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BarMitzvahAttackBreakingSSLwitha13-yearoldRC4WeaknessAbstractRC4isthemostpopularstreamcipherintheworld.
Infact,asofMarch2015,RC4isestimatedtoprotectasmuchas30%ofSSLtraffic,likelyamountingtobillionsofTLSconnectionseveryday.
Yetitsuffersacritical–andlongknown–weaknessknownastheInvarianceWeakness.
InthispaperwewillrevisittheInvarianceWeakness–a13-yearoldvulnerabilityofRC4thatisbasedonhugeclassesofRC4weakkeys,whichwasfirstpublishedintheFMSpaperin2001.
WewillshowhowthisvulnerabilitycanbeusedtomountpartialplaintextrecoveryattacksonSSL-protecteddata,whenRC4isthecipherofchoice,forrecoveringtheLSBsofasmanyas100bytesfromtheencryptedstream.
AsopposedtoBEAST,POODLE,CRIMEandotherattacksonSSLthatwerepublishedinrecentyears,includingtheRoyalHollowayAttackontheusageofRC4,anewattackbasedupontheInvarianceWeaknessdoesnotrelyonaggregationofsmallfragmentsofplaintextinformation,butona"hit",arareeventthatcausesasignificantleakagetooccur.
WeshowhowthisuniquecharacteristiccanbeusedtoattackSSLinnewscenarios,includingthefirstpracticalattackonSSLthatdoesnotrequireanactiveMan-in-the-Middle.
Furthermore,thenewattackisnotlimitedtorecoveryoftemporalsessiontokens,butcanbeusedtostealpartsofpermanentsecretdatasuchasaccountcredentialsandcreditcardnumberswhendeliveredoverHTTPS.
Anothervariantoftheattackrecoversasignificantpartofasecretwithsmallbutnon-negligibleprobability,evenifthatwastransmittedonlyonceovertheSSLconnection.
ThispaperwilldescribetheInvarianceWeaknessindetail,explainitsimpacts,andrecommendsomemitigatingactions.
IntroductionTLSTheProtocolTLSisthemostwidelyusedsecurecommunicationsprotocolontheInternettoday.
StartinglifeasSSL,theprotocolwasadoptedbytheIETFandspecifiedasanRFCstandardunderthenameofTLS1.
0[1].
IthassinceevolvedthroughTLS1.
1[2]tothecurrentversionTLS1.
2[3].
TLS1.
3is,asofMarch2015,indraft[4].
VariousotherRFCsdefineadditionalTLScryptographicalgorithmsandextensions.
SSLiscurrentlyusedforsecuringawidevarietyofapplication-leveltraffic:Itserves,forexample,asthebasisoftheHTTPSprotocolforencryptedwebbrowsing,itisusedinconjunctionwithIMAPorSMTPtocryptographicallyprotectemailtraffic,anditisapopulartooltosecurecommunicationwithembeddedsystems,mobiledevices,andinpaymentsystems.
SSLstrivestofulfilltwomajorgoals:1)allowtwopartiestoauthenticateeachother,and2)securethecommunicationbetweenthetwo.
InmanySSLdeployments,particularsecurewebbrowsing,theauthenticationisone-way,meaningthatonlytheclient(browser)authenticatestheserver(webapplication),butnotviceversa.
SSLsessionsconsistoftwophases:IntheSSLHandshakingProtocoltheclientauthenticatestheserver,theserver(optionally)authenticatestheclientandbothestablishcryptographicsessionkeys,readytoprotectthecommunication.
IntheRecordProtocolthepartiesusetheestablishedsessionkeysandsymmetrickeycryptographytoencrypt(e.
g.
,usingAESblockcipherorRC4streamcipher)andauthenticate(e.
g.
,usingHMACalgorithms)tobuildasecurechannelforapplication-layerdata.
ThepartiescanchoosebetweenmanydifferentauthenticationandencryptionalgorithmsfortheRecordProtocol,essentiallydividedintothefollowingclasses:BlockCipher(CBCmodeofoperation)+HMACStreamCipher(RC4)+HMACAuthenticated-Encryptionusingblockcipher(GCM/CCMmodeofoperation)SSLProtocolWeaknessesInthelastcoupleofyearsseveralsignificantvulnerabilitieshavebeendiscoveredintheSSLprotocol,particularlyinthemostcommonlyusedvariants,AES-CBCandRC4.
