21.ipodnano6

EasterTerm[2015]UKSC32Onappealfrom:[2014]EWCACiv1277JUDGMENTJamesRhodes(Appellant)vOPO(byhislitigationfriendBHM)andanother(Respondents)beforeLordNeuberger,PresidentLadyHale,DeputyPresidentLordClarkeLordWilsonLordToulsonJUDGMENTGIVENON20May2015Heardon19and20January2015AppellantRespondent(OPO)HughTomlinsonQCMatthewNicklinQCSaraMansooriAdamSpekerEdwardCraven(InstructedbyBindmansLLP)(InstructedbyAslanCharlesKousettaLLP)Respondent(CanongateBooksLtd)AntonyWhiteQCJacobDean(InstructedbySimonsMuirhead&BurtonSolicitors)Interveners(EnglishPEN,Article19andIndexonCensorship-WrittenSubmissionsOnly)AdriennePageQCCanYeginsu(InstructedbyOlswangLLP)Page2LADYHALEANDLORDTOULSON:(withwhomLordClarkeandLordWilsonagree)1.
Bytheseproceedings,amotherseekstopreventafatherfrompublishingabookabouthislifecontainingcertainpassageswhichsheconsidersriskcausingpsychologicalharmtotheirsonwhoisnowaged12.
MotherandsonnowliveintheUnitedStatesofAmericaandsothefamilycourtinEnglandandWaleshasnojurisdictiontograntordersprotectingthechild'swelfare.
Instead,theseproceedingshavebeenbroughtinhisname,originallybyhismotherandnowbyhisgodfatherashislitigationfriend,allegingthatpublicationwouldconstituteatortagainsthim.
ThetortinquestionisthatrecognisedinthecaseofWilkinsonvDownton[1897]2QB57andgenerallyknownasintentionallycausingphysicalorpsychologicalharm.
What,then,istheproperscopeofthetortinthemodernlawInparticular,caniteverbeusedtopreventapersonfrompublishingtrueinformationabouthimself2.
Astheobjectoftheproceedingshasbeentoprotectthechildfromharm,allthepartieshaveuntilnowbeenanonymous,ashasthecountrywherethechildnowlives.
Thiscourthasdecidedthatthetortdoesnothavethescopecontendedforonthechild'sbehalfandhencethatthebookmaybepublishedincludingthespecificpassagestowhichobjectionistaken.
Thismeansthatthebookwillinevitablybepublishedintheverynearfuture.
Inthosecircumstancestherecanbenojustificationforkeepingsecrettheinformationcontainedinthebook.
Thisincludes,obviously,theauthor'snameandalsothecountrywheremotherandsonarenowliving.
Thebook,however,usespseudonymsforboththemotherandthechildandsothisjudgmentwillcontinuetodoso.
Butthiscourtisnowabletodescribethebookanditscontentsmorefullythanthelowercourtswereabletodo.
Inthisway,thereasonswhyboththemotherandthefatherhavebeenmotivatedtoactastheyhaveshouldbecomemuchclearerthanperhapstheyhavebeenhitherto.
Thebook3.
ThefatherisJamesRhodes,theconcertpianist,authorandtelevisionfilmmaker.
ThebookisentitledInstrumental.
Theauthorbelievesthat"musichas,quiteliterallysavedmylifeand,Ibelieve,thelivesofcountlessothers.
Ithasprovidedcompanywherethereisnone,understandingwherethereisconfusion,comfortwherethereisdistress,andsheer,unpollutedenergywherethereisahollowshellofbrokennessandfatigue".
Hewantstocommunicatesomeofwhatmusiccando,byprovidingasoundtracktothestoryofhislife.
"Andwoventhroughoutisgoingtobemylifestory.
Becauseit'sastorythatprovidesproofthatmusicistheanswertotheunanswerable.
ThebasisformyconvictionaboutthatisthatIwouldPage3notexist,letaloneexistproductively,solidly–and,onoccasion,happily–withoutmusic.
"Sothebookjuxtaposesdescriptionsofparticularpiecesofmusic,whyhehaschosenthem,whattheymeantohim,andthecomposerswhowrotethem,withepisodesofautobiography.
Hewantsthereadertolistentothe20musictrackswhilereadingthechapterstowhichtheyrelate.
4.
Thusfar,therewouldbenothingforanyonetoworryabout.
Buttheauthor'slifehasbeenashockingone.
Andthisisbecause,asheexplainsinthefirstofthepassagestowhichexceptionistaken,"Iwasused,fucked,broken,toyedwithandviolatedfromtheageofsix.
Overandoverforyearsandyears".
Inthesecondofthosepassages,heexplainshowhewasgroomedandabusedbyMrLee,theboxingcoachathisfirstprepschool,andhowwrongitistocallwhathappenedtohim"abuse":"Abuse.
Whataword.
Rapeisbetter.
Abuseiswhenyoutellatrafficwardentofuckoff.
Itisn'tabusewhena40yearoldmanforceshiscockinsideasix-year-oldboy'sass.
Thatdoesn'tevencomeclosetoabuse.
Thatisaggressiverape.
Itleadstomultiplesurgeries,scars(insideandout),tics,OCD,depression,suicidalideation,vigorousself-harm,alcoholism,drugaddiction,themostfucked-upofsexualhang-ups,genderconfusion('youlooklikeagirl,areyousureyou'renotalittlegirl'),sexualityconfusion,paranoia,mistrust,compulsivelying,eatingdisorders,PTSD,DID(theshiniernameformultiplepersonalitydisorder)andsoonandonandon.
Iwent,literallyovernight,fromadancing,spinning,gigglinglyalivekidwhowasenjoyingthesafetyandadventureofanewschool,toawalled-off,cementshoed,lights-outautomaton.
Itwasimmediateandshocking,likehappilywalkingdownasunnypathandsuddenlyhavingatrapdooropenanddumpyouintoafreezingcoldlake.
YouwanttoknowhowtoripthechildoutofachildFuckhim.
Fuckhimrepeatedly.
Hithim.
Holdhimdownandshovethingsinsidehim.
Tellhimthingsabouthimselfthatcanonlybetrueintheyoungestofmindsbeforelogicandreasonarefullyformedandtheywilltakeholdofhimandbecomeanintegral,unquestionedpartofhisbeing.
"5.
Hedescribeshowhelearnttodissociatehimselffromwhatwashappening,toblockitoutofhismemory,howwhenhemovedtootherschoolshehadlearnttoPage4offersexualfavourstoolderboysandteachersinreturnforsweetsandothertreats.
Hegivesasearingaccountofthephysicalharmshesufferedasaresultoftheyearsofrapeandofthepsychologicaleffects,whichmadeithardforhimtoformrelationshipsandlefthimwithanenduringsenseofshameandself-loathing.
6.
Herecountstheupsanddownsofhisadultlife:ayearatEdinburghUniversityfilledwithdrugsandalcohol,leadingtohisfirstadmissiontoapsychiatrichospital;ayearworkingandsoberingupinParis;threeyearsstudyingpsychologyatUniversityCollegeLondon,leadingtoahighlysuccessfulcareerasasalesmaninfinancialpublishing;meetingandmarryingthemother,whomhecallsJane,anAmericannovelistthenlivinginLondon;makinga"perfecthome"withher.
Heiskindabouthiswife–"Thepoorthingdidn'tstandachance"–andharduponhimself:"I'vehonestlynoideawhatIwasthinking,beyondthatrathersadhopethatifIcontinuedtodowhatnormalpeopledidthenIwouldsomehowbecomenormal.
Buttheideathatamanlikemecouldnotonlygetmarried,butmaintain,nurture,committoamarriagewasfuckingridiculous.
Mywholeconceptoflovewasskewed.
"7.
Thentheirchild,whomhecallsJack,wasborn:"Mysonwasandisamiracle.
ThereisnothingIwillexperienceinmylifethatwillevermatchtheincandescentatomicbomboflovewhichexplodedinmewhenhewasborn.
"Hewantedtobeaperfectfather,but"Idon'tthinkthatIwilleverbeabletomakemypeacewiththefactthattheripplesofmypastbecametidalwaveswhenhewasborn".
Hispasthadinstalled"anunshakeablebeliefthatallchildrensufferthroughchildhoodinthemostabominablewaysandthatnothingandno-onecanprotectthemfromit".
Eventually,helookedforprofessionalhelpfromacharityspecialisinginhelpingvictimsofchildsexualabuseandwastoldthathemusttellhiswifeabouttheabuse.
Sohedid.
Theirchildwasthenfouryearsold.
"Itis,apparently,verycommonfortheworldtospincompletelyoffitsaxiswhenyourchildapproachestheageyouwerewhentheabusebegan".
8.
