officialwww.17rrr.com

10/24www.
bbvaresearch.
comGlobalEconomicOutlookThirdquarter20153China'seconomyinthelimelight:size,financialinterconnectionsandpotentialcontagionchannelsabroadAlleyeshavebeencentredontheswellingandburstingofChina'sstockmarketbubble,givenitspotentialimpactonthedomesticeconomiccycle,aswellasglobalfinancialstabilityandeconomicgrowth.
Therearebasicallythreechannelsforcontagionabroad,andallofthemaresignificantlyorincreasinglyfar-reaching.
Thefirstoftheseisdeteriorationinlocalprivate-sectorconfidence,whichcausestheprivatesectortoholdbackonitsinvestmentdecisionsandamplifiestheslowdowninactivity,therebyspreadingtotherestoftheworldviatradeandforeigninvestment.
Thesecondisawidespreadtighteningoffinancingconditionsamongtheemergingmarkets,whichisexacerbatedbytheeffectoflowerChinesedemandoncommoditypricesandtheimminentFedratehike.
Thethird,thoughnottheleastsignificant,relatestohowtheChineseeconomyisfinanciallyinterconnectedelsewhere,bothbyvirtueofitsstatusasanetcreditoroftherestoftheworldanditspositionsintermsofpurelyfinancialcapitalflows4.
ItmaybeconcludedfrominspectionofChina'srelativecriticalmasswithinglobaleconomicandfinancialchannelsthatthebiggestrisktoworldeconomicgrowthliesinanysharpcontractionofitsactivitylevels,whichmoreovercouldtranslateintoincreasedriskaversionintheEMandaffectthoseeconomieswhichhavethemosttradeexposure,thegreatestdependenceonthecommoditycycleand/orthelargestexternalimbalances.
AscalingdownofdecisionsbyChinatoinvestintherestoftheworldcouldalsodeteriorateglobalfinancingconditions,giventhatChinaistheworld'slargestnetcreditorandthebiggestforeignholderofUSsovereignbonds.
AsforfinancialexposuretoChina,thisisbasicallywithinthebankingsector,whichhasplayedakeyroleinincreasingthecountry'sexternaldebtinthelastdecade.
Thus,andtakingintoaccountfinancialcentralitymetricsdevelopedbyBBVAResearch,iftheshockweretoaffectthelocalbankingsector,thefinancialchannelcouldtakeonglobalsignificance:theinterconnectednessofChina'sbankingsectorwiththeworldfinancialsystemcomfortablyoutstripstheaveragefortheEMsandisevenabovetheaveragefordevelopedmarkets,althoughconsiderablyfarbehindcountriessuchastheUS.
FactorsbehindtheChinesestockmarketcorrectionEverymarketcrashstartsfromitsprecedingrun-up.
China'scaseisnoexception.
Priortothesell-offofmid-June,China'sShanghaiCompositeshotupfrom2,181pointsto5,166pointsinlessthanoneyear.
Formanysmallstocks,theirmagnitudeofpriceincreaseoutperformedthestockindexsubstantially.
4:China'scapitalaccountisnotcompletelyclosed,althoughtherearestillmanyrestrictionsinplace.
Throughsomeprogrammes(QFIIandRQFII),foreigninvestorscaninvestinChina'sdomesticbondandstockmarkets.
Inthemeantime,domesticinvestorscaninvestabroadthroughtheQDIIprogramme.
TheShanghai-HongKongstockexchangeslinkprogramme,whichwasimplementedlastyear,providedanotherchannelfortwo-waycross-borderinvestmentbetweenHongKongandChina.
Moreover,afterseveralyearsofefforts,ChinahassuccessfullyestablishedanoffshoreRMBmarketinHongKongandotherfinancialcentres.
TheoffshoreRMBdepositamountstoaboveRMB1trn(orUSD160bn).
ThereareotheroffshoreRMBmarketssuchasDimSumbondmarketandtheRMBderivativesmarket.
11/24www.
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comGlobalEconomicOutlookThirdquarter2015Figure3.
1MarginlendingfuelledChina'sstockmarketboomTable3.
