行政法phpcms

FRONTIERSOFLAWINCHINAVOL.
9JUNE2014NO.
2DOI10.
3868/s050-003-014-0012-4ARTICLETHELAWS,POLICIES,ANDPOLITICSOFREGULATINGLEADPOLLUTIONINCHINAZHUXiao,*AdamMOSERThisarticleexaminesthepolitics,lawsandpoliciesrelatedtoregulatingleadpollutionfromlead-acidbatteryrelatedmanufacturingfacilitiesinChina.
Particularly,thispaperexamineshowChina'sMinistryofEnvironmentalProtection(MEP)wasabletoforcethetemporaryclosureofnearly90percentoflead-batterymanufacturingfacilitieswithinaperiodofmonthsin2011,afteryearsofenforcementfailures.
TheauthorsanalyzetheextenttowhichtheGovernment'sresponsetoaddressleadpollutionwasbasedonlawsandpoliciesthatcanbesystematicallyandconsistentlydeployedbyMEPasneeded,orwhethersuchmeasuresarereliantonpoliticalwillfromoutsideMEP.
Additionally,theauthorsareconcernedwiththeextenttowhichChina'sgovernanceresponsetoleadpollutionprimarilyaddressesenvironmentalandpublichealthissues;orratheritprimarilyaddressespoliticalandeconomicdevelopmentissues,andwhetherthisdifferenceissignificant.
ThearticlemakessuggestionsforhowChinacanimproveitsenvironmentalenforcement,andinsodoing,contributestoagrowingfieldofscholarshipthatexaminesenvironmentalgovernanceissuesinthecontextofdevelopingcountries.
INTRODUCTION187I.
GROWTHOFLEAD-BATTERYPRODUCTIONANDITSENVIRONMENTALANDHUMANIMPACTS.
188II.
THECHALLENGESANDCHANGESOFENVIRONMENTALENFORCEMENTBEFOREANDAFTER2011.
190A.
LocalProtectionismandChina'sGovernanceSystem190B.
LeadPollutionRegulatoryBackground193III.
ORIGINANDUSEOFCHINA'SROAS.
197A.
TheEIA-ROAConnection.
197B.
LegalOriginsandBasisforROAs199C.
LegalityofChina'sROAs201(竺效)Ph.
D,AssociateProfessorofEnvironmentalLaw,atSchoolofLaw,RenminUniversityofChina,part-timeResearcherofResearchCenterofCivilandCommercialJurisprudenceofRenminUniversityofChina,Beijing,China.
Contact:x.
zhu@ruc.
edu.
cnAdamMoser,CorrespondingAuthor,J.
D.
,AssistantDirector,U.
S.
–ChinaPartnershipforEnvironmentalLawatVermontLawSchool,SouthRoyalton,VT.
USA.
Contact:amoser@vermontlaw.
edu2014]THELAWS,POLICIES,ANDPOLITICSOFREGULATINGLEADPOLLUTIONINCHINA187D.
ROAsasEnforcementCampaigns.
204CONCLUSION.
206INTRODUCTIONIntheyearsandmonthsleadinguptoMay2011,newsofthelatestmassleadpoisoningincidentsseemedtoappearweeklyinChina'sdomesticmedia.
Villagesandschoolswerediscoveringthattheywerebeingpoisonedbynearbyfactories.
Insomecases,thisledtoviolentconfrontationsbetweenvictimsandpolluters.
Theculpritswereprimarilybatteryfactories,leadprocessorsandsmelters,whichexpandedrapidlyandhaphazardlyoverthepastdecade.
1Regulatingthousandsofsmalllead-batteryfactories,someofwhichavoidedofficialregistration,andorwereundertheprotectionoflocalgovernmentswouldbeanenforcementchallengeforanyregulator.
ThisisespeciallythecaseinChina,whereenvironmentalruleoflawisweakandenforcementdutiesareprimarilycarriedoutbylocal-levelbureausthatlackincentive,independence,andinsomecasescapacity.
Thecentralgovernment'sinitialregulatoryresponsetothesemassincidentsofenvironmentalpoisoningwasenhancedrhetoricandcallsforincreasedinspectionsofleadandheavymetalprocessingfacilities.
2Unfortunately,thegovernment'spleastoindustryandlocalleadersfortheincreasedattentiontotheleadpollutionhadlittlediscernibleeffectuntilMay2011.
OnMay18,2011,MEPreleasedanoticethatthreatenedtowithholdtheMinistry'stechnicallyrequisiteapprovalforallenvironmentalimpactassessments(EIAs)forallfutureconstructionprojectsinthoseregionswhereleadrelatedindustrieswereendangeringpublichealthorinnoncompliancewithlawsandpolicies.
3OnMay20,MEPreleasedanothernoticethatappliedthisrestrictiononEIAapprovalstoallnewconstructionprojectsinHuzhouCity,ZhejiangProvince,whereahigh-profileleadpoisoningincidentoccurred.
4Whatfollowedwasanunprecedented"environmental1From2004to2010,leadbatteryproductionincreased133%inChina.
HealthandEnvironmentalImpactsofLeadBatteryManufacturingandRecyclinginChina,2011,at56,athttp://www.
ipe.
org.
cn/Upload/Report-Battery-II-EN.
pdf(lastvisitedOct.
3,2013).
2SeeGuidanceNoticeoftheStateCouncilForwardedtotheMinistryofEnvironmentalProtectionandotherDepartmentsonStrengtheningtheHeavyMetalPollutionPrevention,No.
61,[2009],GeneralOfficeoftheStateCouncil;NoticeonLaunchingSpecialInspectionsofHeavyMetalPollutingEnterprises,No.
112,[2009],GeneralOfficeofMEP,Sep.
29,2009,athttp://www.
zhb.
gov.
cn/gkml/hbb/bgt/200910/t20091022_174813.
htm(lastvisitedOct.
3,2013).
3NoticeonStrengtheningthePollutionPreventionandControloftheLead-AcidBatteriesandtheSecondaryLeadIndustry,No.
56,[2011],GeneralOfficeofMEP,May18,2011,athttp://www.
mep.
gov.
cn/gkml/hbb/bwj/201105/t20110519_210865.
htm(lastvisitedOct.
5,2013).
4NoticetoStopEnvironmentalImpactAssessmentApprovalofHuzhouCity,No.
584,[2011],GeneralOfficeofMEP,May20,2011,athttp://www.
zhb.
gov.
cn/gkml/hbb/bgth/201105/t20110524_211053.
htm(lastvisitedOct.
4,2013).
188FRONTIERSOFLAWINCHINA[Vol.
9:186enforcementstorm.
"ByJuly2011,domesticandinternationalmediareportedthat90percentofChina'sbatteryfactorieshadstoppedproduction.
5Afteryearsofstrugglingtoeffectivelyregulateleadpollution,whatcanexplaintheimpactofthethree-pagenoticeissuedonMay18TheregulatoryandpoliticaltoolthatwasbehindthisnormativedocumentisknowninChineseastheregionalrestrictiononapprovals(quyuxianpi),hereafterreferredtoasarestrictiononapprovals(ROAs).
6AccordingtoChina'sLawonEnvironmentalImpactAssessments,allconstructionprojectsneedtoreceiveapprovalfromMEPoroneofitssubordinatebodiesbeforebeginningconstruction.
Since2007,MEPanditsprovinciallevelbureaushaveselectivelyusedtherestrictiononEIAapprovalstopunishjurisdictionsandcompaniesthatfrequentlyorflagrantlyfailedtocomplywithlaws,regulations,orpolicies.
Onlyaftertheunderlyingissuesofnon-complianceareaddressed,willtheROAsbelifted.
Stoppingtheapprovalofallconstructionprojectsforanentirecounty,city,watershed,orcompanythreatenstoseverelyreduceeconomicactivityandgrowthprospects,andthus,motivateslocalleadersorseniorexecutivestoaddresstheunderlyingenvironmentalissuesthatresultedintherestrictioninthefirstplace.
ThisarticlewillexaminethepoliticsandlawsbehindtheuseofEIArelatedROAsinChina,usingthe2011ROAthattargetedleadpollutionasaspecificexample.
SectionIIprovidesbackgroundandcontexttotheregulatorylandscapeinChinawithafocusonlead-batteryrelatedindustryandmanufacturinginChina.
SectionIIIintroducesthereadertoChina'suseofROAsandthelawandpoliticalbasisfortheiruse.
InSectionIV,theauthorsprovidetheiranalysisoftheuseofROAsinChinaandhowthesystemcanbeimproved.
I.
GROWTHOFLEAD-BATTERYPRODUCTIONANDITSENVIRONMENTALANDHUMANIMPACTSTherapidgrowthofstationarysourcesofleademissionsinChina,includingsmeltersandbatteryrelatedindustries,hasalsoleadtoanincreasednumberofleadpollutionhotspots.
ThegrowthofChina'slead-batteryindustryisattributabletobothitsexportprowessandtherapidexpansionofdomesticdemandforconventionalcarsandelectricbicycles.
From2000to2010,over100millionelectricbikesweresoldinChina,making5BloombergNews,"ChinaShuts90%ofLead-AcidBatteryPlantsasPricesDrop,"Nov.
25,2011,atwww.
businessweek.
com/news/2011-11-25/china-shuts-90-of-lead-acid-battery-plants-as-prices-drop.
html(lastvisitedAug.