Insteadofreturningtodrinkanddrugsheresortedtoself-harm:"That'sthethingaboutcutting–notonlydoyougethigh,butyoucanexpressyourdisgustatyourselfandtheworld,controlthepainyourself,enjoytheritual,theendorphins,theseedy,grittyself-violenceprivatelyandhurtno-oneotherthanyourself".
Buthiswifefoundoutandhewaspersuadedtogointohospitalagain.
Amongthepassageswhichhavenotbeenchallengedisagraphicaccountoftheeffectofthepsychotropicdrugswhichhewasforcedtotakeinhospital.
Hetriedtocommitsuicide,escapedfromthehospital,plannedasecondattemptatsuicidebutranghiswifeforalastwordwithhisson,andwaspersuadedtomeether.
Sohewasreturnedtohospital.
Heworkedhardatbeingamodelpatientsothathecouldbeletout.
ButitwasnotPage5acure.
"Evenoutofhospital,offmeds,physicallypresentformyfamily,Iwasaghost.
"Afriendofferedhimalife-line,treatmentinahospitalintheUnitedStates,wherehespenttwomonths.
"BytheendofitIhad,miraculously,stoppedhatingmyselfquitesomuch.
I'dputonweight,clearedawayalotofthewreckageofthepast,repairedsomerelationshipsandfoundawaytolivewithmyselfthat,mostdays,leftmerelativelycalmandcomposed.
"Thereisamovingpassageaboutrebuildinghisrelationshipwithhisson:"That'stheweirdthingaboutkids–theyhaveacapacityforforgivenessthatmostadultscanonlyaspireto.
Hehasalwayslovedme–itwasinbuiltandimmutable–andIhim.
Afterafewweeksofplaying,singing,hangingout,wefeltabsolutelyconnectedandbacktonormal.
"9.
Butthemarriagecouldnotberepaired.
Motherandfatheragreedtoatrialseparationandhemovedout.
Things"startedtogetmoreandmorewobbly",nothelpedbyhisgoingtothepoliceforthefirsttimeinthehopeofexorcisingsomeofthepasthorrors,wherehefoundtheprocess"brutal,shaming,vile".
Hebeganself-harmingoncemore.
Eventually,themotherdecidedtomovebacktotheUnitedStates.
Onceagain,heisgenerous:"Shehad,understandablyandjustifiably,hadenough.
Therehadbeensomuchdestruction,somuchuncertaintyandpain,andclearlyJanehaddecidedthatJack'sneedshadtocomefirst.
Shewasamotherfirstandforemostandnotsomepatronsaintoflostcauses.
"Theygotintoaroutine.
Hewouldgoovertheretwiceayear,shewouldbringhimoverheretwiceayear,theywouldSkypetwiceaweek.
10.
Interwovenwiththispainfulstoryisthestoryofhisrelationshipwithmusic.
Hediscoveredmusic,specifically,Bach'sChaconneforsoloviolininDminor,transcribedforpianobyBusoni,whilestillatthepreparatoryschoolwherehewasbeingsobrutallyabused:"…thatpiecebecamemysafeplace.
AnytimeIfeltanxious(anytimeIwasawake)itwasgoingroundinmyhead.
Itsrhythmswerebeingtappedout,itsvoicesplayedagainandagain,altered,explored,experimentedwith.
Idoveinsideitasifitweresomekindofmusicalmazeandwanderedaroundhappilylost.
Itsetmeupforlife;withoutitIwouldhavediedyearsago,I'venodoubt.
Butwithit,andwithalltheothermusicthatitledmetodiscover,itactedlikeaforcefieldthatonlythemosttoxicandbrutalpaincouldpenetrate.
"11.
Athisnextpreparatoryschoolhelargelytaughthimselftoreadmusicandplaythepiano.
AtHarrow,hehadhisfirstproperteacher,whowas"awesome".
Hediscoveredthat"literallytheonlythingintheuniverseIrealisedIwantedwastotraveltheworld,alone,playingthepianoinconcerthalls".
Thenhegaveitupduringthetenyearsofuniversity,buildingacareerandgettingmarried.
Butafterhissonwasbornandthedemonsreturned,"Ilookedfordistractions.
IlookedforawayoutPage6thatdidn'tinvolvehomicideorsuicide".
Hefounditinmusic.
Hesetaboutbuildingabusinesspartnershipwiththeagentof"thegreatestpianistintheworld",butwaspersuadedinsteadtotrainasapianisthimself.
Heworkedhard.
Andwhenhehadbeguntoresorttoself-harm,hedecidedtoorganisehisfirstpublicconcert.
HerentedahallontheSouthBank,thehallwasfilled,andtheconcertwentwell:"IrealisethatallthosefantasiesaboutgivingconcertsthatIhadasakid,thatkeptmealiveandsafeinmyhead,wereaccurate.
Itreallyisthatpowerful.
AndIknewIwantedtodoitforever.
Nomatterwhat".
12.
Thenthesuicidalideasandattemptsandhospitalisationtookover.
ButafriendvisitinghiminhospitalbroughthimaniPodnanoloadedwithmusicinsideagiantbottleofshampoo(toiletriesbeingtheonlygiftsallowed).
Onceagainmusicwashissalvation.
Itpersuadedhimtodowhatheneededtodotogetout.
Afterseparatingfromhiswife,hestartedtogetmoreinvolvedinthepianoagain.
Andinacaféhemetthemanwhowastobecomehismanager.
TogethertheyarrangedforhimtorecordhisfirstCD,RazorBlades,LittlePillsandBigPianos.
Hefoundasponsortoenablehimtoconcentrateonhismusic.
HedidadocumentaryaboutChopinfortheBBC.
HismanagerarrangedconcertsattheRoundhouseandtheQueenElizabethHall.
Togethertheydevisedanewsortofconcert,inwhichthepianisttalkedaboutthemusic,thecomposerandwhatitmeanttohim,inaninformalwayquiteunliketheusualclassicalmusicconcert.
Itwasasuccess.
Throughhismanagerhemetthewomanwhowastobecomehissecondwife.
13.
Theconcertsledtosomepressinterest,includinganinterviewwiththeSundayTimesinwhichhementionedtheabusewhichhadhappenedatschool.
Thispromptedtheheadofthejuniorschoolinhisfirstschool,whohadknownthatsomethingwaswrongbutnotwhatitwas,togetintouchandtoprovideapolicestatement.
MrLeewasfound,stillcoachingsmallboysboxing,andprosecuted.
Buthediedbeforehecouldstandtrial:"MaybeonedayIwillforgiveMrLee.
That'smuchlikeliertohappenifIfindawaytoforgivemyself.
Butthetruth,formeatanyrate,isthatthesexualabuseofchildrenrarely,ifever,endsinforgiveness.
Itleadsonlytoself-blame,visceral,self-directedrageandshame…Butshiningalightontopicslikethisishugelyimportant.
Andgettinghundredsofsupportiveandgratefulmessagesfrompeoplewhohadalsogonethroughsimilarexperienceswasanindicatortomethatitneedstobetalkedaboutevenmore.
"14.
Fromthenhiscareerwentfromstrengthtostrength.
Therehavebeenmanyconcerts,allovertheworld.
Therehavebeenfourmorealbums.
TherewasaPage7televisionseriesforSkyArts,PianoMan.
Therewaseventalk,thoughitcametonothing,ofhisappearingintheRoyalVarietyShow.
Heandhismanagerhadfoundanewanddifferentwayofpresentingclassicalmusictotheworldanditworked.
15.
Therehavebeenbadtimessinceaswellasgoodtimes–"SadlyIamonlyevertwoweeksawayfromalockedward"–buttheoverallmessageisoneofhope:"Ilostmychildhoodbutgainedachild.
Ilostamarriagebutgainedasoulmate.
Ilostmywaybutgainedacareerandafourthorfifthchanceatalifewhichissecondtonone.
"Theseproceedings16.
Duringtheirdivorce,themotherandfatheragreedtoincludethefollowingrecital,recitalK,inaresidenceandcontactordermadeinLondonon15June2009:"Anduponthepartiesagreeingtousetheirbestendeavourstoprotectthechildfromanyinformationconcerningthepastprevioushistoryofeitherparentwhichwouldhaveadetrimentaleffectuponthechild'swell-being"17.
AfirstdraftofthebookwassenttothepublishersinDecember2013.
InFebruary2014itwasleakedtothemotherandsomechangesweremadeasaresult,includingtheuseofpseudonymsformotherandchild.
Themotherdidnotconsiderthatthosechangeshadgonefarenough.
InJune2014,shelaunchedtheseproceedingsonbehalfofthechild,claimingagainstthefatherandthepublishersaninjunctionprohibitingpublicationwithoutthedeletionofalargenumberofpassages.
Thecausesofactionallegedweremisuseofprivateinformation,negligenceandtheintentionalinflictionofharm.