1MeasurestostabilisetheChinesestockexchangeRegulatorDateMeasure1PBoCJune24PBoCscrapsloantodepositratiocap2PBoCJune27Ratecutby25bpwithatargetedRRRcutof50bp3CSRCJuly5IPOssuspended4PBoCJuly5EstablishmentofUSD19bnFinancialStabilizationFundby21brokers5PBoCJuly5LiquiditysupportforChinaSecuritiesFinanceCorporateforthelattertobuysharesinthemarketdirectly6CSRCJuly7QFIItoldnottotakenewpositionsinfuturemarkets7CFFEXJuly8RaisemarginrequirementsforsellordersonCSI500indexfuturesSource:BBVAResearchSource:BBVAResearchAconfluenceofmeasuresledthemarkettorallyinsuchashortperiod:first,thegovernment'ssupportforHI-Techlistingfirmshavegreatlyliftedinvestors'expectations;second,inthefaceofgrowthslowdownthePeople'sBankofChina(PBoC)haveimplementedaseriesofeasingmeasuressinceNovemberincludinginterestratesandRequiredReserveRatio(RRR)cuts;third,thegovernment,forthepurposeofreducingcorporates'relianceondebtfinancing,wronglyfavouredretailinvestorsintotheequitymarket.
Moreimportantly,investorsincreasinglyusedmarginloansfrombanks,securityfirms,trustcompaniesandothershadowbankinginstitutionstomaximisetheirinvestmentreturns.
Themarketrallyendedinmid-Junewhenthetrendsinsomeofabove-mentionedfactorsreversed.
Asthemarketrocketedup,thevaluationofmanystockshadgonefarbeyondlevelsjustifiedbyfundamentals.
Withsomepositivesignsofgrowthstabilisationemerginginthesecondquarter,investorsgrewsuspiciousofthecontinuationofthePBoC'seasingstance.
Evenworseisthattheauthorities,inthewakeofinvestors'fast-risingleverage,startedtotightenmarginloansthroughtheshadowbankingsector.
Whenalargenumberofinvestorsattemptedtoreducetheirpositionsatthesametimeitsoontranslatedintoatext-booksell-offintheequitymarket.
Theinitialcorrectionofsharepricescausedbysellingordersalertedotherinvestors,inparticularthosewhoborrowedmarginloans.
Tomanagetheirriskexposuretothemarket,manyleveragedinvestorsoptedtosellpartoftheirshares,whichmagnifiedthesupplyinashorttimeandputmoredownwardpressureonshareprices.
Themarketthusenteredaviciouscircle:themoreleveragedinvestorswantedtoselltheirshares,thefurthersharepricesfell,whichencouragedmoreleveragedinvestorstosell.
Theauthorities'rescuepackageiscontroversialTostopthesell-offinthemarketthegovernmenthasunleashedasetofbailoutmeasurestostabiliseit,includingsuspendingIPOs,raisingshort-sellingcostsofstockindexfutures,directinginsurancefundstowardsthestockmarket,etc.
(Figure3.
1).
Andmoreimportantly,theauthoritiesinstructedbankstolendmoneytotheChinaSecuritiesFinanceCorporatesothatthelattercanpropupsharepricesthroughabuyingspreeinthemarket.
12/24www.
bbvaresearch.
comGlobalEconomicOutlookThirdquarter2015Althoughthesemeasureshavestabilisedthemarketforawhile,theyfailedtoaddressanumberoffactorsthatspawnedthesell-off,someofwhichhaveevenbeenexacerbatedbytheauthorities'actions.
Forexample,theexcessiveuseofmarginlendinghasbeenwidelyblamedasoneoftheculpritsfortherun-upofsharepricesandtheensuingmarketplummet.
Asof22July,theofficialstatisticsofmarginlendingstoodatRMB1.
44trn,whichisdownfromitspeakofRMB2.
27trnon18JunebutisstillwayaboveitsdailyaveragelevelofRMB0.
52trnlastyear.
Thesefiguresdonotincludemarginlendingthroughshadowbanks.
Eventhegovernment'sinterventionsthemselvesbearsignificantrisks.
Thebailoutmeasuresfunctionedattheexpenseofmarket-basedrules.
Thishaslargelydampenedinvestors'confidenceinChina'sstockmarketanddrivenaway"smartmoney"institutionalinvestors.
Asaconsequence,markettradingisexpectedtobeincreasinglydominatedbyretailinvestorsandevenmoresusceptibletotheirherdbehaviour.
Therecentsell-offcouldleadbothforeignanddomesticinvestorstorebalancetheirportfolioandreducetheirpositionsinChina'sstockmarket.
