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FocusedDaydreamingandMind-WanderingFabianDorsch#SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht2014AbstractInthispaper,Idescribeanddiscusstwomentalphenomenawhicharesomewhatneglectedinthephilosophyofmind:focuseddaydreamingandmind-wandering.
Myaimistoshowthattheirnaturesareratherdistinct,despitethefactthatwetendtoclassifybothasinstancesofdaydreaming.
Thefirstdifferencebetweenthetwo,Iargue,isthat,whilefocuseddaydreamingisaninstanceofimaginativementalagency(i.
e.
mentalagencywiththepurposetovoluntarilyproducecertainmentalrepresentations),mind-wanderingisnot—thoughthisdoesnotmeanthatmind-wanderingcannotinvolvementalagencyatall.
Thispersonal-leveldifferenceinagencyandpurposivenesshas,furthermore,theconsequencethatinstancesofmind-wanderingdonotconstituteunifiedandself-containedsegmentsofthestreamofconsciousness—instarkcontrasttofocuseddaydreams.
Besides,thetwokindsofmentalphenomenadifferinwhethertheypossessanarrativestructure,andinhowwemaymakesenseofthesuccessionofmentalepisodesinvolved.
Thereareatleasttwodistinctmentalphenomenathatwesometimescategorizeasinstancesof'daydreaming'.
Ontheonehand,therearewhataretypicallycalledinstancesofmind-wandering.
1Whenwesitinaboringlectureorlookoutthroughthewindowofamovingtrain,weoftenstopattendingtowhatisbeforeoursensesandgiveourmindrelativelyfreereign.
Thatis,wesubstantiallylessenourcontrolovertheflowofmentalepisodesthatconstitutesourstreamofconsciousnessandinsteadletourselvesbesurprisedandentertainedbyexperiencesandthoughtsthatfolloweachothermoreorlessspontaneously,andwhicharetypicallyconcernedwithfrequentlyRev.
Phil.
Psych.
DOI10.
1007/s13164-014-0221-41Discussionsofmind-wandering—sometimesunderthelabelof'daydreaming'—canbefoundin,forexample,SingerandMcCraven(1961),SmallwoodandSchooler(2006),Zangwill(2006),Sutton(2010),andMetzinger(2013).
AlthoughSingerallowsfor'positiveconstructivedaydreaming'whichfurthermorehelpsustoachievesomeofourpersonalgoals,hedoesnotseemtocountfocuseddaydreamsamongthe(central)examplesof'positiveconstructivedaydreaming',butratherconceivesofthelatterinawaywhichiscompatiblewithmycharacterisationofmind-wandering.
SeeMcMillanetal.
(2013)andRegis(2013)forfurtherdiscussion,especiallyconcerningSinger'sseemingidentificationof'daydreaming'withmind-wandering.
F.
Dorsch(*)DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofFribourg,Avenuedel'Europe20,1700Fribourg,Switzerlande-mail:fabian.
dorsch@unifr.
chchangingsubjectmatters.
Fromrecallingsomeofthethingsthatwedidinourlastholidays,wemayswitchtovisualizinghowitwouldbeliketositnowatthebeach,beforethinkingaboutourfriendwhoisinParisrightnow,whichmaythenleadustoentertainthepossibilityofeatingouttonight,afterwhichwemayimaginehowthedinnerconversationwithourpotentialdatemightgo,andsoon.
Ontheotherhand,wemaybeengagedinwhathasbeenlabelledfocuseddaydreaming.
2Insuchcases,wealsowithdrawfromtheworldsurroundingusandstarttoexperienceorthinkaboutobjectsandeventsthatarelargelyabsent,pastorimaginary.
Butwetakeamuchmoreactivepartindirectingtheorderandcontentofourmentalepisodesandusuallysticktoaparticulartopicorissue.
Inpreparationoftheirridedownthetrack,thedriversofbobsleighstendtoclosetheireyesandimagineracingthewholerunfromstarttofinish,therebyvisualizingthealternatingcurvesandstraightpassages.
Infact,someone,whoisanardentspectatorofthesportandalmostasfamiliarwiththetrackasthedrivers,mayengageinmoreorlessthesamefocuseddaydream,eventhoughwithoutanyintentiontofollowitupwitharealrunthroughtheicecanal.
Somepsychologistsappeartodrawthesamedistinction—forinstance,Giambra(1995)whodifferentiatesbetween'spontaneousmind-wandering'(i.
e.
mind-wanderinginmysense)and'deliberatemind-wandering'(i.
e.
focuseddaydreaming).
Schooleretal.
(2011,p.
319),ontheotherhand,seemtointendtoencompassbothmind-wandering(inmysense)andfocuseddaydreamingwhentheydefine'mindwandering'as'engagingincognitionsunrelatedtothecurrentdemandsoftheexternalenvironment'.
Butsomeoftheirwritingsalsosuggestthatwhattheyhaveinmindwhentalkingabout'mindwandering'israthersomethingmorepassive,namely'ashiftofattentionawayfromaprimarytasktowardinternalinformation,suchasmemories'(SmallwoodandSchooler2006,p.
946).
Accordingly,itisnotabsolutelyclearwhethertheytakefocuseddaydreamstobe(central)instancesof'mindwandering'.
Thisillustratesthattheterminologyinthisareaisnot(yet)fullyestablishedanduniform,andthat'daydreaming'and'mind-wandering'areusedindifferentways.
ButIhopethattheexamplesandconceptualconsiderationsgiveninthispapersufficetoclearlyindividuateanddifferentiatethetwokindsofmentalphenomenathatIhaveinmindwhendistinguishingbetweenmind-wanderingandfocuseddaydreaming.
Neitherofthetwomentalphenomenaisoftendiscussedinthephilosophyofmind.
Inparticular,theyarerarelycontrastedwitheachother.
Inthispaper,Iaimtoshowthattheirnaturesareindeedquitedistinct,despitethefactthatwetendtotreatbothasinstancesof'daydreaming'.
Thefirstdifferencebetweenthetwo,Iargue,isthat,whilefocuseddaydreamingisaninstanceofimaginativementalagency(i.
e.
voluntarymentalagencywiththepurposetoproducecertainmentalrepresentations),mind-wanderingisnot—thoughthisdoesnotmeanthatmind-wanderingcannotinvolvementalagencyatall.
Thispersonal-leveldifferenceinagencyandpurposivenesshas,furthermore,theconsequencethatinstancesofmind-wanderingdonotconstituteunifiedandself-containedsegmentsofthestreamofconsciousness—instarkcontrasttofocuseddaydreams.
Besides,thetwokindsofmentalphenomenadifferinwhethertheypossess2Forexample,whenMcGinn(2004,ch.
6)andIchikawa(2009)talkabout'daydreaming',whattheyhaveinmindisfocuseddaydreaming.
SeealsoMetzinger(2013)fordiscussion.
F.
Dorschanarrativestructure,andinhowwemaymakesenseofthesuccessionofmentalepisodesinvolved.
3Thepaperisdividedintotwolargeparts.
Inthefirst,Idescribesomeoftheforemostfeaturesoffocuseddaydreams,notablytheirpurposivenessandtheirnarrativestruc-ture.
Giventhattheyareimaginativementalprojects,Iconcentrateinparticularonthenatureofmentalprojects(i.
e.
complexmentalactions).
Thesecondpartisconcernedwithmind-wanderingandhowitdiffersfromfocuseddaydreaming.
Attheheartofthediscussionisthecentralroleofassociationinmind-wanderingandtheresultinglackofanoverallrepresentationalpurposes,whichpreventsinstancesofmind-wanderingfrombeingdistinctandunifiedmentalphenomena(suchasmentalprojects),andalsofromhavinganarrativestructure.
1FocusedDaydreamingInthissection,Iaimtoillustratethatfocuseddaydreamsareimaginativementalprojects—thatis,instancesofimaginativementalagency—which,moreover,possessanarrativestructure.
Inordertodoso,Ifirsthavetosayabitmoreaboutthenatureofmentalprojects,beforespecificallyaddressingtheissueofwhatitmeansforthemtocountaspurposiveandmentaland,incertaincases,alsoasimaginative.
Iconcludethesectionwithadescriptionofthenarrativestructureoffocuseddaydreams,beforethenmovingoninthenextsectiontohowfocuseddaydreamingdiffersfrommind-wandering.
1.
1MentalProjectsvs.
MentalEpisodesWhatIhaveinmindwhenspeakingofmentalprojectsisperhapsbestillustratedbyalistofexamples:mentallycalculatingasum;drawinganinference;makingupourmindsaboutwhattothinkordobyconsideringandweighinginourmindstherelevantreasonsalreadyavailabletous;tryingtoempathizewithanotherpersonandtopredictherthoughtsandfeelingsonthebasisofourknowledgeabouther;developinginourmindssolutionstosomeproblem;daydreamingaboutclimbingMountEverest;reconstructinginourmemorytheeventsandconversationsofsomedayinthepast;recreatingorcomposinginourmindsstories,picturesormelodies;reflectingonourcurrentsituationandourvariousresponsestowardsitinordertogetclearaboutourownfeelings;calmingourselvesdownbymeditatingorremindingourselvesofsomethingpleasant;imaginingthesensoryexperiencesinvolvedinplayingaBach3Interestingly,asimilarsubdivisionseemstobepresentindreaming.
Whilesomesequencesofdreamepisodesarestructuredandunifiedbymeansoftheirsharedlinktopurposivementalagency(i.
e.
examplesofluciddreaming),othersequenceslackthispurposiveness,structureandunity(i.
e.
'standard'examplesofdreaming).
Note,however,thattermslike'dreaming'or'dream(s)'donotdenoteacertainclassofmentalphenomena,butratheraspecificstateofconsciousness(e.
g.
,tobecontrastedwithbeingawake,orwithbeingcomatose).
Furthermore,therearegoodreasonstoassumethatthereisafundamentaldifferencebetweenwakingconsciousnessanddreamconsciousness,whichhastheconsequencethat,say,focuseddaydreamingandluciddreamingcouldnotbelongtothesamementalkind.