Ananonymityorderwasmadeatthesametime,prohibitingthepublicationofanyinformationwhichmightleadtotheidentificationofthechildasapartytotheproceedingsorthesubjectoftheinformationtowhichtheproceedingsrelated.
Allpartieshavesincefiledevidencebuttherehavebeennofindingsonthefactualmattersindispute.
18.
ThemotherhasfiledareportfromDrChristineTizzard,aconsultantchildpsychologistwhointerviewedthechildinJune2014.
Heropinionwasthathe"islikelytosuffersevereemotionaldistressandpsychologicalharmintheeventthatheisexposedtothematerialinthepublication".
ThechildhasbeendiagnosedwithAsperger'ssyndrome,attentiondeficithyperactivitydisorder,dyspraxiaanddysgraphia.
HequalifiesforanIndividualisedEducationalProgramintheUnitedStatesandreceivesspecialistsupportandcounselling.
Inherview,theinformationPage8inthebookwouldbeinappropriateforany11yearoldchildtoreadandhaveaccessto,butitwouldbeevenmoredevastatingforthischild,becauseofhisdifficultiesinprocessinginformation:hispsychologicalschemasarenotmalleable,hereceivesinformationinaliteralwayandisunabletoconceptualiseitinanalternativeway,andhewouldviewhimselfasresponsibleforsomeofhisfather'sdistressandanextensionofhisfather.
Heisalreadypronetoself-harmandemotionaloutburstsandthesewouldprobablyincrease.
19.
Bothpartiesacceptthatitismostunlikelythatthechildwillcomeintopossessionofthebookitself.
ThepublishersplantopublishitinhardcopyintheUKandmuchoftherestoftheEnglish-speakingworld,andtoretailitinshopsandon-line,buttherearenoplansatpresenttopublishitintheUSA.
Itwillalsobeavailableforpurchaseasane-book.
20.
Thefatheracceptsthatknowingwhathappenedtohimwouldupsetandembarrassthechild,butnotthatitwillbeharmfulifdealtwithintherightwayandattherighttime.
Thebarebonesofhisstoryhavealreadyappearedinarticlesandinterviewswhichareavailableon-line.
Themotherisconcernedthatthechildwhoisproudofhisfather,has"googled"himinthepast.
Ifhedidsoinfuturehewouldbelikelytocomeacrossreviewsandreferencestothebook.
21.
TheapplicationforaninteriminjunctioncamebeforeBeanJinprivateinJuly2014.
Hisjudgmenthasnotbeenpublished.
Hedismissedtheapplicationandstrucktheproceedingsoutonthebasisthatthechildhadnocauseofactionintortagainstthefatherorthepublishers.
Hesaidthattherewasnoprecedentforanorderpreventingapersonfrompublishingtheirlifestoryforfearofitscausingpsychiatricharmtoavulnerableperson,norshouldtherebe.
HeheldthatacauseofactionunderWilkinsonvDowntondidnotextendbeyondfalseorthreateningwords.
22.
Thechild'sappealwasheardinAugust2014andjudgmentgiveninOctober:[2014]EWCACiv1277.
TheCourtofAppealheldthattherewasnoclaiminmisuseofprivateinformationorinnegligence,butthattheclaimforintentionallycausingharmshouldgofortrial.
Thefactualissueswouldbethefather'sintentioninpublishingthebook,thelevelofharmwhichthechildwaslikelytosufferandthecauseofsuchharm.
23.
TheleadingjudgmentwasgivenbyArdenLJ.
SheheldthattheactionunderWilkinsonvDowntonwasnotlimitedtofalseorintimidatorystatements,butsheconsideredotherwaysinwhichthetortmightbekeptwithinacceptablelimits.
Shesaidthatitwas"inconceivablethatthelawwouldrenderallintentionalstatementswhichcausepsychiatricharmactionableindamages.
Insomecasesapersonmayhavetotellbadnewswhichisliabletocausepsychiatricharm.
ButtheremaybePage9manywaysinwhichthecourtcoulddrawthelinebetweenacceptableintentionalstatementsoractswhichcausepsychiatricharm,andthosewhichareactionableunderthishead"(para68).
Sheadded(para69)thatithadtobeshownthattheactwasunjustified"inthesensethatthedefendantwasnotentitledtodoitvis-à-vistheparticularclaimant"(originalemphasis).
Thusshemettheobjectionthatmanydisturbingpublicationsmayforeseeablycausepsychiatricharmtosomeoneofsufficientvulnerabilitybytreatingthecauseofactionasconfinedtothepersonatwhomtheactwasdirected,andthereforethequestionofjustificationwassimilarlyconfined.
ArdenLJhadnotedattheoutsetofherjudgmentthatthebookwasdedicatedtothechild,andthefactthatthefatherhad"acceptedaresponsibilitytousehisbestendeavourstoensurethatOPOisprotectedfromharmfulinformation"wassufficientinherjudgment"tomeanthatthereisnojustificationforhiswords,iftheyarelikelytoproducepsychiatricharm".
24.
Astothementalelementofthetort,ArdenLJheldthatthenecessaryintenttocauseharmcouldbeimputedtothefather,sincehewasawareofthepsychiatricevidenceabouttheharmwhichhissonwouldbelikelysufferifhereadsomeofthecontentsofthebook.
Shesaid,correctly,thattherewasaconsistentlineofauthorityfromWilkinsonvDowntonthatevenifapersondidnotintendtocausesuchharm,anintenttodosocouldbeimputedtohimifthatwasthelikelyconsequence.
25.
InashortconcurringjudgmentJacksonLJsaidthatforastatementtogiverisetoliabilityunderWilkinsonvDowntonitneednotbefalse.
Rather,itmustmeettheessentialcharacteristicsthat"thestatementisunjustifiedandthatthedefendantintendstocauseorisrecklessaboutcausingphysicalorpsychiatricinjurytotheclaimant".
JacksonLJconsideredthatthefollowingfactsweresufficienttoestablishthattheclaimanthadagoodprospectofsuccessforthepurposesofgrantinganinterlocutoryinjunction:i)Thebookcontainedgraphicdescriptionsoftheabusewhichtheappellanthadsufferedandhisincidentsofself-harm.
ii)Thosepassageswerelikelytobequotedbyreviewersornewspaperswhoserialisedthebook.
iii)Ontheuncontradictedexpertevidencethosepassageswerelikelytocausepsychologicalharmtotheclaimant.
iv)Thebookwasdedicatedtotheclaimantandpartlyaddressedtohim.
Page10v)TheappellantknewoftherisksposedtotheclaimantbecauseofhisvulnerabilitiesandhadforthatreasonsubscribedtoRecitalK.
McFarlaneLJagreedwithbothjudgments.
Theformoforderwasthesubjectofasupplementaljudgmentafterafurtherhearinginprivate.
26.
Thecourtgrantedaninteriminjunction,restrainingthedefendantsfrommaking"generallyavailabletothepublicbyanymeansalloranypartoftheinformationreferredtoinConfidentialSchedule2tothisOrder('theinformation')whetherbypublishingtheparticularextractsidentifiedinConfidentialSchedule3orbypublishinganysubstantiallysimilarwordstolikeeffect".
ConfidentialSchedule2readsthus:"InformationreferredtointheOrder(1)Theinformationorpurportedinformationthattherespondentsintendedtopublishinabookentitled'Instrumental'('theBook')(extractsofwhichareparticularisedinConfidentialSchedule3)whichgivegraphicaccountsoftheFirstdefendant'saccountofsexualabusehesufferedasachild;hissuicidalthoughtsandattempts;hishistoryofandtreatmentformentalillnessandincidentsofself-harming;histhoughtsaboutkillingtheappellant;hisfearsthattheappellantwouldalsobeavictimofsexualabuseandlinkingthisaccounttotheappellant.
(2)Anyinformationliabletoorwhichmightleadtotheidentificationoftheappellant(whetherdirectlyorindirectly)asthesubjectoftheseproceedingsorthematerialreferredtoabove.
"27.
InthejudgmentabouttheformoforderArdenLJemphasisedtheuseofword"graphic"intheorder,whichsheexplainedasfollows:"Wetaketheword"graphic"tomeanvividlydescriptive.
Injudgingwhatisvividlydescriptive,wehaveborneinmindthatthepersontobeprotectedisavulnerablechild.
Inthesecircumstances,weconsiderthatwhatshouldbeinjunctedisthatwhichweconsidertobeseriouslyliabletobeingunderstoodbyachildasvividlydescriptivesoastobedisturbing.
"Page1128.
ConfidentialSchedule3containssome40extractsfromthebook.
SomefallwithinthegeneraldescriptioninConfidentialSchedule2asexplainedbyArdenLJandsomedonot.
Bynomeansallthepassagesinthebookwhichmightbethoughttofallwithinthatgeneraldescriptionareincluded.
Nowhereinthelistedextractsorinthecurrentversionofthebookistherementionofthoughtsaboutkillingthechild.
