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September–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|5ForwardArmingandRefuelingPointsforFighterAircraftPowerProjectioninanAntiaccessEnvironmentLtColRobertD.
Davis,USAFTheUnitedStatesdependsuponeffectivepowerprojectiontoadvanceitsnationalinterestsabroad.
AsectionoftheDepart-mentofDefense'sstrategicguidancefor2012describesoneoftheprimarymissionsoftheUSarmedforcesas"Project[ing]PowerDe-spiteAnti-Access/AreaDenialChallenges.
"1TheUSAirForceplaysacentralroleinpowerprojectionbyprovidingairandspacesuperiority;intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance(ISR);rapidglobalmo-Disclaimer:TheviewsandopinionsexpressedorimpliedintheJournalarethoseoftheauthorsandshouldnotbeconstruedascarry-ingtheofficialsanctionoftheDepartmentofDefense,AirForce,AirEducationandTrainingCommand,AirUniversity,orotheragenciesordepartmentsoftheUSgovernment.
Thisarticlemaybereproducedinwholeorinpartwithoutpermission.
Ifitisreproduced,theAirandSpacePowerJournalrequestsacourtesyline.
September–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|6bility;globalstrike;andcommandandcontrol.
2TheUSmilitaryfacessignificantchallengestoitspowerprojectioncapabilities,particularlyintheWesternPacifictheaterofoperations(WPTO).
ThePeople'sRe-publicofChinahasinvestedsubstantialresourcesinthemoderniza-tionofitsmilitaryforcesandcontinuestoexpanditsantiaccess/area-denial(A2/AD)capabilities,largelydesignedtopreventopposingforcesfromgainingaccesstotheWPTO.
3Consequently,astheAirForceattemptstosolvetoday'sA2/ADproblems,itshouldfirstreducethevulnerabilitiesofforward-deployedforcestoA2threats,therebyal-lowingthemtoprojectforceintoacontestedtheater.
Therapidmove-mentandemploymentoffighteraircraftbymeansofmobileforwardarmingandrefuelingpoints(FARP)supportthispriority.
FighterFARP,aninnovativeconcept,combinessortie-generationca-pabilitiesandmobilitysupporttoenablemoreexpeditionaryanddis-persedoperations.
Itusesexistingairfieldsthroughoutanareaofre-sponsibilitytoincreasetherangeandtempooffighteroperations.
FighterFARPincludesrearming,refueling,andswappingpilotswith-outtheuseofairfieldinfrastructure—usuallyin90to120minutes.
Benefitsincludestrategicdeterrence,crisisstability,greaterrangeoffighteraircraft,andsustainedfighteroperationsinanA2/ADenviron-ment.
Currently,thisaffordable,feasibleconceptcanbeexecutedonasmallscale,buttheAirForceshoulddevelopitintoanoperationalca-pabilityforapplicationinavarietyofscenariosusingcurrentandfu-tureaircraft.
AlthoughothernationssuchasIranandNorthKoreahaveA2/ADcapabilities,thisarticlefocusesonissuesintheWPTO.
China'scapac-ityforA2hasincreasedtothepointthatitfundamentallyconfrontsoneofthebasicconceptsofUSpowerprojection—themassingofforcesatforwardbases.
Thus,thearticlefirstdescribesA2/ADintheWPTO,offersabriefhistoryofFARPintheUSmilitary,andexaminesthisconcept,includingitsthreecriticalelements,operationalandstra-tegicbenefits,andknownchallenges.
September–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|7Antiaccess/AreaDenialInanefforttohinderAmerica'sabilitytoprojectcombatpowerandconductoperationsintheWPTO,ChinahasdevelopedarobustA2/ADsystemthatincludesbothdefensiveandoffensivecapabilities.
A2re-ferstoactionsandcapabilitiesintendedtodenyadversaryforcesentrytoatheaterofoperations.
ADdenotesactionsandcapabilitiesin-tendedtolimitanenemy'sfreedomofactionwithinanoperationalarea.
4China'sA2strategycallsfordeterringUSmilitaryactioninsup-portofitsalliesbyincreasingthedifficultyandcostsassociatedwithprojectingpowerintheWPTO.
5ChinaplanstoattainitsA2/ADobjec-tivesthroughthecoordinateduseofairdefenses,antisatellite/cyberweapons,andbothballisticandcruisemissilestotargetoperatingbasesandmaritimeforcesintheregion.
6FighterFARPaddressestheprojec-tionandsustainmentoffighterforcesinacontestedenvironment.
ThreatstoUSandalliedbasesincludeChineseballisticandcruisemissilesthatcanstrikebasesthroughouttheWPTO.
TheDepartmentofDefenseestimatesthatChinacouldtargetapproximately1,100ofitsshort-rangeballisticmissiles(SRBM)and500ground-launchedcruisemissiles(GLCM)againstbaseswithinthefirstislandchain,whichen-compassestheEastandSouthChinaSeas.
Additionally,morethan500medium-rangeballisticmissiles(MRBM)andair-launchedcruisemis-siles(ALCM)canreachbasesasfarawayasGuamandthesecondis-landchain(figs.
1and2).
7September–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|8Figure1.
Thefirstandsecondislandchains.