Additionally,ifthemarketcrashleadstolarge-scalecapitalflight,China'sgovernmentmightneedtotaptheforeignreservestoguardagainstthefree-fallofitscurrency.
ThatmeansChinacouldneedtounwindpartofitsholdingsofUStreasurybonds,whichcouldhaveanimpactonglobalfinancialmarket.
AdverseimpactofthemarketcrashontheoutlookforChina'seconomicgrowthLookingahead,weexpectthestockmarketcrashtohaveanadverseimpactontherealeconomy.
Thechannelsfromthefinancialmarkettotherealeconomyinclude:i)thediminishedbrokerageservicesaspartoftotalGDP;ii)firms'constrainedfinancingchannelsduetothesuspensionofIPOs;iii)shrinkinghouseholdwealth5;andiv)theimpactofthedeteriorationinconfidenceofforeigncapitalonChina'seconomyandfinancialsystem.
WehavethereforeloweredourgrowthprojectionforFY15to6.
7%andto6.
2%forFY16.
Worseisthatthemarketcrashhasavoidablyaddeduncertaintytotheongoingliberalisationofthecapitalaccount.
Theauthoritiescouldbecomemoreconservativeaftersuchahardhit.
TheflawsinChina'sregulatoryframeworkwhichwereexposedbythemarketcrashmightmakepolicymakersreluctanttoopenthedomesticmarkettoforeigninvestors.
Onthecontrary,theauthoritiesshouldnothalttheopeningofitscapitalaccount.
Byinvitingmoreforeigninvestors,inparticularinstitutionalinvestors,intothedomesticmarket,theauthoritiescouldbalancethedominanceofretailinvestorsandmakethemarketlesssusceptibletoherdbehaviour.
Moreover,openingthecapitalaccountcouldalsohelpdomestichouseholdstodiversifytheirinvestments.
Thelackofsuitablealternativeinvestmentchoicesforretailinvestorscontributedtotheoverheatinginbothpropertyandequitymarkets.
China'seconomy:heightenedglobalimportanceincludingfinancialinterconnectednessAnalysisofChina'srelativesignificanceinglobaleconomicandfinancialchannelsarekeytogaugingthesystemicnatureofanyboutoffinancialinstabilityinthecountry,regardlessofthefactthatthismightalsohaveanimpactonitsgrowthdynamics.
China'sparticipationinglobalchainsofgoodsandservices(interconnectednessinrealeconomicflows)hasbeenexpandingataparticularlybriskratesincethemid-1990s.
Themostdirectwaytomeasureacountry'sdegreeofinterconnectednesswithinoverallrealeconomicflows(itsshareinglobal5:AccordingtotheFinancialSurveyofFamilies(2012),around8%ofChinesehouseholdsownfinancialassetsintheformofshares,whichfigurereaches60%forthoseowningbankdeposits.
Invalueterms,only5%oftotalhouseholdwealthisofafinancialnature.
13/24www.
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comGlobalEconomicOutlookThirdquarter2015valuechains-GVC-)istofindthesumoftheimportsofgoodsandservicesrequiredto,inturn,sellgoodsandservicesabroadandthepercentageoftheseexportswhichareintermediateinputsofsalesofgoodsandservicesinthirdeconomies6.
AccordingtotheindicatorconstructedbytheOECD7,Chinaistheeconomywhichincreaseditsdegreeofinterconnectednessthemostbetween1995and20098.
Since2014,Chinahasbeentheworld'sleadingeconomyintermsofGDP,overtakingtheUS,withcomparablepositionsingoodstradeflows.
Inthemid-1990sChinarepresentedlessthan6%ofGDPandcloseto3-5%oftotalexportsandimportsofgoods;in2014,itaccountedfor16%ofoutputandexportsand12%ofimports.
Thenatureofitstradestructuremeansthat,besidesthis,itsshareinglobalvaluechainsisoneofthehighestamongcomparablecountriesintermsofsizeofeconomyandopennesstotrade.
Figure3.
2Gradeofconnectionthroughtradeofgoodsandservices,1995=100Figure3.