Someofthequotationsinparas3to15aboveareamongthe40extractslisted;manyarenot.
29.
TheprohibitiondoesnotrelatetoinformationcontainedinthebookapartfromtheConfidentialSchedulesorcontainedinthepublicjudgmentofthecourt.
Nordoesitapplytoanymaterialwhichhadbeenplacedinthepublicdomainbefore1September2014andeitherappearedontheinternetinthefather'snameinaformandonasiteaccessibleat1September2014orwasattributedtothefatherandcontainedinanationaltelevisionprogrammetransmittedinEnglandwithintheprevious12months.
30.
ThetrialoftheactionwaslistedforApril2015.
Thefatherandthepublisherscontendthatontheagreedfactsthechildhasnocauseofactionagainstthem.
WilkinsonvDownton31.
MrDowntonsecuredaplaceforhimselfinlegalhistorybyamisconceivedpracticaljoke.
HethoughtthatitwouldbeacauseofharmlessamusementamongtheclienteleoftheAlbionpublichouseinLimehousetotellthelandlord'swife,MrsWilkinson,afalsetalethatherhusbandhadfracturedhislegsinanaccidentwhileonhiswaybackfromaracemeetingandthathehadsentamessagetoaskforherhelptogethimhome.
Itcosther1shillingand10pencetosendhersonandanotherhelperonthisfools'errand,butamatteroffargreaterconcernwastheeffectonherhealth.
Shesufferedsevereshocktohernervoussystem,whichmanifesteditselfinvomitingandweeksofphysicalsuffering.
MrsWilkinsonhadnotshownanyprevioussignofpredispositiontonervousshock.
SheandherhusbandsuedMrDownton,andthemattercametotrialbeforeWrightJandajury.
32.
RecoveryofthetransportcostsincurredinresponsetoMrWilkinson'ssupposedrequestforhelppresentednolegaldifficulty.
Suchcostswererecoverableasdamagesfordeceit.
ThejuryassesseddamagesfortheillnesscausedtoMrsWilkinsonbyhernervousshock(togetherwithherhusband'sclaimfortheresultinglossofherservices)at100,butthelegalbasisformakingsuchanawardwasproblematic.
Page1233.
WrightJrejectedtheargumentthatdamagesfordeceitcouldincludeanawardforMrsWilkinson'ssuffering,becausetheessenceofliabilityfordeceitwasthatamakerofafalserepresentation,intendedtobeactedupon,wasliabletomakegoodanylossnaturallyresultingfromtherepresenteeactingonit,buttheillnesssufferedbyMrsWilkinsonwasnotaconsequenceofheractingonwhatshewastold.
Itwassimplyaconsequenceoftheshockbroughtaboutbythenewsreportedtoher.
34.
WrightJheld,atpp58-59,thatacauseofactioncouldbestatedinlawwhereadefendanthas"wilfullydoneanactcalculatedtocausephysicalharmtotheplaintiff–thatistosay,toinfringeherlegalrighttopersonalsafety,andhasinfacttherebycausedphysicalharmtoher.
"Hecontinued"Thatpropositionwithoutmoreappearstometostateagoodcauseofaction,therebeingnojustificationallegedfortheact.
Thiswilfulinjuriaisinlawmalicious,althoughnomaliciouspurposetocausetheharmwhichwascausednoranymotiveofspiteisimputedtothedefendant.
"35.
Thiscompactstatementoflawcontainedanumberofkeyfeatures.
First,heidentifiedtheplaintiff'sprotectedinterestasher"legalrighttopersonalsafety".
Secondly,heidentifiedthedefendant'sactaswilful.
Thirdly,hedescribedtheactas"calculated"tocausephysicalharmtotheplaintiff.
Fourthly,henotedtheabsenceofanyallegedjustification.
Fifthly,hecharacterisedthe"wilfulinjuria"as"inlawmalicious"despitetheabsenceofanypurpose(iedesire)tocausetheharmwhichwascaused.
Havingstatedthelawinthatway,WrightJthenconsideredwhetheritcoveredMrsWilkinson'sclaim.
Heheldthatitdid.
Hesaid:"Onequestioniswhetherthedefendant'sactwassoplainlycalculatedtoproducesomeeffectofthekindwhichwasproducedthatanintentiontoproduceitoughttobeimputedtothedefendant,regardbeinghadtothefactthattheeffectwasproducedonapersonprovedtobeinanordinarystateofhealthandmind.
Ithinkthatitwas.
Itisdifficulttoimaginethatsuchastatement,madesuddenlyandwithapparentseriousness,couldfailtoproducegraveeffectsunderthecircumstancesuponanybutanexceptionallyindifferentperson,andthereforeanintentiontoproducesuchaneffectmustbeimputed…"Page1336.
ThispassageremovesanydoubtthatWrightJwasusingtheword"calculated"inthesenseoflikelytohaveaneffectofthekindwhichwasproduced,andthattheresultwastakeninlawtobeintendedbyaprocessofimputation.
37.
TheworkofmodernscholarsishelpfultounderstandingWrightJ'sjudgmentbyplacingitinitshistoricalcontext.
Thelatterpartofthe19thcenturywasaformativeperiodinthelawoftort,asinotherareasofthecommonlaw.
Therewasamovementtowardsgeneralprinciplesofliabilityforintentionalor"malicious"torts,astherewasalsofornegligence.
(SeeProfessorOliphant'schapter,TheStructureoftheIntentionalTorts,inEmergingIssuesinTortLaw,2007,editedbyProfessorNeyersandothers.
)ThefirsteditionofPollockonTortswaspublishedin1887.
Inithebeganhisdiscussionofprinciplesbystatingitas"ageneralpropositionofEnglishlawthatitisawrongtodowilfulharmtoone'sneighbourwithoutlawfuljustification"(p21).
Heacknowledgedthatthiswasamodernprincipleforwhichtherewasnoexpressauthority,buthereasonedthatasthemodernlawofnegligenceenforcedthedutyoffellow-citizenstoobserveinvaryingcircumstancesanappropriatemeasureofprudencetoavoidcausingharmtooneanother,"muchmoremustthereexist,whetheritbesoexpressedinthebooksornot,thenegativedutyofnotdoingwilfulharm;subject,asallgeneraldutiesmustbesubject,tothenecessaryexceptions"(p22).
InlatereditionshecitedanobiterdictumofBowenLJinSkinner&CovShew&Co[1893]1Ch413,422thatatcommonlawtherewasacauseofaction"wheneveronepersondiddamagetoanotherwilfullyandintentionally,andwithoutjustcauseorexcuse".
WrightJwasfamiliarwithPollockonTortsandhereferredtothe4theditioninWilkinsonvDowntonatp60.
38.
Theword"maliciously"wasmuchusedbothinthelawoftortandincriminallaw.
InthefamouscaseofMogulSteamshipCoLtdvMcGregor,Gow&Co(inwhichtheplaintiffscomplainedaboutbeingkeptoutoftheconferenceofshipownerstradingbetweenChinaandLondon)BowenLJsaidthatthewordhadan"accuratemeaning,wellknowntothelaw"aswellasa"popularandlessprecisesignification".
Asalegaltermitmeant"anintentiontodoanactwhichiswrongful,tothedetrimentofanother":(1889)23QBD598,612.
Hecontinued,atp613:"Now,intentionallytodothatwhichiscalculatedintheordinarycourseofeventstodamage,andwhichdoes,infact,damageanotherinthatotherperson'spropertyortrade,isactionableifdonewithoutjustcauseorexcuse.
Suchintentionalactionwhendonewithoutjustcauseorexcuseiswhatthelawcallsamaliciouswrong(seeBromagevProsser(1825)4B&C247;CapitalandCountiesBankvHenty(1882)7AppCas741,772,perLordBlackburn).
"Page14InBromagevProsserBayleyJdistinguished"maliceinlaw",inferredfromthedefendant'sintentionalinterferencewiththeplaintiff'srights,from"maliceinfact"(p255).
IntheMogulSteamshipcaseBowenLJheldthatthedefendantshadjustcausetoactastheydid,becausetheywerefreetocarryontheirtradefreelytotheirbestadvantage,andtheHouseofLordsagreed[1892]AC25.
39.
Justasabsenceofactualill-willwasnotadefenceifthedefendant'sactwilfullyinterferedwithaninterestoftheplaintiffwhichcarriedarighttolegalprotection,converselytheexistenceofill-willwasheldnottobeenoughtocreateacauseofactionintheabsenceofsucharight.
ThiswastheratiodecidendiinthecelebratedcaseofMayorofBradfordvPickles[1895]AC587,fromwhichitfollowedthatinsofarasBowenLJsuggestedthatanyactofinterferencewithanother'stradewasprimafacieunlawfulhisdictumwastoowide.
