经纪公司加盟,并可以在加盟商的销售额中收取少量的特许费.
我们计划5年内收购剩余的份额.
今年,我们将逐步把连锁加盟商和特许权公司的品牌统一为伯克希尔哈撒韦住房服务.
RonPeltierhasdoneanoutstandingjobinmanagingHomeServicesduringadepressedperiod.
Now,asthehousingmarketcontinuestostrengthen,weexpectearningstorisesignificantly.
即便在萧条时期,RonPeltier在管理住房服务公司上依然工作出色.
现在,房地产市场持续恢复,我们期望利润未来会有显著的提升.
Manufacturing,ServiceandRetailingOperations制造、服务和零售业务OuractivitiesinthispartofBerkshirecoverthewaterfront.
Let'slook,though,atasummarybalancesheetandearningsstatementfortheentiregroup.
我们在这部分的业务种类繁多.
我们将通过一个合并的资产负债表和营收表来了解整个部门.
BalanceSheet12/31/12(inmillions)AssetsLiabilitiesandEquityCashandequivalents5,338Notespayable1,454Accountsandnotesreceivable7,382Othercurrentliabilities8,527Inventory9,675Totalcurrentliabilities9,981Othercurrentassets734Totalcurrentassets23,129Deferredtaxes4,907Goodwillandotherintangibles26,017Termdebtandotherliabilities5,826Fixedassets18,871Non-controllinginterests2,062Otherassets3,416Berkshireequity48,65771,43371,433EarningsStatement(inmillions)201220112010Revenues83,25572,40666,610Operatingexpenses76,97867,23962,225Interestexpense146130111转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
23/45Pre-taxearnings6,1315,0374,274Incometaxesandnon-controllinginterests2,4321,9981,812Netearnings3,6993,0392,462*IncludesearningsofLubrizolfromSeptember16资产负债表2012年12月31日(百万美元)资产负债和权益现金及现金等价物5,338应付债券1,454应收账款和应收票据7,382其他流动负债8,527存货9,675流动负债总和9,981其他流动资产734递延所得税负债4,907流动资产总和23,129商誉和其他无形资产26,017长期负债和其他负债5,826固定资产18,871非控制性权益2,062其他资产3,416伯克希尔的权益48,65771,43371,433营收表(百万美元)201220112010收入83,25572,40666,610运营成本76,97867,23962,225利息支出146130111税前利润6,1315,0374,274所得税和归属于非空性权益的利润2,4321,9981,812净利润3,6993,0392,462*2012年9月16起包括路博润的利润OurincomeandexpensedataconformingtoGenerallyAcceptedAccountingPrinciples("GAAP")isonpage29.
Incontrast,theoperatingexpensefiguresabovearenon-GAAP.
Inparticular,theyexcludesomepurchase-accountingitems,primarilytheamortizationofcertainintangibleassets.
WepresentthedatainthismannerbecauseCharlieandIbelievetheadjustednumbersmoreaccuratelyreflecttherealexpensesandprofitsofthebusinessesaggregatedinthetable.
Iwon'texplainalloftheadjustments–somearesmallandarcane–butseriousinvestorsshouldunderstandthedisparatenatureofintangibleassets:Sometrulydepleteovertimewhileothersneverlosevalue.
符合美国通用会计准则(GAAP)的收入和支出数据列示在29页.
上表中的运营成本是不符合GAAP准则的.
尤其是它剔除了一些购买法下的项目,主要是某些无形资产的摊销.
我们列示这些数据是因为查理和我认为这样的调整更准确地反映了整块业务真实的成本和利润.
我不打算逐一解释所有的调整——有些是细微并且晦涩的——但是认真的投资者必须要理解不同无形资产之间的本质区别:一些无形资产的价值随时间消耗殆尽,但是另外一些的价值从不耗减.
Withsoftware,forexample,amortizationchargesareveryrealexpenses.
Chargesagainstotherintangiblessuchastheamortizationofcustomerrelationships,however,arisethroughpurchase-accountingrulesandareclearlynotrealexpenses.
GAAPaccountingdrawsno转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
24/45distinctionbetweenthetwotypesofcharges.
Both,thatis,arerecordedasexpenseswhencalculatingearnings–eventhoughfromaninvestor'sviewpointtheycouldnotbemoredifferent.
比如软件,摊销费用是真实的成本.
然而一些无形资产,比如客户关系,按购买法的会计准则必须摊销,但是它并非真实的成本.
GAAP并不区分这两种摊销.
两种摊销费用都在计算利润时计入成本——尽管从投资者的角度看,它们是如此不同.
IntheGAAP-compliantfiguresweshowonpage29,amortizationchargesof$600millionforthecompaniesincludedinthissectionaredeductedasexpenses.
Wewouldcallabout20%ofthese"real"–andindeedthatistheportionwehaveincludedinthetableabove–andtherestnot.
Thisdifferencehasbecomesignificantbecauseofthemanyacquisitionswehavemade.
在29页列示的GAAP会计准则的数据下,该部门6亿美元的摊销费用被计入了成本.
我们大致认为其中的20%是"真实"的——这也是我们上面的表格包括的部分——其他的则不是.
这种差别因为我们做了非常多的收购而变得影响巨大.
"Non-real"amortizationexpensealsoloomslargeatsomeofourmajorinvestees.
IBMhasmademanysmallacquisitionsinrecentyearsandnowregularlyreports"adjustedoperatingearnings,"anon-GAAPfigurethatexcludescertainpurchase-accountingadjustments.
Analystsfocusonthisnumber,astheyshould.
"非真实"的摊销费用还对我们一些主要的投资对象产生影响.
IBM近几年进行了许多小笔的收购,并且定期地报告"调整后的营业利润",一个剔除了某些购买法调整的非GAAP数据.
分析师一般关注这个数据,他们也的确应该如此.
A"non-real"amortizationchargeatWellsFargo,however,isnothighlightedbythecompanyandnever,tomyknowledge,hasbeennotedinanalystreports.
TheearningsthatWellsFargoreportsareheavilyburdenedbyan"amortizationofcoredeposits"charge,theimplicationbeingthatthesedepositsaredisappearingatafairlyrapidclip.
Yetcoredepositsregularlyincrease.
Thechargelastyearwasabout$1.
5billion.
Innosense,exceptGAAPaccounting,isthiswhoppingchargeanexpense.
Andthatendstoday'saccountinglecture.
Whyisnooneshouting"More,more"富国银行没有强调它的一项"非真实"摊销费用,据我所知,也没有被分析师所注意到.
富国银行报告的盈利深受一项"核心存款的摊销"费用所累,这似乎意味着这些存款在迅速的消失.
但是实际情形却是存款在不断增长.
去年这项摊销是15亿美元.
除了在GAAP会计准则下,这项异常巨大的摊销在哪里都不具有实际意义.
今天的会计课到此结束.
为什么没有人大声要求"再多讲一点,再多讲一点"Thecrowdofcompaniesinthissectionsellproductsrangingfromlollipopstojetairplanes.
Someofthebusinessesenjoyterrificeconomics,measuredbyearningsonunleveragednettangibleassetsthatrunfrom25%after-taxtomorethan100%.
Othersproducegoodreturnsintheareaof12-20%.
Afew,however,haveverypoorreturns,aresultofsomeseriousmistakesImadeinmyjobofcapitalallocation.
这个版块的公司销售的产品从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机,无所不包.
有些公司有非常好的经济特性,它们无杠杆条件下的税后有形资产回报率从25%到100%多.
其他一些产品的回报率介于12%-20%.
但也有少数公司回报率很糟糕,这是我们在资产配置上所犯下的严重错误.
Morethan50yearsago,Charlietoldmethatitwasfarbettertobuyawonderfulbusinessatafairpricethantobuyafairbusinessatawonderfulprice.
Despitethecompellinglogicofhisposition,Ihavesometimesrevertedtomyoldhabitofbargain-hunting,withresultsrangingfrom转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
25/45tolerabletoterrible.
Fortunately,mymistakeshaveusuallyoccurredwhenImadesmallerpurchases.
Ourlargeacquisitionshavegenerallyworkedoutwelland,inafewcases,morethanwell.
50多年前,查理就告诉我,以合理的价格买入一家优秀的公司比以一个便宜的价格买入一家平庸的公司划算.
尽管这个道理背后的逻辑非常清楚,我还是时不时地犯廉价收购的毛病,收购结果有些难以接受,有些则极其糟糕.
幸运的是,我只在进行小笔收购的时候犯毛病.
我们的大笔收购通常结果都不错,有部分可不仅仅是不错.
Viewedasasingleentity,therefore,thecompaniesinthisgroupareanexcellentbusiness.
Theyemploy$22.
6billionofnettangibleassetsand,onthatbase,earned16.
3%after-tax.
把这个版块看做一个整体的话,这些公司们的业绩非常不错.
他们运作着226亿美元的有形净资产,并获得了16.
3%的税后回报率.
Ofcourse,abusinesswithterrificeconomicscanbeabadinvestmentifthepricepaidisexcessive.
Wehavepaidsubstantialpremiumstonettangibleassetsformostofourbusinesses,acostthatisreflectedinthelargefigureweshowforintangibleassets.
Overall,however,wearegettingadecentreturnonthecapitalwehavedeployedinthissector.
Furthermore,theintrinsicvalueofthebusinesses,inaggregate,exceedstheircarryingvaluebyagoodmargin.
Evenso,thedifferencebetweenintrinsicvalueandcarryingvalueintheinsuranceandregulated-industrysegmentsisfargreater.
Itistherethatthehugewinnersreside.
当然,如果出价过高,买入一些具有良好经济特性的公司也可能成为一笔糟糕的投资.
我们大多数的收购里都支付了远超有形净资产的溢价,这些成本反映在财报巨额的无形资产数据中.
不过总体来说,我们收获了与投资额相称的回报.
而且,这些公司的内在价值,远超它们的账面价值.
需要说明的是,在保险板块和受管制的行业板块,内在价值和账面价值之间的差距更加巨大.
那里才是真正的大赢家所在之处.
Marmonprovidesanexampleofaclearandsubstantialgapexistingbetweenbookvalueandintrinsicvalue.
Letmeexplaintheoddoriginofthisdifferential.
Marmon公司是一个解释内在价值和账面价值差别的极好例子.
现在让我来告诉大家这个诡异的差别源于何处.
LastyearItoldyouthatwehadpurchasedadditionalsharesinMarmon,raisingourownershipto80%(upfromthe64%weacquiredin2008).
IalsotoldyouthatGAAPaccountingrequiredustoimmediatelyrecordthe2011purchaseonourbooksatfarlessthanwhatwepaid.