3China:shareinWorldGDPandglobaltradeofgoods,%oftotalShareofimportedinputsintheoverallexportsofacountryandofitsexportedgoodsandservicesusedasimportedinputstoproduceothercountries'exportsSource:OECD(2015),Importcontentofexports(indicator)Source:BBVAResearch,IMFandWTOThefactthatChinaimportsoverUSD500bnayearincommodities(30%ofthebuyingfromabroad)putssomeperspectiveonitsroleasoneofthebiggestsourcesofdemandforthesegoodsworldwide,forwhichreasonanyreductioninitslevelofactivityplacessignificantdownwardpressureonthepricesofsomeofthese,suchasoilorcopper.
6:ForfurtherdetailsonGlobalValueChains,seetheOECDathttp://www.
oecd.
org/sti/global-value-chains-library.
htm7:Detailsat:https://data.
oecd.
org/trade/import-content-of-exports.
htm8:Forthemostrecentperiod,itseemsreasonabletoassumethattheintensivenessofChina'sshareinglobalflowsofgoodsandserviceshasheldupifonebearsinmindthatalittleoveronehalfofitsimportsandtwothirdsofitsexportsarecapitalandintermediategoods.
14/24www.
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4StructureofChineseexportsandimportsbytypeofproduct,%oftotal,2013Figure3.
5China:totalimportsbytradepartner,%oftotal,2013Source:BBVAResearch,UNCTADSource:BBVAResearch,UNCTADTheUS,JapanandemergingAsiaareChina'skeytradingpartners.
TheUSaccountsfor17%oftotalexportsand9%ofimports,whileJapanrepresentsslightlybelow10%ofbothflows.
HongKong,KoreaandotherAsiancountriessuchasIndiaarealsoprominentamongChina'schiefexportdestinations.
Australia,Germany,SaudiArabiaandBrazil,ontheotherhand,aremajorimportmarkets,aboveallduetothecommoditiestheypurchase,butalsoonaccountofthecapitalgoodstheybuy.
Allinall,anddespitethelackofoverlapasregardssomeofitsexportsandimportmainmarkets,China'scentralityinworldtradeisveryhigh,giventhatitdoesbusinesswithpracticallyallofthecountriesintheworld9.
AswaspointedoutbytheIMF10,thisleadsonetosupposethat,intheeventofashiftinChina'sdemandthereismorelikelytobebiastowardsaspreadingofthecorrectionviasuccessiveroundsofdropsindemandfromothercountriesratherthananymoderatingeffectofabsorptionoftheshock,whichcouldonlybethecaseforaselectfewofChina'stradingpartners,essentiallytheoilproducers.
Withrespecttoexchangesofservices,Chinahaslessofatradepresenceintheworldcomparedtogoods,althoughtherecenttrendsregardingthisitemareindicativeofChina'sdevelopmentfromanindustrialandexporteconomytoonemoreorientedtowardsconsumptionandservices,inkeepingwiththeincreaseinthecountry'sincomepercapita.
Somethingover4%oftotalservicesexportsareprovidedbyChina,whichisinturnresponsiblefor7%ofimportsworldwide.
Thesearestilllowlevels,butthegrowthisrapid,aboveallinthecaseofimports.
Bothsharesaredoublewhattheywereonedecadeago,thusfarexhibitingahighlevelofgeographicalconcentration,mainlyintermsoftheflowofexports,whereHongKongaccountsfor40%ofthetotal.
9:See"NetworkEffectsofInternationalShocksandSpillovers",IMFWorkingPaper,July2015https://www.
imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15149.
pdf10:Seepreviousnote.
15/24www.
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comGlobalEconomicOutlookThirdquarter2015Figure3.
6China:shareinglobalservicestrade%oftotalFigure3.
7China:balanceofpayments(USD100mn)Source:BBVAResearch,UNCTADSource:BBVAResearch,SAFEFigure3.
8China:Netinternationalinvestmentposition(USD100mn)Figure3.
9China:outstockFDI,%oftotalSource:BBVAResearch,SAFESource:BBVAResearch,UNCTADAsidefromthepotentialtradeimpact,whichisevidencedbythesizeofChina'seconomyandexportandimportflows,Chinaalsostandsoutforbeingthelargestnetholderoffinancialassetsoftherestoftheworld(netcreditor)asaresultofpersistentlyamassingcurrentaccountsurpluses11.
Aportionofthesesurpluseshasbeenchannelledoutintotherestoftheworldintheformofportfolioinvestments(mainly),whileanotherandmoresignificantparthasbeensetasideforbuildingupreserveswhich,attheendof2014,totalledsomeUSD3.