ThechiefsourceofwatersuppliedforthecitizensofBradfordwasacollectionofspringsonlandownedbythecorporationatthefootofahillsideontheoutskirtsofthecity.
AbovethatlandwasatractownedbyMrPickles,andthespringswerefedbywaterflowingundergroundfromMrPickles'sland.
MrPicklesembarkedontheworkofsinkingashaftonhislandwhichhadtheeffectofalteringtheflowofwaterandreducingthevolumewhichfedthesprings.
Thecorporationbroughtproceedingsforaninjunctiontorestrainhimfromdoingthework.
Thepleaderallegedthathewasacting"maliciously".
Itwasarguedthathewasnotactingfortheimprovementofhisownland,butthathesimplyintendedtodeprivethecorporationofwaterwhichitwouldotherwisehavereceived,withthemotiveofforcingittobuyhimoutatapricesatisfactorytohimself.
Thecorporationwasgrantedaninteriminjunctionatfirstinstance,buttheinjunctionwassetasidebytheCourtofAppeal(LordHerschell,LC,andLindleyandALSmithLJJ,[1895]1Ch145)andtheCourtofAppeal'sjudgmentwasupheldbytheHouseofLords.
ItwasheldthatMrPickleshadactedthroughoutinaccordancewithhislegalrights.
Thecorporationhadnolegalrighttotheflowofwaterfromhislandand,thatbeingso,hismotiveswereirrelevant.
LordHalsburyLCsaidatp594:"Thisisnotacaseinwhichthestateofmindofthepersondoingtheactcanaffecttherighttodoit.
Ifitwasalawfulact,howeverillthemotivemightbe,hehadarighttodoit.
Ifitwasanunlawfulact,howevergoodhismotivemightbe,hewouldhavenorighttodoit.
MotivesandintentionsinsuchaquestionasisnowbeforeyourLordshipsseemtometobeabsolutelyirrelevant.
"40.
AllthiswouldhavebeenfamiliartoWrightJ.
ShortlybeforehegavejudgmentinWilkinsonvDowntonhehadbeensummonedwithotherjudgestogivehisopiniontotheHouseofLordsinthefamouscaseofAllenvFlood[1898]AC1.
HedeliveredhisjudgmentinWilkinsonvDowntonon8May1897andhisopinioninAllenvFloodon3June1897.
InhisopinioninAllenvFlood,at[1898]AC63,hesaidthatincircumstanceswhere:Page15"therewasnototherwiseanywrongorinjuria,itfollowsthattherecouldnotbemaliceintheordinarylegalsenseofthatterm,ascompendiouslystatingthewilfulinfringementofalegalrightorbreachofalegaldutywithoutmatteroflegaljustificationorexcuse:uponwhichmaybecitedBromagevProsser[andotherauthorities].
Theseandotherauthoritiesshowthatingeneralwherevertheterm'malice'or'maliciously'formspartofastatementofacauseofactionorofacrime,itimportsnotaninferenceofmotivetobefoundbythejury,butaconclusionoflawwhichfollowsonafindingthatthedefendanthasviolatedarightandhasdonesoknowingly,unlessheshowssomeoverridingjustification.
"41.
LordHerschellsaidinhisjudgmentinAllenvFloodatp124:"MorethanoneofthelearnedjudgeswhoweresummonedreferswithapprovaltothedefinitionofmalicebyBayleyJinthecaseofBromagevProsser:'Maliceincommonacceptationofthetermmeansill-willagainstaperson,butinitslegalsenseitmeansawrongfulactdoneintentionallywithoutjustcauseorexcuse.
'Itwillbeobservedthatthisdefinitioneliminatesmotivealtogether.
"42.
ItisinterestingtocompareandcontrastWrightJ'sopinioninAllenvFloodwithhisjudgmentinWilkinsonvDownton.
InhisopinioninAllenvFloodWrightJmadethepoint(astheHouseofLordshadheldinMayorofBradfordvPickles)thatifthedefendant'sconductdidnotinterferewithanyrightoftheplaintiff,maliceinitspopularmeaningwouldnotbeenoughtocreateawrongorinjuria.
ButinWilkinsonvDowntonhetreatedthedefendant'swilfulnessintellingadeliberatefalsehoodasanelementoftheinjuria.
Thetwoapproacheswerenotincompatible,foritisperfectlypossibleforthelawtorecogniseaninterestdeservingsomeformoflegalprotection,buttorequireanappropriatedegreeoffaultforaninterferencewithittoconstitutealegalinjuria;theappropriatefaultelementmayvary,typicallybetweennegligenceandintention(althoughtheyarenottheonlypossibilities);andthemeasureofprotectionprovidedbythelawmayvaryasbetweendifferenttypesofinterest(beitaperson'sproperty,tradeorpersonalsafety).
InWilkinsonvDowntonWrightJidentifiedtheplaintiff'sprotectedinterestasherrighttopersonalsafety.
Theremaybegoodreasonsofsocialpolicyforthelawtotreatapersonwhodeliberatelydoessomethingwhichcausesanothertosufferphysicalorpsychologicalinjuryorillnessbytellingthemafalsestory(WilkinsonvDownton)moreharshlythanonewhocarelesslypassesonfalseinformation.
Page1643.
InthepassagecitedabovefromhisopinioninAllenvFlood,WrightJreferredtocaseswhere"malice…formspartofastatementofacauseofactionorofacrime".
Inrelationtothecriminallaw,ProfessorMarkLunneyhasdrawnattentioninanilluminatingarticle,Practicaljokinganditspenalty:WilkinsonvDowntonincontext(2002)10TortLawReview168,178,tothedecisionoftheCourtofCrownCasesReservedinRvMartin(1881)8QBD54.
Thedefendantcausedpanicinatheatrebybarricadinganexitdoorandextinguishingthegaslighting.
Intheresultingconfusionseveralpeoplewereseriouslyinjured.
Hisconductwasintendedasaprank,butanysanepersonwouldhaverealisedthatitwasdangerous.
Thecourtupheldhisconvictionforunlawfullyandmaliciouslyinflictinggrievousbodilyharm,contrarytosection20oftheOffencesAgainstthePersonAct1861.
LordColeridgeCJsaid(atp58):"Theprisonermustbetakentohaveintendedthenaturalconsequencesofthatwhichhedid.
Heacted'unlawfullyandmaliciously',notthathehadanypersonalmaliceagainsttheparticularindividualsinjured,butinthesenseofdoinganunlawfulactcalculatedtoinjure…"StephenJsaid(alsoatp58)that:"iftheprisonerdidthatwhichhedidasamerepieceoffoolishmischiefunlawfullyandwithoutexcuse,hedidit'wilfully',thatis,'maliciously',withinthemeaningofthestatute.
"44.
ThereisastrikingparallelbetweenthelanguageandreasoninginRvMartinandinWilkinsonvDownton.
WrightJ'spropositionthatthe"injuria"was"inlawmalicious",despitetheabsenceofany"maliciouspurpose"or"motiveofspite"containedaclearechoofthecriminallaw.
45.
Historicallythedoctrineofimputedintention,thatistosaythatapersonistobetakenasamatteroflawtointendthenaturalandprobableconsequencesofhisacts,survivedinthecriminallawaslateasthedecisionoftheHouseofLordsinDPPvSmith[1961]AC290.
ThedecisionsurprisedmostcriminallawyersandwasdescribedbyProfessorGlanvilleWilliamsinhisTextbookoftheCriminalLaw,(1sted)(1978),p61,as"themostcriticisedjudgmentevertobedeliveredbyanEnglishcourt".
Thedoctrinewasabolishedbysection8oftheCriminalJusticeAct1967.
Thisstates:"Acourtorjury,indeterminingwhetherapersonhascommittedanoffence,-Page17(a)shallnotbeboundinlawtoinferthatheintendedorforesawaresultofhisactionsbyreasononlyofitsbeinganaturalandprobableconsequenceofthoseactions;but(b)shalldecidewhetherhedidintendorforeseethatresultbyreferencetoalltheevidence,drawingsuchinferencesfromtheevidenceasappearproperinthecircumstances.
"46.
ThefinalmatterwhichWrightJaddressedinhisjudgmentinWilkinsonvDowntonwaswhethertheeffectonMrsWilkinsonofthereportaboutherhusband"was,tousetheordinaryphrase,tooremotetoberegardedinlawasaconsequenceforwhichthedefendantisanswerable".
Havingexpressedtheviewthatitwasdifficulttoimaginethatsuchareportcouldfailtoproducegraveeffects,unsurprisinglyhesaidthatapartfromauthorityhewouldholdthatitwasnottooremote.
Hethenconsideredtwoauthoritiesadvancedforthepropositionthat"illnessthroughmentalshockisatooremoteorunnaturalconsequenceofaninjuriatoentitletheplaintifftorecoverinacasewheredamageisanecessarypartofthecauseofaction":VictorianRailwaysCommissionersvCoultas(1888)13AppCas222andAllsopvAllsop(1860)5H&N534,approvedbytheHouseofLordsinLynchvKnight(1861)9HLCas577.