I'venowhadayeartothinkaboutthisweirdaccountingrule,butI'veyettofindanexplanationthatmakesanysense–norcanCharlieorMarcHamburg,ourCFO,comeupwithone.
MyconfusionincreaseswhenIamtoldthatifwehadn'talreadyowned64%,the16%wepurchasedin2011wouldhavebeenenteredonourbooksatourcost.
去年,我告诉大家,我们增持了Marmon的股票,持股比例升至了80%(从2008年我们收购时的64%).
我还告诉大家,根据GAAP会计准则,我们必须以远低于我们实际支付价格的成本记录这笔交易.
我花了一整年的时间来思考这条怪异的会计准则,但是没有找到任何合理解释——查理和MarcHamburg,我们的CFO,也想不出来.
当我得知,如果我们之前没有拥有64%的权益,那我们2011年新购买的16%就可以以实际购买成本入账时,我更加糊涂了.
In2012(andinearly2013,retroactivetoyearend2012)weacquiredanadditional10%ofMarmonandthesamebizarreaccountingtreatmentwasrequired.
The$700millionwrite-offweimmediatelyincurredhadnoeffectonearningsbutdidreducebookvalueand,therefore,2012's转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
26/45gaininnetworth.
2012年(实际发生在2013年初,但追溯调整至2012),我们又购买了Marmon额外的10%股份,同样奇怪的会计要求又出现了.
立即减记的7亿美元没有影响我们的利润,但是降低了我们的账面价值,因此也降低了2012年公司的净资产值.
Thecostofourrecent10%purchaseimpliesa$12.
6billionvalueforthe90%ofMarmonwenowown.
Ourbalance-sheetcarryingvalueforthe90%,however,is$8billion.
CharlieandIbelieveourcurrentpurchaserepresentsexcellentvalue.
Ifwearecorrect,ourMarmonholdingisworthatleast$4.
6billionmorethanitscarryingvalue.
最近10%的收购价格意味着我们持有Marmon另外的90%股份价值126亿美元.
但我们账面记录的价值仅有80亿.
查理和我认为最近的收购价格代表了真实的价值.
如果我们是对的,那我们持有Marmon的实际价值至少比账面价值高46亿美元.
Marmonisadiverseenterprise,comprisedofabout150companiesoperatinginawidevarietyofindustries.
Itslargestbusinessinvolvestheownershipoftankcarsthatareleasedtoavarietyofshippers,suchasoilandchemicalcompanies.
Marmonconductsthisbusinessthroughtwosubsidiaries,UnionTankCarintheU.
S.
andProcorinCanada.
Marmon是一家多元化的公司,有150多家各个行业的子公司.
它最大的业务是持有并租赁油罐车给各种货运公司,比如油运和化工产品运输公司.
Marmon的业务主要由美国的UnionTankCar和加拿大的Procor两家子公司运营.
UnionTankCarhasbeenaroundalongtime,havingbeenownedbytheStandardOilTrustuntilthatempirewasbrokenupin1911.
LookforitsUTLXlogoontankcarswhenyouwatchtrainsrollby.
AsaBerkshireshareholder,youownthecarswiththatinsignia.
WhenyouspotaUTLXcar,puffoutyourchestabitandenjoythesamesatisfactionthatJohnD.
Rockefellerundoubtedlyexperiencedasheviewedhisfleetacenturyago.
UnionTankCar历史悠久,1911年标准石油托拉斯帝国被分拆之前一直由其拥有.
有火车经过的时候留意看UTLX的标志.
作为伯克希尔的股东,大家拥有打着这个商标的油罐车.
当大家看到UTLX的车时,请挺起胸膛,并享受一个世纪前约翰·洛克菲勒看到自己的车队时所享受到那种成就感.
Tankcarsareownedbyeithershippersorlessors,notbyrailroads.
AtyearendUnionTankCarandProcortogetherowned97,000carshavinganetbookvalueof$4billion.
Anewcar,itshouldbenoted,costsupwardsof$100,000.
UnionTankCarisalsoamajormanufactureroftankcars–someofthemtobesoldbutmosttobeownedbyitandleasedout.
Today,itsorderbookextendswellinto2014.
铁路公司并不拥有油罐车,它们属于货运商或者租赁公司.
去年年底,UnionTankCar和Procor一共拥有97,000辆油罐车,账面价值40亿美元.
强调一下,一辆新车成本约10万美元.
UnionTankCar还是一家主要的油罐车制造商——一部分出售但大部分自己持有并出租.
现在,它的订单已经排到2014年了.
AtbothBNSFandMarmon,wearebenefittingfromtheresurgenceofU.
S.
oilproduction.
Infact,ourrailroadisnowtransportingabout500,000barrelsofoildaily,roughly10%ofthetotalproducedinthe"lower48"(i.
e.
notcountingAlaskaandoffshore).
AllindicationsarethatBNSF'soilshipmentswillgrowsubstantiallyincomingyears.
BNSF和Marmon都受益于与美国原油生产的重新扩张.
我们的铁路现在每天运输50万桶原油,大约是"下48州"(不包括阿拉斯加和离岸州)总产量的10%.
种种迹象表明,BNSF今年的原油运输量将会显著增长.
转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
27/45Spaceprecludesusfromgoingintodetailaboutthemanyotherbusinessesinthissegment.
Company-specificinformationaboutthe2012operationsofsomeofthelargerunitsappearsonpages76to79.
篇幅所限,我们不能在这里一一讨论许多其他公司的细节.
2012年各个主要公司的详细情况参见76至79页.
FinanceandFinancialProducts金融和金融产品Thissector,oursmallest,includestworentalcompanies,XTRA(trailers)andCORT(furniture),aswellasClaytonHomes,thecountry'sleadingproducerandfinancerofmanufacturedhomes.
Asidefromthese100%-ownedsubsidiaries,wealsoincludeinthiscategoryacollectionoffinancialassetsandour50%interestinBerkadiaCommercialMortgage.
这是我们最小的业务版块,包括两家租赁公司,XTRA(拖车租赁)和CORT(家具租赁),以及ClaytonHome,国内领先的预置房生产商和金融租赁商.
除了这些100%拥有的子公司外,我们还有其他一些金融资产以及BerkadiaCommericalMortgage公司50%的权益.
WeincludeClaytoninthissectorbecauseitownsandservices332,000mortgages,totaling$13.
7billion.
Inlargepart,theseloanshavebeenmadetolowerandmiddle-incomefamilies.
Nevertheless,theloanshaveperformedwellthroughoutthehousingcollapse,therebyvalidatingourconvictionthatareasonabledownpaymentandasensiblepayments-to-incomeratiowillwardoffoutsizedforeclosurelosses,evenduringstressfultimes.
我们把Clayton归入到这个版块,是因为它拥有332,000笔抵押贷款,合计137亿美元.
这些贷款中的大部分贷给了中低收入家庭.
然而这些贷款在房地产市场崩盘中表现良好,这进一步增强了我们的认识,即合理的首付比例和合理的月供收入比可以有效防范抵押跌价损失,即便在市场萧条时也有效.
Claytonalsoproduced25,872manufacturedhomeslastyear,up13.
5%from2011.
Thatoutputaccountedforabout4.
8%ofallsingle-familyresidencesbuiltinthecountry,asharethatmakesClaytonAmerica'snumberonehomebuilder.
Clayton去年还生产了25,872套预置房,比2011年上升13.
5%.
这占全国全国独栋住宅建设量的4.
8%,其份额为全美第一.
CORTandXTRAareleadersintheirindustriesaswell.
OurexpendituresfornewrentalequipmentatXTRAtotaled$256millionin2012,morethandoubleitsdepreciationexpense.
Whilecompetitorsfretabouttoday'suncertainties,XTRAispreparingfortomorrow.
CORT和XTRA也是各自行业中的佼佼者.
2012年XTRA在新租赁设备上的投资是2.
56亿美元,是其折旧额的两倍.
当竞争对手们在担忧今天的不确定性时,XTRA已经在为明天做准备.
Berkadiacontinuestodowell.
OurpartnersatLeucadiadomostoftheworkinthisventure,anarrangementthatCharlieandIhappilyembrace.
Berkadia13依然保持良好的业绩.
Leucadia14的伙伴们在这项业务上付出很多,这是查理13美国最大的第三方商业抵押贷款服务提供商之一.
(资料来源Berkadia官方网站)14LeucadiaNationalCorporation(NYSE:LUK),美国控股集团,业务涉及矿产、电信、医疗服务、制造、银行、房地产、酿酒行业,2011年6月15日市值约80亿美元.
因年回报率超过22%被誉为"小伯克希尔".
目前最大的投资为Jefferies和FortescueMetalsGroup.
(资料来源:维基百科)转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
28/45和我喜闻乐见的安排.
Here'sthepre-taxearningsrecapforthissector:下面是这个版块的税前收入概述:20122011(inmillions)Berkadia3525Clayton255154CORT4229XTRA106126Netfinancialincome*410440848774*Excludescapitalgainsorlosses20122011(百万美元)Berkadia3525Clayton255154CORT4229XTRA106126其他金融业务净利润*410440848774*不包括资本利得或损失Investments投资Belowweshowourcommonstockinvestmentsthatatyearendhadamarketvalueofmorethan$1billion.
下面是我们年末持有的,市值超过10亿美元的股票投资.
12/31/12SharesCompanyPercentageofCompanyOwnedCost*Market151,610,700AmericanExpressCompany13.
71,2878,715400,000,000TheCoca-ColaCompany8.
91,29914,50024,123,911ConocoPhillips2.
01,2191,39922,999,600DIRECTV3.
81,0571,15468,115,484InternationalBusinessMachinesCorp6.
011,68013,04828,415,250Moody'sCorporation12.
72871,43020,060,390MunichRe11.
32,9903,59920,668,118Phillips663.
36601,0973,947,555POSCO5.
17681,295转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
29/4552,477,678TheProcter&GambleCompany1.
93363,56325,848,838Sanofi2.
02,0732,438415,510,889Tescoplc5.
22,3502,26878,060,769USBancorp4.
22,4012,49354,823,433Wal-MartStores,Inc1.
62,8373,741456,170,061WellsFargo&Company8.
710,90615,592Others7,64611,330TotalCommonStocksCarriedatMarket49,79687,662*Thisisouractualpurchasepriceandalsoourtaxbasis;GAAP"cost"differsinafewcasesbecauseofwrite-upsorwrite-downsthathavebeenrequired.
2012年12月31日股份数公司持股比例成本*市值151,610,700美国运通13.
71,2878,715400,000,000可口可乐8.
91,29914,50024,123,911康菲石油2.
01,2191,39922,999,600DIRECTV3.
81,0571,15468,115,484IBM6.
011,68013,04828,415,250穆迪12.
72871,43020,060,390慕尼黑再保险11.