Inparticular,weshouldnottake(lucid)dreamingtobeaninstanceofimagining.
IdiscussanddefendtheseclaimsinmoredetailinDorsch(2015).
FocusedDaydreamingandMind-Wanderingpreludeonthepiano;andsoon(furtherexamplescanbefoundinWollheim1973and1984,ch.
3;Peacocke1985;Budd1989,ch.
5;andZangwill2006).
Mentalprojectslikethesearecompositementalepisodes,thatis,complexsegmentsofthestreamofconsciousness.
Theyarecomposedofsimple(r)mentalepisodes,suchasepisodesofperceiving,remembering,imagining,thinking,feeling,desiringordeciding.
Itisnotalwayseasytosaywhichmentalepisodescountascomposite,andwhy.
Butoneofthemaincriterionshouldprobablybewhetheragivensegmentofthestreamofconsciousnessinvolveselementsthatcouldoccurontheirown,thatis,independentlyofbeingpartofthesegment.
Accordingly,ifamentalepisodedoesnotallowforsuchfurtherdivision,itshouldnotcountasamentalproject.
Likeallothermentalepisodes,mentalprojectsareconsciousandepisodicphenomena.
Wehaveaccessfromtheinsidetowhattheyarelike(ortowhatitislikeforustohavethem);andtheyhaveapreciseduration,withspecificstartingandendpoints.
Itmakessense,forinstance,toaskwhensomeonestartedtocalculateacertainsuminitshead,andhowlongittookhim.
Indeed,theirepisodiccharacteriscentraltotheunityofmentalepisodes,onthepersonallevel,asdiscreteandindependentmentalphenomena.
However,notallcompositesofmentalepisodesareprojects—justthinkofthefairlyrandomsequenceofmentalepisodesthatyouenjoyedbetweentwelveandoneo'clocktoday.
Moreover,twodistinctmentalprojectsmayoccurinourmindsroughlyatthesametime(e.
g.
,immediatelyfollowingoralternatingwitheachother).
Forinstance,mypursuitoftheprojectofthinkingaboutaparticularphilosophicalproblemmaytemporallyoverlapwithmypursuitoftheprojectofdecidingwhattowriteinalettertoafriend;andImayswitchmyattentionfromonetotheotherandbackagain.
Thisindicatesthatthedifferentiationofmentalprojectsfromeachotherandfromothercomplexsequencesofmentalepisodesisamatterofmorethanjusttheirtemporalaspects.
1.
2PurposivenessandUnityThecrucialfeatureinthisrespectisthepersonal-levelpurposivenessofmentalprojects.
Itisresponsibleforthefactthatmentalprojectsaresingle,self-containedphenomenaandconstitutedistinctpartsofthestreamofconsciousness.
Withouttheirpurposive-ness,mentalprojectscouldnotbedistinguishedfromotherphenomenaoccurringinphenomenalconsciousness.
Inparticular,itwouldbeunspecifiedwhichsimplermentalepisodesareconstituentsofaparticularproject,andwhichbelongtoadifferentcomplexmentalepisode,ortononeatall.
Thepurposeofmentalprojectsiswhatholdstheirelementstogetheranddistinguishestheprojectsfromothermentalphenom-ena,allonthepersonallevel.
Indeed,weidentifyanddescribementalprojectsintermsoftheirpurpose.
Theprojectsofempathizingwithanotherpersonandofdeliberatingaboutwhattodotonightdifferfromeachotherbecauseweengageintheminthepursuitofdifferentends,namelytobetterunderstandtheotherpersonandhersituation,andtocometoadecisionwithrespecttohowtospendtheevening,respectively.
Thepurposeofamentalprojectunifiesthelatteronthepersonallevelbydetermin-ingwhichepisodesinone'sstreamofconsciousnessaregeneratedorincludedaspartoftheproject,andwhichnot.
Whatistherebydecisiveiswhetherthegenerationorinclusionoftheepisodescontributes(oristakenbyustocontribute)tothefurtheranceF.
Dorschofthepurposethatdefinesthementalproject.
4Forexample,pursuingtheprojectofrecallingsomepastholidayinvolvesreminiscingaboutcertaineventsthathappenedduringit;andtheresultingepisodesofrememberingbecomeconstituentsofourprojectbecausetheycontributetothedesiredrecollectionofthoseholidays.
Bycontrast,theperceptions,thoughtsorfeelingsthatwemayhaveatthesametimeas,butunrelatedto,ourrememberingarenotbepartofourprojectbecausetheydonotfurtherthepurposeofrecallingtheholiday.
Similarly,whichepisodesareproducedoradmittedaselementsoftheprojecttodecidewhattodotonightisdeterminedbytheendofthisproject,namelytocometoareasonablepracticalconclusion.
Remindingourselvesoftheavailableoptionsandourevaluationsof,orfeelingstowards,theseoptionsarebothconstituentsofourproject.
Takingintoconsiderationwhatwecurrentlyhearanotherpersonsayingmaybeincludedbyusaswell,dependingonwhetheritbearsontheissue.
ButfeelinganitchorhavingaspontaneousthoughtaboutwhetherBovaryisreallyoblivioustothereasonsforhiswife'sbehaviourdonotenterourproject.
Whatmattersforwhetheracertain(simpler)episodebelongstoagivenmentalprojectisthuswhethertheepisodehelpstheprojecttofulfilitspurpose.
Thepreciseextentornatureofthiscontributionmaynotalwaysbeeasytospecify.
Intelligibilityofthelinkbetweenepisodeandprojectseemstobeaminimalrequirement;whichagainpresupposessomenon-causal—ornotmerelycausal—connectionbetweenthepurposeoftheprojectandthenatureorcontentoftheepisodeinquestion.
Rationallinks(likeinstrumentalones)areobviouslygoodcandidates.
Butperhapsothertypesofconnec-tionarerelevantaswell(e.
g.
,thoseinvolvedinthenarrativestructurestobediscussedlateron).
5Inanycase,withoutapurpose,mentalprojectswouldlackunityandfailtoconstitutedistinctmentalphenomena.
Theywouldbenothingmorethanarbitrarilyindividuatedportionsofthestreamofconsciousness.
For,apartfrompurposiveness,nootherfeatureofsuchsegmentscouldunifythemandspecifywhichparticularmentalepisodesbelongtotheproject.
Theunitycouldnotbeduetotheobtaining,amongtheepisodesofeachproject,ofcertaincausalorrationalrelations.
Thereasonforthisisthattherespectiverelationsoftenreachbeyondthebordersofprojects:mentalprojectsdonotoccurcausallyorrationallydisconnectedfromotherconsciousphenomena.
WhenIamengagedintheprojectofdecidingwheretogoduringmysummerholidays,arandomthoughtabout4Thereisofcoursethecomplicationthatwemaybewrongaboutwhatcontributestothepursuitofacertainend.
Wemay,forinstance,erroneouslythinkthatlisteningtoourfriend,orrelaxingourselvesbythinkingofsomethingpleasant,helpsustocometoabetterdecisionaboutwhattodotonight.
Soshouldourconsiderationofourfriend'sopinion,orourmentalefforttorelaxourselves,countaspartofourdeliberativeprojectIftheydo,wemighthavetoacknowledgethatwhatmattersfortheinclusioninagivenmentalprojectisnotreal,butonlyseemingcontributiontotheachievementoftheproject'spurpose.
However,thereisnoneedtosettlethisissuehere;andinwhatfollows,Iassume,justforthesakeofsimplicity,thatactualcontributionisrequired.
Evenifthisshouldturnouttobefalse,itwouldstillremaintruethatwhatunifiesmentalprojectsistheirpurpose.
5Thatwedonotyethaveafullgraspofallthedifferentwaysinwhichmentalepisodesmaycontributetothefulfillmentofthepurposeofamentalprojectandthusbepartofthatprojectdoesnotimplythatthereisnodefiniteanswertothequestionofwhen—andwhy—agivenmentalepisodebelongstoaparticularproject.
Thesameappliestotheissueofwhethermentalprojectsarelimitedexclusivelytothemind(seethefollowingfootnote).
Butevenifmentalprojectswouldhavevagueboundaries,thiswouldnotdeprivethemofunity,orofformingarealclassofmentalphenomenathatcanbefurtherinvestigated,empiricallyorotherwise.
Indeed,suchinvestigationispresumablyneededtobeabletoidentifymoreclearlythebordersofgivenmentalprojects.
FocusedDaydreamingandMind-WanderingmyfriendmaygivemetheideatovisitRome—forinstance,becauseIknowthatitismyfriend'sfavouritecity.
ImayalsoconsiderthefactthatRomeislocatedinItalyandcanbereachedbytrainin8h—afact,knowledgeofwhichIacquiredbymeansofpastperceptionsandjudgements.
Furthermore,myeventualdecisiontotraveltoRomemaygiverisetofurtherdecisions,suchastocheckonthepricesfortrainticketsandhotelrooms,ortogetintotouchwithmyfriendslivinginRome.
Butnoneoftheseothermentalepisodes—therandomthoughtaboutmyfriend,thepastperceptionsorjudge-mentsconcerningRome,orthesubsequentdecisionstofurtherplanthejourney—arepartofmymentalprojectofdecidingwheretospendmysummerholidays,despiteofbeingcausallyorrationallyrelatedtothisproject.
Mentalprojectsarealsonotunifiedinvirtueofsomethingexternaltothem.
Asithappens,theepisodesofagivenprojectneednotconcernacommonobjectorsubjectmatter.
Andeveniftheydo,thiswillsimplybeanotherconsequenceoftheparticularnatureofthepurposeoftheprojectinquestion.
WhenIamdaydreamingaboutmynextholidays,theinvolvedmentalrepresentationsmayhavemanydifferentobjects,suchasthevariousfriendsthatIwouldliketomeet,orthevariousplacesthatIwouldliketovisit.