TheAES-CBCvarianthasseensignificantcryptanalysis(paddingoracleattacks[5],BEAST[6],Lucky13[7],TIME[16],andPOODLE[15]).
Andin2013AlFardanet-alpublishedananalysis[8]oftheRC4mode,whichshowedhowtomountanattackthatrecoversdatatransmittedoveraSSL/RC4connection.
TheattackwasbasedonsomeofthemanyknowweaknessesofRC4,inparticularthesignificantstatisticalbiasesinitsfirstoutputbytes,andtheweakerstatisticalbiasesintheRC4keystream.
ImplementationWeaknessesInrecentyearsSSLimplementationshavereceivedsignificantattentionandscrutinyfromsecurityresearchers,andthishasresultedinsteadydiscoveryofnewvulnerabilities(andpatching,withorwithoutdisclosure).
In2014severaldozenvulnerabilitieswerediscoveredintheOpenSSLlibrary(themostpopularimplementationofSSL),HeartbleedbeingthemostsevereoneinthatitallowsanattackertodumpmemorysegmentsfromtheSSLserver,inmanycasesexposingsecretkeyinformation.
Vulnerabilitiesinseveralotherimplementationswerepublishedaswell(e.
g.
,CVE-2014-6321inMicrosoftSChannel).
OnRC4TheStreamCipherThe4-lineStreamCipherRivestCipher4(RC4)isoneofthesimplestcryptographicalgorithms,implementingapseudo-randomgeneratorthatisusedtoimplementastreamcipher.
TheinternalstateofRC4includesapermutationSof[0,1,.
.
,255]andtwoindicesiandjinthispermutation.
Inthekeyschedulingphase(KSA)anL-bytelongRC4key(forLvaryingbetween5and256)isusedtoconstructtheinitialstatepermutationS0.
Intheencryptionphase,RC4PRGA,whichisinitializedwiththeresultantS0isusedtogenerateastreamofpseudo-randombytes,denotedasthekeystream.
LikemostoftheStreamCiphers,thesepseudo-randombytesareXOR-edwiththeplaintextbytestogeneratetheciphertextbytes.
ThebuildingblocksofRC4aredescribedbelow.
KSA(K)PRGA(S0)j=0S=[0,1,2,…,255]fori=0.
.
255j=(j+S[i]+K[imodeL])S[i]S[j]Alloperationsaredonemod256i,j=0,0S=S0whilebytesareneeded:i=i+1j=j+S[i]S[i]S[j]EmitS[S[i]+S[j]]Knownforitssimplicityandforitsrespectedauthor,RC4gainedconsiderablepopularity.
Andgivenitsimpressiveperformance,beingabletoencryptanddecryptalmosttwotimesfasterthanAES,formanyyearsitwasconsideredtobethedefaultstreamcipher.
SecurityofRC4RC4isnotasecurecipher.
Backinthe90s,whenRC4wasatradesecretofRSAanditsdetailswhereknownbutnotformallyapproved,RC4wasbelievedtobesecure.
However,inthefollowingdecade,RC4hadundergonesignificantscrutinybycryptographyexperts,whichshowedstatisticalbiasesinthepseudo-randomstreamthatallowanattackertodistinguishRC4fromrandom([9],[10])andtopredictitsallegedlypseudo-randombitswithhighprobability([10]).
WhilethisstatisticalanalysisrequiresmanymillionsofRC4keystreambytes,tworesearchesin2001ontheinitializationofRC4hadswitchedthefocusofRC4analysistoitspoorinitializationmechanisms.
Thefirst[11]hadshownthatthesecondbyteofRC4hashugestatisticalbias,havingtwicetheexpectedprobabilitytobezero.
Thesecond[12],laterknownastheFMSresearch,hadcompletelybrokenRC4inthewayitwasusedintheWEPprotocol.
TheseresultshadinitiatedawaveofresearcheffortsandanalysisresultsonRC4initialization,awavewhoseendisyettobeseen.