20,2013).
6Restrictionofapprovals(ROAs)isusedtorefertoChina'ssystemofquyuxianpi.
TheauthorsbelievethatROAsisanaccurateandmoreusefulterminologyfortheChinesesystem.
AsSectionthreeinthisarticledescribesindetail,thereareseveraltypesofROAsthathavebeenusedinChina,somearegeographicallyfocused,andsomefocusonaspecificindustrysector,whileothersareapplicabletojustonecompany.
TheoneelementthatallthesehaveincommonistherestrictionofEIAapprovals.
2014]THELAWS,POLICIES,ANDPOLITICSOFREGULATINGLEADPOLLUTIONINCHINA189ittheworld'slargestmarketforelectricbikes.
7In2009,ChinasurpassedtheUnitedStatesastheworld'slargestmarketforautomobiles.
8Accompanyingthegrowthofcarsandelectricbikes,thedomesticproductionoflead-acidbatteriesalsoincreased.
Themajorityofstarterbatteriesusedinconventionalcarsandrechargeablebatteriesutilizedinelectric-powerbikesarelead-acidbatteries.
Chinaproducesoveraquarteroftheworld'sleadacid-batteries.
Inadditiontomeetingdomesticdemand,Chinaistheworld'slargestexporteroflead-batteriesusedinelectricbikes.
9In2010,Chinausedathirdoftheworld'sindustriallead,3.
75milliontons,accordingtoanindustryassociation.
Ofthat,3.
13milliontonsor83.
5percentwereusedforlead-batteryproduction.
10TheboominelectricbikesandbatteryproductionenrichedmanyinvestorsandprovidedarelativelycheaptransportationoptiontohundredsofmillionspeopleinChinaandtheworld.
Totheextentthatelectricbikesdisplaceconventionalpetroleumfueledmotorbikes,theiradoptionalsohelpstoreducestreet-levelemissions.
SinceChinaswitchedtounleadedgasolineoveradecadeago,overalllevelsofleadinChina'sambientairhavefallen.
However,thenumberofstationarysourcesofleadpollutionhasincreasedandtheregulationofemissionsfromthesesourceshasnotkeptpacewiththisexpansionwhichhascreatedpollutionhotspots.
TheNewYorkTimesreportedthatareviewof2006data"suggestedthatone-thirdofChinesechildrensufferfromelevatedbloodleadlevels.
"11ThoughChina'sownstatisticsrefutethisclaim.
Itisevidentthatleadpollutionhotspotsexistandtheirimpactonhumanhealthisactualandapparent.
12ChinadailynewspaperreportedinJanuary2010:"Atleast51childreninEastChina'sJiangsuprovincewerefoundtohaveexcessivelevelsofleadintheirblood,thelatestleadpoisoningscandalafterastringofsuchcaseslastyear,soundingnewalarmsforheavymetalpollutioninChina.
Medicalchecksfor1107DanielCusick,CanE-bikesDisplaceCars,ScientificAmerican,Feb.
22,2012,athttp://www.
scientificamerican.
com/article.
cfmid=can-ebikes-displace-cars(lastvisitedAug.
20,2013).
8"ChinaEndsU.
S.
'sReignasWorld'sLargestAutoMarket,"Bloomberg,Jan.
10,2010,athttp://www.
bloomberg.
com/apps/newspid=newsarchive&sid=aE.
x_r_l9NZE(lastvisitedJul.
10,2013).
9BloombergNews,fn.
5"ChinaShuts90%ofLead-AcidBatteryPlantsasPricesDrop,"Nov.
25,2011,atwww.
businessweek.
com/news/2011-11-25/china-shuts-90-of-lead-acid-battery-plants-as-prices-drop.
html(lastvisitedAug.
20,2013).
10Id.
11SharonLaFraniere,LeadPoisoninginChinatheHiddenScourge,NYTimes,Jun.
15,2011,athttp://www.
nytimes.
com/2011/06/15/world/asia/15lead.
html_r=2(lastvisitedAug.
20,2013).
12DavidLennetetal.
,"ReducingtheHealthRisksfromIndustrialLeadPollution:Case-studybasedrecommendations",NaturalResourceDefenseCouncil(NRDC),June2011,http://www.
nrdc.
cn/phpcms/userfiles/download/201305/21/Reducing%20the%20Health%20Risks%20from%20Industrial%20Lead%20Pollution.
pdf(lastvisitedAug.
20,2013).
190FRONTIERSOFLAWINCHINA[Vol.
9:186childrenyoungerthan16inDafeng,Jiangsu,showed51testedpositiveforhighleadlevels,saidDafeng'smunicipalgovernmentonitswebsiteyesterday.
DafengShengxiangPowerSupplyCoLtd,alead-acidbatterymanufacturer,washeldresponsibleforthepoisoning.
Thecompanyislocatedlessthan100metersawayfromtheHekouvillagewhereresidentsstartedtocomplainofanorexiaandvomitingamongtheirchildrensinceAugustlastyear.
"13InMayof2011,morethan200peopleattackedalead-batteryfactorythathadbeenoperatingandpollutinginMengxiVillageforsixyears.
Villagersbecameoutragedwhentheylearnedthat233adultsand99childrenhadelevatedbloodleadlevels,someofwhichwereseventimesashighasnormallevels.
14WhatmakesthisincidentmoresurprisingisthatthevillageislocatedinthecostalprovinceofZhejiang,isjustafewhoursdrivingtoShanghaiandHangzhoubothofwhicharetherelativelyaffluentmetropolises.
Additionally,justamonthpriortotheattackontheMengxifactory,theTaizhouSuqiStorageBatteryCo.
Ltd.
inTaizhouCity,Zhejiangwasclosed,becauseitpoisoned168villagers,including53children.
15TheproliferationofmassleadpoisoningincidentsandincreasedmediaattentionputpressureontheChinesegovernmenttoact.
Andinsomeways,partsofthegovernmenthadalreadyacted.
Existinglawsandregulations,althoughnotperfect,couldhavebeenusedtosignificantlyreducetheleadpoisoningincidentsifrigorouslyenforced.
TwonoticesfromChina'sStateCouncilin2009,whichhadthesamelegalstatusasthenoticeissuedinMay2011,urgedlocalgovernmentstocontrolleadpollution,buthadonlyasmallimpactoncontrollingpollution.
16Thefollowingsectionbrieflyexaminestheexistinglawsandregulationsthatweremadeinplacepriorto2011andfacedtheimplementationchallenges.
II.
THECHALLENGESANDCHANGESOFENVIRONMENTALENFORCEMENTBEFOREANDAFTER2011A.
LocalProtectionismandChina'sGovernanceSystemAcommonnarrativeofenvironmentalenforcementfailuresinChinaisthat13YANFengqian,"JiangsuKidsHitbyleadPoisoning",ChinaDaily,Jan.
6,2010,www.
chinadaily.
com.
cn/cndy/2010-01/06/content_9270316.
htm(lastvisitedOct.
5,2013).
14Id.
15"EastChinaCityCracksDownonPollutionafterLeadPoisoningScandal",Xinhua,Apr.
19,2011,http://news.
xinhuanet.
com/english2010/china/2011-04/19/c_13835782.
htm(lastvisitedOct.
5,2013).
16Mostnotableamongtheseeffortsweretwonoticesissuedin2009:GuidanceNoticeoftheStateCouncilForwardedtheMinistryofEnvironmentalProtectionandotherDepartmentsonStrengtheningtheHeavyMetalPollutionPrevention,No.
61,[2009],GeneralOfficeoftheStateCouncil;NoticeonLaunchingSpecialInspectionsofHeavyMetalPollutingEnterprises,No.
112,[2009],GeneralOfficeofMEP,Sep.
29,2009,http://www.
zhb.
gov.
cn/gkml/hbb/bgt/200910/t20091022_174813.
htm(lastvisitedOct.
5,2013).
2014]THELAWS,POLICIES,ANDPOLITICSOFREGULATINGLEADPOLLUTIONINCHINA191environmentalprotectionfrequentlysacrificedforshort-termGDPgrowthatthelocal-level.
17Thisphenomenoncanbeattributedtothreefactors:1)China'soverallstageofeconomicdevelopment,2)lackofarobustlegalenforcementsystem,and3)local-levelpoliticalandeconomicconditionsthatfavorignoringenvironmentalenforcementtoachieverapidGDPgrowth.
Likemostindustrialcountries,Chinahaspursuedamodelof"pollutionfirst,treatmentlater.
"Theformalizationofthe"pollutionfirst,treatmentlater"policyapproachcanbeseeninthemajorityofChineseenvironmentallawsandpolicies,whicharegenerallyvagueandweak―aproductofenvironmentalinterestsbeingrelativelyweakduringthedraftingofsuchlegislation.
18Economicprotectionismcomesinmanyshapesandsizes.
InChina,localprotectionismgenerallyreferstoeffortsbyalocaljurisdiction(county,city,orprovince)toprotectlocallybasedindustries.
Thisarticleislessconcernedwiththeprotectionistissuesofmarketintegrationandindustrydiversification,andmorefocusedonprotectionismthatresultsinthefailuretoenforcenationallawsandpoliciesrelatedtoenvironmentalcompliance.