32,9903,59920,668,118Phillips663.
36601,0973,947,555韩国浦项制铁5.
17681,29552,477,678宝洁1.
93363,56325,848,838赛诺菲2.
02,0732,438415,510,889特易购5.
22,3502,26878,060,769美国合众银行4.
22,4012,49354,823,433沃尔玛1.
62,8373,741456,170,061富国银行8.
710,90615,592其他7,64611,330合计49,79687,662*此处为实际投资成本,等于计税基础,GAAP准则下的成本在某些情况下因减记和增计而不同.
Onepointaboutthecompositionofthislistdeservesmention.
InBerkshire'spastannualreports,everystockitemizedinthisspacehasbeenboughtbyme,inthesensethatImadethedecisiontobuyitforBerkshire.
Butstartingwiththislist,anyinvestmentmadebyToddCombsorTedWeschler–oracombinedpurchasebythem–thatmeetsthedollarthresholdforthelist($1billionthisyear)willbeincluded.
Aboveisthefirstsuchstock,DIRECTV,whichbothToddandTedholdintheirportfoliosandwhosecombinedholdingsattheendof2012werevaluedatthe$1.
15billionshown.
关于上面的投资组合,有一点需要说明.
在伯克希尔以前的年报中,上面的每只股票都是我买的,我为伯克希尔做出了买入的决定.
但是今年以后的组合中,由ToddCombs或者TedWeschlerg投资购买的,或者两人联合购买的,满足列示要求的(今年是10亿美元)都转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
30/45会被列入上表.
DIRECTV就是第一支这样的股票,Todd和Ted在他们的投资组合中都持有它,2012年末市值合计11.
5美元.
ToddandTedalsomanagethepensionfundsofcertainBerkshiresubsidiaries,whileothers,forregulatoryreasons,aremanagedbyoutsideadvisers.
Wedonotincludeholdingsofthepensionfundsinourannualreporttabulations,thoughtheirportfoliosoftenoverlapBerkshire's.
Todd和Ted还管理着一些伯克希尔子公司的养老金,另外一些由于监管的原因由外部的投资公司管理.
我们的年报表格里不包括养老金账户的持股,虽然它们的组合有许多与伯克希尔的组合相重叠.
WecontinuetowinddownthepartofourderivativesportfoliothatinvolvedtheassumptionbyBerkshireofinsurance-likerisks.
(Ourelectricandgasutilitybusinesses,however,willcontinuetousederivativesforoperationalpurposes.
)Newcommitmentswouldrequireustopostcollateraland,withminorexceptions,weareunwillingtodothat.
Marketscanbehaveinextraordinaryways,andwehavenointerestinexposingBerkshiretosomeout-of-the-blueeventinthefinancialworldthatmightrequireourpostingmountainsofcashonamoment'snotice.
我们将继续削减与伯克希尔保险风险相关的衍生品投资组合.
(我们的电力和天然气公用业务还会继续进行运营所需的衍生品投资.
)除了少数的例外,新的合约将会要求我们提供抵押,我们不情愿做抵押.
市场有可能会走极端,但我们无意于将伯克希尔暴露在任何金融市场的意外情况之中,这可能片刻之间就吞噬掉伯克希尔堆积如山的现金.
CharlieandIbelieveinoperatingwithmanyredundantlayersofliquidity,andweavoidanysortofobligationthatcoulddrainourcashinamaterialway.
Thatreducesourreturnsin99yearsoutof100.
Butwewillsurviveinthe100thwhilemanyothersfail.
Andwewillsleepwellinall100.
查理和我崇尚维持多重的流动性保障,避免任何会耗光我们现金的运营策略.
这种策略在100年中的99年里将降低我们的回报率.
但是这可以在别人都倒下的时候,保护我们安然度过第100年的危机.
于是100年里我们都可以安心睡觉.
Thederivativeswehavesoldthatprovidecreditprotectionforcorporatebondswillallexpireinthenextyear.
It'snowalmostcertainthatourprofitfromthesecontractswillapproximate$1billionpre-tax.
Wealsoreceivedverysubstantialsumsupfrontonthesederivatives,andthe"float"attributabletothemhasaveragedabout$2billionovertheirfive-yearlives.
Alltold,thesederivativeshaveprovidedamore-than-satisfactoryresult,especiallyconsideringthefactthatwewereguaranteeingcorporatecredits–mostlyofthehigh-yieldvariety–throughoutthefinancialpanicandsubsequentrecession.
Inourothermajorderivativescommitment,wesoldlong-termputsonfourleadingstockindicesintheU.
S.
,U.
K.
,EuropeandJapan.
Thesecontractswereinitiatedbetween2004and2008andevenundertheworstofcircumstanceshaveonlyminorcollateralrequirements.
In2010weunwoundabout10%ofourexposureataprofitof$222million.
Theremainingcontractsexpirebetween2018and2026.
Onlytheindexvalueatexpirationdatecounts;ourcounterpartieshavenorighttoearlytermination.
我们出售的为企业债在提供信用保障的衍生品明年将会到期.
基本可以确定我们将会在这些合约上实现10亿美元的税前收入.
我们还获得了大笔的预收款,这些合约5年的存续期里贡献的"浮存金"平均大于20亿美元.
如前所述,这些衍生品提供了远超合意的回报,尤其考虑到,我们承保的是企业债券——大部分是高收益品种——并且安然度过了金融危机和之后的衰退期.
在其他主要的衍生品合约里,我们曾卖出了四个主要股票指数的长期的看转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
31/45跌期权——美国、英国、欧洲和日本.
这些合约是2004年至2008年期间签订的,即使在市场最糟糕的时候,也仅有小额的抵押要求.
2010年,我们解除了10%的风险敞口,赚得2.
22亿美元.
剩余的合约将会在2018年至2026年之间到期.
只有期末的指数才能用于结算,我们的交易对手不能提前行权.
Berkshirereceivedpremiumsof$4.
2billionwhenwewrotethecontractsthatremainoutstanding.
Ifallofthesecontractshadcomedueatyearend2011,wewouldhavehadtopay$6.
2billion;thecorrespondingfigureatyearend2012was$3.
9billion.
Withthislargedropinimmediatesettlementliability,wereducedourGAAPliabilityatyearend2012to$7.
5billionfrom$8.
5billionattheendof2011.
Thoughit'snosurething,CharlieandIbelieveitlikelythatthefinalliabilitywillbeconsiderablylessthantheamountwecurrentlycarryonourbooks.
Inthemeantime,wecaninvestthe$4.
2billionoffloatderivedfromthesecontractsasweseefit.
伯克希尔签订以上还未到期的合约时时,收到了42亿美元的保费.
如果所有合约都在2011年到期,我们当时需要赔付62亿美元,2012年这个数字是39亿美元.
由于结算负债的大幅下降,我们的GAAP负债从2011年的85亿下降到2012年的75亿.
虽然最终结果还不确定,但是查理和我相信,最终的负债将会比我们现有的账面负债还低.
另外,我们可以自由运用这些合约产生的42亿美元,投资于我们喜欢的标的.
WeBuySomeNewspapers.
.
.
Newspapers我们买了一些报业公司……报业Duringthepastfifteenmonths,weacquired28dailynewspapersatacostof$344million.
Thismaypuzzleyoufortworeasons.
First,Ihavelongtoldyouintheselettersandatourannualmeetingsthatthecirculation,advertisingandprofitsofthenewspaperindustryoverallarecertaintodecline.
Thatpredictionstillholds.
Second,thepropertieswepurchasedfellfarshortofmeetingouroft-statedsizerequirementsforacquisitions.
过去的15个月里,我们以3.
44亿美元收购了28家日报.
有两个原因可能让你非常疑惑.
第一,我一直在致股东的信和年会里向大家说,报纸行业的总体发行量、广告和利润下降没有悬念.
这个预测依然有效.
第二,我们买下的资产完全达不到我们要求的收购规模标准.
Wecanaddressthesecondpointeasily.
CharlieandIlovenewspapersand,iftheireconomicsmakesense,willbuythemevenwhentheyfallfarshortofthesizethresholdwewouldrequireforthepurchaseof,say,awidgetcompany.
Addressingthefirstpointrequiresmetoprovideamoreelaborateexplanation,includingsomehistory.
第二点可能比较容易解释.
查理和我喜欢报纸,如果它们的经济情况合意,我们会买下它们,哪怕它们的规模根本达不到我们的收购标准,比如一些袖珍型公司.
解释第一点需要多费一些唇舌,还需要一些故事.
News,toputitsimply,iswhatpeopledon'tknowthattheywanttoknow.
Andpeoplewillseektheirnews–what'simportanttothem–fromwhateversourcesprovidethebestcombinationofimmediacy,easeofaccess,reliability,comprehensivenessandlowcost.
Therelativeimportanceofthesefactorsvarieswiththenatureofthenewsandthepersonwantingit.
新闻,简单的说,就是人们不知道但却又想知道的事情.
考虑及时性、方便性、可靠性、全面性和成本,人们会从实现最佳组合的渠道搜寻他们想要的新闻——对他们来说重要的新闻.
这些因素的重要程度随新闻的特性和受众的需求而不同.
BeforetelevisionandtheInternet,newspapersweretheprimarysourceforanincredible转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
32/45varietyofnews,afactthatmadethemindispensabletoaveryhighpercentageofthepopulation.
Whetheryourinterestswereinternational,national,local,sportsorfinancialquotations,yournewspaperusuallywasfirsttotellyouthelatestinformation.
Indeed,yourpapercontainedsomuchyouwantedtolearnthatyoureceivedyourmoney'sworth,evenifonlyasmallnumberofitspagesspoketoyourspecificinterests.
Betteryet,advertiserstypicallypaidalmostalloftheproduct'scost,andreadersrodetheircoattails.
在没有电视和互联网以前,报纸是各种新闻的最主要信息渠道,这一事实让其成为大部分人不可或缺的产品.
无论你关注国际、国内、地方时间,还是体育、财经新闻,大家订阅的报纸通常是最快的信息来源.
哪怕整份报纸里只有几页满足大家的兴趣爱好,报纸里所包含的信息还是让你的订阅物超所值.
更好的是,广告商通常支付了几乎全部的刊印成本,读者只需搭个顺风车.
Additionally,theadsthemselvesdeliveredinformationofvitalinteresttohordesofreaders,ineffectprovidingevenmore"news.
"Editorswouldcringeatthethought,butformanyreaderslearningwhatjobsorapartmentswereavailable,whatsupermarketswerecarryingwhichweekendspecials,orwhatmovieswereshowingwhereandwhenwasfarmoreimportantthantheviewsexpressedontheeditorialpage.
不仅如此,广告本身也提供了很多信息给有兴趣的读者,实际上相当于提供了更多"新闻".