Correlationbetweenkeybytesandstatebytes(e.
g.
,[13]),correlationbetweenkeybytesandfirstoutputbytes(e.
g.
,[12]),andbetweenkeybytesandfurtheroutputbytes([14]),significantstatisticalbiasesinthefirst256outputbytes[17],andmanyotherresults.
Interestingly,theseriesofsuccessfulattacksdidn'thaveasignificantimpactonthepopularityofRC4,andinfactduringthewaveofCBCattacksonSSLin2012,someexpertsrecommendedswitchingtoRC4.
TheInvarianceWeaknessTheFMSresearch[12]detailstwosignificantRC4weaknesses.
TheIVweakness,resultinginapracticalkeyrecoveryattackandcompletebreakofRC4intheWEPprotocol,receivedmostoftheattention,leavingtheotherweakness-denotedinthepaperastheInvarianceWeakness-intheshadowsfor13years.
TheInvarianceWeakness,isanL-shapekeypatterninRC4keys,whichonceitexistsinanRC4key,preservespartofthestatepermutationintactthroughouttheinitializationprocess.
Thisintactpartincludestheleastsignificantbitsofthepermutation,whenprocessedbythePRGAalgorithm,determinestheleastsignificantbitsoftheallegedlypseudo-randomoutputstreamalongalongprefixofthestream.
Thesepatterns,andadetailedexplanationofhowtheyarepreserved,aredescribedindetailin[12]and[13].
ThesebiasedstreambytesareXOR-edwiththeplaintextbytes,resultinginsignificantleakageofplaintextbytesfromtheciphertextbytes.
ThesepatternsoccurfordifferentnumberofLSBs,asingleLSB,2LSBs,3LSBsto7LSBs,resultingwithdifferentclassesofweakRC4keys.
Duetothestructureoftheseclasses,eachclasscontainsthesucceedingclassesandthusthefirstclassisthelargest,denotedbelowastheMainClass.
Theportionofq-classforL-bytekeys(whichistheprobabilityofarandomkeytobeintheclass)is2-(qL+(9-q)).
For16-bytekeytheportionoftheMainClass(1-class)is2-24(1in16million)andtheportionof2-classis2-39(veryrare).
Thesenumbersareshowninthefollowingtable.
#LSBsApplicabilityClassProbability(8-bytekey)ClassProbability(16-bytekey)1Keyswithevennumberofbytes2-162-242Keyswithnumberofbytesthatisamultipleof42-232-393Keyswithnumberofbytesthatisamultipleof82-302-544Keyswithnumberofbytesthatisamultipleof162-372-69Whenakeyfromaq-classisused,thefollowingthingshappen:TheinitializationphaseofRC4failstomixthestatewithkeymaterialproperly,andpreservestheKleastsignificantbitsofitsinternalstateAsaresult,theinitialstateofRC4hasfixednon-mixedqLSBsqleastsignificantbitsofthefirst30-50bytesstreambytescomplywithadeterministicpatternwithsignificantprobabilityqleastsignificantbitsofthefirst30-50plaintextbytesareexposedwithsignificantprobabilityTheprobabilityoftheqLSBstocomplywiththepatterndropswiththestream.
ThisprobabilityisdemonstratedinthefollowingdiagramsforasingleLSB,2LSBsand3LSBs.
Figure1:SingleLSB(advantageover0.
5)Figure2:2LSBs(advantageover0.
25)Figure3:3LSBs(advantageover0.
125)Thereasonforthedecreasingprobabilityisthestatepatterngetting"ruined"withthestreamgenerationandafter50bytesemittedbyRC4PRGA,thepatternfadesout.
However,subsequentanalysisweranonRC4streamswhenusingweakkeysshowedadifferencepatternbetweenstreamLSBs,whichislesssensitivetothis"ruining"effect,andmanagestosurviveforasmanyas100bytesofthekeystream.
ThesurvivalprobabilityofdifferencepatternsisdemonstratedinthefollowingdiagramsforasingleLSB,2LSBsand3LSBs,withreferencetothevaluepatterns(thediffpatternisinredandthevaluepatternremainsinblue).