WhilelocalprotectionismisnotuniquetoChina,thereareaspectsofChina'smacro-governancemodelthattendstoexacerbateitandwarrantabriefdiscussion.
Chinaisaunifiedstate,withpoweremanatingfromtheCentralGovernmentinBeijing.
However,reformsinthe1980sthataimedtoincreaseeconomicdevelopmentandCentralGovernmentpoliciesthatmadelocalgovernmentsprimarilyresponsibleforraisingrevenueforlocalprojectshasresultedindefactolocalautonomy.
19Thisautonomyprovideslocalauthoritiestheroomtheyneedtopromoteeconomicgrowth,butalsoprovideslocalleaderstheabilitytoinfluencetheenforcementoflawswhenthoselawsgetinthewayoflocalpriorities.
Behindthislocal-nationalgovernmentalstructurearetwosystemsthataimtocreatenationalcoherence.
OneisasystemoutlinedinChina'sConstitutionthatpromulgateslawsandregulationsandenforcesthemthrough17WANGCanfa,ChineseEnvironmentalLawEnforcement:CurrentDeficienciesandSuggestedReforms,8Vt.
JrlofEnv.
L.
159,at169,http://vjel.
vermontlaw.
edu/files/2013/07/Chinese-Environmental-Law-Enforcement.
pdf(lastvisitedOct.
15,2013);ZHANGXuehua,EnforcingEnvironmentalRegulationsinHubeiProvince,China:Agencies,Courts,Citizens,StanfordUniversityPh.
DDissertation,2008,at30,http://books.
google.
com.
hk/booksid=ulQ-wy-3BOkC&printsec=frontcover&dq=ZHANG+Xuehua,+Enforcing+Environmental+Regulations+in+Hubei+Province,+China:+Agencies,+Courts,+Citizens&hl=zh-CN&sa=X&ei=py2AUp6vK4m7kgWGnICQDw&ved=0CDkQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=ZHANG%20Xuehua%2C%20Enforcing%20Environmental%20Regulations%20in%20Hubei%20Province%2C%20China%3A%20Agencies%2C%20Courts%2C%20Citizens&f=false(lastvisitedOct.
20,2013).
18BenjaminvanRooij,ImplementationofChineseEnvironmentalLaw:RegularEnforcementandPoliticalCampaigns,37(1)DevelopmentandChange57,6061(2006).
19SeeZHENGYongnian,De-FactoFederalismofCentral–LocalRelationsinChina,ChinaPolicyInstituteDiscussionPaper8,Jun2006,http://www.
nottingham.
ac.
uk/cpi/documents/discussion-papers/discussion-paper-8-de-facto-federalism.
pdf(lastvisitedSep.
8,2013);BenHillman,FactionsandSpoils:ExaminingPoliticalBehaviorwithintheLocalStateinChina,64TheChinaJournal1,13(2010).
192FRONTIERSOFLAWINCHINA[Vol.
9:186governmentministriesandbodies,includingthejudicialsystem.
Theothersystemistheintra-partycadreevaluationsystem,whichattemptstoassesspartyfunctionariesforpromotionbasedontheiradherencetopartygoals.
Thesetwosystemscanbecomplementarywitheachother.
However,whentheyarenotincadencethereisthepossibilityformixedsignalsandmixedincentives.
Forexample,oneaspectislaws,regulationsandpoliciespromulgatedbygovernmentbodies,suchastheNationalPeople'sCongress,theStateCouncilandtheMinistryofEnvironmentalProtection.
TheotheroneistheChineseCommunistParty's(CCP)cadreevaluationsystem,whichhashistoricallyincentivizedlocallevelleaderstopromoteGDPgrowthoverenvironmentalprotectionforthesakeofintra-partycareeradvancement.
20Consequently,thecompetitionforintra-partypromotionhasledtothelocalcadrescompetingagainsteachotherforGDPgrowth,andatleastonestudyfoundthattheincreaseofinvestmentinenvironmentalprotectionhasanegativeeffectonthecareeradvancementofcadres.
21Themisalignmentofcentralgovernmentalpolicyandinternalpartypolicy,resultsinlocallevelleadersfavoringcareeradvancementoverthestrictimplementationofenvironmentallaws.
22Additionally,thereluctanceofthecentralgovernmentandtheCCPtofurtherpromotetheruleoflaw,anindependentjudiciary,andpublicoversight,limitstheeffectivenessoflawsandregulationsthatcouldactasacounterbalancetothemyopicpursuitofGDPgrowth.
Regardlessoftherootcauses,localautonomyandthelocalprotectionismthatitnurturesaresignificantbarrierstotheunifiedandsystematicenforcementofChina'sexistingenvironmentallawsandregulations.
23Theabilityoffactoriestoavoidlawsandregulationsthatexistonthebooksisanexampleofthelocalprotectionthatpollutersoftenreceive.
Anevenmoredisturbingexampleofthisprotectionismisfoundinnumerousreportsofvictimsofleadpollution,includingchildren,beingdeniedtestingorreceivingfalsifiedtestresultsfromlocalhospitals,becauselocalauthoritiesdesiredtoprotectboththemselvesandpollutersbykeepingpotentialvictimsunawareoftheleadpollution.
24InMarch2012,parentsinChenzhouCity,Hunan,reportedbeingturnedawayfromhospitalsafterrequestingbloodleveltestsfortheirchildren,thisafter200childreninthetownwerediagnosedwithhighbloodleadlevelsin2010.
25Chenzhouisacityof4.
5millionpeopleand1000smelting20SeeAlexWang,TheSearchforSustainableLegitimacy:EnvironmentalLawandBureaucracyinChina,37Harv.
Env.
L.
Rev.
365,391(2013).
21Id.
22Id.
at385.
23SeeWANG,fn.
17at169.
24SeeHumanRightsWatch,"MyChildrenHaveBeenPoisoned"APublicHealthCrisisinFourChineseProvinces,Jun.
2011.
25Xinhua,BloodLeadLevelTestingResumedAmidPublicOutcry,Mar.
29,2012,athttp://www.
china.
org.
cn/china/2012-03/29/content_25019214.
htm(lastvisitedOct.
21,2013).
2014]THELAWS,POLICIES,ANDPOLITICSOFREGULATINGLEADPOLLUTIONINCHINA193plants.
China'sofficialXinhuanewsagencyreportedthat:"Overthepastfewmonths,[amother]tookhersontoeverymajorhospitalinChenzhou.
Eachtime,theyweretoldthetestcouldnotbedone.
"Thedoctorssaidtheirequipmentwasnotworkingandnooneknewwhenitwouldbefixed.
Theysaidthechildshouldjustdrinkmoremilkandeatmoreleanpork.
"26Article16oftheEnvironmentalProtectionLawprovidesthat"localpeople'sgovernmentsatvariouslevelsshallberesponsiblefortheenvironmentalqualityofareasundertheirjurisdictionandtakemeasurestoimproveenvironmentalquality.
"27Inpractice,localgovernmentsareprimarilyinchargeoftheenforcementoflawsandregulationsaimedatprotectingtheenvironment.
TheresponsibilitytoenforcelawsandregulationsfallsmostdirectlyonlocalEPBsatvariouslevelslowerthanprovinciallevel.
TheselocalEPBsareinchargeofeverythingfromurgingtheirlocalgovernmentstotakeenvironmentalconsiderationsintoplanningdecisionstoensuringthatemittersinstallpollutioncontrolequipment,themonitoringofemissions,andissuingfeesandfines.
28LocalEPBsarefrequentlyinhibitedfromfulfillingtheirenforcementdutiesduetotheirlackofindependencefromthelocalgovernmentsandofteninternalexpertcapacity.
29LocalgovernmentscontrolthemajorityoffundingthatEPBsreceiveandaregenerallyabletomakepersonneldecisionsthataffecttheEPBsleadership.
30Inahighprofileincidentin2010,thelocalcountygovernmentofGuzhenfiredsixEPBofficersfortheirpersistentandlawfulattemptstoenforcestandardsonalocalfactory.
31B.
LeadPollutionRegulatoryBackgroundChina'sNationalDirectoryofHazardousWastesclassifiesleadoxide,theprimaryconstituentinlead-acidbatteries,asatoxicpollutant.
32Additionally,Chinahasnumerousenvironmentalstandardsspecifictoleademissions,butwiththeexceptionofoneregardingthedistancesbetweenleadbatteryfactoriesandresidentialzones,thesestandardsonlyworkinconjunctionwithotherenvironmentallaws.
Additionally,the26Id.
27EnvironmentalProtectionLawofChina,Article16.
28CharlesR.
McElwee,EnvironmentalLawinChina:MitigatingRiskandEnsuringCompliance,OxfordUniversityPress(NewYork),at11315(2011).
29Interviewnotesonfilewithauthor;SeeWANG,fn.
17at169;ZHANG,fn.
17at50;seeSupraNYTimes,"ShenYulin,theenvironmentalprotectiondirectorforDeqingCounty,wheretheHaijiufactoryislocated,said65inspectorswereresponsibleforaregionofnearly400squaremiles,withmorethan2,000factories.
"30SeeMcElwee,fn.
28at116117.
31LIChengsi,etal,HowCanLawEnforcementBreak"FortifiedVillages"and"LocalPolicies",ChinaEnvironmentalNews,Jul.