(FromJanvanToletal.
,AirSeaBattle:APoint-of-DepartureOperationalConcept[Washington,DC:CenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments,2010],13,http://www.
csbaonline.
org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/.
ReprintedwithpermissionfromtheCenterforStra-tegicandBudgetaryAssessments.
)September–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|9Figure2.
RangesofChineseweaponsystems.
SRBMsincludetheDF-11,DF-11A,andDF-15A;MRBMs,theDF-21andD-3A;andcruisemissiles,theDH-10andC-803.
(FromJanvanToletal.
,AirSeaBattle:APoint-of-DepartureOperationalConcept[Washington,DC:CenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments,2010],18,http://www.
csbaonline.
org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/.
ReprintedwithpermissionfromtheCenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments.
)TheinabilitytooperatefrombasesintheWPTOwouldthreatenUSpowerprojectionintheregion.
Overthepast60years,the"Americanwayofpowerprojection"hasincludedrapidlydeployingalargenum-berofforcestoasmallnumberofsecureforwardbases,generatingmanysorties,andfreelyinitiatingcombatoperationsastheUnitedStateschooses.
8IfChinaexpectsUSmilitaryintervention,thenitisreasonabletoassumethatChinesemilitaryforceswouldseizetheini-tiativebyexecutingacampaigntodenyUSforwardbasing,therebySeptember–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|10limitingaccesstotheregion.
9InlightofChina'sA2capabilities,mass-ingforcesatmainoperationsbases(MOB)actuallyprojectsvulnerabil-ityratherthanpower.
ABriefHistoryofDispersedOperationsandFARPTheAirForcedefinesFARPas"fuel's[sic]operationsusedtohotre-fuelaircraftinareaswherefuelisotherwisenotavailable.
Fuelistrans-ferredfromasourceaircraft's(C-130,C-17,orC-5)internaltankstore-ceiveraircraft.
"10TheArmy'sandMarineCorps'sdefinitionsdifferslightly,resemblingthatofJointPublication1-02,DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms:"atemporaryfacility.
.
.
toprovidefuelandammunitionnecessaryfortheemploymentofavia-tionmaneuverunitsincombat.
"11Thisarticleusesthelatterdefinitionsinceitincorporatesthearmingofaircraftinadditiontorefueling.
TheutilizationofFARPanddispersedairoperationsisnotnew.
ThroughouttheColdWar,thethreatofSovietattacksonNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)airbasesledtodifferentformsofdis-persedoperations.
NATOdevelopedplanstousehost-countrycivilianairfieldsandlargesectionsoftheGermanautobahnasemergencylandingstrips.
12InMarch1984,thatorganizationpracticedthiscapa-bilityduringExercise"Highway84,"duringwhichNATOaircraftoper-atedforthreeweeksfromasectionoftheautobahn.
Continuedcon-cernaboutthesecurityofforwardbasesledtothemultiweekSaltyDemoexercisein1985atSpangdahlemAirBase,Germany.
SaltyDemoshowedtheeffectofsustainedattacksagainstamodernairbaseandhelpedguideAirForceinvestmentsinEuropethroughtheendoftheColdWar.
13AsthethreattoUSoverseasbasesdecreasedduringthetwodecadesfollowingtheColdWar,theneedtodispersequicklyfromMOBsalsodecreased.
Nevertheless,FARPremainsareliablemethodofenhanc-ingflexibilityandcombateffectiveness.
Forexample,AirForce,Ma-rine,andArmyhelicopterunitsregularlyexecuteFARPoperationsSeptember–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|11withpre-positionedfuelsupplies.
SomeAirForceC-17crewsreceivetrainingtoconducttheseoperationswithaircraftfromAirForceSpe-cialOperationsCommand.
RescueunitsintheAlaskaAirNationalGuardemployHC-130stoextendtherangeoftheirHH-60PaveHawkhelicoptersbymeansofFARP.
Numerousmilitaryoperationssincethe1960s,includingthoseinVietnam,Panama,Iraq,andAfghanistan,haveusedFARP.
14RecentadvancesinChineseA2haveelevatedthethreattoUSoperatingbases,leadingtodevelopmentofanewapplica-tionofFARP.
RapidFighterMovements:ANewConceptforDispersedOperationsNo"silverbullet"willsolvetheA2/ADdilemma.
Aneffectivestrat-egywilllikelyincludestandoffweapons,disablingtechnologies,andoperationalresilience.
Typicalelementsofthelatterincludeimprovedindicatorsandwarning,ballisticmissiledefense,cruisemissilede-fense,redundancy,selectivehardening,rapidinfrastructurerepair,anddistributedbasing.
15Thistypeofbasingentailsdeployingaircraftsquadronstolargernumbersofbaseswithsufficientrampspace,weapons-storageareas,andinfrastructureforhigh-volumefueldeliv-ery.
ThefighterFARPconceptaddstooperationalresiliencebytakingdistributedbasingtoanentirelynewlevel.
ThisconceptcombinescurrentAirForcecapabilitiesinnewways,resultinginsignificantstrategic,operational,andtacticaladvantages.
Itpairsafour-shipoffighterswithatransportaircraft,makinguseofFARPtorearm,refuel,andswappilotsquicklyatover250possiblelo-cationsthroughouttheWPTO.