编辑们在思想和观点上绞尽脑汁,但是对很多读者来说,招聘信息,哪里有房屋出租,哪个超市周末打折,或者哪部电影何时在哪里上映,比主要文章里的观点要有意义的多.
Inturn,thelocalpaperwasindispensabletoadvertisers.
IfSearsorSafewaybuiltstoresinOmaha,theyrequireda"megaphone"totellthecity'sresidentswhytheirstoresshouldbevisitedtoday.
Indeed,bigdepartmentstoresandgrocersviedtooutshouttheircompetitionwithmulti-pagespreads,knowingthatthegoodstheyadvertisedwouldflyofftheshelves.
Withnoothermegaphoneremotelycomparabletothatofthenewspaper,adssoldthemselves.
反过来说,报纸对于打广告的公司来说也是不可或缺的.
如果希尔斯或者西夫韦在奥马哈开了新店,它们需要一个"大喇叭"来告诉城里的居民为何今天应该去光顾它们的商店.
实际上,大型百货商店、珠宝店争相在报纸上连篇打广告,因为它们知道广告促销的产品立马就会被抢购一空.
再没其他宣传方式比得上报纸了,广告自身就是广告.
Aslongasanewspaperwastheonlyoneinitscommunity,itsprofitswerecertaintobeextraordinary;whetheritwasmanagedwellorpoorlymadelittledifference.
(AsoneSouthernpublisherfamouslyconfessed,"IowemyexaltedpositioninlifetotwogreatAmericaninstitutions–nepotismandmonopoly.
")只要是当地唯一的一份报纸,它一定利润可观;经营水平的好坏没有太大影响.
(正如一家南部的出版社坦言,"我一生优越的地位全部归功于美国的两项制度——裙带关系和垄断.
")Overtheyears,almostallcitiesbecameone-newspapertowns(orharboredtwocompetingpapersthatjoinedforcestooperateasasingleeconomicunit).
Thiscontractionwasinevitablebecausemostpeoplewishedtoreadandpayforonlyonepaper.
Whencompetitionexisted,thepaperthatgainedasignificantleadincirculationalmostautomaticallyreceivedthemostads.
Thatleftadsdrawingreadersandreadersdrawingads.
Thissymbioticprocessspelleddoomfortheweakerpaperandbecameknownas"survivalofthefattest.
"近些年里,绝大部分城市都只剩下了一份报纸(或者两家竞争的报纸合并如同一个经济利益体).
这种淘汰不可避免,大部分人只愿意订阅和阅读一份报纸.
当竞争存在的时候,发行量领先的报纸基本会自动获得大部分的广告.
于是广告吸引读者,读者吸引广告.
共生转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
33/45的过程淘汰弱势的报纸,即所谓的"胖者生存".
Nowtheworldhaschanged.
Stockmarketquotesandthedetailsofnationalsportseventsareoldnewslongbeforethepressesbegintoroll.
TheInternetoffersextensiveinformationaboutbothavailablejobsandhomes.
Televisionbombardsviewerswithpolitical,nationalandinternationalnews.
Inoneareaofinterestafteranother,newspapershavethereforelosttheir"primacy.
"And,astheiraudienceshavefallen,sohasadvertising.
(Revenuesfrom"helpwanted"classifiedads–longahugesourceofincomefornewspapers–haveplungedmorethan90%inthepast12years.
)现在情况变了.
股价信息和全国体育节目的信息在报纸开始印刷的时候已经成了旧闻.
互联网提供了大量招聘和租房信息.
电视机随时播放政治、国内和国际新闻.
报纸在一个接一个地丢失它的阵地.
受众减少以后,广告也随之下降.
(招聘类广告收入——曾经报纸的重要收入——在过去的12年里下降超过90%.
)Newspaperscontinuetoreignsupreme,however,inthedeliveryoflocalnews.
Ifyouwanttoknowwhat'sgoingoninyourtown–whetherthenewsisaboutthemayorortaxesorhighschoolfootball–thereisnosubstituteforalocalnewspaperthatisdoingitsjob.
Areader'seyesmayglazeoveraftertheytakeinacoupleofparagraphsaboutCanadiantariffsorpoliticaldevelopmentsinPakistan;astoryaboutthereaderhimselforhisneighborswillbereadtotheend.
Whereverthereisapervasivesenseofcommunity,apaperthatservesthespecialinformationalneedsofthatcommunitywillremainindispensabletoasignificantportionofitsresidents.
但无论如何,报纸在传递地方新闻方面,依然维持着霸主地位.
如果大家想知道自己的社区发生了什么——无论是市长的八卦,税收,或者高中橄榄球队的新闻——没有任何东西能取代报纸.
读者看到加拿大税局的照片,或者读到巴基斯坦的政局发展会犯困;但是一条与读者或者他的邻居有关的新闻,会被从头到尾认真阅读.
只要社区观念普遍存在,满足特定新闻需求的报纸就会对社区内的大部分居民不可或缺.
Evenavaluableproduct,however,canself-destructfromafaultybusinessstrategy.
Andthatprocesshasbeenunderwayduringthepastdecadeatalmostallpapersofsize.
Publishers–includingBerkshireinBuffalo–haveofferedtheirpaperfreeontheInternetwhilechargingmeaningfulsumsforthephysicalspecimen.
HowcouldthisleadtoanythingotherthanasharpandsteadydropinsalesoftheprintedproductFallingcirculation,moreover,makesapaperlessessentialtoadvertisers.
Undertheseconditions,the"virtuouscircle"ofthepastreverses.
即便一个有价值的产品,也会因错误的商业模式而自毁.
过去几十年,大大小小的报纸都在这件事件上犯错误.
出版者——包括伯克希尔的布法罗——都曾在互联网上免费提供它们的报纸,同时却对纸质报纸收费.
这怎么能不导致纸质报纸发行量的大幅下降呢下跌的发行量,进一步降低了它对广告方的意义.
于是"恶性循环"不断重复.
TheWallStreetJournalwenttoapaymodelearly.
ButthemainexemplarforlocalnewspapersistheArkansasDemocrat-Gazette,publishedbyWalterHussman,Jr.
Walteralsoadoptedapayformatearly,andoverthepastdecadehispaperhasretaineditscirculationfarbetterthananyotherlargepaperinthecountry.
DespiteWalter'spowerfulexample,it'sonlybeeninthelastyearorsothatotherpapers,includingBerkshire's,haveexploredpayarrangements.
Whateverworksbest–andtheanswerisnotyetclear–willbecopiedwidely.
华尔街日报早很早就开始尝试收费模式.
地方性报纸的范例则是ArkansasDemocrat-Gazette,由WalterHussman出版,Jr.
Walter也很早开始尝试收费模式,过去的几十年里,它的发行量维持的比国内其他报纸都要好.
除了Walter外,其他报纸,包括伯转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
34/45克希尔的报纸,直到最近几年才尝试付费模式.
效果最好的模式——现在还不确定——将会被广泛复制.
CharlieandIbelievethatpapersdeliveringcomprehensiveandreliableinformationtotightly-boundcommunitiesandhavingasensibleInternetstrategywillremainviableforalongtime.
Wedonotbelievethatsuccesswillcomefromcuttingeitherthenewscontentorfrequencyofpublication.
Indeed,skimpynewscoveragewillalmostcertainlyleadtoskimpyreadership.
Andtheless-than-dailypublicationthatisnowbeingtriedinsomelargetownsorcities–whileitmayimproveprofitsintheshortterm–seemscertaintodiminishthepapers'relevanceovertime.
Ourgoalistokeepourpapersloadedwithcontentofinteresttoourreadersandtobepaidappropriatelybythosewhofindususeful,whethertheproducttheyviewisintheirhandsorontheInternet.
查理和我认为报纸在一个联系紧密的社区中提供了全面和可靠的信息,如果采取恰当的互联网策略,将会在很长时间内保持活力.
我们不认为削减内容和发行频率会带来成功.
实际上,狭窄的覆盖范围会导致狭窄的客户群.
而低于一天的发行频率在一些较大的城镇和城市也被尝试过了——虽然短期内可能提高利润——但是长期来看会减少报纸的曝光频率.
我们的目标是让报纸充满读者感兴趣的内容,并且让觉得它有用的人支付合理的费用,无论是纸质的还是网络版.
OurconfidenceisbuttressedbytheavailabilityofTerryKroeger'soutstandingmanagementgroupattheOmahaWorld-Herald,ateamthathastheabilitytooverseealargegroupofpapers.
Theindividualpapers,however,willbeindependentintheirnewscoverageandeditorialopinions.
(IvotedforObama;ofour12dailiesthatendorsedapresidentialcandidate,10optedforRomney.
)我们的信心来源于TerryKroeger在奥马哈先驱报的卓越管理,他的团队有能力管理更多的报纸.
各份报纸则会在新闻采编上保持独立.
(我投票支持奥巴马;但我们的12份日报调查的总统候选人中,有10份选择罗姆尼.
)Ournewspapersarecertainlynotinsulatedfromtheforcesthathavebeendrivingrevenuesdownward.
Still,thesixsmalldailiesweownedthroughout2012hadunchangedrevenuesfortheyear,aresultfarsuperiortothatexperiencedbybig-citydailies.
Moreover,thetwolargepapersweoperatedthroughouttheyear–TheBuffaloNewsandtheOmahaWorld-Herald–heldtheirrevenuelossto3%,whichwasalsoanabove-averageoutcome.
AmongnewspapersinAmerica's50largestmetropolitanareas,ourBuffaloandOmahapapersranknearthetopincirculationpenetrationoftheirhometerritories.
我们的报纸当然也逃脱不了导致收入下滑的压力.
但到目前为止,我们拥有的6份小型日报2012年的收入没有下降,这是比其他大城市日报要好的成绩.
另外,我们的两份大型报纸——布法罗新闻报和奥马哈先驱报——收入下滑维持在3%,也优于平均水平.
在全美50个大城市圈,我们的布法罗和奥马哈报纸在当地的渗透率名列前茅.
Thispopularityisnoaccident:Credittheeditorsofthosepapers–MargaretSullivanattheNewsandMikeReillyattheWorld-Herald—fordeliveringinformationthathasmadetheirpublicationsindispensabletocommunity-interestedreaders.
(Margaret,Iregrettosay,recentlyleftustojoinTheNewYorkTimes,whosejoboffersaretoughtoturndown.
Thatpapermadeagreathire,andwewishherthebest.
)两份报纸的流行并非意外:应归功于报纸的编辑们——布法罗的MargaretSullivan和世界先驱报的MikeReilly——他们传递了让关注社区的读者不可或缺的信息.
(非常遗憾,转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
35/45Margaret最近离开我们加入了纽约时报,但她的成绩不可磨灭.