13,2010,athttp://www.
cenews.
com.
cn/ztbd1/gzjttzsj_zt/201007/t20100714_661607.
html(lastvisitedOct.
12,2013)32NationalDirectoryofDangerousWastes(guojiaweixianfeiqiwuminglu).
194FRONTIERSOFLAWINCHINA[Vol.
9:186successfulenforcementofleadspecificstandardsisonlyaseffectiveastheenforcementoftheseotherenvironmentallaws,astheyalsoprovidethelegalsupportforpunishinganemitterfornon-compliance.
Themostimportantoftheselawsare:China'sEnvironmentalImpactAssessmentLaw,the"threesimultaneoussystem,"theDeclarationandRegistrationfortheDischargeofPollutants,theCleanProductionLaw,andtheLawonPreventionandControlofAtmosphericPollutionandChina'sEnvironmentalProtectionLaw.
The"HealthProtectionZoneStandardforLeadBatteryPlants,"issuedbytheMinistryofHealth,requiresthatplantsshouldnotbelocatedwithin500to800metersofresidentialcommunities,dependingonthesizeoftheplant'sproductionandaveragewindspeeds.
33ThisstandardshouldbeconsideredwhenfactoriesareundergoingEIAapproval.
However,inJune2011,itwasestimatedthat95to99percentofChina'sleadbatteryplantsdidnotmeetthe500-meterstandard.
34China'sEIAlawbroadlyappliestoallconstructionprojects,majormodificationsandrenovations—fromrestaurantsandcommercialspacestofactoriesandhydropowerdams.
35Appropriately,thelevelofassessmentthatisrequireddependsontheexpectedenvironmentalimpactofaproject.
Projectswithdeminimisimpactsonlyneedtoregister,largerprojectswillatleasthavetofilloutaform,andfullenvironmentalimpactassessmentreportsarerequiredforprojectsthatwillhavea"major"impactontheenvironment.
36AccordingtotheclassificationcatalogueissuedbyChina'sMEP,allbatteryfabricationfacilitiesmustundertakeafullenvironmentalimpactassessmentreport.
37AnotherfundamentalelementofChina'senvironmentallawisthe"threesimultaneous"system,whichsimilartoanEIA,ismeanttoensurethatenvironmentalprotectionisincludedinaproject'sdesign,construction,andoperationphases.
Thereisnospecificlawforthe"threesimultaneous"system,butitsrequirementsandevenenforcementmechanismsareincludedintomanyofChina'smajorenvironmentallaws.
3833铅蓄电池厂卫生防护距离标准(HealthProtectionZoneStandardforLeadStorageBatteryPlants)GB116591989.
34SeeLüMinghe,"LeadCleanupStorm,"SouthernWeekend,Jun.
3,2011,http://www.
infzm.
com/content/59935(lastvisitedOct.
12,2013).
35Article16,EIALaw.
36SeeMcElwee,fn.
28at130131.
37ConstructionProjectEnvironmentalAssessmentClassificationManagementCatalogue,2008,at10,http://www.
mep.
gov.
cn/info/bgw/bl/200809/t20080905_128232.
htm(lastvisitedOct.
18,2013).
38Article26oftheEnvironmentalProtectionLaw:Facilitiesforthepreventionandcontrolofpollutionatconstructionsitesmustbedesigned,builtandcommissionedtogetherwiththeprincipalpartoftheproject.
Nopermissionshallbegivenforaconstructionprojecttobecommissionedorused,untilitsinstallationsforthepreventionandcontrolofpollutionareexaminedanddeterminedtobeuptostandardbythecompetentdepartmentofenvironmentalprotectionthatexaminedandapprovedtheenvironmentalimpactstatement.
Article11oftheAirPollutionLaw:projectsthatdonotfulfilltherequirementsspecifiedinthenationalregulationsforenvironmentalprotectionforsuchconstructionprojectsshallnotbepermittedtobeginoperationoruse.
SeealsoArticle17oftheWaterPollutionLaw.
2014]THELAWS,POLICIES,ANDPOLITICSOFREGULATINGLEADPOLLUTIONINCHINA195UnderboththeEIAapprovalprocessandthethreesimultaneoussystems,localenvironmentalconditionsandtheproject'sabilitytomeetapplicabledischargestandardsshouldbethebasisfortheEPB'sapproval.
39Withinonemonthafteraconstruction,reconstruction,orexpansionproject'spollutionpreventionandcontrolfacilitiesarecompleted,verifiedandapprovalqualificationsobtained,pollutant-dischargingworkunitsmustaccuratelyfillouttheDeclarationandRegistrationFormforDischargingPollutants.
40Aftertherelevantindustrydepartmenthasverifiedthepollutioncontroldevices,theunitshallregisterandenrollwiththelocalenvironmentalprotectiondepartmentandobtaintheEnrollmentCertificatefortheDeclarationandRegistrationofDischargingPollutants.
Technically,the"threesimultaneous"systemandtheprocessofgaininganenvironmentalimpactassessmentapprovalshouldensurethatlead-acidbatterymanufacturershaveappropriatepollutioncontrolequipmentthatcanmeettherequiredemissionstandards.
Unfortunately,thereisalargegapbetweenwhattechnicallyshouldhappenandwhatactuallyhappened.
InDecemberof2010,itwasreportedthat60percentofChina'smorethan3000lead-acidbatteryfactorieswerenotregisteredforproductionwiththenationalgovernment.
41Ifunregistered,itisveryunlikelythatthesefactoriesundertookthecostofanEIAreportandacquiringproperapprovalfromEPBs.
EvenifafactoryisofficiallyregisteredwithanEIAapprovedbytherelevantEPBthatisstillnotenoughtoensureitmeetsemissionstandards.
42AnEIAisonlyasgoodasitsfollow-throughandthisoftenrequiresEPBsdiligentmonitoringandenforcement.
Inaddition,undertheCleanProductionLawanditsimplementingregulationspecifictotheleadbatteryindustry,batteryfactoriesshouldregularlyundertakecleanproductionaudits.
43ThisauditduplicatesmanyofthechecksthatarerequiredbytheEIAand"threesimultaneous"approvals,e.
g.
thefacilitycanachievecompliancewithrelevantemissionlimits.
44Anauditshouldalsoensurethatthereareproceduresinplacetoreducetheriskofleadpollutionleavingthefactorybyemployees'clothesandshoes.
EPBsshouldreviewandapprovecleanproductionaudits;includingthatthefactoryhasinstalledrequiredequipmentthatcanmeetemissionstandards.
39Article20.
3,RegulationsontheAdministrationofConstructionProjectEnvironmentalProtection.
40排放污染物登记管理规定(RegulationsonRegistrationofPollutantDischargeReporting).
41WANGQiufeng,MoreThan60PercentinIndustryareUnpermitted,6BigProblemstoConsiderforLeadBatteryIndustry,第一财经报道(ChinaBusinessNews),Dec.
6,2010,http://finance.
sina.
com.
cn/roll/20101206/00409057851.
shtml(lastvisitedOct.
23,2013).
42SeeLennet,fn.
12at11.
43CleanerProductionStandard—LeadBatteryIndustryHJ447—2008,http://english.
mep.
gov.
cn/standards_reports/standards/others1/Cleaner_Production_Standards/200907/t20090716_156248.
htm(lastvisitedJun.
18,2013).
44SeeMcElwee,fn.
28at213.
196FRONTIERSOFLAWINCHINA[Vol.
9:186Despitetheselaws,thereissignificantevidencethatleadpollutingfacilitieswerenoncompliant,inadditiontowidespreadincidentsofleadpoisoning.
45InSeptember2009,MEPinconjunctionwithnearlyeveryotherrelevantCentralGovernmentMinistryreleasedanotice(Tongzhi)ontheneedtoinspectallheavymetalpollutingenterprisesandtoensurethattheyaremeetingemissionanddischargestandards.
46Thenoticeincludedformsforlocal-levelenvironmentalagenciestousetoassessthecomplianceofheavymetalpollutionsources.
Alsoin2009,China'sStateCouncilincoordinationwithMEPandotherministriesissuedanoticeontheneedtostrengthenthepreventionofheavymetalpollution.
47Despitethesehigh-levelnoticesandwarnings,massincidentsofleadpoisoningcontinuedandtherewaslittleevidencethattheleadbatteryindustrywasbeingforcedbylocalregulatorstocleanupitsproductionprocesses.
AfterChina'sMinistryofEnvironmentalProtectionreleasedanoticeininMay2011,regardingtheregulationoflead-acidbatteryfactoriesandleadrecyclingfacilities,localgovernmentsclearlybegantotakeeffortstocontrolleadpollution,atleasttemporarily.
48ByJulyof2011,nearly90%ofthelead-batteryfactorieswhichhaveregisteredinChinahadsuspendedproduction.
InNovember2011,itwasreportedthatthelocalenvironmentalprotectionbureaushadinspected1,744lead-batterymanufacturersacrossChina,andonly229werestilloperating.
49Whatchangedfrom2010to2011Thesimplestansweristhatleadpollutionwasdesignatedatotalvolumepollutantduringthe12thFive-YearPlanperiod,whichbeganin2011.
50Thespecificregulatorytoolthatspearheadedtheleadenforcementcampaignin2011wasMEP'sthreattorestrictitsapprovalsofEIAsinareaswherenoncompliancewasrampantorwhereleadpollutionwasimpactingsocialorder.