Thetransportaircraftcontainsapriori-tizedpartskit,munitionsforrearming,aforwardareamanifold(FAM)carttoregulatefuelpressurefromitsinternaltankstothefighters,ad-ditionalpilotstorotateintothefightercockpits,andtrainedpersonneltoconductfuel,weapons,andmaintenancefunctions.
Thefactthattheweapons,fuel,equipment,andpersonnelnecessarytoconductSeptember–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|12FARPareallcontainedinthetransportaircraftprecludestheneedforfuelandlogisticssupportatFARPlocations.
Successfulimplementa-tionofthefighterFARPconceptdependsuponthreekeyelements:(1)generationoffighterandtransportaircraftfrombasesoutsidetheA2environmentandprojectionofthatpoweroverlongdistancesinaco-ordinatedfashion;(2)theavailabilityofacceptablerunwaysthrough-outthejointoperationsarea(JOA)whereFARPoperationscanoccurwithreducedriskofenemyattack;and(3)successfulregenerationofcombatsortiesusingFARPinatime-constrainedenvironmentwithoutdependingonfuelorlogisticssupportfromthedispersedairfield.
GenerationandPowerProjectionofFARPForcesFighterFARPreliesoneffectivecombatgenerationofpairedfighterandtransportaircraftthatcanprojectcombatpoweroverlongdis-tancesintoanA2environment,acapabilitydemonstratedandexer-cisedatJointBaseElmendorf–Richardson(JBER),Alaska.
16Since2009thatbase'sF-22andC-17units(fig.
3)haveexercisedlong-rangestrikeandescort(LRS/E)trainingmissionsinwhichtheyrapidlydeployaformationofF-22sandoneC-17onaneight-hour-plusmission,receivemissionupdatesairborne,generate(orreceive)target-qualitycoordi-nates,defeatair-to-airadversaries,deliverair-to-groundordnanceinadensesurface-to-air-missileenvironment,andlandataforwardloca-tion.
17Theseexercisesarerepresentativeofthelongdistancesin-volvedifcombatoperationsintheWPTOaresupportedbyfightersoutsidethesecondislandchain;moreover,theyshowthesynergisticeffectofcombiningfifth-generationplatformswithatailoredsupportpackageonaC-17.
Figure4indicatesthedistancesfromAlaskaandHawaiitotheWPTO.
September–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|13Figure3.
F-22FARPsitelayout.
FourF-22sandaC-17lineupinpreparationofFARPoperationsduringanoperationalunitevaluationatJBERinAugust2013.
(PhotocourtesyofTSgtDanaRosso,USAFR,477thFighterGroupPublicAffairs,JBER,Alaska.
)September–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|14Figure4.
DistancesinthePacifictheater.
(FromJanvanToletal.
,AirSeaBattle:APoint-of-DepartureOperationalConcept[Washington,DC:CenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments,2010],12,http://www.
csbaonline.
org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/.
ReprintedwithpermissionfromtheCenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments.
)SuitableAirfieldsandFreedomfromEnemyAttackOncetheF-22sexecuteanLRS/EmissionintotheJOA,theywillneedasuitableairfieldunlikelytobeattackedbyenemyballisticorcruisemissilesforausefulperiodoftime.
Typically,thesefightersrequirerunwaysatleast8,000feetlongand75feetwidealthoughoperationsgroupcommanderscanallowshorteronesifthecomputedtakeoffandlandingdistancesdonotexceed80percentoftheavailablerunway.
18Dependingonfuelandweaponloads,anF-22willlikelyoperatefromrunways6,000feetlong,ataminimum.
TheC-17,whichhasexcellentSeptember–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|15short-fieldtakeoffandlandingcapabilities,caninmostsituationsoper-atewithsucharunway.
Thepavementclassificationnumber,anaddi-tionalconsiderationfortheC-17,representstheweight-bearingcapac-ityoftherunway.
TheWPTOhasatleast163airfieldsthatare8,000x75feet,andreducingtherequiredlengthto6,000feetincreasestheto-talto258.
Table1summarizesthepossibleFARPlocationsintheWPTOthatliewithinthesecondislandchain.
Table1.
FARPairfieldsbyrunwaylengthandlocation(intheWPTO)8,000ft.
+7,000–7,999ft.
6,000–6,999ft.
TotalsFromPRCtoFirstChain117144317484BetweenChainsIncludingtheSecond)461424Totals1632867GrandTotal258Source:"WorldwideAirportDatabase,"AirportNavFinder,accessed8February2014,http://airportnavfinder.
com/index.
php.
Foralistofall258airfields,seeLtColRobertD.
Davis,"FighterFARP:AnAffordableandFeasibleConceptforPowerProjectioninanA2/ADEnvironment"(MaxwellAFB,AL:AirWarCollege,2014).
ThesenumbersdonotincludeairfieldsbeyondthesecondislandchainalthoughseveralinPapuaNewGuineaandnorthernAustraliaarecloseenoughforconsideration.
Alloftherunwaysnotedinthetableareasphalt,butthepavementclassificationnumberdidnotenterintotheequation.