纽约时报挖了一个好墙角,我们祝她一切顺利.
)Berkshire'scashearningsfromitspaperswillalmostcertainlytrenddownwardovertime.
EvenasensibleInternetstrategywillnotbeabletopreventmodesterosion.
Atourcost,however,Ibelievethesepaperswillmeetorexceedoureconomictestforacquisitions.
Resultstodatesupportthatbelief.
伯克希尔在报纸上的现金收入将会不断下降.
即便互联网策略得当也不能阻止温和的侵蚀.
至于我们的投资,我们相信这些报纸将会达到或者超过我们的收购回报标准.
至今为止的数据都证明了我们的想法.
CharlieandI,however,stilloperateundereconomicprinciple11(detailedonpage99)andwillnotcontinuetheoperationofanybusinessdoomedtounendinglosses.
OnedailypaperthatweacquiredinabulkpurchasefromMediaGeneralwassignificantlyunprofitableunderthatcompany'sownership.
Afteranalyzingthepaper'sresults,wesawnoremedyforthelossesandreluctantlyshutitdown.
Allofourremainingdailies,however,shouldbeprofitableforalongtimetocome.
(Theyarelistedonpage108.
)Atappropriateprices–andthatmeansataverylowmultipleofcurrentearnings–wewillpurchasemorepapersofthetypewelike.
查理和我始终坚持11条经济原则(参见99页),我们不会持续运营扭亏无望的业务.
我们收购MediaGeneral时包括了一家在其管理下盈利一塌糊涂的日报,我们对其进行了分析,找不出解决办法,虽不情愿,但最后还是将其关闭.
而我们其他的日报,则在未来很长一段时间内都会保持盈利.
(它们被列示在108页).
如果价格合理——这意味着当前盈利非常低的估值倍数——我们还会购买一些类似的报纸.
AmilestoneinBerkshire'snewspaperoperationsoccurredatyearendwhenStanLipseyretiredaspublisherofTheBuffaloNews.
It'snoexaggerationformetosaythattheNewsmightnowbeextinctwereitnotforStan.
伯克希尔报纸业务的一个重要事件是年末布法罗新闻报的StanLipsey退休了.
毫不夸张地说,如果不是Stan,布法罗不会有现在的成绩.
CharlieandIacquiredtheNewsinApril1977.
Itwasaneveningpaper,dominantonweekdaysbutlackingaSundayedition.
Throughoutthecountry,thecirculationtrendwastowardmorningpapers.
Moreover,Sundaywasbecomingevermorecriticaltotheprofitabilityofmetropolitandailies.
WithoutaSundaypaper,theNewswasdestinedtoloseouttoitsmorningcompetitor,whichhadafatandentrenchedSundayproduct.
查理和我1977年4月收购了布法罗.
当时它是一份晚报,主打工作日而没有周日版.
全国上下,发行量都朝着晨报集中.
而且周日版对于都市日报的盈利来说越来越重要.
没有周日版,布法罗几乎注定要输给它的晨报竞争对手,它们拥有加厚的、城坚池固的周日版.
WethereforebegantoprintaSundayeditionlatein1977.
Andthenallhellbrokeloose.
Ourcompetitorsuedus,andDistrictJudgeCharlesBrieant,Jr.
authoredaharshrulingthatcrippledtheintroductionofourpaper.
Hisrulingwaslaterreversed–after17longmonths–ina3-0sharprebukebytheSecondCircuitCourtofAppeals.
Whiletheappealwaspending,welostcirculation,hemorrhagedmoneyandstoodinconstantdangerofgoingoutofbusiness.
于是我们在1977年晚些时候开始刊印周日版.
但是噩梦开始了.
竞争对手起诉我们,地区法官CharleBrieant宣布了重创我们的判决.
他的判决后来在第二轮的上诉中以3-0的彻底反对被否定了——但那已经是17个月之后.
在上诉期间,我们损失了发行量,大出血,并且随时面临着停业的危险.
转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
36/45EnterStanLipsey,afriendofminefromthe1960s,who,withhiswife,hadsoldBerkshireasmallOmahaweekly.
IfoundStantobeanextraordinarynewspaperman,knowledgeableabouteveryaspectofcirculation,production,salesandeditorial.
(HewasakeypersoningainingthatsmallweeklyaPulitzerPrizein1973.
)SowhenIwasinbigtroubleattheNews,IaskedStantoleavehiscomfortablewayoflifeinOmahatotakeoverinBuffalo.
那时StanLipse,60年代就他已经是我的好朋友,和他的妻子一起卖给了伯克希尔一家小型奥马哈周报.
我发现Stan是一位一流的报业人士,对发行量、产品、销售和编辑各个方面了如指掌.
(他是让那份小周报荣获1973年普利策奖的关键人物).
所以当我在布法罗焦头烂额的时候,我邀请Stan离开他舒适的生活,接手布法罗.
Heneverhesitated.
AlongwithMurrayLight,oureditor,StanperseveredthroughfouryearsofverydarkdaysuntiltheNewswonthecompetitivestrugglein1982.
Eversince,despiteadifficultBuffaloeconomy,theperformanceoftheNewshasbeenexceptional.
Asbothafriendandasamanager,Stanissimplythebest.
他没有犹豫.
和MurrayLight,我们的主编一起,Stan在艰难的时光中坚持奋斗了4年,直到布法罗1982年在竞争中胜出.
从那时起,即便布法罗城(又译水牛城)经济糟糕的时候,我们的报纸业绩都表现良好.
无论作为朋友还是经理人,Stan都是最棒的.
Dividends分红AnumberofBerkshireshareholders–includingsomeofmygoodfriends–wouldlikeBerkshiretopayacashdividend.
ItpuzzlesthemthatwerelishthedividendswereceivefrommostofthestocksthatBerkshireowns,butpayoutnothingourselves.
Solet'sexaminewhendividendsdoanddon'tmakesenseforshareholders.
部分伯克希尔的股东——包括我一些最好的朋友——可能都希望伯克希尔进行现金分红.
让他们疑惑的是,我们从大多数伯克希尔拥有的子公司那里收到很多分红,却从来不向大家分红.
我们有必要来了解一下什么时候分红对股东有意义,什么时候没有.
Aprofitablecompanycanallocateitsearningsinvariousways(whicharenotmutuallyexclusive).
Acompany'smanagementshouldfirstexaminereinvestmentpossibilitiesofferedbyitscurrentbusiness–projectstobecomemoreefficient,expandterritorially,extendandimproveproductlinesortootherwisewidentheeconomicmoatseparatingthecompanyfromitscompetitors.
一家盈利的公司,可以有许多方法配置它的盈利(当然这些方法并非互斥的).
公司的经理层首先应该检查继续投资公司主业的可能性——提高生产效率的项目,区域扩张,扩张或改进生产线,或者其他加深与竞争对手之间护城河的投资.
Iaskthemanagersofoursubsidiariestounendinglyfocusonmoat-wideningopportunities,andtheyfindmanythatmakeeconomicsense.
Butsometimesourmanagersmisfire.
Theusualcauseoffailureisthattheystartwiththeanswertheywantandthenworkbackwardstofindasupportingrationale.
Ofcourse,theprocessissubconscious;that'swhatmakesitsodangerous.
我要求子公司的经理人们永无止境地专注于加深护城河的机会,他们也的确找到很多行之有效的办法.
但有时候我们的经理人也犯错.
错误的原因通常是因为他们先找到了他们想要的答案,然后在反过来寻找支持它们的理由.
显然这样的程序是错误的;这也是让错误无比危险的原因.
Yourchairmanhasnotbeenfreeofthissin.
InBerkshire's1986annualreport,Idescribed转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
37/45howtwentyyearsofmanagementeffortandcapitalimprovementsinouroriginaltextilebusinesswereanexerciseinfutility.
Iwantedthebusinesstosucceedandwishedmywayintoaseriesofbaddecisions.
(IevenboughtanotherNewEnglandtextilecompany.
)ButwishingmakesdreamscometrueonlyinDisneymovies;it'spoisoninbusiness.
你们的董事长也犯过同样的错误.
在伯克希尔1986年的年年报里,我详述了我们20年来在原有的纺织业务上的努力和投资最终如何竹篮打水一场空.
我希望公司最后能成功,导致了一些列糟糕的决定.
(我甚至一度曾想买下另一家新英格兰的纺织厂.
)但是梦想成真只在迪士尼的童话故事里存在,现实毕竟是现实.
Despitesuchpastmiscues,ourfirstprioritywithavailablefundswillalwaysbetoexaminewhethertheycanbeintelligentlydeployedinourvariousbusinesses.
Ourrecord$12.
1billionoffixed-assetinvestmentsandbolt-onacquisitionsin2012demonstratethatthisisafertilefieldforcapitalallocationatBerkshire.
Andherewehaveanadvantage:Becauseweoperateinsomanyareasoftheeconomy,weenjoyarangeofchoicesfarwiderthanthatopentomostcorporations.
Indecidingwhattodo,wecanwatertheflowersandskipovertheweeds.
虽然过去犯过如此错误,但我们可用资金的首要配置选择依然是它能否被现有业务有效利用.
2012年我们创纪录的121亿固定资产投资和补强型收购证明,在伯克希尔,有一大片肥沃的土地可以投资.
而且我们具备显著优势:我们运营着如此众多的业务,所能享受的投资领域要比大多数公司多得多.
在决定投资什么的时候,我们可以直接浇灌鲜花,同时避开杂草.
Evenafterwedeployheftyamountsofcapitalinourcurrentoperations,Berkshirewillregularlygeneratealotofadditionalcash.
Ournextstep,therefore,istosearchforacquisitionsunrelatedtoourcurrentbusinesses.
Hereourtestissimple:DoCharlieandIthinkwecaneffectatransactionthatislikelytoleaveourshareholderswealthieronaper-sharebasisthantheywerepriortotheacquisition即使在利用过了伯克希尔现有业务的诸多投资机会以后,伯克希尔依然不断产生富余的现金.
我们的下一步,则是寻找与现有业务无关的收购机会.
我们的标准也很简单:查理和我是否认为我们可以通过收购交易让股东在每股资产上变得更加富有Ihavemadeplentyofmistakesinacquisitionsandwillmakemore.
Overall,however,ourrecordissatisfactory,whichmeansthatourshareholdersarefarwealthiertodaythantheywouldbeifthefundsweusedforacquisitionshadinsteadbeendevotedtosharerepurchasesordividends.
在收购上我已经犯了很多错误,而且还会接着犯错.
不过总体来说,我们的记录还算让人满意,也就是说我们把资金用于收购,比起把资金用来回购或者分红,我们的股东变得更加富有了.