If,ontheotherhand,allepisodesinvolvesareconcernedjustwithRomeandmyfriendslivingthere,thiswillbeduetothefactthatthepurposeofmyprojectismorespecific,namelytodaydreamaboutmynextvisittoRome.
Sinceitisdifficulttothinkoffurtherfeaturesorfactorsthatmightberesponsiblefortheunityofmentalprojects,itisreasonabletoconcludethat,inordertoconstitutedistinctmentalphenomenain—andnotmerelyarbitrarytemporalportionsof—thestreamofconsciousness,mentalprojectshavetobepurposive.
Theunityofaprojectdoesnotpresupposethattheprojectiscontinuouslyintheforegroundofourattention,oreveninphenomenalconsciousness.
WhenIaminterruptedbyatelephonecallwhiletryingtosolveaproblemordeliberatingaboutwhattodointhesummer,Imayreturntomyprojectandtakeitupagainstraightafterwards,orthenextday,orthenextweek.
Althoughmymentalprojectmaystayinthebackgroundofmymindduringthephoneconversationandperhapsforsometimelonger,itneednotdoso.
Inparticular,Idonothavetobeconsciouslyoccupiedwiththeprojectduringthewholeperiodofthebreakinordertobeabletoreturntoitlateron.
Thisisjustareflectionofthefactthatwedonotbeginanewproject—mentalornot—eachtimewetakeupagainourstrivingforaparticulargoal.
Indeed,complexprojectslikewritingabook,ortryingtounderstandourselvesoranotherperson,usuallyhaveanon-continuousnature.
Ourengagementswiththemstretchovermonthsoryearsandinvolvenumerousbreaks,whilecontinuingtobeconcernedwithasingle,temporallyextendedandnon-continuousproject.
Inthisrespect,mentalprojectsaresimilartomanycomplexmentalexperiences,suchasaestheticones.
Forinstance,wedonotbegintoreadanovelaneweachtimewetakeitupagainonthepagewhereweleftitthelasttime,butinsteadtypicallycontinueourexperienceofreadingit(andthisremainstrueevenwhenwerereadsomeofitspassagesinordertoremindourselves,orgetaclearergrasp,ofthem).
1.
3PurposivenessandAgencyApartfrombeingresponsiblefortheiridentityandunity,thepurposivenessofmentalprojectsalsocontributestotheirstatusasinstancesofmentalagency.
ThatsomethingisF.
Dorschpurposive(onthepersonallevel)means,veryroughly,thatitisdonebyusforanend:thatis,eitherjustforitsownsake,orforanulteriorpurpose(Pink1996,pp.
14f.
and144).
Wemaykickaballbecausewesimplywanttokickit,orbecausewewanttoscoreagoal.
Inbothcases,ourkickingoftheballispurposive.
Wedothingsforanendonthebasisof,andastheeffectof,someofourmotivationalstates(orepisodes)thatpresentuswiththeendinquestion.
Inourexample,whatmovesustokicktheballmaybeourintentiontoscoreagoal,say.
Similarly,weareengagedinthementalprojectofcalculatingasuminourmind,orofimaginingtobeintheshoesofsomeoneelse,becausethisiswhatwehavedecidedtodo.
Themotivationalroleofintentionsandsimilarmentalstatesistherebymultifaceted.
Theyinitiateandsustainpurposivedoings;theyguidethemuntiltheircompletionorinterruption;andtheyhelpusandotherstomakesenseofwhatwearedoing.
Wegothroughthemotionsofkickingtheballbecause,andaslongas,wewanttoscoreagoal;wetrytokicktheballinawaywhichwebelieveismostlikelytoleadtoagoalbeingscored;andthatwekicktheballinthiswayisintelligibleinthelightofourwishtoscoreagoal.
Accordingly,whatisdistinctiveofmotivationalstatesisthattheypossessthe—notnecessarilyalwaysrealized—powertoinitiate,sustain,guideandexplainpurposivedoings.
Manydifferentkindsofstate(orepisode)havebeenproposedascandidatesformotivationalstates,suchasdesires,volitions,tryings,urges,impulses,wants,wishes,emotions,evaluativeorpracticaljudgements,andsoon.
Outofconvenience,Ifocushereonintentionsasexamplesofstateswithmotivationalpower.
Thelinktomotivationalstatesalreadyindicatesthatpurposivenessiscloselyrelatedtoagency.
Indeed,somephilosophershavearguedthatallpurposivedoings—includingallengagementsinmentalprojects—countasactions(Pink1996,pp.
14f.
and42;2003).
Butthiswouldmeanthattherecanbeinvoluntarymentalactions.
Forexample,decidingtodosomethingispurposive,butnotdoneatwill(Pink1996,ch.
7).
Whenwecomeupwithaparticulardecisionaboutwhattodotonight,say,wedonotmakethisdecisionsimplyinresponsetowantingtomakeit(i.
e.
independentlyofwhetherwewilleveractonit),butinsteadinresponsetosomeotherpurpose(e.
g.
becausewewanttospendapleasanteveningandhavesomeopinionsaboutwhatconstitutessuchanevening).
Rejectingthepossibilityofinvoluntaryactions,manyphilosophershavethereforelimitedagencytopurposivedoingsthataredoneatwill(e.
g.
Davidson1980,ch.
4;seealsoPink2003).
Mentalprojectsturnouttobeinstancesofagency,independentlyofwhetherweacceptpurposivenessorvoluntarinessasthemarkofagency.
Forourengagementinmentalprojectsisnotonlypurposive,butalsovoluntary.
Whenwearecreatingastoryinourmind,ortrytorelaxourselvesbymeansofvisualisingsomethingpleasant,wedothisatwill,thatis,becausewewanttodoit(evenifthereissomeulteriorpurposethatdrivesourvoluntaryengagementintheproject).
However,thatmentalprojectsareinstancesofagencydoesnotrequirethatalltheirepisodicconstituentsareinstancesofagency(Wollheim1973,pp.
70f.
).
Mentalprojectsnormallyinvolveatleastsomeepisodeswhichhavebeengeneratedbypassivemechanisms,suchasassociation,epistemicprocesses,orthemanifestationofmentaldispositions.
Inthisrespect,mentalprojectsdonotdifferfromotherformsofagency.
Activelyraisingone'sarm,say,involvesthestimulationofcertainnerves;whilescoringagoalexploitstheeffectsofgravityandalsothemovementsoftheotherplayers(whicharepassiveinsofarthatFocusedDaydreamingandMind-Wanderingtheyarebeyondthecontrolofthescorer).
Relatedly,theunityofmentalprojectsdoesnotpresupposethatall(orperhapsevenanyof)theepisodesincludedinaprojectcomeintobeingduringourpursuitofit.
Instead,theymayariseindependentlyoftheprojectandonlyafterwardsbecomeoneofitsparts—say,duetosomeactofactiveinclusiononourbehalf,orsimplybecausetheyhappentohelpusinourpursuitoftheproject.
Somementalprojectsmaypossesspurposeswhichrenderthemopen-endedinthesensethatthereisnospecificpointatwhichtheirpurposecountsasachieved.
Suchprojectsdonotfinishbythemselves,buthavetobeterminatedbysomefactorsexternaltothem—say,anactofwill,orsomedistractinginfluence.
WhenIamengagedindaydreamingaboutthelikelyconsequencesofclimbingMountEverestonmylifeandthelivesofothers,thereneednotbeanyclearpointwithinthedaydreamatwhichIcount,orrecognizemyself,ashavingfinishedmyproject:notaftervisualizingmyselfreachingthesummit;norafterreturninginmyimaginationtothebasecamp,orKatmandu,orhome;norafterimaginingthereactionsofmyfriendstomybraggingaboutmyfeat,norafterspeculatingaboutthefameandfortuneswhichwillawaitmeandcompletelychangemylifeifIsellmystory.
Ofcourse,themoredetailsofmyclimbIimagine,thericherandmorecompletemydaydreammightbecome.
Butthereisnorichestormostcompletedaydreamtobehad:Icouldliterallygoonandon,evenbeyondimaginingmyowndeath(e.
g.
whenIimaginemyposthumousfame).
Similarly,thereneednotbeanyclearpointatwhichIbegintobesuccessfulindaydreamingaboutclimbingMountEverest.
Forthereisnoeasilyspecifiablelowerlimitofrichnessorcompletenesswhichseparatessuccessandfailure.
ItisunclearwhenIbegintocountas,say,daydreamingabouttheclimb:whenIsupposethatIamclimbing;whenIvisualizeacertainstretchofmyclimb;oralreadywhenIimaginearrivinginKatmanduandrealizingthatmyclimbinggeargotlostontheflightandIhavetogiveuponmyambitions.
Thisdoesnotimply,however,thatwecannotfailinpursuingopen-endedprojects.
Ontheonehand,wecanfailtoengageinthematall(e.
g.
,ifIfailtoformanyimaginativerepresentation,orifIrepresentmyselfsolelyaslyinginthesunontheRiviera).
Ontheotherhand,thedaydreammaynotberichorcompleteenough(e.
g.
,whenIintendtoimaginenotonlymyclimb,butalsoitsconsequencesformylife,butterminatemyimaginativeactivitybeforereachingthissecondpointinmydaydream).
Inalltheserespects,open-endedmentalprojectsaresimilarto,say,thenon-mentalprojectofgoingforawalk:thelatteralsohasnoclearboundaries,doesnotbyitselfimposeanystoppingpoint,yetmaynonethelessfail.
1.
4MentalProjectsvs.
Non-MentalProjectsMostofwhatIhavesaidsofaraboutthepurposiveness,unityandagencyofmentalprojectsalsoappliestonon-mentalprojects,likebuildingahouse,writinganovel,teachingsomeonetospeakanewlanguage,preparingapartyorraisingachild.
Buttherearealsocrucialdifferencesbetweenthetwokindsofproject.
Firstofall,projectscountasmentalonlyif—andbecause—theyaimatalteringsomefactsaboutone'sownmind.