LocationsdemandacertifiedFARPsurveyinaccordancewithAirForceInstruction11-235,ForwardAreaRefuelingPoint(FARP)Operations,15December2000,http://static.
e-publishing.
af.
mil/production/1/af_a3_5/publication/afi11-235/afi11-235.
pdf.
MaintainingasurvivablefighterforceisacentralfeatureoftheFARPconceptsinceitcomplicatesChina'seffortstodenyforwardbasestoUSforces.
ToincreasethesurvivabilityofFARPforces,theUSmilitaryshoulddenythePeople'sLiberationArmy's(PLA)real-timeawarenessoftheFARPlocationscurrentlyinuse,denyitsabilitytostriketheselocationsinatimelymanner,orloweritswillingnesstotar-getaparticularairfield.
19DependingonChina'sabilitytomonitorpo-September–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|16tentialFARPlocations,FARPoperationscouldprobablybeconductedduringtimesofreducedawareness.
Duringamajormilitaryoperation,itisalsoplausiblethatUSforceswillattempttodisruptordenyPLAISRthroughkineticornonkineticmeans.
FARPplannersshouldcoor-dinatecloselywithintelligencepersonneltoknowwhencertainloca-tionsareavailableandforhowlong.
China'sballisticandcruisemissilesposethegreatestrisktoFARPoperations.
Giventhatcountry'sscientificapproachtowarfare,onecanrealisticallyassumethatitwilldedicatemostofthosemissilestoasmallnumberofhigh-prioritytargetssuchasUSandalliedMOBs.
However,targetingfighterFARPlocationswillrequiresignificantlymoremissilesaswellasChinesewillingnesstolaunchatbasesinmanynearbycountries(includingJapan,SouthKorea,Indonesia,Sin-gapore,Malaysia,Thailand,andPalau).
TheuncertaintyofFARPloca-tionsandthetremendousillwillcreatedbytargetingitsneighborswilllikelyaffectChina'swillingnesstouseballisticorcruisemissilesagainstthosesites.
20AlthoughchoosingaFARPlocationfurtherfromtheChinesecoast-linemayreducetheriskofmissileattack,doingsomayproveunnec-essarybecauseofChina'sreducedawarenessorwillingnesstotargetFARPairfields.
(Itwouldalsolessentheeffectivenessoftheconcept.
)Nevertheless,aFARPlocationgreaterthan486nauticalmiles(nm)fromtheChinesecoastwilllieoutsideSRBMrange,leavingonlyMRBMsastheprimaryballisticmissilethreat.
21Choosingasite540or810nmfromthecoastwillprovide60or90minutesofprotectionfromGLCMs,respectively.
22IntheWPTO,atleast174potentialFARPloca-tionsare540nmfromChina,130ofthembeyond810nm.
TothwartanattackbyALCMs,USforcesshouldpreventChinesebombers(H-6sandJH-7s)fromreachingthemaximumlaunchrangeoftheirmostlikelyweapons—323nm.
23Air-to-airfightersorotherjointcounteraircapabilitiescouldsupplythisprotection.
September–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|17ConductingFighterFARPThefighterFARPconcept,anaturalextensionoftheLRS/Emission,allowsfighterstoresumeoperationsquicklyafteramissionwithoutreturningtoabasefarfromtheJOA.
Besidesasuitablerunway,otherminimumrequirementsforfighterFARPincludecertifiedmainte-nance,weapons,andfuelspersonnel;aFARP-certifiedC-17crew;aFAMcart;supportingfuelsequipment;ammunition;maintenanceequipment;beyondline-of-sight(BLOS)communications;additionalF-22andC-17aircrewswithcrew-restquarters;onetotwomissionplannerswithamission-planningcomputer;andair-refueling(AR)tankersupport.
24Thelengthoftimeonthegrounddependsupontheamountoffuelandmunitionsneededbythefighters.
Ifitneedsfewmunitions,afour-shipofF-22scanbebackintheair60minutesafterlanding.
Inmostsituations,arming/refuelingthefighterstakes60to120minutes(fig.
5).
25Figure5.
F-22armingandrefuelingoperationsduringanF-22FARPevaluationatJBER,Alaska.
(CourtesyofTSgtDanaRosso,USAFR,477thFighterGroupPublicAffairs,JBER,Alaska.
)SeveralfactorsaffectthenumberofdaysthatF-22scansustainFARPoperationsawayfromabasehavingrobustmaintenancecapability,butthetypicalnumberisthreedays.
26TheC-17sandassociatedper-sonnelmustrotatemorefrequentlybecauseoffatigueandammuni-tionconsiderations.
AlthoughthisconceptrequiresadditionalanalysisSeptember–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|18beforeitcanbedevelopedintoanoperationalcapability,enoughinfor-mationexiststohighlightthemostsignificantbenefitsandissuesasso-ciatedwithfighterFARPoperations.
StrategicBenefitsThemostsignificantstrategicbenefitofthefighterFARPconceptisitspotentialdeterrentvalue.
Possessionofacrediblecapabilitytoconductfighteroperationsdespiteanadversary'sattempttodenyforwardbas-ingwouldlikelyhaveadeterrenteffectandmightpreventtheneedforlethalmilitaryforce.