But,tousethestandarddisclaimer,pastperformanceisnoguaranteeoffutureresults.
That'sparticularlytrueatBerkshire:Becauseofourpresentsize,makingacquisitionsthatarebothmeaningfulandsensibleisnowmoredifficultthanithasbeenduringmostofouryears.
不过借用标准的免责申明,历史记录不能保证未来的收益.
对伯克希尔来说尤其是这样:伯克希尔当前的规模,比起多年以前的小规模来说,通过收购带来显著的效益越来越难.
Nevertheless,alargedealstilloffersuspossibilitiestoaddmateriallytoper-shareintrinsicvalue.
BNSFisacaseinpoint:Itisnowworthconsiderablymorethanourcarryingvalue.
Hadweinsteadallocatedthefundsrequiredforthispurchasetodividendsorrepurchases,youandIwouldhavebeenworseoff.
ThoughlargetransactionsoftheBNSFkindwillberare,therearestillsomewhalesintheocean.
转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
38/45不过一笔巨额的收购还是可以实质性地提高我们的每股价值.
BNSF就是一个不错的例子:它现在比账面价值要值钱的多.
如果我们把用来收购的钱用来分红或者回购,我们的情况要比现在糟糕.
虽然像BNSF这样的大家伙不多,但是海里还是有鲸鱼的.
Thethirduseoffunds–repurchases–issensibleforacompanywhenitssharessellatameaningfuldiscounttoconservativelycalculatedintrinsicvalue.
Indeed,disciplinedrepurchasesarethesurestwaytousefundsintelligently:It'shardtogowrongwhenyou'rebuyingdollarbillsfor80orless.
Weexplainedourcriteriaforrepurchasesinlastyear'sreportand,iftheopportunitypresentsitself,wewillbuylargequantitiesofourstock.
Weoriginallysaidwewouldnotpaymorethan110%ofbookvalue,butthatprovedunrealistic.
Therefore,weincreasedthelimitto120%inDecemberwhenalargeblockbecameavailableatabout116%ofbookvalue.
资金的第三种利用方式——回购——在公司股票价格与保守估算的内在价值相比还有明显折扣时,具有意义.
实际上,有纪律的股票回购是合理利用资金最安全方法:以80美分或者更低的价格购买1美元很难出错.
去年的年报里我们解释了回购的规则,如果机会来了,我们会大笔回购股票.
我们之前说不会以超过账面价值110%的价格回购股票,但是事实证明那不切实际.
因此,12月市场上一大笔股票以账面价值的116%出售时,我们把价格上限提到了120%.
Butneverforget:Inrepurchasedecisions,priceisall-important.
Valueisdestroyedwhenpurchasesaremadeaboveintrinsicvalue.
ThedirectorsandIbelievethatcontinuingshareholdersarebenefittedinameaningfulwaybypurchasesuptoour120%limit.
不要忘了:在回购决策里,价格是最重要的.
如果回购价格高于内在价值那就是在毁灭(股东的)价值.
董事们和我都认为,继续以低于账面价值120%的价格回购股票对股东是有利的.
Andthatbringsustodividends.
Herewehavetomakeafewassumptionsandusesomemath.
Thenumberswillrequirecarefulreading,buttheyareessentialtounderstandingthecaseforandagainstdividends.
Sobearwithme.
最后我们来到分红.
这里我们需要一些假设并且要做些计算.
这些数字需要一些功夫才能理解,但是这对于理解应该和不应该分红的原因很重要.
所以请耐心听我讲.
We'llstartbyassumingthatyouandIaretheequalownersofabusinesswith$2millionofnetworth.
Thebusinessearns12%ontangiblenetworth–$240,000–andcanreasonablyexpecttoearnthesame12%onreinvestedearnings.
Furthermore,thereareoutsiderswhoalwayswishtobuyintoourbusinessat125%ofnetworth.
Therefore,thevalueofwhatweeachownisnow$1.
25million.
我们假设你和我各自拥有一家价值200万美元的公司的一半.
公司每年的利润率是12%——24万美元——并且可以合理预期新增投资也能获得12%的回报率.
另外假设,外部投资者始终愿意以净资产125%的价格收购我们的公司.
于是,我们各自资产的市价是125万美元.
Youwouldliketohavethetwoofusshareholdersreceiveone-thirdofourcompany'sannualearningsandhavetwo-thirdsbereinvested.
Thatplan,youfeel,willnicelybalanceyourneedsforbothcurrentincomeandcapitalgrowth.
Soyousuggestthatwepayout$80,000ofcurrentearningsandretain$160,000toincreasethefutureearningsofthebusiness.
Inthefirstyear,yourdividendwouldbe$40,000,andasearningsgrewandtheone-thirdpayoutwasmaintained,sotoowouldyourdividend.
Intotal,dividendsandstockvaluewouldincrease8%eachyear(12%earnedonnetworthless4%ofnetworthpaidout).
你可能希望公司每年把利润的三分之一用来分配,剩余三分之二继续投资.
你觉得这个转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
39/45方案即满足了当前收入的要求,又能实现资本增值.
所以你建议我们分配8万美元现金,剩余16万用于增加公司未来的利润.
第一年,你会收到4万美元的分红,之后利润会增长,三分之一的分红比例继续保持,你收到的分红也会增长.
于是,分红和股票价值会以每年8%的速度增长(12%的回报率减去4%的分红比例).
Aftertenyearsourcompanywouldhaveanetworthof$4,317,850(theoriginal$2millioncompoundedat8%)andyourdividendintheupcomingyearwouldbe$86,357.
Eachofuswouldhavesharesworth$2,698,656(125%ofourhalfofthecompany'snetworth).
Andwewouldlivehappilyeverafter–withdividendsandthevalueofourstockcontinuingtogrowat8%annually.
10年以后,我们的公司会价值4,317,850美元(期初的2百万按8%的复合增长率计算),同时你下一年收到的分红也会增长到86,357美元.
我们两人各自的股票价值2,698,656(我们各自一半净资产的125%).
我们之后也会一直快乐下去——分红和股价依然每年增长8%.
Thereisanalternativeapproach,however,thatwouldleaveusevenhappier.
Underthisscenario,wewouldleaveallearningsinthecompanyandeachsell3.
2%ofoursharesannually.
Sincetheshareswouldbesoldat125%ofbookvalue,thisapproachwouldproducethesame$40,000ofcashinitially,asumthatwouldgrowannually.
Callthisoptionthe"sell-off"approach.
但还有另外一种方式可以让我们更加快乐.
那就是我们留存所有的利润,同时每年卖出手中3.
2%的股票.
因为股票可以以净资产125%的价格卖出,所以这种方法第一年也能获得4万美元的现金,卖出获得的资金也会不断增长.
我们暂且把这种方法叫做"卖出法".
Underthis"sell-off"scenario,thenetworthofourcompanyincreasesto$6,211,696aftertenyears($2millioncompoundedat12%).
Becausewewouldbesellingshareseachyear,ourpercentageownershipwouldhavedeclined,and,aftertenyears,wewouldeachown36.
12%ofthebusiness.
Evenso,yourshareofthenetworthofthecompanyatthattimewouldbe$2,243,540.
And,remember,everydollarofnetworthattributabletoeachofuscanbesoldfor$1.
25.
Therefore,themarketvalueofyourremainingshareswouldbe$2,804,425,about4%greaterthanthevalueofyoursharesifwehadfollowedthedividendapproach.
在"卖出法"的情形下,10年以后公司的净资产值会增长到6,211,696(期初的2百万按12%的复合增长率计算).
但是因为我们每年卖出股票,持股比例会下降,10年以后,我们每人拥有公司36.
12%的股票.
即便如此,你所持的股票对应的净资产为2,243,540美元.
另外别忘了,每一美元的净资产值可以以1.
25美元卖出.
因此,剩余的股票市值2,804,425美元,大约比分红的情形下高4%.
Moreover,yourannualcashreceiptsfromthesell-offpolicywouldnowberunning4%morethanyouwouldhavereceivedunderthedividendscenario.
Voila!
–youwouldhavebothmorecashtospendannuallyandmorecapitalvalue.
同时,你每年卖出股票获得的现金要比分红获得的现金情形下高4%.
哇!
——你不但每年有更有钱花,最后还有更多的财产.
Thiscalculation,ofcourse,assumesthatourhypotheticalcompanycanearnanaverageof12%annuallyonnetworthandthatitsshareholderscanselltheirsharesforanaverageof125%ofbookvalue.
Tothatpoint,theS&P500earnsconsiderablymorethan12%onnetworthandsellsatapricefarabove125%ofthatnetworth.
BothassumptionsalsoseemreasonableforBerkshire,thoughcertainlynotassured.
当然,上述的计算假设平均每年12%的净资产回报率,而且股东能以账面价值的125%卖出股票.
这一点上,标普500回报率明显超过12%,并且股价远超净资产的125%.
这两条假设对于伯克希尔来说似乎都是适当的,当然未来无法保证.
Moreover,ontheplusside,therealsoisapossibilitythattheassumptionswillbeexceeded.
转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
40/45Iftheyare,theargumentforthesell-offpolicybecomesevenstronger.
OverBerkshire'shistory–admittedlyonethatwon'tcomeclosetobeingrepeated–thesell-offpolicywouldhaveproducedresultsforshareholdersdramaticallysuperiortothedividendpolicy.
考虑到乐观的情形,上面的假设条件被超过的可能性也是存在的.
如果事实如此,那么卖出法就更具优势.
根据伯克希尔的历史——必须申明这无法继续重复——卖出策略比分红策略给股东带来了多得多的财富.
Asidefromthefavorablemath,therearetwofurther–andimportant–argumentsforasell-offpolicy.
First,dividendsimposeaspecificcash-outpolicyuponallshareholders.
If,say,40%ofearningsisthepolicy,thosewhowish30%or50%willbethwarted.
Our600,000shareholderscoverthewaterfrontintheirdesiresforcash.
Itissafetosay,however,thatagreatmanyofthem–perhapsevenmostofthem–areinanet-savingsmodeandlogicallyshouldprefernopaymentatall.
除了计算上的优势以外,还有两个原因——也非常重要——支持卖出策略.
第一,分红策略强制对所有股东进行同样比例的分红.
比如说,分红比例是40%,那些希望分红比例是30%,50%的股东受到损害.
我们60万股东的分红偏好各不相同.
或许可以有把握地说,他们中的许多人——或许是绝大部分——偏好储蓄模式,因此倾向于不分红.
Thesell-offalternative,ontheotherhand,letseachshareholdermakehisownchoicebetweencashreceiptsandcapitalbuild-up.
Oneshareholdercanelecttocashout,say,60%ofannualearningswhileothershareholderselect20%ornothingatall.