9trn.
Consequently,China'snetinternationalinvestmentposition(thedifferencebetweenthevalueofitsassetsandliabilitiesagainsttherestoftheworld)hasbeensystematicallypositive,ataround20%ofGDPin2014.
Assetpurchasesintherestoftheworld,togetherwiththeappreciationintheirvalue,have11:AfterreachingUSD400bnin2008,thesehavesincestabilisedataroundUSD200bn,or2%ofChina'sGDP.
16/24www.
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comGlobalEconomicOutlookThirdquarter2015liftedChina'sinvestmentpositionintherestoftheworldtoUSD6.
4trn,whichmorethanoutweighstheincreaseinliabilitiesintheformofexternaldebtandwhich,accordingtoSAFE(StateAdministrationofForeignExchange),measuredapproximatelyUSD1.
6trnatthecloseof1Q15(barely16%ofGDPand35%ofthecountry'stotalliabilitieswiththeworldoutsideit).
Thisleadsustodrawatwofolddistinctionwhentryingtogaugethefinancialinterconnectionandpotentialcontagionchannelsintheeventofacrisisofthisnature.
Thefirstlieswithapotentialsaleofassetsabroadand/orascalingdownofacquisitionsbyChinaforthesakeofpreservingfinancialstabilityathomeandcompensatingfortherecentoutflowofcapitalinthewakeofdoubtsovertherobustnessoftheeconomiccycle.
ThesecondfocussesonthestructureofChineseexternalborrowingtodetermineitsfinancialinterconnectednesswiththeglobalnodesofinfluence.
Thelion'sshareofChina'screditpositionisintheformofreserveassets,whichrepresentover50%ofthecountry'soverallassetsinitsexternalrelations.
AconsiderablepartofthesereserveassetsisinvestedinUSgovernmentdebt;infact,20%oftotalUSsovereigndebtinforeignhandsisownedbytheChinese.
Since2013andin2015todate,buyingfromChinahasmanagedtooffsetnetsalesofUSdebtbyallotherforeigninvestors.
ThereforeanyslowdowninthepaceofbuyingfromChinaornetsellingprocesscouldpromptaspikeinUSyieldswhichwouldimplytougherfinancingconditionsworldwide.
Intermsofforeigndirectinvestmentdecisions,China'spositionseemslessawkwardasregardstheglobalsituation(China'sstockofFDIabroadrepresentsscarcely2.
3%ofthetotalworldwideandismainlyconcentratedinAsia),eventhoughadeteriorationinthedomesticeconomymighttranslateintolessofanappetitetoinvest,inspiteofthefactthattheChineseauthoritieshavecommittedtobuttressingtheinternationalisationprocessbybuyingbusinessinterestsinregionswithalowpresenceuptonow(suchisthecaseoftheEuropeanUnion).
TurningtotheshareofglobalfinancialflowsasmeasuredonthebasisoftotalexternalliabilitiesanddrawingonBISstatistics12,Chinahardlyevenaccountsfor3%ofworldfinancialliabilities.
Furthermore,intermediationforhalfofChina'sexternaldebtishandledthroughthefinancialsectorandrepresents7%ofthebankingsector'sliabilitiesglobally,whichisstillalowpercentageifcomparedwithChina'srelativeimportanceineconomicactivityandtrade.
ThebankingsectorsintheUK,theUSandJapanare,inthatorder,theChinesefinancialsector'stopexternalcreditorsbut,inallthesecases,withtheexceptionoftheUK,theexposurewhichthisrepresentswithrespecttobanklendinggrantedexternallyismodest(Figures3.
10and3.
11).
12:Seehttps://www.
bis.
org/statistics/r_qa1509_hanx9e_u.
pdf17/24www.
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10ClaimsonChina(%oftotalclaims)Figure3.
11ClaimsonChina(%oftotalclaimsheldbyeachcountry)Source:BBVAResearch&BISCBSTable9ESource:BBVAResearch&BISCBSTable9EEvenso,aswiththecaseofglobalflowsofgoodsandservices13,theexposuretoafinancialshockemanatingfromChinadoesnotmerelydependonthescaleoftheChineseeconomy'sfinancialliabilities,orwhotheholdersoftheseliabilitiesare,butalsoonthedegreeofcreditors'interconnectedness,theircentralitywithintheworldfinancialsystem.