ThisisparticularlytrueforChina,whosemili-taryplanningischaracterizedbyascientificapproachtowarfare.
TheUnitedStatesshouldpubliclyannounceandexerciseitsabilitytocon-ductfighterFARP.
IfChinesemilitaryleaderslackconfidencethattheirantiaircampaignwillachieveitsdesiredaims,thenAmericacanlikelydeterthem.
TheconceptalsoimposessignificantcostsonChina(oranyadver-sary)ifitattemptstodenyFARPlocationsbyincreasingitsnumberofmissilesorISRcapabilities.
GiventhemanypossiblesitesintheWPTOandthelikelihoodthatChinawouldhavetotargetanairfieldwithmultiplemissiles,thePLAwouldneedtoaugmentitsstockpileofweaponssubstantially.
Additionalspace-basedorairborneISRplat-formsarealsoveryexpensive.
ComparedtothelowcostofexecutingfighterFARP,China'soutlayfordenyingsuchacapabilitywouldbeex-tremelyhigh.
Furthermore,theUnitedStateswouldenjoythebenefitofconduct-ingconventional"strategicstrike"missionswithfifth-generationfight-ers.
ByutilizingFARP,F-22scanlaunchfromtheirhomebase,flymorethan4,500miles(withARtankersupport)duringoneflightdutype-riod,swappilots,continuetothedesiredlocation,andoperateinanadvancedthreatenvironmentwhiledeliveringtheirmunitions.
Afterstrikingmultipletargets,theaircraftcanreturntotheirhomebaseorothersuitableairfields.
TheemploymentofF-22soverlongdistancesSeptember–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|19alsoallowsthemtoescortotherstrategicplatformsand/orstrikehigh-valuetargetsontheirown,producingstrategiceffects.
Moreover,fighterFARPoffersresponsive,flexible,andscalableop-tionsforstabilizingacrisisandthusexertsasignificantstrategicim-pact.
Aplausiblefuturecrisismightinvolveaterritorialdisputebe-tweenChinaandJapanorrenewedaggressionbyNorthKorea.
Insuchsituations,apackageofstealthfightersandspecificallypairedtransportaircraftcanbegeneratedanddeployedonalong-rangemis-siontodemonstrateAmericanresolveandreassureUSalliesinthere-gion.
Inlessthan24hours,afour-shipofstealthfighterscanflythou-sandsofmilesusingFARPtoextendtheirrange,deliverprecision-guidedmunitions(ifneeded),andlandataforwardbaseasastabilizingpresence.
Theaircraftcancontinuelocaloperationsormovetoanotherbaseintheregion,usingFARPasnecessary.
Ifthesit-uationdemandsmoreforces,thentheAirForcecangenerateaddi-tionalpackagesandquicklydeploythemtothetheater.
Uponresolu-tionofthecrisis,itcanredeploythemwithinhours.
Flexibleandrapidpowerprojection(especiallyinanA2environment)givesUSleadersmoreoptionsforeffectivecrisisstabilityandhelpsadvanceAmerica'sinterestsabroad.
SortieGenerationTheconceptoffersthesignificantoperationalbenefitofsustainingfifth-generationairpoweroperationswhenMOBsbecomeunusable.
TheestimatednumberofsortiesthatasquadroncangenerateeachdayusingFARPisanimportantplanningfactorandhelpsinevalua-tionsoftheutilityoftheconcept.
EvenunderthebestFARPcondi-tionsandhighavailabilityofplatforms,thesortiegenerationratewillbelowerthanthatofforwardbasesbecauseofefficienciesgainedthroughconsolidatedmaintenanceandsupplyresources.
Theopera-tionalvalueoffighterFARP,though,isnotitsefficiencybutitslackofvulnerabilitytoA2measures.
FighterFARPismorethanagoodidea—itisanecessity.
September–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|20Forexample,anF-22fightersquadronandaircraftmaintenanceunitbasedatJBERwith21primaryaircraftauthorizedcouldemployuptothreefour-shipcellsconcurrently.
27Ifthreecellsareemployedsimul-taneously,then12ofthe21jets(57percent)willconductFARPopera-tionswhiletheremainingnineaircraftremainathomestation.
Asthethreefour-shipsrotatebacktoJBERformaintenance,uptotwoaddi-tionalfour-shipscanreplacethem.
Ifseveralaircraftareundergoinglong-termmaintenance,thefightersquadronmightbeabletoemployamaximumofonlytwofour-shipsconcurrently.
28Thenumberofsortiesflownbyafour-shipeachdaydependsuponseveralfactors.
Ifthetaskedmissionisdefensivecounterairwithfewair-to-airengagements,itcouldremainonstationforanextendedpe-riodoftime(eightto10hours),producingtwomissions(eightsorties)perdayforthefour-ship.
Othermissionssuchasoffensivecounterairorair-to-groundstrikewouldlikelycallforahigherrateofweaponsex-pendituresandanearlierreturntoaFARPlocation.
Inthissituation,afour-shipcouldreasonablyflythreeorfourmissions(12or16sorties)in24hours.
Inlightoftheassumptionsabove,oneF-22squadroncangenerateatleast480sortiesoveracontinuous30-dayflyingperiod(twofour-ships,eachflyingtwomissionsperday).