47.
InVictorianRailwaysCommissionersvCoultastheplaintiffnarrowlyescapedseriousinjuryatalevelcrossing.
Shewasapassengerinabuggydrivenbyherbrother.
Thegatekeepernegligentlyopenedthegatesforthemtocrosswhenatrainwasapproaching.
Therewasnocollision,buttheplaintiffwasfoundbyajurytohavesufferedillnessasaresultoftheshockofseeingthetrainapproachingandthinkingthattheyweregoingtobekilled.
ThePrivyCouncilheldthatmeresuddenterrorunaccompaniedbyactualphysicalinjurycouldnotinsuchcircumstancesbeconsideredaconsequencewhichintheordinarycoursewouldflowfromthenegligenceofthegatekeeper.
48.
WrightJdeclinedtofollowthatauthority.
HeobservedthatithadbeendoubtedbytheCourtofAppeal(PughvLondon,BrightonandSouthCoastRailwayCo[1896]2QB248,250,perLordEsherMR)andhadbeenrejectedinIreland(BellvGreatNorthernRailwayCoofIreland(1890)26LRIr428,perPallesCB)andbytheSupremeCourtofNewYork(MitchellvRochesterRailwayCo(1896)151NYRep107,citedbyPollock).
Hedidnotgofurtherandexpresstheviewthatitwaswrong,butitwasunnecessaryforhimtodoso,forhealsodescribedthecaseasnotinpointsince"therewasnotinthatcaseanyelementofwilfulwrong".
49.
AllsopvAllsopwasacaseofillnessallegedlycausedbyaslanderousimputationofunchastitytoamarriedwoman.
ThewomanheardtheslanderatthirdPage18hand.
Itwasheldthatthewomancouldnotclaimspecialdamagesforherillnessinanactionforslanderagainsttheoriginatoroftheslander.
WrightJtookanarrowviewofthecaseasanauthorityonthetypeofdamagesrecoverableinanactionforslander.
Hesaidthattoadoptitasaruleofgeneralapplicationthatillnessresultingfromafalsestatementcouldnevergiverisetoaclaimfordamageswouldbedifficultorimpossibletodefend.
50.
WrightJ'sessentialreasoningisclear,oncethetermsthatheusedareproperlyunderstood.
Hedidnotattempttodefinephysicalharmofapsychiatricnature,butonthefactsitwasunnecessaryforhimtosaymorethanhedid.
Wehaveanalysedhisreasoningatsomelengthbecauseoftheuncertaintytowhichithasgivenrise.
Subsequentcaselaw51.
WilkinsonvDowntonhasbeenasourceofmuchdiscussionanddebateinlegaltextbooksandacademicarticlesbutseldominvokedinpractice.
Thismaybeduetothedevelopmentofthelawofnegligenceintheareaofrecognisedillnessresultingfromnervousshock.
Butadistinctivefeatureofthepresentcaseisthatthecourtsbelowhaveheldthatthereisnoarguablecaseagainstthefatherinnegligence(applyingBarrettvEnfieldLondonBoroughCouncil[2001]2AC550),andtheclaimanthasthereforebeenconstrainedtorelyonWilkinsonvDownton.
52.
WilkinsonvDowntonwasconsideredbytheDivisionalCourt(KennedyandPhillimoreJJ)inDulieuvWhite&Sons[1901]2KB669.
TheplaintiffwasworkingbehindthebarattheBonnerArmsinBethnalGreenwhenanemployeeofthedefendantnegligentlydroveahorsedrawnvanintotheroomwhereshewas.
Shewaspregnantatthetimeandclaimeddamagesforillnessallegedlyresultingfromhersevereshock.
Thedefendantpleadedthatthedamagesclaimedweretooremote.
TheissuecamebeforetheDivisionalCourtonademurrer.
ThecourtrejectedthedefenceanddeclinedtofollowVictorianRailwaysCommissionersvCoultas.
ThejudgesobservedthatthedecisionofthePrivyCouncilwasentitledtogreatrespectbutwasnomorebindingonthecourtthanitwasontheExchequerDivisioninIreland.
KennedyJputtoonesidecasesofwilfulwrong-doing,suchasWilkinsonvDownton,asperhapsinvolvingspecialconsiderations.
Incasesofnegligence,hesaidthathewasinclinedtolimitliabilitytoinjuryfromshockarisingfromareasonablefearofimmediatepersonalinjurytooneself.
PhillimoreJ,atp683,saidthatheagreedwiththedecisionofWrightJinWilkinsonvDownton"thateveryonehasarighttohispersonalsafety,andthatitisatorttodestroythissafetybywilfullyfalsestatementsandtherebytocauseaphysicalinjurytothesufferer".
Fromthatandotherauthoritieshedrewtheprinciplethat"terrorwrongfullyinducedandinducingphysicalmischiefgivesacauseofaction".
Page1953.
WilkinsonvDowntonwasapprovedbytheCourtofAppealinJanviervSweeney[1919]2KB316.
TheplaintiffwasaFrenchwomanengagedtoaGermanwhowasinternedintheIsleofManduringWorldWar1.
ShelivedasthepaidcompanionofanotherwomanwhohadahouseinMayfair.
Thedefendantswereanex-policeofficerwhoranaprivatedetectiveagencyandhisassistant.
Thefirstdefendantwantedtoinspectsurreptitiouslysomeletterswrittentotheplaintiff'semployer.
InJuly1917hesenthisassistanttoseetheplaintiffandtrickherintocooperatingbypretendingthathewasapoliceofficerandthatshewassuspectedofcorrespondingwithaGermanspy.
Sheclaimedthatthiscausedhertosuffersevereshockresultinginaperiodofnervousillness.
Shesuedfordamagesandwon.
54.
Ontheappealitwasconcededthatthethreateningconductfoundbythejurywouldamounttoanactionablewrongifdamagewhichthelawrecognisedcouldbeshowntohavefloweddirectlyfromit.
Butitwasarguedthattheplaintiff'sillnesswastooremoteinlawandthatWilkinsonvDowntonwaswronglydecided.
ThecourtapprovedthereasoningofWrightJandthestatementofPhillimoreJinDulieuvWhitethat"terrorwrongfullyinducedandinducingphysicalmischiefgivesacauseofaction".
DukeLJdescribedJanviervSweeneyasastrongercasethanWilkinsonvDowntonbecausetherewasanintentiontoterrifytheplaintiffforthepurposeofattaininganunlawfulobject.
55.
ThereappeartohavebeennoreportedcasesinthiscountryonWilkinsonvDowntonforthenext70yearsorso.
Inthelast25yearsithashadamodestresurgenceinthecontextofharassment:KhorasandjianvBush[1993]QB727;WongvParksideHealthNHSTrust[2001]EWCACiv1721,[2003]3AllER932;WainwrightvHomeOffice[2001]EWCACiv2081,[2002]QB1334(CA),[2003]UKHL53,[2004]2AC406(HL).
56.
InKhorasandjianvBushtheplaintiffobtainedaninjunction,inrelianceonWilkinsonvDowntonandJanviervSweeney,topreventaformerpartnerfrommakingthreateningphonecalls.
DillonLJ(withwhomRoseLJagreed)describedthoseauthoritiesasestablishingthat"falsewordsorverbalthreatscalculatedtocause,utteredwiththeknowledgethattheyarelikelytocause,andactuallycausingphysicalinjurytothepersontowhomtheyareutteredareactionable"(p735).
(ThiswasadirectquotationfromtheheadnoteinJanviervSweeney.
)DillonLJinterpretedinjuryinthesenseof"recognisablepsychiatricillnesswithorwithoutpsychosomaticsymptoms",asdistinctfrom"mereemotionaldistress"(p736).
57.
InWongvParksideHealthNHSTrusttheclaimantsuedherformeremployerforpost-traumaticstressresultingfromallegedharassmentatherplaceofwork.
HaleLJ,givingthejudgmentofthecourt,saidthatitfollowedfromWrightJ'sformulationinWilkinsonvDowntonthatalthoughthetortiscommonlylabelled"intentionalinflictionofharm",itwasnotnecessarytoproveactual(subjective)Page20intentiontoinjure;itwassufficienttoprovethattheconductwas"calculated"todosointhesenseofbeingdeliberateconductwhichwaslikelyinthenatureofthingstocauseinjury(para10).
Asexplainedabove,HaleLJwascorrectthatthiswasindeedtheeffectofWrightJ'sformulation,whichtheCourtofAppealendorsedinJanviervSweeney.
Whetheritshouldbeendorsedbythiscourtisadifferentquestion.