ThefollowingsectionexplainstheoriginsofrestrictionsonEIAapprovals(ROAs)andanalyzesthepoliticsandlawbehindtheirapplication.
45SeeLennet,fn.
12at1012.
46NoticeonLaunchingSpecialInspectionsofHeavyMetalPollutingEnterprises,No.
112,[2009],GeneralOfficeofMEP,Sep.
292009,http://www.
zhb.
gov.
cn/gkml/hbb/bgt/200910/t20091022_174813.
htm(lastvisitedSep.
18,2013).
47GuidanceNoticeoftheStateCouncilForwardedtheMinistryofEnvironmentalProtectionandotherDepartmentsonStrengtheningtheHeavyMetalPollutionPrevention,No.
61,[2009],GeneralOfficeoftheStateCouncil,2009.
48NoticeonStrengtheningthePollutionPreventionandControloftheLead-AcidBatteriesandtheSecondaryLeadIndustry,No.
56,[2011],GeneralOfficeofMEP,May18,2011,http://www.
mep.
gov.
cn/gkml/hbb/bwj/201105/t20110519_210865.
htm(lastvisitedJun.
18,2013).
49SeeBloomberg,fn.
5;Lv,fn.
34.
50Thecomplete12thFive-YearPlanforheavymetalshasnotbeenmadepublic,butsomedetailsareknown,seeWANGQian,国务院正式批复《重金属污染综合防治"十二五"规划》[StateCouncilFormallyReplieson"12thFive-YearPlanforComprehensivePreventionandTreatmentofHeavyMetals"],SouthernWeekend,Feb.
22,2011,http://www.
infzm.
com/content/55538(lastvisitedOct.
18,2013).
2014]THELAWS,POLICIES,ANDPOLITICSOFREGULATINGLEADPOLLUTIONINCHINA197III.
ORIGINANDUSEOFCHINA'SROASTheuseofadministrativerestrictionsonpermitsorregulatoryapprovalsisanimportantregulatorypowerwieldedbygovernmentsallovertheworld.
IntheChinesecontext,ROAsarearelativelynewregulatorytoolthatwasfirstusednationallyin2007.
ThefollowingsectionexaminestheoriginsofChina'sROAsystemandhelpsilluminatethepoliticsandlawsbehindtheuseofROAsinChina.
A.
TheEIA-ROAConnectionThebirthofROAsinChinawasconnectedtotheenforcementofChina's2002EnvironmentalImpactAssessmentLaw(EIALaw)andanemphasisduringthe11thFive-YearPlan(2005–2010)onenvironmentaltargetsforreducingenergyintensityandSO2andCODdischarges.
WhileChinahadarudimentarysystemforEIAspriorto2002,the2002EIALawwasthefirstspecificenvironmentalimpactassessmentlegislationinChina.
51TheEIAlawaimedtoembodythepreventativeprincipal,andatthetimeofitsdrafting,manyChinesescholarswerehopefulthatthelawwouldusherinaneweraforenvironmentalregulation.
Unfortunately,theEIAlawhasstruggledtoimprovetheenforcementofenvironmentalregulationsconsistentlyandnationally.
52In2005,whenitbecameapparentthatthenewEIAlawwasbeingfrequentlyandflagrantlyviolated,ifnotoutrightignored,SEPAlaunchedanenforcementcampaignaimedatestablishingthepriorityoftheEIAlaw.
Thecampaignwhichthemediacalledan"EIAStorm,"beganonJanuary18,andhalted30large-scaleprojectsthathadbegunconstructionwithoutEIAapproval.
53Oneofthese30projectswasthestillcontentiousXiluoduDamontheJinshaRiverinSouthwesternChina;aftercompletingitwillbeoneofthelargestdamsintheworldwith12gigawattsofgenerationcapacity.
54Thiswasnot,thefirsttimethatSEPAuseda"storm"campaigntocrackdownonoffenders,butitwasthefirsttimethatthefocuswasontheEIAlawandonsuchlarge-scaleprojects.
55SEPA'spursuitofEIAenforcementcontinuedto2006.
Thatyear,SEPAclaimedthatitsEIAofficestoppedordelayedtheapprovalof163large-scaleprojectswithtotalplannedinvestmentsofUSD123billion(RMB770billion).
Italsoundertookamore51FormoreonChina'sEIAsystempriorto2003seegenerally,Wang,Y.
,R.
K.
MorganandM.
Cashmore,2003,EnvironmentalimpactassessmentofprojectsinthePeople'sRepublicofChina:newlaw,oldproblems,23EnvironmentalImpactAssessmentReview,543579.
52ExamplesofprojectsignoringEIAs,hydropowerdamsShennongjia,Hubei.
http://www.
guardian.
co.
uk/environment/2011/sep/15/shennongjia-china-water-development;http://news.
sina.
com.
cn/c/2011-08-15/141222993191.
shtml(lastvisitedOct.
28,2013).
53The"EIAStorm"in2005,http://www.
china.
com.
cn/chinese/zhuanti/hjwj/1164411.
htm(lastvisitedJun.
18,2013).
54Id.
55Examplesofpriorenvironmentalstormcampaignsorliteraturediscussingthem.
198FRONTIERSOFLAWINCHINA[Vol.
9:186extensiveinvestigationintoexistingviolationsoftheEIAlawandthethreesimultaneoussystem,andsanctioned82"largeprojects.
"56Consideringthescaleofnon-complianceamongsthigh-profileprojects,thereisnosurprisethata2007surveyofEPBregulatorsconductedbyaPekingUniversityprofessorfoundwidespreadandsystematicnon-compliancewiththeEIAlaw.
57SichuanProvincialEPBstaffadmittedthatonly20percentoftheprovince'sprojectscompliedwiththeEIAlaw,whiletheremaining80percenteitherdidnotdoanEIAorfiledapost-constructionEIA.
58DespitetheEIAStormin2005andthecontinuedenforcementfocusfromSEPA,thefactremainedthatthevastmajorityofsanctionedprojectswouldresumeconstructionafterfilingapost-constructionorsupplementalEIA,whichistheEIAlawrequires.
59Worseyet,someoftheprojectsorderedtostopconstructionin2005and2006simplyignoredSEPA'sordersandcontinuedbuilding,oftenwithencouragementtodosofromlocalgovernmentleaders.
60SEPAfounditselfpowerlesstoforcecomplianceortopunishoffendersundertheexistinglawsanditneededsomethingstronger,andsomethingthatwouldmotivatetheirfellowgovernmentofficialsandforcecompliance.
OnJanuary10th,2007,SEPAunveileditsROAsystemtargetingEIAnon-compliance,persistentviolations,andSO2emissions.
61Thisnoticetargetedfourcity-leveladministrativeregions:Tangshan,Hebei;Luliang,Shanxi;Laiwu,Shandong;andLiupanshui,Guizhou.
Foreachofthesecities,SEPAlistedspecificcompaniesandpersistentEIArelatedviolations.
UntiltheseviolationswereaddressednoneoftheEIAsforpendingorfutureconstructionprojectswithinthesecitieswouldbeapproved.
62Inthesamenotice,SEPAappliedanROAtofouroutofthefivemajorpower-generatingcompaniesinChina:DatangInternational,Huaneng,Huadian,andGuodianPower.
Similarly,noneofthependingprojectsforthesecompanieswouldbeapproveduntiltheysatisfactorilyadheredtoSEPA'spre-existingenforcementorders.
6356SeeSEPANews:"SEPABulletin112.
3BillionSeriousEnvironmentalIllegalProjectthefirstUseofROAtoCurbHighPollutingIndustries,"Jan.
10,2007,http://www.
mep.
gov.
cn/gkml/hbb/qt/200910/t20091023_180045.
htm(lastvisitedJun.
21,2013).
57WANGJin(ed.
),环保法治三十年:我们成功了吗—中国环保法治蓝皮书(19792010)[ThreeDecadesofEnvironmentalLaw:Dowesucceed—BlueBookofChineseEnvironmentalLaw(19792010)],PekingUniversityPress(Beijing),at83(2011).
58Id.
59CitetoEIAlaw.
60SeeSEPANews,fn.
56.
61Id.
January2007wasthefirsttimetheROAwasusedbySEPA,butinDecember2006,SichuanProvince'sEPB,verylikelywiththeconsentofSEPA,usedtheROAtoaddressamajorwaterpollutionincidentinLuzhou.
62Id.
63Id.
2014]THELAWS,POLICIES,ANDPOLITICSOFREGULATINGLEADPOLLUTIONINCHINA199Throughouttheremainderof2007,SEPAwoulduseROAstotarget6morecities,2counties,and5developmentzonesacross10provinces,allforviolationsrelatedtotheEIAlaw,thethreesimultaneoussystem,andallinvolvingenergy-intensiveandorSO2emittingprojects.
64In2008,thefocusofROAswereshifted.
EveryROAissuedbyMEPfrom2008to2010,sixROAsintotal,targetedchemicaloxygendemanddischargesfromwastewatertreatmentfacilities.
ThenationalROAwasusedin2011,whenthetargetbecamelead.
Bothinitsoriginanditscontinuoususe,ROAsareinmanywayssimilartotraditionalenforcementcampaignsorenvironmentalstorms,asthesecampaignsarereferredtointheenvironmentalcontext.