Figure4:SingleLSB(diffpattern;advantageover0.
5)Figure5:2LSBs(diffpattern;advantageover0.
25)Figure6:3LSBs(diffpattern;advantageover0.
125)ApplicationsoftheInvarianceWeaknessTheInvarianceWeaknessofRC4hasseveralcryptanalyticapplications,describedindetailin[12]and[13],includingstatisticalbiasesintheRC4pseudo-randomstreamthatallowanattackertodistinguishRC4streamsfromrandomnessandenhancementoftradeoffattacksonRC4.
AnotherapplicationoftheInvarianceWeakness,whichweuseforourattack,istheleakageofplaintextdataintotheciphertextwhenq-classkeysareused.
Theauthorsof[8]hadtranslatedstatisticalbiasesinthekeystreamintoplaintextleakageattacks.
Wefollow[8]anduseourstatisticalbiastorecoverplaintextinformation.
TheInvarianceWeaknessbiasesarenotasstrongasthebiasesusedin[8].
However,thesebiaseshaveuniquecharacteristics,ononehandoccurringrarely,butontheotherhandeffectivein100keystreambyteswithextremelyhighprobability,openingthedoortoplaintextleakageattacksinseveralcircumstancesthatwerebelievedtobecompletelysecure.
UsingtheInvarianceWeaknesstoAttackSSLSSLUsageofRC4SSLRecordProtocolusesRC4forencryptioninmanySSLciphersuites.
IntheHandshakingprotocol,RC4encryptionkeysaregeneratedforupstreamanddownstreamcommunication.
IntheRecordprotocol,theupstreamkeyisusedforencryptionofclient-to-servercommunication,whereasthedownstreamkeyisusedforencryptionofserver-to-clientcommunication.
Itisimportanttonotethattheencryptionsarestatefull,usingthefirstkeystreambytesforencryptingthefirstmessage,thesucceedingkeystreambytesforencryptingthenextmessage,etc.
GiventhattheInvarianceweaknessisexpressedonlyinthefirst100bytesofthekeystream,itcanbeusedonlyforthefirst100bytesoftheprotectedupstreamtrafficandthefirst100bytesoftheprotecteddownstreamtraffic.
GiventhatthefirstencryptedmessageineachdirectionistheSSLHandshakeFinishedmessage(36-bytesintypicalusageofSSL),about64bytesofsecretplaintextdataareleftfortheattack.
Thisflowisdepictedinthefollowingdiagram.
Thefirst36bytesoftheupstreamkeystreamareusedforencryptingtheFinishedmessage.
Thenextbytesareusedtoencrypttheactualapplicationdata.
TheAttackScenarioOurattacksarebasedonthefollowingscenario:theattackersniffsalargenumberofSSLconnectionsencryptedwithRC4,waitingfora"hit";thatisthearrivalofaweakkey.
Onceaweakkeyarrives,theattackerpredictstheLSBsofthekeystreambytes,andusesthesetoextracttheLSBsoftheplaintextbytesfromtheciphertextwithsignificantadvantage.
Inordertofulfillthisscenario,theattackerneedstodeterminewhichSSLsessionsaretheonesinwhichweakkeyswereused.
ForthisisolationtheattackercanusethefactthatthefirstencryptedbytesincludetheSSL"Finished"messageandHTTPrequest,bothhavingpredictableinformation.
Thus,whenaweakkeyisused,theplaintextpatternsareXOR-edwithkeystreampatterns,generatingciphertextpatternsvisibletotheattacker.
[7],[8]andotherpreviousattacksonSSL,usetinystatisticalbiasestoaggregatetinypiecesofplaintextinformation.
Inordertomakethisaggregationpossible,thetargetobjectmustbeencryptedmanytimes,withthesamekeyin[7andwithdifferentkeysinabroadcastscenarioin[8].
Asopposedtotheseattacks,ourattackscenario,whenaweakkeyarrives,getsatonceasignificantamountofdataonthetargetobject,providingimmediatepartialplaintextrecovery.
Ontheotherhand,thispartialplaintextrecoverycannotbeextendedintofullplaintextrecoverybycontinuingtheattackandlisteningtomoresessions.