Inotherwords,mentalprojectshavethepurposeofbringingabout(orotherwiseinfluencing)certainkindsofmentalphenomenainone'sownmind,whethertheseareepisodicordispositionalincharacter;andtheycountasaccomplishediftherespectivementalphenomenaindeedcomeintobeing.
Thus,mentalprojectsaimat,say,theacquisitionofbeliefsorcharactertraits,theF.
Dorschmanifestationofmentaldispositions(suchasofamnemonicoremotionalnature),theformationofjudgements,intentionsorimaginativerepresentations,thealterationofone'smood,orperhapsthedistractionfrom,orrepressionof,certainworriesorfeelings.
Incontrast,non-mentalprojects(suchastheonesmentioned)typicallyaimatbringingaboutfactswhichareeithernon-mentalorconcernthemindofotherpersons.
Havingthepurposeofinfluencingone'sownmindis,however,insufficienttodistinguishmentalfromnon-mentalprojects.
Considertheprojectofimprovingyourmood.
Youmayengageinthisprojectbyturningonandlisteningtoapieceofmusicofwhichyouknowthatitislikelytocheeryouup.
But,instead,youmayalsosimplyauditorilyimaginesingingorlisteningtothesong.
Youmayimproveyourmoodinbothways,butonlythesecondmethodconstitutesanengagementinamentalproject.
Exampleslikethesesuggesttheadditionofafurtherrequirementonmentalprojects,namelythattheyoccur—fromtheirconceptionuntiltheircompletion—exclusivelyinthemind.
Indeed,ifaprojecthasthepurposetobringaboutsomementalphenomenoninone'sownmindanddoesnotinvolveanynonmentaleventsorelements,thenitissafetosaythatitismentalproject.
6Differentkindsofmentalprojectdifferinrespectoftheirpurposesand,hence,alsoinrespectofthementalepisodesthatconstituteourengagementwiththem.
Cognitiveprojects,forinstance,aimattheacquisitionofknowledge;whileimaginativeprojectsaimatthevoluntaryrepresentationofspecificstatesofaffairs—orsoIarguein(Dorsch2012,chs.
13f.
).
Thisdifferenceisstrict,giventhatwecannotacquireknowledgebyformingamentalrepresentationatwill.
Furthermore,therearedifferenttypesofimaginativeprojects,suchasempathizingwithanotherperson(i.
e.
imagininghavingherfeelingsandthoughtsandbeinginherpositionintheworld),engagingwiththefictionalworldrepresentedbyanovelormovie(i.
e.
imaginingwhathappensinthatworldandhavingcertainperceptualoremotionalexperienceswithrespecttothefictionalcharactersandeventsconcerned),settingupandrunningathoughtexperiment(i.
e.
supposingcertainthingstobetrueandinvestigatingtheirconsequences)—or,indeed,focuseddaydreaming.
Instancesoffocuseddaydreamingcountas(possiblyopen-ended)mentalprojectsand,morespecifically,asimaginativeprojectsbecausetheypossessanoverallpurpose,whichistovoluntarilyformrepresentationswithspecificcontents(e.
g.
,contributingtotherepresentationofaclimbofMountEverest).
Whatwearedaydreamingaboutis6Therequirementthatthewholeprojecthastotakeplacewithinthemindmightsometimesbetoostrong.
Whilemostmentalprojectsconsistsolelyofmentalepisodes(andperhapsalsodispositions)andthementalactionsandprocesseswhichlinkthesetogether,itmaybearguedthatsomementalprojectsinvolvealsocertainformsofrelativelynon-interferingbodilyactions.
Forinstance,itdoesnotseemtomattermuchfortheprojectoffindingthebestnextmoveinagivengameofchesswhetheronescansthepositiononachessboardwithone'seyesorinsteadvisualizesitinone'smind.
Butdothemovementsofone'seyesrendertheprojectinquestionnon-mentalOnewayofcapturingsuchcaseswouldbetomodifythesecondrequirementonmentalprojects—forinstance,byrequiringthatmentalprojectsaresuchthattheymerelycould(butneednot)bepursuedwithoutanyinvolvementofbodilyactionorotherexternalevents.
Followingthesuggestionofoneofthereferees,anotheroptionistotreatcaseslikethisasexamplesofembodiedcognition(seeAnderson,2003,sect.
3.
3,foradiscussionofsimilarcases).
Treatingaprojectasdependentonsomebodilymovementinthiswaymightstillbecompatiblewiththeideathattheprojectitselfislimitedtothemind(e.
g.
whenthedependenceisunderstoodasbeingweakerthanproperconstitution).
Inanycase,thementalprojectsthatinterestusthemost—focuseddaydreams—clearlyoccurexclusivelyinthemind.
FocusedDaydreamingandMind-Wanderingdeterminedbysomeunderlyingmotivationalstateswhichguideourmentalagencybymovingustogenerateorincludeepisodeswithrelevantcontents,andtolinkthemtoeachotherinaccordancewiththegeneralrepresentationalpurposeoftheactivityofdaydreaminginquestion.
Inotherwords,themotivationalstatesdeterminetheepisodicconstituents,courseandgeneralcontentofourfocuseddaydreams.
Inparticular,focuseddaydreamingoftenstartsofffromanassumedpremise,generallyreflectingtheintendedcontentoftheactivityofdaydreaming,andisthenactivelydevelopedfromtherestepbystep,inawayverysimilartothatofstories.
Forinstance,mydaydreamaboutclimbingMountEverestoriginatesinmyintentionordesiretoformrepresentationsthatareconcernedwith,andjointlyconstitutearepresentationof,suchaclimb.
DaydreamingwiththisgeneralpurposeinmindmaybeginwiththeassumptionthatIamabouttoclimbMountEverest,andprogressfromtherebymeansoftheproductionorincorporationofaseriesofrepresentations,linkedtoeachotherandtotheinitialassumptioninvirtueoftheoverallpurposeofrepresentingaclimbofMountEverest.
Suchrepresentationsmayconcerntheprepa-rationsfortheclimb,theactualwayupthemountain,theviewofthesurroundinglandscape,theintermingledfeelingsofexhaustion,cold,fear,excitementandcraziness,thedistancingthoughtexpressingmyknowledgethatIcouldneveractuallybringmyselftoclimbMountEverest,theconsiderationofwhatmightbringpeopletoattempttheclimb,theexperienceofreachingthesummitandofthesuddenirrelevanceofeverything(includingone'ssafereturn),andsoon.
AllthesementalepisodesandprojectsmakeupthecomplexactivityofdaydreamingabouthowitwouldbetoclimbMountEverest.
Theepisodes'occurrence,contentandrelationshiptoeachotheraremotivatedandguidedbymyintentiontodaydreamaboutclimbingthemountain;and,together,theepisodescontributetotheachievementofthatpurpose.
Afullaccountoffocuseddaydreamingwouldhavetosaymoreaboutwhether—andif,how—theydifferfromothertypesofimaginativeproject.
Insomecases,thistaskseemsfairlyeasy.
Forinstance,focuseddaydreamsarenotresponsestorepresentationalartworksanddifferinthisrespectfromourfromimaginativeengagementswiththelatter.
Butitislessclearwhetherthereisarealdifferencebetweenfocuseddaydreaming,ontheonehand,andempathyorthoughtsexperiments,say,ontheother.
Onenoticeabledifferenceisperhapsthatthelasttwoarealwaysembeddedinmoreencompassingcognitiveprojects,whilethefirstisoftennot.
Forexample,wemayimaginehavingtheexperiencesandthoughtsofanotherpersonbecausewewanttofindouthowshefeels(empathy),orbecausewejustenjoyimaginingbeingherorinherposition(daydream).
Moreover,suchdifferencesinpurposeengenderdifferencesinthementalepisodesthatmakeuptherespectiveimaginativeprojects.
Whenempathiz-ing,wetrytobeasaccurateaspossiblewithrespecttotheotherperson'smentalstatesandthusrelyon,andincorporateintoourproject,ourknowledgeabouther.
Bycontrast,therearenosuchconstraintsondaydreamingaboutbeingtheotherperson(e.
g.
,wecandaydreamaboutbeingacertaincelebrityandseeingtheworldwithhereyesalthoughwemightnotknowmuchaboutwhatisgoingoninhermind).
However,empathizingwithanotherpersoninordertounderstandherbetter—aswellasrunningacertainthoughtexperiment,forthatmatter—mayultimatelybenothingbutafocuseddaydream,appliedtosomesecondarycognitivepurpose.
Thishypothesisreceivesfurthersupportfromotherexamples,liketheonementionedatthebeginning.
F.
DorschVisualizingaridedowntheicecanalisalsoaninstanceoffocuseddaydreamingthatwemayengageinsimplyforthesakeofdoingso,oralternativelybecauseofsomeulteriorpurposes(e.
g.
,toprepareforarealrun).
1.
5NarrativeStructureInanycase,whatischaracteristicoffocuseddaydreaming—butperhapsnotofallothertypesofimaginativeproject—isthatitpossessesanarrativestructure.
Thisaspectoffocuseddaydreamingiscentraltoitsdistinctionfrommind-wandering,whichiswhyitisworthwhiletolookatitmoreclosely.
However,itisadmittedlynoteasytospecifypreciselywhatitmeansforasequenceofepisodestohaveanarrativestructure.
Forourpurposes,itsufficestohighlightthefactthattherearefivefeaturesthatarecharacter-isticofmany,ifnotall,sequencesofmentalrepresentationswithanarrativestructure(whatIcall'narratives').
Oneofthesefeaturesisthattheentitiesthattheepisodesinthesequenceareaboutarefrequentlyrepresentedasbehavinginregulatedwayswhichfacilitateourunder-standingoftheirbehaviour.
Forinstance,physicalobjectsfollownaturallawsandareusedinaccordancewithconventions;whilepersonsthinkandactinrationaloratleastcomprehensibleways.
Thisenablesus,forinstance,toidentifyorempathizewiththecharactersinstories;ortomakesenseofthecausalnexusbetweencertainnarratedevents(Williams2002,pp.
233ff).