However,therearesomereasonstobelievethattheROAshavethepotentialtobedistinguishedfromenforcementcampaignsandbecomestandardizedenforcementtoolsforimprovingenvironmentalcompliance.
B.
LegalOriginsandBasisforROAsTodate,theuseofROAsinChinahasbeensolelyconnectedtoEIAapprovals.
ItisprimarilybecausetheEIAlawisthemostexplicitlawvestingtheMEPwiththepowertoapproveprojectsbasedonenvironmentalimpacts.
However,the2002EIALawdoesnotdescribeorprovidefortheuseofROAs,andthereforeMEPlookstootherdocumentstofindsupportfortheuseofROAs.
InMEP'sfirstnotificationofROAsinJanuary2007,itstatedthatitwasdoingsoinaccordancewiththeStateCouncil'spolicystatementOntheImplementationofScientificDevelopmentandEnvironmentalProtectioninDecember2005,65MEPcitedspecificallytoparagraphs13and21inthepolicystatement.
Theseparagraphsstatedrespectively,thatadditionalnewsourcesofSO2pollutionshouldbestrictlycontrolledinlargeandmediumsizecities,andthattheEIAsystemshouldbestrictlyenforcedandenvironmentallyharmfulprojectsshouldnotbeapproved.
66Itseemsthatthispolicystatementinconjunctionwiththe11thFive-YearPlan'stotalvolumecontroltargetsonSO2andCODwerethebroaderpolicysupportthatMEPreliedontousethefirstROAs.
OnthesamedaythatMEPissueditsstatementonitsuseofROAs,MEPalsoreleasedastatementonthelegalbasisforROAs.
67ThisstatementsetforthtenviolationsthatcouldbethecauseforMEPtouseanROA.
ForeachoftheseviolationsMEPprovidesatleastonepolicy,regulationorlaw,andinmostcasesacombinationofthese,tosupport64SeeTableROAsbyMEP(20072012).
65SeeSEPANews,fn.
56.
66StatementontheImplementationofScientificDevelopmentandEnvironmentalProtection,No.
39,[2005],StateCouncil,3Dec.
2005,http://www.
gov.
cn/zwgk/2005-12/13/content_125680.
htm(lastvisitedOct.
8,2013).
67TheLegalBasisoftheRestrictionsonApprovalsforRegionandEnterpriseGroups,http://www.
sepa.
gov.
cn/hjyw/200701/t20070111_99506.
htm(lastvisitedJun.
11,2013).
200FRONTIERSOFLAWINCHINA[Vol.
9:186theuseofanROAwithrespecttoeachviolation.
Thestatementcitedeightdifferentpolicies,regulationsorlaws,buttheStateCouncil'sstatementontheImplementationofScientificDevelopmentandEnvironmentalProtectionwascitedfivetimes,whichmadeitthemostfrequentlyciteddocumentforlegalsupport.
TheEIAlawwascitedtooncewithrespecttoviolationsrelatedtoprojectsinprotectedandenvironmentallysensitiveareas.
68Noticesregardingsteelproduction,SO2emissions,andcleanproductionprovidedtheremainderoflegalsupportfortheROAs.
NeithertheStateCouncil'sStatementontheImplementationofScientificDevelopmentandStrengtheningEnvironmentalProtection,orthedistinctionofSO2orCODastotalvolumecontrolpollutantslegislationinastrictsense.
Thisdistinctionislessimportantinadministrativepracticethanitsamongstlegalscholars;however,itisadistinctionthatshouldbemade.
Simplyspeaking,lawsmustbepassedbyChina'sNationalPeople'sCongressoritsStandingCommittee.
TheStateCouncilcanapproveregulations,buttheStateCouncil'sstatementonScientificDevelopmentisconsideredpolicy,whichisnotlawinrealsense,butitcanbemoreinfluentialthanlaw.
69MEPtriedcrediblytoformalizeandstandardizetheuseofROAs.
OnJune5,2008,itissuedDraftManagementMeasuresonEnvironmentalImpactAssessmentofRegionalRestrictionsonApprovalsfortrialimplementation(DraftROAMeasures).
70AnIssuingMinistrycanapprovedraftmeasuressuchasthesesolelyonitsown.
71However,theDraftROAMeasuresmetwithstrongoppositionfromwithinandwithoutMEPandtheywereneverformallyapproved.
OppositionlikelycamefrompowerfulintereststhatthoughttheDraftMeasuresprovidedMEPwithtoomuchpowertoimpactthegrowthoflocallevelGDP.
AlthoughtheDraftROAMeasuresfailedtogainapproval,MEPwassuccessfulatgainingsomeadditionallegalsupportforROA'sinotherlegislationin2008;atpresent,itincludesonemajorlawandoneregulation.
Paragraph4ofArticle18oftheWaterPollutionPreventionandControlLawofthePeople'sRepublicofChina(2008Revision)providesthat:"Theareaswherethetotaldischargeofimportantwaterpollutantsisovertheprescribedlevel,andtheadministrativedepartmentofenvironmentalprotectionoftherelatedpeople'sgovernmentshallsuspendtheexaminationandapprovaloftheenvironmentalimpactassessmentdocumentsofconstructionprojectswhichincreasethetotaldischargeofimportantwaterpollutants.
"ItisworthnotingthattherevisedwaterpollutionlawbecameeffectiveonJun.
1,68Id.
69SeeZHUXiao,EnvironmentalLaw,ChinaEnvironmentalSciencePress(Beijing),at2729(2011).
70No.
283,[2008],LetteroftheGeneralOfficeofMEP,http://www.
zhb.
gov.
cn/info/bgw/bbgth/200806/t20080606_123651.
htm(lastvisitedJun.
24,2013).
71SeeZHU,fn.
70at30.
2014]THELAWS,POLICIES,ANDPOLITICSOFREGULATINGLEADPOLLUTIONINCHINA2012008,andthatonJuly10,2008,MEPissuedfourROAsforfourcitiesinfourprovincestargetingwastewatertreatmentfacilitiesandCODdischarges.
72InadditionArticle30oftheRegulationonEnvironmentalImpactAssessmentofPlanning(StateCouncil,2009)providesthat:"Ifthetotaldischargevolumeofmajorpollutantsintheareafortheexecutionofplanningexceedsthestateorlocalindicatorforthecontroloftotaldischargevolume,theplanningpreparationorganshallsuspendexaminingandapprovinganyenvironmentalimpactassessmentdocumentonanewconstructionprojectwhichwillincreasethetotaldischargevolumeofmajorpollutantsintheaforesaidareafortheexecutionofplanning.
"WhilethesetwopiecesoflegislationgivesomelegislativesupporttoROAs,theydonotprovidetheclarityordetailthatMEPsoughttoprovideinitsDraftROAMeasures.
ThosemeasuresclearlyestablishedthreetypesofROAs:geographic,sectional(byindustrysector),andcompany-wide(appliestoallnewprojectsforaspecificcompany).
ThemeasuresthendelineatedundercircumstancesthatanROAcouldbeusedforeachofthethreetypesofROAs.
Forexample,ageographicROAcouldbeusedifaregionwasexceedingthetotalemissionsofacontrolledpollutantorifseriousenvironmentaldamagewasoccurring.
Similarly,acompany-wideROAcouldbeusedifthecompanyhadrepeatedlyfailedtoaddressenvironmentalviolations.
ThemeasuresproposedthattheshortestapplicationofanROAwouldbeatleastonemonthandthatallinformationinvolvedshouldbemadepublic.
WithoutMEP'sDraftROAMeasures,thelegalsupportforROAsandguidanceconcerningthescopeandpracticeofROAsleavesmuchtobedesired.
However,attheprovinciallevel,severalprovincesfollowedMEP'sleadin2008anddraftedlocalmeasuresfortheuseofROAsthatareverysimilarsubstantivelytoMEPsdraft.
ThefirstProvincetodraftsuchmeasureswasHebei,whichdidsoin2007,andtheyalsosetforththeconditions,scopeandapplicationofROAs.
73ThestandardizationofROAsatthenationallevelisadvisable,butstandardizationdoesnotprovidelegalsupportbyitself.
ThenextsectionexaminesthelegalsupportofROAs.
C.
LegalityofChina'sROAsTheroleofalmostanygovernmentistomonopolizetheawesomeregulatorypowerofissuingpermits,licensesandacornucopiaofapprovalsthatprojectsandinvestments72Announcementof2007AnnualExaminationResultoftheTotalVolumeofMajorPollutantsoftheProvincesandFivePowerCompanies,athttp://www.
mep.
gov.
cn/zlkz/zxfb/200807/t20080707_125155.
htm(lastvisitedJun.
21,2013).
73LIULimin,TheBirthofTrialMeasuresonRegionalRestrictiononApprovals,Dec04,2007,athttp://www.
mep.
gov.
cn/hjyw/200712/t20071204_113769.
htm(lastvisitedJun.
8,2013).
202FRONTIERSOFLAWINCHINA[Vol.
9:186require.
Suchawesomeregulatorypowermustalsobebalancedagainsttherightsoftheregulated.
TheChineseGovernmentandinthiscaseMEPthepowertodenytheapprovalofanEIAandstopaprojectfromgoingforwardisinherentintheEIALaw.
Articlessevenandtwenty-fiveoftheEIALawstatethatprojectsthatdonotmeettherequirementsofthelawarenottobeapproved.