WhenMOBsareunusable,480sortiespermonthflownbyeightfifth-generation,con-tinuouslypresentfightersrepresentasubstantialamountofcombatpower.
FighterFARPoperationsmayprovenecessaryonlyduringtheopen-ingweeksormonthsofamajorcombatoperation.
InahypotheticalWPTOscenario,thisconceptwouldlikelybecombinedwithotherdis-tributedbasingandresiliencyefforts.
Asthemilitaryoperationun-folds,theballisticandcruisemissilethreattoMOBsislikelytoattenu-ate,anddamagetothosebaseswillberepaired.
ThelesserthreatwillallowfighterandmaintenanceunitstomoveforwardtoMOBswheretheycantakeadvantageofconsolidatedresources.
Althoughitisdiffi-culttopredictthetimerequiredtoreducesuchathreat,onecanrea-September–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|21sonablyassumethatasquadrontaskingtoconductFARPoperationswouldlastonetotwomonths.
OtherOperationalandTacticalBenefitsTheaffordabilityofthefighterFARPconceptcomparedtothatofotheroperationalresiliencyeffortsisanimportantbenefitthathasopera-tionalimplications.
Ontheonehand,typicalbase-dispersaleffortsre-quirecostlyinfrastructureinvestmentsatmultiplebasesthroughouttheregion.
Theseconstructionprojectsarenotonlyexpensivebutlengthy.
Ontheotherhand,expensesassociatedwithFARPoperationsarerelativelysmallsinceinvestmentsarelimitedtothepurchaseofadditionalFAMcarts,fuelhoses,modifiedin-transitcrew-restbunks,andadditionaltrainingtocertifyFARPpersonnel.
Althoughotherdis-persalandresiliencyeffortsshouldcontinue,fighterFARP—afeasible,provenconcept—offersaffordabledispersionthatcanbeimplementedimmediately.
Moreover,fighterFARPistransferrable.
ThisarticleconcentratesontheWPTO,butfighterFARPisapplicabletoanytheaterwithaccept-ablelandingsurfaces.
Alaska'sgeographicpositionpermitsLRS/EandFARPmissionsovertheNorthPoletoreachotherareasofresponsibil-ityquickly.
Newfifth-andsixth-generationaircraftshouldbedesignedwiththeflexibilitytooperatefromdispersedlocationsusingaFARPconcept.
FuturetechnologiesandcapabilitieswillamplifytheutilityofFARPbyaddingimprovedsensors,weapons,andintegratednetworksintojointoperatingconceptsthatexploitmultipledomains(air,space,cyber,surface,andsubsurface).
KnownChallengesTherapidgenerationandmovementoffighterairpowerwillchallengemanyoftheAirForce'sestablishedwaysof"doingbusiness.
"Althoughinitialevaluationoftheconcepthashighlightedsomeissues,noneofthemareinsurmountable.
ThefirstsetconcernsthesustainmentofFARPoperationsthroughthecontinuoususeofC-17aircraft(fig.
6).
September–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|22FatigueandlimitationsoftheflightdutyperiodpreventaC-17fromsupportingtheseoperationsformorethanabout24hours.
Sustainingasteadysupplyoffuel,munitions,personnel,andequipmentontheseplatformspresentsalogisticalproblemthatdemandscreativesolu-tions.
TheaddedriskofanaircraftmalfunctionrequiringextensivemaintenanceataFARPlocationposesanothersetofpotentialobsta-cles.
Forthemostpart,thesolutionsareaffordableandfeasible;more-over,theycanbeimplementedimmediatelywithacceptablelevelsofrisk.
Thelistofchallengesandsolutionsintable2isnotexhaustive,andfurtheranalysisoftheseandothersshouldcontinue.
Intheend,thesignificanceofthestrategicandoperationalbenefitsgreatlyout-weighsthehindrances.
Figure6.
C-17loadedforF-22FARPpractice.
(CourtesyofTSgtDanaRosso,USAFR,477thFighterGroupPublicAffairs,JBER,Alaska.
)September–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|23Table2.
KnownchallengesandpossiblesolutionsforfighterFARPKnownChallengesPossibleSolutionsCrewfatigueRotatetransportaircraftapproximatelyevery24hours.
Augmenttransportaircrews.
Providein-transitrestfornontransportcrews.
Installbunksonthesideofcargobay(currentcapability).
Modify"Tortoise"—securedebriefmodules(currentlypossessedbyfightersquadrons).
ModifySeniorLeaderin-TransitConferenceCapsule.
MunitionsrequirementsAnticipatemunitionsbasedonairtaskingorder.
Positionmunitionsatairfieldswithmunitions-storagecapabilities.
Swaptransportaircraftmorefrequently.
HighC-17demandIncreasethetypesofFARPtransportaircraft(C-130,C-5,etc.
).
LowerthedemandtomoveunitstoMOBsuntilthreatlevelsdecrease.
Establishprioritiesbetweensupported/supportingcommanders.
FuelrequirementsCoordinatetankersforbothfighterandtransportAR.
AircraftmalfunctionsCarrysparepartskitontransportaircraft.
Flynon-mission-capableaircraftifsafetodoso.