WhatcanyoudowithLSBsTheabovescenarioallowstheattackertorecovertheleastsignificantbitsofuptoahundredsecretbytes.
Whenthetargetobjectisasessioncookie,theattackerreducestheeffectivesizeofthecookie,allowingaccelerationofbruteforceattackonthesessioncookieforthesakeofSessionHijacking.
Forexample,learningtheLSBsofASPsessioncookies,whichcontain16charactersof5-bitentropyeach,reduces16bitsofthecookieentropyandthuscanbeusedforfasterbruteforceattackonthesessioncookievalue.
ForPHPsessioncookiesthisaccelerationcanincreasetouptoafactorof232.
Whenthetargetobjectisann-characterpassword,anattackerpossessingthepasswordLSBscanaccelerateadictionaryattackwithafactorof2n,reducingthesecurityofan8-charpasswordbyafactorof256.
Furthermore,anattackerwhorunsabruteforceattackonaloginAPI,canscanadatabaseofknownpopularpasswords,extractthepasswordsthatcomplywiththeLSBpatternandtryonlythese,reducingthenumberofattemptsbyafactorof2n.
Werananexperimentonadatabaseofmostcommonlyusedpasswords,wherewegrouppasswordsaccordingtotheirleastsignificantbits.
ForasingleLSBthemostcommon1000passwordsweregroupedinto252sets,leavingthebruteforceattackeranaverageofonly4attempts,belowthebarrierformostbruteforceprotectionpolicies.
Theestimationforthenumberofwebaccountsthatareprotectedwithoneofthetop1000mostcommonly-usedpasswordsvariesbetween10-15percent,settingthestageforanattackthatusestheInvarianceWeaknesstoextracttheLSBsofthepasswordinhopethattheuserisoneofthecareless10%.
Weusedapasswordspopularityanalysisfrom[18]toestimatethenumberofbruteforceattemptsanattackerneedstomakeoncehehastheLSBsofapasswordknowntobeinthetop100,1000and10,000(wetookthenumbersfrom[18]asis).
PortionofwebaccountsNumberofLSBgroupsBruteforceworstcase(#Attempts)Bruteforceaveragecase(#Attempts)Top1004.
4%6861.
5Top100013.
2%252244Top10,00030%55720118Theentropyofa16-digitcreditcardnumberisusuallyconsideredtobe5digits,sincethefirst6digitsarenon-secret,thelast4digitsarefreelyexposedonreceiptsandforvalidationpurposes,andthereisa1-bytechecksum(Luhnalgorithm).
AnattackerpossessingtheLSBsofacreditcardnumber,reducesthesearchdomainfrom100,000intoonly1500.
These1500candidatenumberscanbetestedbymakingattemptsforsmallamountpaymentsinretailwebapplicationstofindthevalidoneafter750attemptsonaverage.
Thusthereductioninthecreditcardentropyfrom100,000potentialnumbersinto1500potentialnumbersissignificant,andincreasesthepracticalityofattacks.
AMan-in-the-MiddleAttackThefirstattackwedescriberesemblestheRC4attackfrom[8],withtheattackerusingalargenumberofencryptionsofsecretdata,e.
g.
,asessioncookie,inordertorecoverpartsofthiscookie.
OnewaytoobtainthislargenumberofencryptionsisthroughtheBEASTscenario,whereJavaScriptmalwareisdownloadedfromanattacker-controlledwebsiteandrunsinthevictim'sbrowser,repeatedlysendingHTTPSrequeststothevictimwebserver.
Sessioncookiesareautomaticallyincludedineachoftheserequestsinapredictablelocation,andcanthusbetargetedintheattack.
Theattacker,whoneedsnewSSLconnectionsfornewRC4keystreamprefixes,canenforceterminationoftheSSLsessionafterthetargetencryptedcookieissent;thebrowserwillautomaticallyestablishanewSSLsessionwhenthenextHTTPSrequestissent.
Theattackin[8]recoversthesessioncookiewithprobabilityof50%after226sessions.
Ourattackisexpectedtohaveahit–1-classkeybeingused–every224connections.