Theregularityofnarrativesiscloselyrelatedtoanotheraspectofnarrativesequences:thattheyoftenportraysomedevelopmentconcerningtherepresentedentities.
Movement,metamorphosis,maturation,orrevolution,areallpossibleexamplesofsuchadevelopment.
Anarrativemaybeaboutthemovementofballsonasnookertable,oraboutthealterationintheircolours;itmaybeaboutthechangeinacharacter'sopinions,orabouttheoverthrowofagovernment.
Inaddition,boththefeatureofregularityandthatofdevelopmentpresup-poseathirdaspect:thattherelevantepisodesinthenarrativesequenceconcernthesameparticularentities.
Morethanonementalepisodeisneededtorepresentapatternofbehaviouroraprocessofevolution.
Andtheepisodesinvolvedhavetobeaboutthesamething,namelywhateveractsorchangesinthewayinquestion.
Afourthimportantcharacteristicofmanynarrativesequencesisthattheyrevealacertainperspectiveonwhatisbeingtold—whetherthisperspectiveisverysubjectiveandevaluativeoremotional,asinthecaseof,say,manyfirst-personalnarrations;ormoreobjectiveanddistanced,asinthecaseof,say,classicalinstancesofanomniscientnarrator(Goldie2003a,b).
Alastcharacteristicofnarrativesisthattheyusuallyportraytheeventstheyrepresentastemporallyordered:onethingisrepresentedashappeningeithersimulta-neoustoorafteranother(Carroll2001,p.
120;Lamarque2004,p.
394).
Therearepresumablyfurtherfeaturesdistinctiveofmany,ifnotall,narratives.
Butnotingthesefivecharacteristicsshouldsufficetoclarifythedifferencebetweenfocuseddaydreamingandmind-wanderingwithrespecttotheirintelligibility.
Focuseddaydreamstypicallypossessseveralorallofthefeaturesjustdescribed.
Forinstance,manyoftheepisodesmakingupmydaydreamaboutclimbingMountEverestFocusedDaydreamingandMind-Wanderingconcernthesameindividualentities(suchaspeople,tools,peaks,etc.
),whicharethusoftencharacterizedbymeansofmorethanoneepisode.
Then,thedaydreamislikelytorepresentobjectsasbehavinginregulatedways(e.
g.
,avalanchesorice-axesobeyinggravity;ordespairingandpanickingclimbersfollowingtheirtemperamentorgeneralhumannature).
Furthermore,thedaydreamportraysmanykindsofdevelopment(e.
g.
,thechangesindaytime,weather,height,feelings,andsoon).
Anditnormallydoesthisbymeansofarrayingcertaineventsintime(e.
g.
,theascentashappeningbeforethefall).
Finally,thedaydreamasawhole—orsomeconsiderablepartofit—maydisclosesomeofmyownfeelingsoropinionsaboutattemptingtoclimbMountEverest(e.
g.
,myfearandfascination,ormyassessmentthatmanypeopletakingupthischallengedonotreallyknowwhattheyaredoing).
2Mind-WanderingTheotherclassicalexampleofwhatwesometimestaketobedaydreamingismind-wandering.
Justlikefocuseddaydreaming,mind-wanderinginvolvessequencesofconnectedmentalepisodes.
But,thistime,theconnectionisnot—ornotprimarily—duetoimaginativepurposivenessandmentalagency,butinsteadtoassociationandsimilarcausalfactors.
Aftersayingabitmoreabouttwodifferentkindsofassociativemind-wanderingandtheirdifferenceintemporalextension,Ihighlighttwocentralaspectsoffocuseddaydreamsthatinstancesofmind-wanderinglack:representationalpurposiveness,andunity.
Inaddition,thetwophenomenaalsodiffertypicallyinwhethertheypossessanarrativestructure,andstrictlyinhowthesuccessionofmentalepisodesinvolvedisintelligibletous.
Wethereforeshouldconcludethat,whilefocuseddaydreamsareimaginativementalprojects,instancesofmind-wanderingdonotevenconstitutedistinctandunifiedsequencesofmentalepisodeswithcleartemporalboundaries.
2.
1TwoKindsofAssociativeChainsMind-wanderingoccurswhenreduceourownmentalactivity,letourmind'wanderofffreely'andswitchourattentionfromouractualsurroundingstothesequenceofexperiencesandthoughtsunfoldinginourminds.
Weareespeciallypronetomind-wanderingifweareinarelaxedmoodanddonothaveanyurgentbusinesstotakecareof—forinstance,whenwearetakingabath,lyinginbedandwaitingforsleep,meditating,sittinginaboringlecture,orlookingoutsidethroughthewindowofamovingtrain.
Themostbasicformsofmind-wanderingconsistinsequencesofsimple,associa-tivelylinkedmentalepisodes.
Whathappensinsuchcasesisthatweabstainfromanyactiveinterventionand,sotospeak,'leanback'and'watch'theseriesofexperiencesandthoughtsthatenterourstreamofconsciousnessduetoassociativeandsimilarpassiveforces.
Indeed,verydifferentcausalfactorsorprocessesmayberesponsiblefortheoccurrenceofthementalepisodesconcerned,andthusformovingforwardtheinstanceofmind-wanderingthatisconstitutedbythoseepisodes.
Butwhattheyallhaveincommonisthattheyarepassive:theybringabouteachoftheepisodeswithoutthehelpofouragency(eventhoughwemayactivelytriggertheirinitialcomingintoF.
Dorschoperation).
7Furthermore,theyoften(thoughnotalways)giverisetonewmentalepisodesinvirtueoftherepresentationalcontentsoftheoldones(anaspectofmind-wanderingtowhichIreturnshortly).
Inwhatfollows,Ithereforeusetheterm'association'torefercollectivelytothevariouspassive,andoftencontent-related,factorsresponsiblefortheproductionofmentalepisodesinmind-wandering.
HereishowJamesdescribesanexampleofthekindofassociativechainthatIhaveinmind:[…]ourmusingspursueanerraticcourse,swervingcontinuallyintosomenewdirectiontracedbytheshiftingplayofinterestasiteverfallsonsomepartialitemineachcomplexrepresentationthatisevoked.
Thusitsooftencomesaboutthatwefindourselvesthinkingattwonearlyadjacentmomentsofthingsseparatedbythewholediameterofspaceandtime.
Nottillwecarefullyrecalleachstepofourcogitationdoweseehownaturallywecame[…]topassfromonetotheother.
Thus,forinstance,afterlookingatmyclockjustnow(1879),IfoundmyselfthinkingofarecentresolutionintheSenateaboutourlegal-tendernotes.
Theclockhadcalleduptheimageofthemanwhohadrepaireditsgong.
Hehadsuggestedthejeweler'sshopwhereIhadlastseenhim;thatshop,someshirt-studswhichIhadboughtthere;they,thevalueofgoldanditsrecentdecline;thelatter,theequalvalueofgreenbacks,andthis,naturally,thequestionofhowlongtheyweretolast,andoftheBayardproposition.
[…]Everyreaderwhowillarresthimselfatanymomentandsay'HowcameItobethinkingofjustthis'willbesuretotraceatrainofrepresentationslinkedtogetherbylinesofcontiguityandpointsofinterestinextricablycombined.
Thisistheordinaryprocessoftheassociationofideasasitspontaneouslygoesoninaverageminds.
(James1890,pp.
539f.
)AndJamescontinuestopresentanotherexampletakenfromHobbes:InaDiscourseofourpresentcivillwarre,whatcouldseemmoreimpertinent,thantoask(asonedid)whatwasthevalueofaRomanPennyYettheCohrencetomewasmanifestenough.
FortheThoughtofthewarre,introducedtheThoughtofthedeliveringuptheKingtohisEnemies;TheThoughtofthat,broughtintheThoughtofthedeliveringupofChrist;andthatagaintheThoughtofthe30pence,whichwasthepriceofthattreason:andthenceeasilyfollowedthatmaliciousquestion;andallthisinamomentoftime;forThoughtisquick.
(Hobbes1651/1996,part1,ch.
3,init.
)AsHobbesrightlynotes,suchassociativesequencesofsimplementalepisodes(i.
e.
episodesofseeing,feeling,thinking,andsoon)areusuallynotverylong.
Indeed,bothexamplesillustratewellthatweoftendonotnoticealltheassociativestepsduringtheiroccurrenceandhavetoretrospectivelyreconstruct—or,inJames'words,'carefullyrecall'—theseintermediarystepsaftertheexperiencesandthoughtsconcernedhave7SeeSmallwood(2013)fordiscussion,whoalsodistinguishesbetweentheinitialcausesofinstancesofmind-wandering(whichmaybevoluntaryorinvoluntary)andthemechanismsthatareresponsibleforthedevelopmentandcontinuityofthesequenceofmentalepisodesinquestion.
FocusedDaydreamingandMind-Wanderingalreadydisappearedagain(Zangwill2006,p.
265).
Now,thereareatleastthreereasonsfortherelativeshortnessofsequencesofassociativelylinkedsimplementalepisodes.
First,mentalepisodesdonotremaininexistenceforlongerperiodsoftime,unlesstheyareactivelysustainedbyusandthusincorporatedintosomementalproject(e.
g.
,afocuseddaydream),orcausedbyunderlyingfactorsthatstayefficaciousforlongerstretches(e.
g.
,hallucinogenicdrugsorpsychologicaldisorders;seeDorsch2010,p.
187,and2012,ch.
14.
4).
Associationisnormallynotamongthesefactors,nottheleastbecausetheoriginalepisodesthatassociativelygiverisetothenewonesareoftenthemselvesrathershort-lived.
Second,manymentalepisodesoccurringaspartofassociativechainsdonotthemselvesleadtofurtherepisodesbymeansofassociation—eitherbecausetherearenocorrespondingassociativelinksordispositionsestablishedinourminds,orbecausewesimplystarttobecomementallyoccupiedwithotherthings.
Asaresult,manyassociativesequencesofexperiencesandthoughtscometoahaltorpeteroutafterashortwhile.