Ofcourse,ashareholderinourdividend-payingscenariocouldturnaroundandusehisdividendstopurchasemoreshares.
Buthewouldtakeabeatingindoingso:Hewouldbothincurtaxesandalsopaya25%premiumtogethisdividendreinvested.
(Keepremembering,open-marketpurchasesofthestocktakeplaceat125%ofbookvalue.
)相反,卖出策略则让股东可以自由决定现金和资本增值的比例.
一位股东可以选择兑现60%的利润,另一位可以选择兑现20%或者不兑现.
当然,分红策略下的股东可以用分红把股票买回来,但是他这样做会遇到困难:既要缴纳股息税,又要支付25%的溢价才能把股票买回来.
(记住,公开市场以账面价值的125%交易股票.
)Theseconddisadvantageofthedividendapproachisofequalimportance:Thetaxconsequencesforalltaxpayingshareholdersareinferior–usuallyfarinferior–tothoseunderthesell-offprogram.
Underthedividendprogram,allofthecashreceivedbyshareholderseachyearistaxedwhereasthesell-offprogramresultsintaxononlythegainportionofthecashreceipts.
分红策略的第二个坏处同样严重:分红策略的税收负担劣于——通常严重劣于——卖出策略.
分红策略下,每年股东收到所有的现金分红都要交税,而卖出策略只需为现金收入中的利得部分交税.
Letmeendthismathexercise–andIcanhearyoucheeringasIputawaythedentistdrill–byusingmyowncasetoillustratehowashareholder'sregulardisposalsofsharescanbeaccompaniedbyanincreasedinvestmentinhisorherbusiness.
Forthelastsevenyears,Ihaveannuallygivenawayabout414%ofmyBerkshireshares.
Throughthisprocess,myoriginalpositionof712,497,000B-equivalentshares(split-adjusted)hasdecreasedto528,525,623shares.
Clearlymyownershippercentageofthecompanyhassignificantlydecreased.
让我们以我本人的例子来解释股东如何逐步减持股票,同时实现投资的增值,并结束这数学练习吧——我可以听到你们好像牙医的钻头被拿开了一样的欢呼雀跃.
过去的7年里,我每年减持自己持有的4.
25%伯克希尔股票.
经过减持,我一开始的712,497,000股B股股票(经过拆股调整)减少到了528,525,623股.
很显然我的持股比例显著的减少了.
转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
41/45Yetmyinvestmentinthebusinesshasactuallyincreased:ThebookvalueofmycurrentinterestinBerkshireconsiderablyexceedsthebookvalueattributabletomyholdingsofsevenyearsago.
(Theactualfiguresare$28.
2billionfor2005and$40.
2billionfor2012.
)Inotherwords,InowhavefarmoremoneyworkingformeatBerkshireeventhoughmyownershipofthecompanyhasmateriallydecreased.
It'salsotruethatmyshareofbothBerkshire'sintrinsicbusinessvalueandthecompany'snormalearningpowerisfargreaterthanitwasin2005.
但我在公司的投资实际上增加了:我现在持有的股票的账面价值明显高于7年前.
(具体数字是2005年的282亿比2012年402亿.
)换句话说,我现在伯克希尔的持股比例虽然降低了,但是留在伯克希尔进行增值的钱更多了.
我在伯克希尔股票的内在价值和公司的盈利能力也比2005年大大增强.
Overtime,Iexpectthisaccretionofvaluetocontinue–albeitinadecidedlyirregularfashion–evenasInowannuallygiveawaymorethan412%ofmyshares(theincreasehavingoccurredbecauseI'verecentlydoubledmylifetimepledgestocertainfoundations).
随着时间推移,即便我现在每年减持手少4.
5%的股票(增加的减持份额是由于我增加了对某些基金会的终身承诺),我预计上述增长还会继续——尽管是以一种不规则的方式.
Aboveall,dividendpolicyshouldalwaysbeclear,consistentandrational.
Acapriciouspolicywillconfuseownersanddriveawaywould-beinvestors.
PhilFisherputitwonderfully54yearsagoinChapter7ofhisCommonStocksandUncommonProfits,abookthatranksbehindonlyTheIntelligentInvestorandthe1940editionofSecurityAnalysisintheall-time-bestlistfortheseriousinvestor.
Philexplainedthatyoucansuccessfullyrunarestaurantthatserveshamburgersor,alternatively,onethatfeaturesChinesefood.
Butyoucan'tswitchcapriciouslybetweenthetwoandretainthefansofeither.
总而言之,分红策略必须始终保持清晰、稳定并且理性.
反复无常的策略会把股东弄糊涂,也会排斥潜在的投资者.
PhilFisher54年前在他《普通股和不普通的利润》一书的第7章非常经典地解释了这件事情,对认真的投资者而言,这本书在经典书目上仅次于《聪明的投资者》以及1940年版的《证券分析》.
Phil说你可以成功地运营一家卖汉堡的餐馆,或者一家以中国菜为主打的餐馆,但是你不可能不停地转换还同时留住两类顾客.
Mostcompaniespayconsistentdividends,generallytryingtoincreasethemannuallyandcuttingthemveryreluctantly.
Our"BigFour"portfoliocompaniesfollowthissensibleandunderstandableapproachand,incertaincases,alsorepurchasesharesquiteaggressively.
大多数公司奉行稳定的分红策略,一般逐步增加分红,削减分红通常是非常不情愿的.
我们的"四大"投资组合就遵循类似的、可理解的模式.
有时候,它们还非常积极地回购股票.
Weapplaudtheiractionsandhopetheycontinueontheirpresentpaths.
Welikeincreaseddividends,andweloverepurchasesatappropriateprices.
我们拍手称赞它们现行的策略,并希望它们继续保持.
我们喜欢增加分红,我们也喜欢以合理的价格回购股票.
AtBerkshire,however,wehaveconsistentlyfollowedadifferentapproachthatweknowhasbeensensibleandthatwehopehasbeenmadeunderstandablebytheparagraphsyouhavejustread.
Wewillstickwiththispolicyaslongaswebelieveourassumptionsaboutthebook-valuebuildupandthemarket-pricepremiumseemreasonable.
Iftheprospectsforeitherfactorchangemateriallyfortheworse,wewillreexamineouractions.
当然在伯克希尔,我们一直采取了另外一条不同的分红策略,我们深知这样做的合理性,转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
42/45也希望上述的段落能帮助大家理解这一策略.
只要我们认为关于账面价值增长和市场价格的假设依然合理,我们就会一直坚持上述策略.
如果将来某项因素变化导致了实质性的改变,我们将会重新审视我们现行的策略.
TheAnnualMeeting年会(关于伯克希尔公司年会的时间、地点安排等,与投资无关,翻译从略.
)TheannualmeetingwillbeheldonSaturday,May4thattheCenturyLinkCenter.
CarrieSovawillbeincharge.
(Thoughthat'sanewname,it'sthesamewonderfulCarrieaslastyear;shegotmarriedinJunetoaveryluckyguy.
)Allofourheadquartersgrouppitchesintohelpher;thewholeaffairisahomemadeproduction,andIcouldn'tbemoreproudofthosewhoputittogether.
Thedoorswillopenat7a.
m.
,andat7:30wewillhaveoursecondInternationalNewspaperTossingChallenge.
ThetargetwillbetheporchofaClaytonHome,precisely35feetfromthethrowingline.
LastyearIsuccessfullyfoughtoffallchallengers.
ButnowBerkshirehasacquiredalargenumberofnewspapersandwiththemcamemuchtossingtalent(orsothethrowersclaim).
Comeseewhethertheirtalentmatchestheirtalk.
Betteryet,joinin.
Thepaperswillbe36to42pagesandyoumustfoldthemyourself(norubberbands).
At8:30,anewBerkshiremoviewillbeshown.
Anhourlater,wewillstartthequestion-and-answerperiod,which(withabreakforlunchattheCenturyLink'sstands)willlastuntil3:30.
Afterashortrecess,CharlieandIwillconvenetheannualmeetingat3:45.
Ifyoudecidetoleaveduringtheday'squestionperiods,pleasedosowhileCharlieistalking.
Thebestreasontoexit,ofcourse,istoshop.
Wewillhelpyoudosobyfillingthe194,300-square-foothallthatadjoinsthemeetingareawithproductsfromdozensofBerkshiresubsidiaries.
Lastyear,youdidyourpart,andmostlocationsrackeduprecordsales.
Inanine-hourperiod,wesold1,090pairsofJustinboots,(that'sapairevery30seconds),10,010poundsofSee'scandy,12,879Quikutknives(24knivesperminute)and5,784pairsofWellsLamontgloves,alwaysahotitem.
Butyoucandobetter.
Remember:Anyonewhosaysmoneycan'tbuyhappinesssimplyhasn'tshoppedatourmeeting.
Lastyear,Brooks,ourrunningshoecompany,exhibitedforthefirsttimeandranupsalesof$150,000.
Brooksisonfire:Itsvolumein2012grew34%,andthatwasontopofasimilar34%gainin2011.
Thecompany'smanagementexpectsanotherjumpof23%in2013.
Wewillagainhaveaspecialcommemorativeshoetoofferatthemeeting.
OnSundayat8a.
m.
,wewillinitiatethe"Berkshire5K,"aracestartingattheCenturyLink.
FulldetailsforparticipatingwillbeincludedintheVisitor'sGuidethatyouwillreceivewithyourcredentialsforthemeeting.
Wewillhaveplentyofcategoriesforcompetition,includingoneforthemedia.
(Itwillbefuntoreportontheirperformance.
)Regretfully,Iwillforegorunning;someonehastomanthestartinggun.
Ishouldwarnyouthatwehavealotofhome-growntalent.
TedWeschlerhasrunthemarathonin3:01.
JimWeber,Brooks'dynamicCEO,isanotherspeedsterwitha3:31best.
ToddCombsspecializesinthetriathlon,buthasbeenclockedat22minutesinthe5K.
That,however,isjustthebeginning:Ourdirectorsarealsofleetoffoot(thatis,someofourdirectorsare).
SteveBurkehasrunanamazing2:39Bostonmarathon.
(It'safamilything;hiswife,Gretchen,转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
43/45finishedtheNewYorkmarathonin3:25.
)CharlotteGuyman'sbestis3:37,andSueDeckercrossedthetapeinNewYorkin3:36.
Charliedidnotreturnhisquestionnaire.
GEICOwillhaveaboothintheshoppingarea,staffedbyanumberofitstopcounselorsfromaroundthecountry.
Stopbyforaquote.
Inmostcases,GEICOwillbeabletogiveyouashareholderdiscount(usually8%).
Thisspecialofferispermittedby44ofthe51jurisdictionsinwhichweoperate.