HaleLJalsoconfirmedtheviewexpressedinKhorasandjianvBushthatforliabilitytoariseunderWilkinsonvDowntontheremustbe"physicalharmorrecognisedpsychiatricillness".
Theinterestingquestioniswhetheritshouldbesufficienttoestablishconductintendedtocauseseverealarmordistressfallingshortofarecognisedpsychiatricillnessbutinfactcausingthelatter.
ThisquestionwastouchedoninWainwrightvHomeOffice.
58.
InWainwrightvHomeOfficeayoungadultwhosufferedfromcerebralpalsyandseverearrestedsocialandintellectualdevelopmentwaswronglysubjectedbyprisonofficerstoastripsearch,whichwascarriedoutinaparticularlyhumiliatingfashion.
Hewasgreatlydistressedbytheepisodeandwassubsequentlydiagnosedassufferingpost-traumaticstressdisorder.
HeclaimeddamagesunderWilkinsonvDownton.
Itwasarguedonhisbehalfthattheambitofharmcoveredbythetortshouldextendbeyondcasesofrecognisedphysicalorpsychiatricinjuryandshouldincludedistressofthekindwhichwasthenaturalconsequenceoftheprisonofficers'treatmentofhim.
59.
IntheCourtofAppealLordWoolfCJsaidthathehadnodifficultywiththestatementinSalmond&HeustononTorts,(21sted)(1996),p215,that"onewhobyextremeandoutrageousconductintentionallyorrecklesslycausessevereemotionaldistresstoanotherisliableforsuchemotionaldistress,providedthatbodilyharmresultsfromit":[2002]QB1334,para49.
(ThisstatementwastakenfromtheAmericanLawInstitute,RestatementoftheLaw,Torts,(2nded)(1965),section46.
)Butthetrialjudgehadnotmadeanyfindingthattherewassuchintentionorrecklessness,andforthatreasonLordWoolfheldthattheclaimfailed.
60.
BuxtonLJagreedthattheclaimfailedonthefacts,buthedisagreedwiththeformulationinSalmond&Heuston.
HeconsideredthattheheadnoteinJanviervSweeney,adoptedbyDillonLJinKhorasandjianvBush,came"ascloseasitispossibletodotoageneralstatementoftheruleinWilkinsonvDownton"(para79).
Butifthatwasnotcorrect,heheldthattherulemustbelimitedtoWrightJ'sstatementthatthedefendant'sactwassoclearlylikelytoproduceaneffectofthekindthatoccurredthatanintentiontoproduceitshouldbeimputedtohim(objectiverecklessness).
ThereformulationinKhorasandjianvBushrequiredsubjectiverecklessnessastothecausationofphysicalinjuryinthesenseofrecognisablepsychiatricdistress.
Intentionorrecklessnessmerelyastosevereemotionaldistress,fromwhichbodilyharmhappenedtoresult,wasnotenough.
BuxtonLJregardedthecourtinWong'scaseastreatingthetwoformulationsasequivalentintheireffect.
Page2161.
IntheHouseofLordstheprincipaljudgmentwasgivenbyLordHoffmann.
HisanalysisofWilkinsonvDowntonwasthatWrightJwaspreventedbythedecisionofthePrivyCouncilinVictorianRailwayCommissionersvCoultasfromfindinginnegligence,andWrightJdevisedaconceptofimputedintentionwhichsailedasclosetonegligenceashefeltthathecould;thatitwasnotentirelyclearwhathemeantbyfindingthatthedefendantintendedtocauseinjury;butthatbythetimeofJanviervSweeneythelawwasablecomfortablytoaccommodatethefactsofWilkinsonvDownton,sincethecourtinDulieuvWhitehaddeclinedtofollowVictorianRailwayCommissionersvCoultas.
(Seeparas44,37and39to40.
)62.
Thisinterestingreconstructionshowsthepitfallsofinterpretingadecisionmorethanacenturyearlierwithoutafullunderstandingofjurisprudenceandcommonlegalterminologyoftheearlierperiod.
TheconceptofimputedintentionwascertainlynotanovelconceptdevisedbyWrightJtogetaroundaperceivedstumblingblockinthelawofnegligence.
Theconceptwasinthemainstreamoflegalthinkingatthattime.
MoreoverthereisnoreasonforsupposingthatWrightJwouldhavefeltobligedtofollowthedecisionofthePrivyCouncilunlesshecouldfindameansofdistinguishingit.
HepointedoutthatithadbeendoubtedbytheCourtofAppeal,wasinconsistentwithadecisionoftheCourtofAppealinIrelandandhadbeencriticisedintheUSAandbyPollock.
JustasKennedyandPhillimoreJJsaidinDulieuvWhitethattheywerenotboundbythedecisionofthePrivyCouncil,WrightJwouldhaveknownthathewasnotboundtofollowitasamatterofprecedent(andrespectforitwouldhavebeenreducedbythecommentsoftheeminentjudges,LordEsherandPalles,CB,whohadeitherdoubteditorjudgedittobewrong).
ThereisnoreasontosupposethatWrightJwasbeingartfulwhenhedescribedthePrivyCouncil'sdecisionasnotinpointbecauseitdidnotinvolvewilfulwrongdoing.
Hisreasoningmayseemuncleartomodernreaders,butitwouldnothavebeenuncleartothosefamiliaratthetimewithhisuseoftheterms"malicious","calculated"and"imputed".
63.
ItisalsoincorrecttosuggestthatafterDulieuvWhitethelawwouldhavecomfortablyaccommodatedthefactsofWilkinsonvDowntonwithinthelawofnervousshockcausedbynegligence.
KennedyJ'sjudgmentinDulieuvWhitewouldhavelimitedacauseofactioninnegligencefordamagesfornervousshocktocasesinwhichthenervousshockresultedfromfearfortheplaintiff'sownpersonalsafety,whichwouldnothaveincludedMrsWilkinson'scase,sinceherfearwasforherhusband.
ThislimitationwasdisapprovedbyamajorityoftheCourtofAppealinHambrookvStokesBrothers[1925]1KB141(SargantLJdissenting)andwasfinallyputtorestinMcLoughlinvO'Brian[1983]1AC410.
Inanyeventnegligenceandintentareverydifferentfaultelementsandthereareprincipledreasonsfordifferentiatingbetweenthebases(andpossibleextent)ofliabilityforcausingpersonalinjuryineithercase.
Page2264.
LordHoffmannrejectedtheargumentonbehalfofMrWainwrightthatthereshouldbeliabilityunderWilkinsonvDowntonfordistress,notamountingtorecognisedpsychiatricinjury,onthebasisofimputedintent.
Hesaidatpara45:"If…oneisgoingtodrawaprincipleddistinctionwhichjustifiesabandoningtherulethatdamagesformeredistressarenotrecoverable,imputedintentionwillnotdo.
Thedefendantmustactuallyhaveactedinawaywhichheknewtobeunjustifiableandeitherintendedtocauseharmoratleastactedwithoutcaringwhetherhecausedharmornot.
"65.
LordHoffmannsaidthathereadLordWoolf'sjudgmentassuggestingawillingnesstoacceptsuchaprinciple,butthatthefactsdidnotsupportit.
AswereadLordWoolf'sjudgment,thepropositionfromSalmond&Heustonwhichhewaswillingtoacceptwasslightlydifferent.
Itwasthatdamagesshouldberecoverableonlyincaseswheretheclaimantsufferedrecognisedbodilyorpsychiatricinjury(andnotmereemotionaldistress),butthatinordertobeentitledtodamagesforsuchinjuryitshouldbesufficienttoshowthattheinjuryresultedfromsevereemotionaldistresswhichwasintentionallyorrecklesslycausedbythedefendant'soutrageousconduct.
66.
LordHoffmannwasopentotheideathatcompensationshouldbeavailableincaseswheretherewasagenuineintentiontocausedistress,butheaddedastrongnoteofcaution.
Heobservedthatininstitutionsandworkplacesalloverthecountry,peopleconstantlysayanddothingswiththeintentionofcausingdistressandhumiliationtoothers.
"This",hesaidatpara46,"showslackofconsiderationandappallingmannersbutIamnotsurethattherightwaytodealwithitisalwaysbylitigation".
HereferredalsototheProtectionfromHarassmentAct1997,whichprovidesaremedyindamagesforacourseofconductamountingtoharassment.
HeobservedthattherequirementofacourseofconductshowedthatParliamentwasconsciousthatitmightnotbeinthepublicinteresttoallowthelawtobesetinmotionforone"boorish"incident,andthatitmightbethatanydevelopmentofthecommonlawshouldshowsimilarcaution(para46).
67.
LordHoffmannconcludedthatWilkinsonvDowntonasanauthoritydidnotprovidearemedyfordistressfallingshortofrecognisedpsychiatricinjury,andthatinsofarastheremightbearemedyfordistress(withoutpsychiatricinjury)intentionallycaused,thenecessaryintentionwasnotestablished(para47).