Third,itisratherdifficultforustoremainpurelypassiveforverylongwithrespecttoourmentallives.
Thatis,itisnoteasyforusnottogiveintoourtendencytoswitchattentionfromonethingtoanother,andtotrytotakecontrolofthesequencesofnon-perceptualexperiencesandthoughtsinourmind.
Thisrestlessnessofourmindandwillisreflected,forinstance,inthedifficultyof,andthemanyfailedattemptsat,meditation.
Butthereareotherinstancesofmind-wanderingthatlastmuchlonger—mostprominently,sequencesofassociativelylinkedfocuseddaydreams(andpossiblyotherkindsofmentalproject).
Weoftenengageinaseriesofsuccessivefocuseddaydreams.
Andtheswitchesfromonetothenextarefrequentlyfacilitatedbythespontaneousoccurrenceofmentalepisodesinvirtueofsomeassociativelinks(O'Shaughnessy2000,p.
216),orindeedbywhatJamesinthepassagequotedearliercalls'theshiftingplayofinterest'(e.
g.
,whensomenewobject,eventortopiccatchesourattention).
Whatwethengetaretemporallyextendedinstancesofmind-wandering.
Whathappensinsuchcasesisthatsomeepisodicconstituentofthecurrentdaydream(orperhapsalsoanunrelated,butcontemporaneousepisode)associativelybringsaboutanothermentalepisodewhichsubsequentlyfiguresasthestartingpointforanewdaydream,oratleastinstilsinusthemanifestdesireorintentiontobeginanewdaydream.
Suchasequenceofassociativelylinkedfocuseddaydreamsmaylooklikethefollowing:IamdaydreamingaboutwalkingthestreetsofLondonand,duetosomememoryoforfondnessforBritishbarberpoleswiththeirredandwhitestripes,thisincludesvisualizingsuchapoleattheentrancetoabarbershop;thecolourandnameofthispolegiverise,bymeansofassociation,totheimageofthePolishflagandhencetosomethoughtaboutPoland;becauseofsomelong-standingdesiretovisitthatcountry,IstopmydaydreamaboutLondonandbegintooccupymyselfinsteadwithadaydreamaboutvisitingPoland,startingoffwiththethoughtofthiscountry;thisagainmayremindmeofmyPolishfriendatschoolwhomIhavenotheardofforyears,sincesheenteredartschool;andImaythusbegintodaydreamabouthersubsequentlifeandaboutmeetingheragain.
Indeed,suchassociativesequencesoffocuseddaydreams(and,possibly,othermentalprojects)aremoretypicalexamplesofmind-wanderingthantheshorterasso-ciativechainsofsimpleepisodes.
Whenwearelyinginthebathtub,say,wetendtoletF.
Dorschourmindwanderfreelyformorethanjustbriefmoments.
Thisrequiresthattherespectiveinstancesofmind-wanderingarenotsimplyamatterofassociation,butinvolveusasagents.
For,again,itwouldbealmostimpossibletonotactivelyintervenewithsequencesofspontaneouslyoccurringexperiencesandthoughts,orforsuchsequencestocontinuewithoutanyactivesustainment,foranyprolongedperiodoftime.
Accordingly,whenlettingourmindwanderoff,wetypicallyalternatebetweenpassivelywitnessingthespontaneousoccurrenceofexperiencesandthoughtsandactivelydevelopingsomeoftheseexperiencesandthoughtsintomoreexpansivedaydreams.
Whenoneofourafocuseddaydreamsterminates,weoftenreturntoashortperiodofmentalinactivitybeforemovingontotheactivepursuitofanewdaydream.
Inotherwords,mind-wanderingisoftenamixtureofassociationandfocuseddaydreaming(or,moregenerally,mentalprojects).
Ouroccupationwithsuchassociativesequencesoffocuseddaydreamsisverysimilartotheactivityofmoreorlessaimlesslywanderingaroundacity.
8Duringthewalk,most—ifnotall—ofourstepsorturnsaremadeintentionally.
Buttheyareusuallynotgovernedbyanoverallpurposedirectingthemtowardsacertaindestina-tion,say,orgivingthemanintelligiblepattern(e.
g.
,whenweaimtoturnrightateverysecondcorner).
Forwherewedirectourstepstoisoftendeterminedbyfactorsbeyondus:becausesomethingcatchesoureyes;becausewejustfollowotherpeople;becausethereoccursanunexpectedopeningbetweenthehousesorwalls;andsoon.
Similarly,whenweletfocuseddaydreamfollowfocuseddaydream,weareincontroloftheparticulardaydreams,especiallyoftheirinception.
Butourvariousdaydreamstypicallydonotshareanoverallrepresentationalgoal:theynormallydonotconcernthesamesubjectmatteroreventhesamecharacters,places,events,andsoon.
Accordingly,wherewefinallyendupineithercaseisnotdeterminedbyourmotivationalstates,inparticularnotbyourdesireorintentiontowanderofffreelyonthestreetsorinourmind.
Instead,variousfactors,suchasassociations,whims,distractions,externalstimuli,andsoon,contributetoouractivityofwalkingordaydreamingbysuggestingpossiblenewdirectionstobepursued.
Now,mind-wandering—independentlyofwhetheritinvolvesassociativechainsofsimplementalepisodesormorecomplexmentalprojects—differsfromfocuseddaydreaminginseveralimportantrespects.
Mostprominentamongthemarefourcloselyrelateddifferences,ofwhichthefirstisthemostfundamentalinthesensethatithelpstoexplainthepresenceoftheothers.
Thefourdifferencesconcern,respectively,therepresentationalpurposiveness,thenarrativestructure,theintelligibilityandtheunityofthesegmentsofthestreamofconsciousnessinquestion.
Whiletheseconddifferencemaybejusttypicalorgradual(i.
e.
mayholdnormally,butnotalways),theotherthreearestrictdifferencesthatseparatethetwomentalphenomenainaclear-cutmanner,ratherthanlocatingthemonacontinuum.
2.
2TheDifferenceinRepresentationalPurposivenessFocuseddaydreamingandmind-wanderingdonotgenerallydifferwithrespecttowhetherwecanengageinthempurposivelyorevenvoluntarily.
Wecandecidetolet8Purelyassociativesequenceswouldbemorelikesittingonabusandlettingittakeuswhereveritgoes.
Weremaincompletelypassiveandjustwatchthechangingscenery.
FocusedDaydreamingandMind-Wanderingourmindwanderofffreelyinordertoachieveacertaingoal,inthesamewayinwhichwecandecidetoliedownandstopmovinginordertoachieveacertainend(e.
g.
,torestourmindorbody,ortoenjoythepleasureofnotactivelydoinganything).
9But,incontrasttofocuseddaydreams,instancesofmind-wanderingdonotpossessarepre-sentationalpurpose,thatis,apurposewhichputssomeconstraintsonwhatthementalepisodesaimedforaremeanttorepresent.
Consider,again,thetwoexamplesthatHobbesandJamesdescribe.
Whichepisodesareincludedintherespectivechainsofsimplementalepisodesisnotamatterofsomeunderlyingintentiontoformorhavementalrepresentationswithacertaincontent.
Rather,whatisoperativeandresponsiblefortheconstituentsandprogressofthesequenceistheforceofassociation.
Accordingly,thetwoassociativechainslackanyrepresentationalpurposeand,specifically,anyimaginativepurpose.
Theyarenotunifiedbyacommonrepresentationalaim.
Thesameistrueofassociativesequencesoffocuseddaydreams.
Althougheachinstanceoffocuseddaydreamingisdeterminedbyimaginativeagency,theresultingassociativechainisnotunifiedbyanoverallimaginativepurposeandthereforedoesnotshowanycontinuityinwhatisrepresented.
Theswitchfromonefocuseddaydreamtoanotherisinsteadaccompaniedbyaswitchofimaginativepurpose,aswellasbyaswitchintherepresentedentities.
Inotherwords,theassociativesequenceoffocuseddaydreamsisnon-purposiveinsofarasitlacksanoverallrepresentationalpurpose;butitispurposiveinsofarasitconsistsinaseriesofparticularfocuseddaydreams,eachofwhichispurposive.
Sequencesofassociativelylinkedfocuseddaydreamsdifferthusbothfromsinglefocuseddaydreams(becauseofthelackofanoverallpurpose)andfromassociativesequencesofsimpler,nonpurposivementalepisodes(becauseoftheinvolvementofmentalagency).
Elsewhere,Ihavearguedatlengththatimaginingisessentiallyanaction,inthesamesenseinwhichwalkingorjumpingareessentiallyactions(Author2012,chs.
13f.
).
Morespecifically,Ihaveidentifiedimaginingwiththementalactionofexertingvoluntarycontroloverwhichspecificstatesofaffairsourrespectivementalepisodesarerepresenting.
Inotherwords,whenweareimaginingsomething,itisatleasttosomeconsiderableextentuptouswhichobjectsweareimaginingashavingwhichproperties(e.
g.
,whetherweareimaginingsomethingaboutaunicorn,say,aswellaswhichsizeorcolourweimaginetheunicornashaving).
Ifthisviewisright,thedifferenceinrepresentationalpurposivenessisaccompaniedbyadifferenceinimagi-nativeness:whilefocuseddaydreamingisaninstanceofimagining,mind-wanderingisnot.
Ofcourse,someorevenalloftheindividualmentalepisodesassociativelylinkedinmind-wanderingmaystillcountasimaginative.
Buttheiroverallassociationcannotbecauseitlackstherequiredrepresentationalpurpose.
9SeeGiambra(1995),SmallwoodandSchooler(2006)andSmallwood(2013).
Wegner(1997)claimsthatmentalagencymayalsogiverisetomind-wanderinginanotherway.
Hisviewisthat,oftenwhenweintrospectivelycheckwhetherourdeliberateattemptatfocusingourmindonsomethingparticularhasbeensuccessful,wecauseourmindtowanderoffpreciselybecauseofouractiveinterventiontothecontrary.