Leavegroundedaircraftandflyremainingplatforms(degradedmissionwithtwo-orthree-ship).
Launchadditionaltransportwithpartsandpersonneltofixaircraft.
Long-termfleethealthTakeadvantageofhigher-qualitylowobservablemaintenancefacilitiesatestablishedstealthfighterbases(AlaskaandHawaii).
CommandandcontrolEstablishadedicatedmissionplannerwithcommunicationlinktoairandspaceoperationscenter.
Developrobustlost-communicationcontingencyplans.
UsecurrentBLOScommunicationsontransportaircraft.
InvestinfutureBLOScommunicationsforfighteraircraft.
September–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|24Fifth-GenerationDoolittleRaidIfweshouldhavetofight,weshouldbepreparedtodosofromtheneckupinsteadoffromtheneckdown.
—GenJimmyDoolittleThefamousDoolittleRaidduringWorldWarIIoffersasuperbexam-pleofhowaninnovativeconceptcanleadtostrategiceffects.
On18April1942,justfourmonthsaftertheJapaneseattackonPearlHarbor,LtColJimmyDoolittleled16aircraftand80menonabombingraidoverTokyo.
TheJapanesebelievedthatthe"tyrannyofdistance"inthePacificandtheirdefensivecapabilitieswouldpreventAmericanforcesfromreachingthehomeland.
29However,theDoolittleRaidin-creasedtheoperationalreachofairpowerbyplacingB-25bombersontheUSaircraftcarrierHornet.
Doolittle'sunorthodoxconcepthadthesupportofLtGenHenryH.
"Hap"Arnold,chiefoftheArmyAirForces.
LaunchingB-25soffaNavycarrierrequiredspecialmodifica-tionstothebombersandarobusttrainingprogramfortheaircrews.
TheraidoverTokyoachievednearlycompletesurpriseandbol-steredUSpublicsupportforthewarenormously.
Althoughthephysi-caldestructionwasrelativelysmall,thefactthatAmericanmilitarypowerhadpenetratedtheJapanese"A2"perimetercauseddevastatingpsychologicaldamage.
30ConsequentlyJapan'sleaderschangedtheirstrategy,leadingtoruinousdefeatattheBattleofMidway.
31ThefighterFARPconcepthasseveralparallelstotheDoolittleRaid.
BothdealwiththetyrannyofdistanceandtheA2environmentintheWesternPacific.
Further,liketheraid,fighterFARPextendstheopera-tionalreachofairpower.
Mostimportantly,ittoocanhaveademoraliz-ingeffectonanadversary,causinghimtoquestionhisstrategy,andcancreatebothoperationalandstrategiceffectsthatadvanceUSobjectives.
September–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|25ConclusionProjectionofpoweraroundtheworldisanimportantmilitarycapa-bilitythatcontributestoAmerica'snationalsecuritystrategy.
China'sA2/ADstrategyseekstochallengeUSforceprojectionintheWPTOanddeterAmericaninvolvementintheeventofChina'smilitaryac-tionagainstitsneighbors.
ToprojectandsustainairpowerinanA2en-vironment,theAirForcemustovercomethethreattoitsforwardoper-atinglocationsfromenemyballisticandcruisemissiles.
TheFighterFARPconceptaddressesthisissuebyprovidingflexibleanddispersedsortiegenerationthatdoesnotdependupontheuseofMOBs.
Rarelydoesasingleconceptaddressstrategic,operational,andtacti-caloperationssimultaneously.
ThegenerationoffighterFARPsortiesprovidesincreaseddeterrence,rapidstabilizationofacrisis,long-rangepowerprojectionintocontestedenvironmentstoconductcounterairorstrikemissions,andtheproductionofstrategiceffectsviasurpriseraidsorextendedcombatoperations.
Bythesemeans,theUnitedStatescanimposecostsontheadversary,offeroptionstonationalleadersfortheeffectiveprojectionofairpowerinasupposedlydeniedenvironment,anddosoquicklyatrelativelylowexpenseandwithex-istingforces.
Thiscollectionofstrategic,operational,andtacticalad-vantagesmakestheassociatedriskacceptable.
Demonstrationandex-erciseofthiscapability,regardlessofwhetherornotAmericaactuallyusesit,greatlycomplicatetheadversary'splanningprocessandcost.
Underthesecircumstances,theAirForcecannotignoretheconceptoffighterFARPintheWPTOandshouldinvestinitnow.
Notes1.
USDepartmentofDefense,SustainingU.
S.
GlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor21stCenturyDefense(Washington,DC:OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,January2012),4,http://www.
defense.
gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.
pdf.
2.
DepartmentoftheAirForce,GlobalVigilance,GlobalReach,GlobalPowerforAmerica:TheWorld'sGreatestAirForce—PoweredbyAirmen,FueledbyInnovation(Washington,DC:September–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|26DepartmentoftheAirForce,January2013),4–9,http://www.
af.
mil/Portals/1/images/airpower/GV_GR_GP_300DPI.
pdf.
3.
DepartmentofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:MilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingthePeople'sRepublicofChina,2013(Washington,DC:OfficeoftheSecretaryofDe-fense,2013),i,http://www.
defense.
gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.
pdf.
4.