Sincesuchahitistranslatedtolongkeystreampatternwithprobabilityof1%-5%,severaldozenhitsarerequiredtocompleteasuccessfulpartialplaintextrecovery.
Forthesakeofsimplicity,intherestofthediscussionweuseasinglenumberof1billionasthenumberofattemptsrequiredtomounttheattack,reflectingthenumberofencryptionstheattackerisexpectedtoseeuntilbeingabletorecoverthedata.
AsopposedtotheBEASTattack,thecurrentattackdoesnotrequirethatthesamekeyisusedinallencryptions,butfollows[8]inrequiringthatthekeybechangedbetweenencryptions.
Moreover,asopposedtotheattackin[8],whichishighlysensitivetosituationswhereinthesessioncookieexpiresorthebrowserisclosedbytheuser(inwhichcasetheattackhastobeginfromthestart),ourattackiscompletelyinsensitivetothesecases.
Whenaweakkeyisused,thelearntinformationisonthesessioncookiefromthatparticularrequest,regardlessofanythingthathappenedbeforethehit,andanythingthatwillhappenafterthehit.
ANon-TargetedPassiveAttackThenatureoftheInvarianceWeakness,allowingtheattackertolearnsignificantplaintextdatafromasinglehit(thatisasinglemessagethatwasencryptedwithaweakkey)opensthedoortonewattackscenarioswhichwerenotpossibleinanyofthepreviousattacks.
Thenextattackwe'lldescribeisapassivevariantoftheaforementionedattack.
Init,theattackereavesdropsontheinboundtraffictoapopularretailorfinancialwebapplication,aimingtostealcreditcardnumberinfo(asimilarattackworksonpasswords).
Theattackerisrequiredtowait1billionconnectionsforaweakkeyusageevent,thiseventbeingvisiblethroughfixedorstructureddatainthisapplication,propagatingthroughthekeystreampatternsintotheciphertext.
TheattackerthenusestheInvarianceWeaknesstopredictkeystreamLSBs,andusesthesetocalculateplaintextLSBsfromciphertextLSBs.
Itisimportanttonotethatthecompromisedcreditcardnumberorpasswordisofarandomvictim,withtheattackernothavinganycontroloveritsidentity.
AccordingtoFacebookuserstatistics,thenumberofdailyactiveusersinFacebookiscloseto1billion.
Thenumberoftimeseachoftheseusersexecutesalogin,eithervisitingFacebookseveraltimes,orpressingaLikebuttoninanotherapplication,canberoughlyestimatedas4.
ThusapassiveeavesdroppersniffingonFacebookinboundlineswaitingforhits,willsee256weakkeysonthedaily4billionlogins,4ofwhichareexpectedtogeneratealongstreampatternandexposethepasswordLSBs.
LuckilyFacebookhadrecentlyremovedRC4fromitslistofSSLsupportedciphers.
GroupAttacksIntheBEAST-likevarianttheattackerisrequiredtogenerate1billionconnectionsfromthevictim'sbrowser.
Ontheotherhand,inthepassivevarianttheattackerneedstosniffon1billionconnectionstothesamewebapplication.
Inanothervariantoftheattack,combiningthetwo,theattackerobtainsthese1billionconnectionsactivelyfromagroupofvictimusers.
TheattackerneedstogetGroupMan-in-the-Middlesetup,beingamaninthemiddleforagroupofusers.
Sincethemostnaturalmethodsofestablishingman-in-the-middleareDNSpoisoningandmakingusersconnecttoamalicioushotspot(eitherofwhichwillestablishtheattackerasMan-in-the-Middleforagroupofusers),thisGroupMan-in-the-Middlesituationispractical.
TheattackerthenrunstheBEAST-likeattackwitheachofthepotentialvictims,terminatingtheirconnectionsimmediatelyafterthesessioncookiebeingsent,untiloneofthemgetsasuccessfulhit,aweakkeythatpropagatessuccessfullyintoalongpattern.
Thiseventisexpectedtooccurafteratotalnumberof1billionSSLconnectionsfromallusersaltogether.
Thisattackscenarioisunique,andstemsfromtheuniquenatureofthisattack,witheveryhitleakingalargequantityofsecretinformation.