Independentlyofitsmerits,thisproposaliscompatiblewiththeviewdefendedherethat,althoughmind-wanderingisnotaninstanceofimaginativeagency,wemayactivelyengageinitbychoosingtoletourmindwanderoff.
ThekindofimpactofagencythatWegneridentifiesismuchmoreindirectand,sinceittreatsmind-wanderingmerelyasanunintendedcausaleffectofmentalagency,alsoneitherintentional,noropentointrospection.
F.
Dorsch2.
3SomeSimilaritiesinIntelligibilityBecauseoftheirfundamentaldifferenceinrepresentationalpurposiveness,focuseddaydreamingandmind-wanderingalsodifferinthreeotherrespects,allofwhichconcernthenatureoftheconnectionsbetweenthementalepisodesinvolved.
Beforeaddressingthesefurtherdifferences,itisworthwhiletopointoutsomesimilaritiesintheintelligibilityoftheconnectionsbetweentheepisodicelements.
Bothinfocuseddaydreamingandinmind-wandering,thelinksbetweenthementalepisodesconcernedareinprincipleintelligible:weusuallycanaccountfortheoccur-renceoftheepisodesinvolvedbymakingsenseoftheconnectionsinplay(seeGoldie'snotionofthecoherenceinnarrativesinhis2003aandb).
Forinstance,thatIamvisualizingalandscapeofsnow-coveredmountainsorimaginingthefeelingofelationandexhaustionwhenreachingthesummitofaneight-thousandercanbeexplainedbyreferencetomyintentiontodaydreamaboutclimbingMountEverest:thelatteriswhatmotivatestheoccurrenceoftheformer.
Similarly,Hobbes'thoughtoftreasoncanbetracedbacktohisoccupationwiththewarbetweentheRoyalistsandtheParliamen-tarians,raginginhistimes,whichheknowstoinvolvethehandingoverofthekingtotheEnglishParliament:thinkingaboutthewarhascausedHobbestothinkabouttreasonbecausethetworepresentationsconcerneventswhichare,forhim,significantlylinked(i.
e.
,thedeliveranceofthekingandthewarinquestion).
Moreover,therationaleofbothfocuseddaydreamsandassociativechainsisintel-ligibleonthebasisofreflectingontheintrospectiblefeaturesofthementalepisodesinvolved,notablytheircontents.
Myunderlyingintentionexplainsmyengagementintheimaginativeactivitiesbecausethecontentsoftheepisodessatisfythedescription(whichispartofthecontentoftheintention)ofwhatIhavebeenmeaningtorepresent.
Thismatchmakesitcomprehensiblewhytheintentionhasgivenrisetothespecificrepresentationsinquestion,andnottoothers.
Similarly,Hobbes'thoughtaboutthecivilwaraccountsfortheoccurrenceofhisthoughtabouttreasonbecausethereisforhimarecognizablelinkbetweenthetworepresentedevents(e.
g.
,becauseheknowsthetworepresentedeventstobeconnectedthroughthefigureoftheKing).
Itishencelegitimateforhim,aswellasus,tojudgethatthetwothoughtsarecoupledinvirtueofsomeassociativelink.
Asaresult,bothfocuseddaydreamsandsequencesofassociatedepisodicrepresen-tationsareintelligibleinvirtueofthecontentsofthementalstatesinquestion(andperhapsalsosomeoftheirotherintrospectiblefeatures,suchastheiraffectivecharac-ter).
Furthermore,bothdifferinthisrespectfromsequencesofmentalepisodeswhicharemerelytemporallyorcausallyrelatedtoeachotherandsucceedeachotherforreasonsotherthanwhattheyrepresent.
2.
4TheDifferenceinNarrativeStructureHowever,focuseddaydreamingandassociationdifferinthenatureoftheirintelligiblestructure.
Thedifferencecanperhapsbebestexpressedbysayingthat,atleasttypically,onlyfocuseddaydreamsarenarrative,orcanbenarrated.
Ihavealreadyarguedthatfocuseddaydreamsshowmany,ifnotallofthefivefeaturesthatarecharacteristicofnarrativestructures,namelytherepresentationofregularities,developmentsandtem-poralorder,thecontinuousreferencetothesameentities,andthemanifestationofaFocusedDaydreamingandMind-Wanderingspecificperspectiveonwhatisrepresented.
Incontrast,thesequencesofassociativelylinkedepisodesinvolvedinmind-wanderingnormallydonotshowanyofthefivefeatures,atleastnottoasignificantextent.
InbothJames'andHobbes'examples,thementalrepresentationsinvolveddonotmakesenseofregularitiesamongentities.
Therepresentedpeople(e.
g.
,thewatchmak-er,ortheking)arenotreallyrepresentedasthinkingoractingincertainwaysandhencearenotsubjecttoourunderstanding.
Thesameistrueoftherepresentedobjects:theconventionsandeconomicprinciplesgoverningtheflotationandexchangeofcurren-ciesorsimilarvaluesremainundisclosed(althoughtheirexistenceandinfluencemaybeconveyed);anditisnotclarifiedhowthewarunfolded,orwhytheclockhadbrokendown.
Therearesometracestobefoundoftherationalityofsubjectsorofthebehaviourofphysicalentities:thedeliveranceofthekingisrepresentedastreasonandasmotivatedbygreed;anditissuggestedthattheclockisworkingagainafterhavingbeenrepaired.
Buttherespectiveformsofbehaviourarenotfullyorrichlyrepresented:theyareonlymentionedorhintedat.
Moreover,theformsofbehaviour(aswellasmostotherentities)aretypicallyrepresentedbysingleepisodes,withtheresultthatgraspingtheirpresencedoesnotrequiregraspinganyassociativeconnections.
Thattreasonismotivatedbygreedispartofthecontentofasinglethought:itismerelystatedandnotfurtherelucidated.
Thisexplainswhymind-wanderingusuallydoesnotrevealorpermitthesamekindofmeaningfulnessandunderstandingofregularitiesasdaydreaming.
Therelativeisolationofassociativelyconnectedepisodesisalsocloselyrelatedtothefactthatsuchsequencesnormallydonotportrayanysignificantdevelopments:theepi-sodesdonotlinkuptorepresentchanges,ortheinfluenceofdynamicforces,overtime—as,again,illustratedbyJames'andHobbes'examplesquotedabove.
Itissaidthatthevalueofgoldhasdeclined;andtheideaofwaralsoinvolvesthenotionofsomedevelopment.
Butanew,bothrepresentationsarerestrictedtosingleepisodes(orevenconcepts)anddonotprovideanyrichorinformativegraspofthestateddevelopments.
Thatanytracesofarepresentationofregularityordevelopmentaretypicallylimitedtosinglethoughtsorimagesisfurtherexplainedbythefactthatnotmanyoftheentitiesrepresentedbymembersofassociativesequencesarereferredtobymorethanoneepisode—and,intheexamples,nonebymorethantwo.
Thatboththeimageoftheclockandthethoughtaboutthemanwhorepaireditmakereferencetotheclockdoesnotestablishanynarrativelinkbetweenthetworepresentations—and,inparticular,nodevelopmentorlaw-likeconnection.
Thesameappliestothetwothoughtsabouttheoccurrenceoftreason:theyhavenothingincommonandarenotfurtherlinked,overandabovebeingthoughtsofthesamepersonandsharingthesamesubjectmatterorobject(inawidersense).
Finally,theassociativesequencesinbothexamplesofmind-wanderingdonotmanifestanyperspectivesorattitudesinadditiontothoseexpressedbyeachofthesingleepisodes.
Hobbes'thoughtsassessthedeliveranceofthekingtobetreasonanddonotfullyapproveofaskingthequestionaboutthevalueofaRomanpenny.
Buttheydosonotinvirtueoftheirassociativeorotherlinks,butsimplybybeingthethoughtsthattheyare.
Theywouldrevealthesameviewontheeventsinquestioniftheyoccurredontheirown.
Accordingly,theassociativelinksarenotessentialtothedisclosureofHobbes'assessment.
F.
DorschWhattheseconsiderationsindicateisthatsequencesofassociativelylinkedepisodestypicallydonotpossessanarrativestructure.
AstheparticularnatureofthequotesofJamesandHobbesindicate,anyattemptatnarratingwhatisgoingoninourmindswhenweletthemwanderfreelyproducesjustalistofsuccessiveandassociatedmentalrepresentations,butnotanythinglikeacohesiveastory(Zangwill2006,p.
264).
Ofcourse,mind-wanderingmaystillinvolvenarrativeelements,namelyiftheassocia-tivelylinkedepisodesarefocuseddaydreams,eachwiththeirownnarrativestructure.
Buteventhen,theresultinginstanceofmind-wanderingasawholestilllacksanoverallnarrativestructurebecauseofthenon-narrativeassociativetransitionsfromonefocuseddaydreamtoanother.
Themainreasonforthisis,ofcourse,thelackofanyrepresentationalpurpose.
Focuseddaydreamspossessanarrativestructureexactlybecausetheyareunifiedbythepurposeofrepresentingaparticularscenariothatinvolvestemporallyorderedeventsandobjectsbehavinginregularandprogressiveways.
Thatis,itispreciselybecausefocuseddaydreamsareguidedbytheintentiontoformrepresentationswithaspecificcontentthattheepisodicconstituentsofthedaydreamsendupconcerningthesameentitiesandrelationships,aswellasestablishingacoherentpointofviewonthelatter.
Associativelinks,bycontrast,normallydonotengenderthesamekindofnarrativecohesionbecauseoftheirdisconnectionfromanyrepresentationalunity.
2.
5TheDifferenceinIntelligibilityThedifferenceinnarrativestructurebetweenfocuseddaydreamingandmind-wanderingiscloselyrelatedtoanotherdifferencethatpertainstohowwemakesenseofparticularinstancesofeachofthetwomentalphenomena.
Inthecaseofafocuseddaydream,theconnectionsbetweentheepisodesconcernedmakesensetousinthelightofthegeneralpurposeorsubjectmatterofthedaydreamprimarilybecauseofthelinksbetweentheentitiesthattheepisodesrepresent(i.
e.