DepartmentofDefense,JointOperationalAccessConcept(JOAC),version1.
0(Washing-ton,DC:DepartmentofDefense,17January2012),6,http://www.
defense.
gov/pubs/pdfs/joac_jan%202012_signed.
pdf.
5.
YeZicheng,InsideChina'sGrandStrategy:ThePerspectivefromthePeople'sRepublic,ed.
andtrans.
StevenI.
LevineandGuoliLiu(Lexington:UniversityPressofKentucky,2011),3.
SeealsoJohnA.
Shaud,AirForceStrategyStudy,2020–2030(MaxwellAFB,AL:AirUniver-sityPress,AirForceResearchInstitute,January2011),130,http://www.
dtic.
mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a540345.
pdf.
AlthoughChinadoesnotseekalarge-scalemilitaryconflictwiththeUnitedStates,itsleadersexpectAmericatointerveneifChinaactsaggressivelyinare-gionaldispute.
6.
AndrewF.
Krepinevich,WhyAirSeaBattle(Washington,DC:CenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments,2010),13–24,http://www.
csbaonline.
org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/2010.
02.
19-Why-AirSea-Battle.
pdf.
SeealsoDepartmentofDefense,An-nualReporttoCongress,5–11;andJanvanToletal.
,AirSeaBattle:APoint-of-DepartureOpera-tionalConcept(Washington,DC:CenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments,2010),18–20,http://www.
csbaonline.
org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/.
7.
DepartmentofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:MilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingthePeople'sRepublicofChina,2012(Washington,DC:OfficeoftheSecretaryofDe-fense,May2012),29,http://www.
defense.
gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_CMPR_Final.
pdf.
Further-more,Chinahasapproximately500combataircraftwithinunrefueleddistanceofTaiwanandtheabilitytodeploysubstantiallymore(atotalof2,300combataircraft),manyofwhichcanemployALCMs.
FuturecapabilitiesofthePeople'sLiberationArmywillincludelargernumbersofmissileswithincreasedrange,advancedstealthfighterssuchastheJ-20andJ-31,andnewairdefensesystems.
SeeKrepinevich,WhyAirSeaBattle,32,35.
8.
VanToletal.
,AirSeaBattle,23.
9.
Ibid.
,51.
10.
AirForceInstruction(AFI)23-201,FuelsManagement,23January2012,71,http://static.
e-publishing.
af.
mil/production/1/af_a4_7/publication/afi23-201/afi23-201.
pdf.
Forad-ditionalAirForceFARPguidance,seeAFI11-235,ForwardAreaRefuelingPoint(FARP)Opera-tions,15December2000,http://static.
e-publishing.
af.
mil/production/1/af_a3_5/publication/afi11-235/afi11-235.
pdf.
11.
JointPublication1-02,DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms,8November2010(asamendedthrough15March2014),104,http://www.
dtic.
mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.
pdf.
SeealsoArmyTechniquesPublication3-04.
94(FM3-04.
104),ArmyTechniquesPublicationforForwardArmingandRefuelingPoints,January2012,1-1,http://armypubs.
army.
mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/atp3_04x94.
pdf.
12.
DonaldE.
Lewisetal.
,APerspectiveontheUSAFECollocatedOperatingBaseSystem,RANDNoteN-2366-AF(SantaMonica,CA:RANDCorporation,July1986),3,http://www.
rand.
org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2007/N2366.
pdf.
September–October2014Air&SpacePowerJournal|2713.
ChristopherJ.
Bowie,"TheLessonsofSaltyDemo,"AirForceMagazine92,no.
3(March2009):54,http://www.
airforcemag.
com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2009/March%202009/0309salty.
pdf.
14.
CaptJeremyR.
Lewis,"PerformanceEvaluationofaForwardArmingandRefuelingPoint(FARP)UsingDiscreteEventSimulation,"GraduateResearchProjectAFIT/MLM/ENS/05-08(Wright-PattersonAFB,OH:AirForceInstituteofTechnology,2005),8–9,http://www.
dtic.
mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a442595.
pdf.
15.
RogerCliffetal.
,ShakingtheHeavensandSplittingtheEarth:ChineseAirForceEmploy-mentConceptsinthe21stCentury(SantaMonica,CA:RANDCorporation,2011),239.
16.
ThefighterFARPconceptcanbeappliedtoanyfighterandtransportcombinationcapableofconductingFARP.
Sofar,ithasbeenappliedonlytoF-22sandC-17satJBER,AK.
Applicationtoothertransportaircraftandfuturefighterswillincreasetheconcept'sutility.
17.
LtColRobertD.
Davis,commander,525thFighterSquadron,tocommander,3rdWing,andcommander,477thFighterGroup,tripreportmemorandum,21December2012.
SeealsoCaptAshleyConner,"InnovationAdvancesF-22asStrategicForceinthePacific,"477thFighterGroupPublicAffairs,9October2013,http://www.
477fg.
afrc.
af.
mil/news/story.
aspid=123366570.
18.
AFI11-2F-22A,vol.
3,F-22A—OperationsProcedures,8December2009,11,http://static.
e-publishing.
af.
mil/production/1/af_a3_5/publication/afi11-2f-22av3/afi11-2f-22av3.
pdf.