(Onesupplementalpoint:Thediscountisnotadditiveifyouqualifyforanother,suchasthatgivencertaingroups.
)Bringthedetailsofyourexistinginsuranceandcheckoutwhetherwecansaveyoumoney.
Foratleasthalfofyou,Ibelievewecan.
BesuretovisittheBookworm.
Itwillcarryabout35booksandDVDs,includingacoupleofnewones.
CarolLoomis,whohasbeeninvaluabletomeineditingthislettersince1977,hasrecentlyauthoredTapDancingtoWork:WarrenBuffettonPracticallyEverything.
SheandIhavecosigned500copies,availableexclusivelyatthemeeting.
TheOutsiders,byWilliamThorndike,Jr.
,isanoutstandingbookaboutCEOswhoexcelledatcapitalallocation.
Ithasaninsightfulchapteronourdirector,TomMurphy,overallthebestbusinessmanagerI'veevermet.
IalsorecommendTheClashoftheCulturesbyJackBogleandLauraRittenhouse'sInvestingBetweentheLines.
Shouldyouneedtoshipyourbookpurchases,ashippingservicewillbeavailablenearby.
TheOmahaWorld-Heraldwillagainhaveabooth,offeringafewbooksithasrecentlypublished.
Red-bloodedHuskerfans–isthereanyNebraskanwhoisn'tone–willsurelywanttopurchaseUnbeatable.
IttellsthestoryofNebraskafootballduring1993-97,agoldenerainwhichTomOsborne'steamswent60-3.
Ifyouareabigspender–oraspiretobecomeone–visitSignatureAviationontheeastsideoftheOmahaairportbetweennoonand5:00p.
m.
onSaturday.
TherewewillhaveafleetofNetJetsaircraftthatwillgetyourpulseracing.
Comebybus;leavebyprivatejet.
Livealittle.
Anattachmenttotheproxymaterialthatisenclosedwiththisreportexplainshowyoucanobtainthecredentialyouwillneedforadmissiontothemeetingandotherevents.
AirlineshavesometimesjackeduppricesfortheBerkshireweekend.
Ifyouarecomingfromfaraway,comparethecostofflyingtoKansasCityversusOmaha.
Thedrivebetweenthetwocitiesisabout212hours,anditmaybethatyoucansavesignificantmoney,particularlyifyouhadplannedtorentacarinOmaha.
Spendthesavingswithus.
AtNebraskaFurnitureMart,locatedona77-acresiteon72ndStreetbetweenDodgeandPacific,wewillagainbehaving"BerkshireWeekend"discountpricing.
Lastyearthestoredid$35.
9millionofbusinessduringitsannualmeetingsale,anall-timerecordthatmakesotherretailersturngreen.
ToobtaintheBerkshirediscount,youmustmakeyourpurchasesbetweenTuesday,April30thandMonday,May6thinclusive,andalsopresentyourmeetingcredential.
Theperiod'sspecialpricingwillevenapplytotheproductsofseveralprestigiousmanufacturersthatnormallyhaveironcladrulesagainstdiscountingbutwhich,inthespiritofourshareholderweekend,havemadeanexceptionforyou.
Weappreciatetheircooperation.
NFMisopenfrom10a.
m.
to9p.
m.
MondaythroughSaturday,and10a.
m.
to6p.
m.
onSunday.
OnSaturdaythisyear,from5:30p.
m.
to8p.
m.
,NFMishavingapicnictowhichyouareallinvited.
AtBorsheims,wewillagainhavetwoshareholder-onlyevents.
Thefirstwillbeacocktailreceptionfrom6p.
m.
to9p.
m.
onFriday,May3rd.
Thesecond,themaingala,willbeheldonSunday,May5th,from9a.
m.
to4p.
m.
OnSaturday,wewillbeopenuntil6p.
m.
Inrecentyears,ourthree-dayvolumehasfarexceededsalesinallofDecember,normallyajeweler'sbestmonth.
转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
44/45Around1p.
m.
onSunday,IwillbeginclerkingatBorsheims.
Lastyearmysalestotaled$1.
5million.
ThisyearIwon'tquituntilIhit$2million.
BecauseIneedtoleavewellbeforesundown,Iwillbedesperatetodobusiness.
Cometakeadvantageofme.
Askformy"CrazyWarren"price.
WewillhavehugecrowdsatBorsheimsthroughouttheweekend.
Foryourconvenience,therefore,shareholderpriceswillbeavailablefromMonday,April29ththroughSaturday,May11th.
Duringthatperiod,pleaseidentifyyourselfasashareholderbypresentingyourmeetingcredentialsorabrokeragestatementthatshowsyouareaBerkshireholder.
OnSunday,inthemalloutsideofBorsheims,ablindfoldedPatrickWolff,twiceU.
S.
chesschampion,willtakeonallcomers–whowillhavetheireyeswideopen–ingroupsofsix.
Nearby,NormanBeck,aremarkablemagicianfromDallas,willbewilderonlookers.
Additionally,wewillhaveBobHammanandSharonOsberg,twooftheworld'stopbridgeexperts,availabletoplaybridgewithourshareholdersonSundayafternoon.
Don'tplaythemformoney.
Gorat'sandPiccolo'swillagainbeopenexclusivelyforBerkshireshareholdersonSunday,May5th.
Bothwillbeservinguntil10p.
m.
,withGorat'sopeningat1p.
m.
andPiccolo'sopeningat4p.
m.
Theserestaurantsaremyfavorites,andIwilleatatbothofthemonSundayevening.
Remember:TomakeareservationatGorat's,call402-551-3733onApril1st(butnotbefore)andatPiccolo'scall402-342-9038.
AtPiccolo's,orderagiantrootbeerfloatfordessert.
Onlysissiesgetthesmallone.
(IoncesawBillGatespolishofftwoofthegiantvarietyafterafull-coursedinner;that'swhenIknewhewouldmakeagreatdirector.
)Wewillagainhavethesamethreefinancialjournalistsleadthequestion-and-answerperiodatthemeeting,askingCharlieandmequestionsthatshareholdershavesubmittedtothembye-mail.
Thejournalistsandtheire-mailaddressesare:CarolLoomis,ofFortune,whomaybeemailedatcloomis@fortunemail.
com;BeckyQuick,ofCNBC,atBerkshireQuestions@cnbc.
com,andAndrewRossSorkin,ofTheNewYorkTimes,atarsorkin@nytimes.
com.
Fromthequestionssubmitted,eachjournalistwillchoosethesixheorshedecidesarethemostinterestingandimportant.
Thejournalistshavetoldmeyourquestionhasthebestchanceofbeingselectedifyoukeepitconcise,avoidsendingitinatthelastmoment,makeitBerkshire-relatedandincludenomorethantwoquestionsinanyemailyousendthem.
(Inyouremail,letthejournalistknowifyouwouldlikeyournamementionedifyourquestionisselected.
)LastyearwehadasecondpanelofthreeanalystswhofollowBerkshire.
Allwereinsurancespecialists,andshareholderssubsequentlyindicatedtheywantedalittlemorevariety.
Therefore,thisyearwewillhaveoneinsuranceanalyst,CliffGallantofNomuraSecurities.
JonathanBrandtofRuane,Cunniff&Goldfarbwilljointheanalystpaneltoaskquestionsthatdealwithournon-insuranceoperations.
Finally–tospicethingsup–wewouldliketoaddtothepanelacredentialedbearonBerkshire,preferablyonewhoisshortthestock.
Notyethavingabearidentified,wewouldliketohearfromapplicants.
TheonlyrequirementisthatyoubeaninvestmentprofessionalandnegativeonBerkshire.
ThethreeanalystswillbringtheirownBerkshire-specificquestionsandalternatewiththejournalistsandtheaudienceinaskingthem.
CharlieandIbelievethatallshareholdersshouldhaveaccesstonewBerkshireinformationsimultaneouslyandshouldalsohaveadequatetimetoanalyzeit,whichiswhywetrytoissuefinancialinformationafterthemarketcloseonaFridayandwhyourannualmeetingisheldon转载请注明ArKiller翻译,非常感谢!
部分借用也请注明出处,PDF转Word请仔细一些,每年的表格都可能调整,请注意不要把利润也写错.
45/45Saturdays.
Wedonottalkone-on-onetolargeinstitutionalinvestorsoranalysts.
Ourhopeisthatthejournalistsandanalystswillaskquestionsthatwillfurthereducateshareholdersabouttheirinvestment.
NeitherCharlienorIwillgetsomuchasaclueaboutthequestionstobeasked.
Weknowthejournalistsandanalystswillcomeupwithsometoughones,andthat'sthewaywelikeit.
Alltold,weexpectatleast54questions,whichwillallowforsixfromeachanalystandjournalistand18fromtheaudience.
Ifthereissomeextratime,wewilltakemorefromtheaudience.
Audiencequestionerswillbedeterminedbydrawingsthatwilltakeplaceat8:15a.
m.
ateachofthe11microphoneslocatedinthearenaandmainoverflowroom.
Forgoodreason,Iregularlyextoltheaccomplishmentsofouroperatingmanagers.
TheyaretrulyAll-Stars,whoruntheirbusinessesasiftheyweretheonlyassetownedbytheirfamilies.
Ibelievetheirmindsettobeasshareholder-orientedascanbefoundintheuniverseoflargepublicly-ownedcompanies.
Mosthavenofinancialneedtowork;thejoyofhittingbusiness"homeruns"meansasmuchtothemastheirpaycheck.
Equallyimportant,however,arethe23menandwomenwhoworkwithmeatourcorporateoffice(allononefloor,whichisthewayweintendtokeepit!
).
ThisgroupefficientlydealswithamultitudeofSECandotherregulatoryrequirements,filesa21,500-pageFederalincometaxreturnaswellasstateandforeignreturns,respondstocountlessshareholderandmediainquiries,getsouttheannualreport,preparesforthecountry'slargestannualmeeting,coordinatestheBoard'sactivities–andthelistgoesonandon.
Theyhandleallofthesebusinesstaskscheerfullyandwithunbelievableefficiency,makingmylifeeasyandpleasant.
TheireffortsgobeyondactivitiesstrictlyrelatedtoBerkshire:Lastyeartheydealtwith48universities(selectedfrom200applicants)whosentstudentstoOmahaforaQ&Adaywithme.
TheyalsohandleallkindsofrequeststhatIreceive,arrangemytravel,andevengetmehamburgersforlunch.
NoCEOhasitbetter;Itrulydofeelliketapdancingtoworkeveryday.
Thishomeofficecrew,alongwithouroperatingmanagers,hasmydeepestthanksanddeservesyoursaswell.
CometoOmaha–thecradleofcapitalism–onMay4thandchimein.
March1,2013WarrenE.
BuffettChairmanoftheBoard