However,China'sEIALaw,likemostEIAlaws,isfocusedonprocessoversubstance,anddoesnotspecifythetypesofsubstantivefailuresthatcouldleadtoaprojectbeingrejected.
Onlyin2008didMEPissueanormativedocument,whichdetailssixcriteriathatareassessedtodeterminewhetheraprojectisapproved,whichincludeswhetherthepollutantisatotalvolumecontrolpollutant.
74ConsideringthemassiveenforcementpotentialofROAs,itisremarkablethatonlyarelativefewChinesescholarshaveexaminedROAs.
75ThelimitedattentionthatROAshavereceivedhastendedtoanalyzethemasaformofadministrativepenalty(xingzhengzhicai).
76ButforseveralreasonsROAsdonotfitthegeneraldefinitionofadministrativepenalties.
AccordingtoChineseadministrativejurisprudence,"anadministrativepenaltyisasanctionimposedbyanadministrativebodyonanentitythatviolatedadministrativelaw.
"77Accordingtothisdefinitionitfollowsthatanadministrativepenaltyhasthreeelements:(1)anenforcingadministrativebody,(2)alegalviolationandstatutorysanction,and(3)theobjectoftheadministrativeenforcement,i.
e.
theviolator.
78ROAshaveonlyoneofthesethreeelements—theenforcingadministrativebody.
Withrespecttothesecondelement,therearelegalviolations.
Butaspreviouslydiscussedinsection,thestatutorysupportforusingROAsasasanctionisveryweak.
Withrespecttothethirdelement,theobjectoftheadministrativeenforcement,thisvarieswidelydependingonthetypeofROAthatisused.
Underacompany-wideROA,likethatissuedagainstfourofChina'slargestelectricutilitiesin2007,atraditionalregulated74建设项目环境影响评价文件的审批(ApprooaloftheDocumentsfortheAssessmentoftheEnvironmentalImplicationsofConstructionProjects),http://www.
mep.
gov.
cn/news/sp/200802/t20080225_118636.
htm(lastvisitedJun.
18,2013).
75OnMay9,2013,theauthorsearchedthemostcompleteChineseperiodicaldatabase,ChinaNationalKnowledgeInfrastructure(CNKI).
Whentheauthorused"regionalrestriction"asthekeywordstosearchlegaljournals,17Chinesearticlespublishedafter2007,wereget(http://acad.
cnki.
net/KNS/brief/result.
aspxdbprefix=CJFQ).
2Chinesearticlespublishedafter2007,weregetwhentheauthorused"regionalrestrictionofEIA"asthekeywordstosearch(http://acad.
cnki.
net/KNS/brief/result.
aspxdbprefix=CJFQ).
Excludedfromnon-legalarticles,thereareonly11articles.
76SeeJUYingying,论行政处罚的新举指—区域外限批(ANewMeasureofAdministrativePenalty—"RegionalRestrictiononApprovals"),3法制与社会(LagalSystemandSociety)177,177(2008).
77HUJinguang(ed.
),行政法与行政诉讼法(AdministrativeLawandAdministrativeLitigationLaw),HigherEducationPress(Beijing),at146(2007).
78SeeJIANGMingan(ed.
),行政法与政诉讼法(AdministrativeLawandAdministrativeLitigationLaw),PekingUniversityPress&HigherEducationPress(Beijing),at727(2011).
2014]THELAWS,POLICIES,ANDPOLITICSOFREGULATINGLEADPOLLUTIONINCHINA203entityexits.
However,whenanalyzedunderelementtwo,acompany-wideROAdirectlyconflictswiththemaximumstatutorysanctionspermittedinotherenvironmentallaws,e.
g.
undertheEIALawamaximumfineofRMB200,000(USD32,500),andthus,raisesadditionalquestionsaboutitsstatutorysupport.
Incontrast,geographicandsectorialROAsdonothavetraditional"objectsofadministrativeenforcement.
"ForgeographicROAs,theobjectofenforcementisalocaladministrativeregion,i.
e.
thelocalgovernmentandallpartiesinterestedintheapprovalsoffutureprojects.
InthecaseofsectorialROAs,theobjectofenforcementisanindustrysectorandallactorsinthatsector.
TheseROAstargetviolations,buttheyalsoinvolveprojectsandpartiesthatareunrelatedtospecificviolations.
InthecaseofthegeographicandsectorialROA,ahigher-levelgovernmentbodyordersasubordinatebodytoceaseapprovingcertainEIAs.
Technically,thistypeoforderdoesnottargetanyindividualentity.
Rather,itbroadlytargetsaregionoranindustry.
WithinChina'sbodyofadministrativelaw,thistypeofadministrativeactioncanbedefinedasanabstractadministrativeaction.
AccordingtoChina'sAdministrativeProcedureLaw,anabstractadministrativeactionisonethatdoesnottargetaspecificobjectofenforcement.
79Individualentitiesgenerallydonothavestandingtochallengesuchabstractadministrativeactionsonthegroundthattheyareimpactedbythem.
ThemostlegallyquestionableofthethreeROAtypesisthecompany(enterprise)ROA.
Whilethelegalityofgeographicandindustry-wideROAscanbejustifiedtosomeextentasabstractadministrativeactionsthatdonotdiscriminatelytargetindividualentities,companyROAsclearlytargetspecificindividualcompaniesandpunishthemfornon-complianceaboveandbeyondwhatispermittedbytheEIAlaw,theEnvironmentalProtectionLawandotherrelevantlaws.
DespitethequestionablelegalityofthecompanyROA,nocompanyhasusedChina'sjudiciarytochallengesuchanROA.
80Indeed,notypeofROAhaseverbeenchallengedinaChinesecourt.
OnepossibleexplanationforthelackofengagingthejudiciarytochallengetheauthorityofROAsisthatROAsareviewedbyboththeregulatorsandthetargetsofregulationaspoliticallymotivatedenforcementcampaigns.
Inthiscase,thecourtsmaynotbefreetoapplyapurelegalanalysistotheuseoftheROAs.
Similarly,ROAsmightbeviewedasbeingintegratedintoandworkingtosupportthecadreevaluationsystemasitisconnectedtoenvironmentaltargetssetforthinChina'sFive-YearPlan.
Insuchcase,politicsandtheFive-YearPlanmighttrumpthetechnicallegalityofaspecificmeansofenforcement.
79SeeAdministrativeProcedureLaw;anotherexampleofanabstractadministrativeactionisBeijingCitydecidingtonolongerissuevehiclelicensesondemand,butratherthroughalottery.
80Forevidencethatlargestate-ownedenterpriseshavecompliedwithcompanyROAsseehttp://www.
mep.
gov.
cn/gkml/hbb/qt/200910/t20091023_180047.
htm(lastvisitedOct.
6,2013).
204FRONTIERSOFLAWINCHINA[Vol.
9:186D.
ROAsasEnforcementCampaignsTheprecedingexplainedhowROAsfitintoChina'sexistingbodyofenvironmentallaw.
ItexaminesROAsinthecontextoftraditionalChineseenforcementcampaignsandaskswhetherROAsarebetterdefinedasapoliticalenforcementcampaignorarelativelynewenforcementtoolrootedinexistingenvironmentallaw.
Thisdistinctionisimportant,anditisbecausethatenforcementcampaignsaregenerallyundertakenprimarilyforpoliticalreasonsandmaynotactuallyenhanceenforcementoverthelong-term.
81Ifontheotherhand,theuseofROAscanbedistinguishedfrompoliticallymotivatedenforcementcampaigns,andthenthereishopethattheycanbestandardizedandpredictablydeployedtoenhanceenforcement.
Post-Maoeraenforcementcampaignshavebeenusedtotargetnumerouslegalandpoliticalissuessincethe1980s.
Campaignshavetargetedcriminalgangs,piratedgoods,unlicensedinternetcafés,foodsafety,forcedlabor,andpollution.
82BenjaminvanRooijhashighlightedseveralcharacteristicsofChineseenforcementcampaigns.
Manyofthefirstmodernenforcementcampaignstargetedcriminalbehavior.
However,campaignshaveincreasinglytargetednon-criminalviolationsaswell.
VanRooijnotesthatwithinChinesepoliticalspeakandthemedia,fourmajortermshavebeenemployedoverthedecadestodescribeenforcementcampaigns:1)congzhong=severesanctions,2)congkuai=speedatwhichenforcementhappens,3)jizhong=targetedandconcentratedaimofthecampaign,andfinally4)yifa=enforcementaccordingtolaw.
83InadditiontothesefourChineseterms,vanRooijhassetforthoneofcharacteristicswhichwasgenerallyfoundinenforcementcampaigns.
Firstly,socialeventscreatepoliticalwillamongsttopleaderstosupportincreasedtargetedenforcement.
84Politicalwilliscrucialtoensurethatdifferentgovernmentdepartmentsatdifferentlevelsfallinlinewiththeimplementationofthenewenforcementfocus.
85Secondly,legislationmaybeaddedorchangedtohelpfacilitatestricterenforcement.
Thirdly,campaignleaderschoosewhichlawsorpartsoflawsshouldbethefocusofthecampaign.
86Fourthly,therewillbesomeattemptstostandardizeandformalizetheimplementationofthecampaign;itwillinvolvetargetsandproceduresforsubordinatebodiestofollow,whichwillhelpsuperiorsevaluateprogress.