,therelationships,regularitiesanddevelopmentsamongthoseentities).
Wetracethecoherenceofthedaydreambacktothecausalorotherconnectionsbetweentherepresentedentities.
Inotherwords,whatmattersandisintelligibleforusishowtheportrayedentitiesarelinkedtoeachother.
Thisispartoftheexplanationwhydaydreamsarenarratable.
Butfortheintelligibilityofdaydreams,itisnotnecessarythattheirepisodesthemselvesarecausallylinkedtoeachother,orthatwebecomeawareofanycausallinksthatmayobtainamongthem.
Theexperiencesandobjectsimaginedduringmydaydreamareunifiedbythenarrativewayinwhichtheycontributetotheimaginativepurposeofmydaydream(i.
e.
bygivingrisetothementalrepresentationofapotentialclimbofMountEverest).
Thisissufficienttoprovidethedaydreaminquestionwithcoherence.
Therepresentationsinvolvedneednot—andoftendonot—causallyinfluenceeachother.
Inthecaseofaninstanceofmind-wandering,ontheotherhand,comingtounderstandtheconnectionsbetweentheepisodesinvolvedmeanscomingtounder-standtheirspecificallyassociativecausallinks.
Andthisrequirestakingintoaccounttheircontents(ortheirotherfeaturesopentointrospection)onlyinsofarastheyarecausallyorotherwiselinkedtoeachotherinvirtueofwhattheyrepresent.
Infact,twokindsofrepresentationmaybeassociatedinourmindsformanydifferentreasons,notallofwhichpertaintotheircontents:becausetheyrepresentthesame,orsimilar,objects(e.
g.
,aparticularclock);orinsteadthesamefeaturesofobjects(e.
g.
,beinganFocusedDaydreamingandMind-Wanderinginstanceoftreason);orbecauseweonceexperiencedtherepresentedentitiesatroughlythesametimeorlocation(e.
g.
,seeingthewatchmakerinthejewelryshop);orwhilebeinginacomparablemood(e.
g.
,whenrealizingthatoneisinlove);andsoon.
Buthowtherepresentedentitiesarecausallyorotherwiserelatedtoeachotheristypicallyirrelevant.
Instead,whatcountsandisintelligibleisprimarilythespecificcausalorsimilarlinksbetweentheassociatedmentalepisodes.
Hence,mind-wanderingdiffersinitsintelligiblenaturefromfocuseddaydreaming.
Withrespecttofocuseddaydreams,wemakesenseoftherelationshipsamongtheentitieswhichthementalepisodesportray;whilewithrespecttosequencesofassocia-tivelylinkedmentalepisodes,wemakesenseoftherelationshipsamongthoseepisodesthemselves.
Again,thisdifferencecanbetracedbacktothemorebasicdifferenceinwhatlinksthementalepisodesintherespectivesegmentsofthestreamofconscious-ness.
Iftheconnectionsareduetosomesharedrepresentationalpurpose,theyprimarilyconcernwhatisrepresented;whileiftheconnectionsareduetoassociation,theypertaintotheassociatedepisodesthemselves.
2.
6TheDifferenceinUnityThelastdifferencebetweeninstancesoffocuseddaydreamingandinstancesofmind-wanderingconsistsinthefactthatonlytheformer,butnotthelatter,constitutedistinctandself-containedpartsofthestreamofconsciousness,atleastonthepersonallevel.
Inparticular,examplesofmind-wanderingandothercasesofassociationdonotconstitutementalprojects.
Theydonotshowtherequiredunitypartlybecausetheylackanoverallrepresentationalpurpose,andthereforealsoanarrativestructure.
Theotherreasonfortheabsenceofpersonal-levelunityisthatinstancesofmind-wanderingdonotpossessanyotherfeaturewhichcouldbeusedtoexplainwhytheycontainexactlytheseexperiencesandthoughtsandnoothermentalepisodes.
Theassociativelinksbetweenthesuccessivementalepisodesareinsufficienttoestablishtheunityoftheresultingsequences.
Inparticular,thereisnoanswertothequestionofwhenorwhereoneinstanceofmind-wanderingstopsandanotherstarts.
Forinstance,howmanyassociativesequencesofexperiencesandthoughtsarein-volvedinJames'orHobbes'exampleWhyshouldwetakethesetofmentalrepresentationsconcernedwiththeclockandthewatchmakertobepartofthesameunifiedmentalphenomenonas,say,thesetofmentalrepresentationsconcernedwiththevalueofgoldandofthedollarItmightbeproposedthatwejusthavetolookatwhenassociativecausation(i.
e.
somespecificformofcausationinvirtueofrepresen-tationalcontent)actuallystartsandstopsinordertodelineatedistinctsequencesofmind-wandering.
Butthisproposalwouldnotworkbecausetheidentityandunityofmentalphenomenaispartlyamatterofwhathappensincounterfactualconditions.
Forexample,weneedanswerstoquestionslikewhethertheassociativesequencewouldstillbethesameifitwouldlinkupmorementalepisodes,ordifferentones—thatis,questionsconcerningtheessentialityofcertainactualorpotentialepisodicconstituents.
Inthecaseoffocuseddaydreams,wecananswersuchquestionsbyreferencetotheirunifyingrepresentationalpurpose,aswellastotheirresultingnarrativestructure.
Instancesofmind-wanderingarealsonotunifiedbythenon-representationalpur-posesforwhichwemightbeengagedinthem.
Itissometimesourchoicetoletourmindwanderofffreely(or,ifoneprefers,toabstainfrommentallyacting).
WemayF.
Dorschchoosetodothis,say,foritsownsake,orbecausewewanttorelaxourselves,orbecausewetakepleasureinbeingsurprisedbywhateversequenceofmentalepisodesunfoldsinourmind.
Butnoneoftheseorsimilargoalscanunifytheresultingsequencesofmentalepisodes.
Firstofall,theendoflettingourmindwanderoffiscompletelyunspecificanddoesnotdistinguishbetweenthevariousinstancesofmind-wanderingthatinvolveit.
Accordingly,itdoesnothelptodeterminewhichmentalepisodesformpartofwhichpurposiveinstancesofmind-wandering.
Theother,secondarygoalsalsoleaveitcompletelyopenwhichmentalepisodesareableorrequiredtoachievethem.
Ofcourse,wecoulduseourknowledgeaboutwhichexperiencesandthoughtsarelikelytofurtherourendofunwinding,say,andactonourrespectiveintentionbyproducinginusthesementalepisodes.
Butifweactinthisway,weendupengaginginafocuseddaydream,ratherthanlettingourmindwanderoff.
Otherfeaturesofthementalepisodesinvolvedinmind-wandering—suchastheirtemporalorcausalrelations,ortheirconcernwiththesameentities—areequallyunabletounifytheepisodesinadistinctmentalphenomenon.
Manymentalepisodesaretemporallyorcausallylinkedtoeachotherinthesamewayastheepisodesinvolvedinmind-wandering,withouttherebytogetherformingaself-containedsegmentwithinthestreamofconsciousness.
So,theexistenceofsuchrelationsisnotsufficientforunity.
Referentialsameness,ontheotherhand,oftenfailstobepresentincasesofassociativemind-wandering.
Afterall,thepointofassociationistoswitchattentionfromonethingtosomethingcompletelydifferent.
Besides,eveniftheepisodesintheassociativesequencehappentorepresentthesameentities,theydosoonlyarbitrarily.
Itisalwayspossiblethatanassociativechain,thathassofarbeenrepresentationallyhomogenous,continueswithmentalrepresentationsofverydifferentevents,personsorobjects.
Andthereisnoanswertothequestionofwhethersuchswitchesinsubjectmatteralsoleadtochangesintheidentityoftheinstanceofmind-wanderingconcerned.
Hence,referentialsamenesscannotbeusedtounifyoccurrencesofmind-wandering,evenifitmayberesponsiblefortheunityofothersegmentsofthestreamofconsciousness,suchastemporallyextended(andpossiblyinterrupted)aestheticexperiencesofparticularartworks(Dorsch2000,ch.
1).
3ConclusionFocuseddaydreamsareinstancesofimaginativementalagency:theyarementalprojectswiththepurposeofvoluntarilyproducingspecificmentalrepresentations.
Theirpurposivenessprovidesthemwithunityandanarrativestructure.
Instancesofmind-wandering,ontheotherhand,donotconstitutementalprojectsand,inparticular,lackanyoverallrepresentationalpurposeandnarrativestructure.
Indeed,mind-wanderingdoesnotevengiverise,onthepersonallevel,toself-containedsequencesofmentalepisodes.
Rather,itjustconsistsinasuccessionoflooselyconnectedmentalepisodesandcannotbedistinguishedfromothersegmentsofthestreamofconscious-nessinanon-arbitrarymanner.
Inparticular,thereisnoanswertothequestionofwhichmentalepisodesorwhichassociativestepsbetweenthemareessentialtoanygivenassociativechain.
FocusedDaydreamingandMind-WanderingThisdoesnotmean,however,thatmind-wanderingcannotinvolvementalorevenimaginativeagency.
Fortheassociativelylinkedmentalepisodesmaybe—andoftenare—simpleorcomplexinstancesofsuchagency.
Thisisperhapsalsothemainreasonwhywetendtowronglytakefocuseddaydreamingandmind-wanderingtobeinstancesofoneandthesamementalphenomenon(i.
e.
'daydreaming'):theybothtypicallyinvolveimaginativeagency,albeitinverydifferentways—eitherbecausesuchagencyisconstitutiveofthem(focuseddaydreaming),orbecauseitisconstitutiveofsomeoftheirepisodicelements(mind-wandering).
10Inotherwords,instancesofmind-wanderingarecloselyconnectedtofocuseddaydreams—andthusalsotoimag-inativeagency—becausetheyusuallyinvolvesuchimaginativementalprojectsaselementsintheirassociativechains.
11AcknowledgmentsResearchonthisworkwasfundedbytheSwissNationalScienceFoundation.
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