One-TimeEncryptionFromtheperspectiveofavictim,theseverityofanattackisproportionaltothedamageoftheattackandtoitslikelihood.
ConsiderauserwhousesSSLtoprotecthismostprecioussecret,andsendsitonlyonceoverSSL.
Interestingly,thisone-timeoperationhasariskofonein64milliontogetaweakRC4keyandoneinabilliontoleakpartsofhisprecioussecret.
Itistruethatoneinabillionisatinyfraction,butstill,itisnotanegligiblefraction.
TheimplicationisthedisturbingfactthateverywebuserisclearlyriskinghisdataeverysingletimehesendsitoveranRC4/SSLconnection.
ConclusionandRecommendationsInthispaperwedemonstratedhowtheInvarianceWeaknesscanbeusedtomountnewattacksonSSLwhenusingRC4.
Weimprovedthesizeoftheprefixforwhichplaintextinfoleaksinto100bytes.
Weshowedhowthe"ResetInsensitivity"oftheInvarianceWeaknesssetsthestagefornewattackscenarios,includingthefirstpassiveattackonSSL.
ThesecurityofRC4hasbeenquestionableformanyyears,inparticularitsinitializationmechanisms.
However,onlyinrecentyearshasthisunderstandingbeguntranslatingintoacalltoretireRC4.
Inthisresearchwefollow[8]andshowthattheimpactofthemanyknownvulnerabilitiesonsystemsusingRC4isclearlyunderestimated.
Whilewaitingforabroad-brushretirementofRC4,specificpartiesshouldconsiderthefollowingactionstoprotectthemselvesfromitsweaknesses:WebapplicationadministratorsshouldstronglyconsiderdisablingRC4itintheirapplications'TLSconfigurations.
Webusers(particularlypowerusers)areencouragedtodisableRC4itintheirbrowser'sTLSconfiguration.
BrowservendorswoulddowelltoconsiderremovingRC4fromtheirTLScipherlists.
OrganizationsleveragingImpervaSecureSpheretoprotecttheirbusiness-criticalwebapplicationsanddata,andwhereinSecureSphereissettohandleTLSconnectionsonbehalfoftheapplications,canconfigureSecureSpheretostopusingtheweakciphersandworkonlywithrobustciphers.
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VPiyH_ysVew

Cloudxtiny:£1.5/月,KVM-512MB/100GB/英国机房

Cloudxtiny是一家来自英国的主机商,提供VPS和独立服务器租用,在英国肯特自营数据中心,自己的硬件和网络(AS207059)。商家VPS主机基于KVM架构,开设在英国肯特机房,为了庆祝2021年欧洲杯决赛英格兰对意大利,商家为全场VPS主机提供50%的折扣直到7月31日,优惠后最低套餐每月1.5英镑起。我们对这场比赛有点偏见,但希望这是一场史诗般的决赛!下面列出几款主机套餐配置信息。CPU...

可抵御99%的攻击中国单域版cdn:9元/月7T防御 cloudsecre

官方网站:点击访问CDN客服QQ:123008公司名:贵州青辞赋文化传媒有限公司域名和IP被墙封了怎么办?用cloudsecre.com网站被攻击了怎么办?用cloudsecre.com问:黑客为什么要找网站来攻击?答:黑客需要找肉鸡。问:什么是肉鸡?答:被控的服务器和电脑主机就是肉鸡。问:肉鸡有什么作用?答:肉鸡的作用非常多,可以用来干违法的事情,通常的行为有:VPN拨号,流量P2P,攻击傀儡,...

易探云香港云服务器价格多少钱1个月/1年?

易探云怎么样?易探云是目前国内少数优质的香港云服务器服务商家,目前推出多个香港机房的香港云服务器,有新界、九龙、沙田、葵湾等机房,还提供CN2、BGP及CN2三网直连香港云服务器。近年来,许多企业外贸出海会选择香港云服务器来部署自己的外贸网站,使得越来越多的用户会选择易探云作为网站服务提供平台。今天,云服务器网(yuntue.com)小编来谈谈易探云和易探云服务器怎么样?具体香港云服务器多少钱1个...

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