Calculationofmeasuresofinterconnectedness,whicharebeingdevelopedbyBBVAResearch,isbasedonthenumberoffinanciallinksaneconomyhaswiththeglobalsystemasawhole,bothinbound(thecountry'sliabilities)andoutbound(assets)andtheseareweightedbytherelativesizeofeachexposure.
Thismeasurelocatesthedegreeofcentralityofeachcountry(node)withinthewholebutdoesnotmakeitpossibletoestablishtheproximityofeachofthesenodesinrelationtothecentreofthesystem.
Toaddinthisaspectweweightthesignificanceofeachlinkaccordingtoitsrelationshipwiththoseclusterswhichhavethehighestdegreeofinterconnectednesswiththerest.
Thesynthesisofthetwometricsmentionedenablesthefusionoftheconnectednesscriterionwiththedegreeofoverallintegrationwithintheglobalfinancialsystemandgivesusanideaofthecapacityaneconomy(node)hasforspreadingcontagiontothesystemasawhole.
TheresultsforChina(Figure3.
12)makesitclearthatonlyiftheshockaffectsthebankingsectorwillthefinancialchannelbeabletotakeonglobalproportions:theinterconnectednessoftheChinesebankingsectorwiththeworldfinancialsystemcomfortablyoutstripsthemedianvalueforEMsandisevenaheadofthemedianforDMs,althoughitisaveryconsiderabledistanceshortofcountriessuchastheUSoreventhegroupofthemosthighlyfinanciallyinterconnectedcountries.
13:SeeIMFreferenceinnote6.
18/24www.
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12Interconnectivityandexposureoffinancialsystemsasof4Q14Source:BBVAResearch,BISConsolidatedBankingStatisticsTable9EPotentialimpactofaneconomicshockinChinaFromanalysingthechannelsforcontagionmentionedaboveitmaybededucedthatthegreatestrisktotheglobalsituationofdeteriorationinChina'seconomicsituationisfromacontractioninactivitywhichaffectstherestoftheworldviatradingandinvestmentties,whereasthereislessvulnerabilitytopurelyfinancialcontagion.
Thiscanalsoentailanincreaseinglobalriskaversion,whichwouldbemoreintenseintheEMs,withanincreaseinsovereignbondspreadsandadepreciationoftheircurrenciesgivenapossibleoutflowofforeigncapital.
ThosecountrieswithgreatertradeexposuretoChina,andthoserelyingmoreheavilyonthecommoditycycleand/ormoredependentonsizeabledisequilibriumintermsoftheirexternalposition,couldpossiblyexperienceworserelativeresponses,botheconomicallyandfinancially.
Therecenttrendsinthecurrencymarketsupportthispattern(Figure3.
13).
AmarkedcorrectioninthepaceofChina'seconomicgrowth,togetherwithanupturnintheperceivedriskinthebulkoftheEMstolevelsonaparwiththoseobservedin2008-09,couldtranslateintoawidespreadcontractionineconomicactivityacrosstheworld,butwithamajordifferenceamongthevariouseconomies.
IntheUSthedeteriorationinfinancialconditionswouldbemitigatedbytheviewofthedollarasasafe-havenasset,whereasamongtheEMs,andespeciallyinthosethataremorefinanciallyvulnerableowingtotheirrelianceonexternalcapitalflows,theimpactwouldbegreater,evenpossiblyworsethantheinitialshockfromChina14.
14:CalculationofimpactsbasedontheBBVAResearchGVARmodel.
19/24www.
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comGlobalEconomicOutlookThirdquarter2015Figure3.
13ExposuretoChinaandforeignfundingneeds*Figure3.
14ImpactonGDPduetoanactivityandriskpremiashocktriggeredbyChina,%*Sizeofbubble:magnitudeofcurrencydepreciationagainstUSDsinceMay15Source:BBVAResearch,UNCTAD,IMFSource:BBVAResearch23/24www.
bbvaresearch.
comGlobalEconomicOutlookThirdquarter2015DISCLAIMERThisdocumenthasbeenpreparedbyBBVAResearchDepartment,itisprovidedforinformationpurposesonlyandexpressesdata,opinionsorestimationsregardingthedateofissueofthereport,preparedbyBBVAorobtainedfromorbasedonsourcesweconsidertobereliable,andhavenotbeenindependentlyverifiedbyBBVA.
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