87Finally,there81SeeBenjaminvanRooij,ThePoliticsofLawinChina:EnforcementCampaignsinthePost-MaoPRC,athttp://ssru.
com/abstract=1368181(lastvisitedMar.
25,2009).
82Id.
at6.
83Id.
at13,VanRooijnotesthatyifawasalateradditiontothislist.
84Id.
at13.
85Id.
at14.
86Id.
87Id.
2014]THELAWS,POLICIES,ANDPOLITICSOFREGULATINGLEADPOLLUTIONINCHINA205isoftenapublicparticipationcomponent.
88WhenthesecharacteristicsareappliedtothehistoricuseofROAstherearesomesignificantoverlaps.
ThefirstROAscoincidedwithstrongpoliticalsupportforreductionsinenergy-intensity,SO2emissions,andCODdischargesduringthe11thFive-YearPlan(FYP).
MEP'sfirstROAstargetedEIAnon-compliance;butmorespecifically,thevastmajorityofROAsfocusedonprojectsthatwereenergy-intensiveandmajorsourcesofSO2,alltargetsunderthe11thFive-YearPlan.
89Followingtheinitial2007applicationofROAs,everyROAissuedbetween2008andtheendof2010targetedCODdischarges,withafocusonwastewatertreatmentfacilities.
90Whetherexplicitorimplicit,therewasadefinitivecoherencetoMEP'sinitialuseofROAsandthepronouncedenvironmentalprioritiessetforthinthe11thFive-YearPlan.
Morespecifically,SO2andCODwerebothtotalvolumecontrol(TVC)pollutants,andleadwasaddedasaTVCpollutantin2011aspartofthe12thFive-YearPlan.
91InthecaseofROAsthattargetedleadpollution,SectionIofthispaperdescribeshowmassleadpoisoningincidentsputpressureontheauthoritiestotakedecisiveactionandcreatedthepoliticalwilltoact.
Inaddition,the12thFive-YearPlan(20102015)targetsheavymetalpollution,specificallylead.
Inthisway,theROAtargetingleadpollutionfollowsasimilarpatternthatallotherROAsfollowed.
FirstthereisabroadpoliticalsupportforaddressingaspecificpollutantandthenaplanandtargetsareincludedinaFive-YearPlan,andincludeinoneformoranotheroneofChina'scadreevaluationsystem.
Withregardtothesecondandthirdcharacteristic:legislativechangesandtheselectionofwhichlawstofocuson,whichdependsonhowexactlylegislationandlawisdefined.
In2007,whenMEPfirstusedROAs,therelevantchangesthatMEPcitestosupportcamefromtheStateCouncil's2005StatementonScientificDevelopmentandEnvironmentalProtection,whosestrictlyspeakingisapolicystatementnotlegislation.
AlthoughnotcitebyMEP,theFive-YearPlan'stargetsonenergyintensity,SO2,COD,andeventuallylead,clearlyinfluencedMEP'senforcementdecisions.
However,itwouldbeastretchtocallthesetargetslawortofindstronglegalsupportforthemindependentoftheFive-YearPlan.
ItwasnotuntiltherevisionoftheWaterPollutionControlLaw(WPCL)in2008thatROAsgainedsometraditional,althoughstillvague,legislativesupport.
92ItwasonlyaftertheWPCL'sthatMEPbegantouseROAstoaddressCODdischargesintowater.
88Id.
89SeeTableROAsbyMEP(20072012).
90Id.
91SeeQianWangNowReportatSouthernWeekend,fn.
50.
92WaterPollutionControlLaworPRC,Article18.
206FRONTIERSOFLAWINCHINA[Vol.
9:186ThedesignationofapollutantasaTVCpollutantisapolicychange,nottechnicallyalegislativechange.
InthecaseofROAs,therehasbeenlittle"legislativechange"withtheexceptionoftherevisedWPCL,whichusessimilarlanguageregarding"importantpollutant"subjecttoatotalvolumelimit.
93However,ifchangestoofficialpolicyandintra-partyperformanceevaluationmechanismsareincludedhereaswell,thenitiseasytoconnecttheuseofROAsinChinawithpolicyandlegislativechanges.
EffortsbyMEPanditssubordinateprovincialbranchestostandardizetheuseofROAsgenerallyhavebeenongoing.
ItwasfirstevincedbyMEP'sattempttoissueROArulesandbyprovincesthathavealreadyissuedsuchrules.
However,itisalsopossibleforROAstotrytostandardizeenvironmentalenforcementcampaignsbyrootingsuchcrackdownsmorefirmlyinpolicyandclarifyingtheirpoliticalsupportandjustifications.
Thus,attemptstostandardizeROAsareattemptstostandardizeenvironmentalenforcementcampaigns.
CONCLUSIONAscanbeseenintheleadbatteryindustry'sresponsetotheMay2011ROA,ROAsareapowerfulenforcementtoolforMEP.
However,theuseofROAsbyMEPhasnotbeensufficientlyestablishedinlegislation.
Withoutclearlegislativesupport,theMEP'suseofROAsmustrelyonstrongpoliticalsupportbothhorizontallyandverticallywithinthegovernment.
Theneedtoobtainsuchpoliticalsupportmayresultindelayingstrongenforcementactionsuntilenvironmentalproblemsbecomepoliticalproblems—sometimessoseverethattheythreatenthegovernment'slegitimacy.
94Again,theexampleofcontrollingleadpollutionishelpful.
By2009itwasveryclearthatleadpollutionwasaserioushumanhealthandenvironmentalproblem.
IfMEPcouldhaveusedtheROApriorto2011,beforeleadwasclassifiedasaTVCpollutant,wouldithaveHowmanyleadpoisoningincidentscouldhavebeenavoidediftheproblemwasaddressedtwoyearsearlierBut,theadditionalmasspoisoningincidentswereseeminglyrequiredtocreateenoughhorizontalandverticalpoliticalwilltoeventuallyusetheROAintheenforcementcampaign.
ROAscanbeviewedasanattemptbyMEPtostandardizeenvironmentalenforcementcampaigns.
However,todate,MEPhasbeenunabletogainclearlegislativesupportfortheuseofROAs.
ItappearstotheauthorsthatafterMEPfirstbegantouseROAsin2007,totargetEIAviolations,andbeforeitbegantotargetCODdischargeviolationsin2008,therewasanagreementmadebetweeninterestgroupsinthegovernmentthatROAsshouldonlytargetthosepollutantsthathavebeendesignatedastotalvolumecontrolpollutants.
Totalvolumecontrolpollutantsaredesignatedbythe93SeeChina'sWPCL,Article18.
94SeeWANG,fn.
20at39495.
2014]THELAWS,POLICIES,ANDPOLITICSOFREGULATINGLEADPOLLUTIONINCHINA207StateCouncil,andthus,aresubjecttoinputandinterestsmuchbroaderthanthoseoftheMEP.
Asofthe12thFive-YearPlan,ChinahasonlyeightTVCpollutants:SO2,COD,NOx,lead,chromium,mercury,cadmiumandarsenic.
IntheUnitedStatesandothercountries,environmentalregulatorsfrequentlyexercisetheirauthoritytoapprovepermitsorEIAapprovalsbasedonambientenvironmentalqualitystandardsandthespecificvolumesofpollutantsthattheapplicantwouldaddtotheenvironment.
Forareasthatarenoncompliantwithambientenvironmentalqualitystandards,thisalonemaybeenoughtorestricttheapprovalofanadditionalpollutingentity.
Chinadoesnotcurrentlyhaveanationwidesystemthatconnectsambientenvironmentalqualitystandardswiththeissuanceofpermits,orEIAapprovals.
However,China'sexperimentationwithtotalvolumepollutantsanditsdesignationofcertainareasasTVCregionsevincesthatChinaisattemptingtoconnectambientenvironmentalqualitywiththeapprovalofnewsourcesofpollution.
ROAsareausefulmethodforensuringthatalreadyheavilypollutedregionsarenotoverlyburdenedwithadditionalpollutionsources.
TheuseofROAsshouldbegivenclearstatutorysupportanditsapplicationshouldbeconnectedmorecloselytoregionalenvironmentalqualitystandardsforallpollutants,notjustforthosethathavebeenlistedasTVCpollutants.
SuchreformstotheuseofROAs,willhelpmoreROAsfrombeingatoolforenforcementcampaignstowardapredictableenforcementmechanismthatwillencouragecompliancemorebroadly.
Enforcementcampaignstendtodealwithenvironmentalproblemsaspoliticalproblems.
Thisusuallymeansthattheenvironmentalproblematissuemustfirstbecomesoseverethatitbecomesapoliticalproblem.
Suchanapproachtoenvironmentalgovernanceisnotsustainable.
Furthermore,oncethepoliticalendsofanenforcementcampaignaremettheresourcestoaddresstheunderlyingenvironmentalproblemmaynotremainavailable.
Campaignsarenotanadequateorappropriateresponsetodealingwiththecomplicatedissuesofenvironmentalregulationandgovernance.
EmpoweringMEPwithclearlegislativesupportfortheuseofROAsastheyareneededtoovercomeenvironmentalenforcementchallengesisamoresophisticatedmeanstoadvanceChina'senvironmentalgovernance.