Page23Othercommonlawjurisdictions68.
MostcommonlawjurisdictionshaveadoptedWilkinsonvDownton.
InAustraliaitwascitedwithapprovalbytheHighCourtinBunyanvJordan(1937)57CLR1.
Despitesomelatercasesinwhichthecourtshavetendedtotreatitassubsumedwithinthelawofnegligence,SpigelmanCJintheNewSouthWalesCourtofAppealtreateditasanintentionaltortinNationwideNewsPtyLtdvNaidu[2007]NSWCA377,paras71-72.
IthasalsobeenfollowedinNewZealand(StevensonvBasham[1922]NZLR225;BradleyvWingnutFilmsLtd[1993]1NZLR415),Ireland(SullivanvBoylan[2013]IEHC104)andHongKong(WongKwaiFunvLiFung[1994]1HKC549).
IntheUSAandCanadatherehasbeensignificantfurtherdevelopment.
69.
TheAmericanLawInstitute'sRestatementoftheLaw:Torts(2nded)(1965),section46(1)stated:"Onewhobyextremeandoutrageousconductintentionallyorrecklesslycausessevereemotionaldistresstoanotherissubjecttoliabilityforsuchemotionaldistress,andifbodilyharmtotheotherresultsfromit,forsuchbodilyharm.
"45statesacceptedthisdefinitionandothersadoptedamodifiedversionofit.
(SeeRFraker,"ReformulatingOutrage:acriticalanalysisoftheproblematictortofIEED"(2008)61VandLRev983.
)IntheRestatement(Third)ofTorts:LiabilityforPhysicalandEmotionalHarm(2012)thewordingofsection46ismarginallydifferentbutthemeaningisunchanged:"Anactorwhobyextremeandoutrageousconductintentionallyorrecklesslycausessevereemotionalharmtoanotherissubjecttoliabilityforthatemotionalharmand,iftheemotionalharmcausesbodilyharm,alsoforthebodilyharm.
"Thecommentarytothecurrentversionstates:"Theoutragetortoriginatedasacatchalltopermitrecoveryinthenarrowinstancewhenanactor'sconductexceededallpermissibleboundsofacivilizedsocietybutanexistingtortclaimwasunavailable.
Thistortpotentiallyencompassesabroadswathofbehaviourandcaneasily,butofteninappropriately,beaddedasasupplementtoasuitinwhichthegravamenisanothertortorastatutoryviolation.
TheintentrequirementissatisfiedwhenanactorPage24knowsthatconductissubstantiallycertaintocauseharm.
Becauseemotionalharmisoftenapredictableoutcomeofotherwiselegitimateconduct,suchasterminatinganemployee,liabilityforthistortcouldbeexpansive.
Courtshaveplayedanespeciallycriticalroleincabiningthistortbyrequiring'extremeandoutrageous'conductand"severe"emotionalharm.
Agreatdealofconductmaycauseemotionalharm,buttherequisiteconductforthisclaim–extremeandoutrageous–describesaverysmallsliceofhumanbehaviour.
Therequirementthattheresultingharmbeseverefurtherlimitsclaims.
Theselimitsareessentialinpreventingthistortfrombeingsobroadastointrudeonimportantcountervailingpolicies,whilepermittingitsjudicioususefortheoccasionswhenitisappropriate.
"70.
InCanadaitissettledlawthat"Thetortofintentionalinflictionofmentaldistressorshockhasthreeelements:(1)anactorstatement…thatisextreme,flagrantoroutrageous;(2)theactorstatementiscalculatedtoproduceharm;and(3)theactorstatementcausesharm"(HighParklaneConsultingIncvLewis(2007)CanLII410,para31,perPerellJ).
Thisthree-limbedtestisderivedfromalineofearlierauthoritiesincludingparticularlythedecisionofMcLachlinJ,sittingasshethenwasintheBritishColumbiaSupremeCourt,inRahemtullavVanfedCreditUnion[1984]3WWR296.
Inthatcasetheplaintiffwasharassedatwork,falselyaccusedoftheftinthreateningcircumstancesandsummarilydismissedwithoutpropercauseinahumiliatingfashion.
Thedefendantsubmittedthattobeliableforwilfulinflictionofnervousshockitsconductmustbeoutrageous.
McLachlinJsaid,atpara52:"ThissubmissionappearstobefoundedonthedistinctiondrawninAmericancasesbetweenmereinsult,whichisnotactionable,and'extremeandoutrageousconduct'whichis:Linden:CanadianTortLaw(3rded)(1982),p48.
WhilethisdistinctionappearsnottohavebeenexpresslyadoptedintheCanadianandCommonwealthcases,theconductconsideredintheleadingauthoritiessuchasWilkinsonvDownton,andJanviervSweeney,wasinfactflagrantandextreme.
Moreover,itisdifficulttoacceptthatthecourtsshouldprotectpersonsfromeverypracticaljokeorunkindcomment.
"71.
McLachlinJsaidthat"assuming"thatonlyflagrantandextremeconductinflictingmentalsufferingwasactionable,thedefendant'sconductcouldbesodescribed.
Sheidentifiedthetwofurtheringredientsofthetortasbeing:thattheconductwas"plainlycalculatedtoproducesomeeffectofthekindwhichwasproduced"(quotingfromWrightJ'sjudgmentinWilkinsonvDownton),andthattheconductproducedprovableillness.
Shefoundthattheconductwas"plainlycalculated"tocauseprofounddistressbecauseitwasclearlyforeseeable.
SincethatdecisionthecourtshavefollowedtheapproachofimputingthenecessaryintentionPage25wheresevereemotionaldistresswasforeseeable(seeProfessorDeniseRéaume'schapter,TheRoleofIntentionintheTortinWilkinsonvDownton,inEmergingIssuesinTortLaw).
Analysis72.
TheordermadebytheCourtofAppealwasnovelintworespects.
Thematerialwhichtheappellantwasbannedfrompublishingwasnotdeceptiveorintimidatorybutautobiographical;andthebanwasprincipallydirected,nottothesubstanceoftheautobiographicalmaterial,buttothevividformoflanguageusedtocommunicateit.
TheappealthereforeraisesimportantquestionsaboutfreedomofspeechandaboutthenatureandlimitsofliabilityunderWilkinsonvDownton.
73.
InWilkinsonvDowntonWrightJrecognisedthatwilfulinfringementoftherighttopersonalsafetywasatort.
Ithasthreeelements:aconductelement,amentalelementandaconsequenceelement.
Theissuesinthiscaserelatetothefirstandsecondelements.
Itiscommongroundthattheconsequencerequiredforliabilityisphysicalharmorrecognisedpsychiatricillness.
InWainwrightvHomeOfficeLordHoffmanndiscussedandleftopen(withexpressionsofcaution)thequestionwhetherintentionalcausationofseveredistressmightbeactionable,butnooneinthiscasehassuggestedthatitis.
74.
Theconductelementrequireswordsorconductdirectedtowardstheclaimantforwhichthereisnojustificationorreasonableexcuse,andtheburdenofproofisontheclaimant.
Weareconcernedinthiscasewiththecurtailmentoffreedomofspeech,whichgivesrisetoitsownparticularconsiderations.
WeagreewiththeapproachoftheCourtofAppealinregardingthetortasconfinedtothosetowardswhomtherelevantwordsorconductweredirected,buttheymaybeagroup.
Apersonwhoshouts"fire"inacinema,whenthereisnofire,isaddressinghimselftotheaudience.
InthepresentcasetheCourtofAppealtreatedthepublicationofthebookasconductdirectedtowardstheclaimantandconsideredthatthequestionofjustificationhadthereforetobejudgedvis-à-vishim.
Inthisrespectweconsiderthattheyerred.
75.
Thebookisforawideaudienceandthequestionofjustificationhastobeconsideredaccordingly,notinrelationtotheclaimantinisolation.
Inpointoffact,thefather'scaseisthatalthoughthebookisdedicatedtotheclaimant,hewouldnotexpecthimtoseeituntilheismucholder.
ArdenLJsaidthatthefathercouldnotbeheardtosaythathedidnotintendthebooktoreachthechild,sinceitwasdedicatedtohimandsomepartsofitareaddressedtohim.
Wehaveonlyfoundonepassageaddressedtohim,whichisintheacknowledgments,butmorefundamentallywedonotunderstandwhytheappellantmaynotbeheardtosaythatPage26thebookisnotintendedforhiseyesatthisstageofhislife.
ArdenLJalsoheldthattherecouldbenojustificationforthepublicationifitwaslikelytocausepsychiatricharmtohim.
Thatapproachexcludedconsiderationofthewiderquestionofjustificationbasedonthelegitimateinterestofthedefendantintellinghisstorytotheworldatlargeinthewayinwhichhewishestotellit,andthecorrespondinginterestofthepublicinhearinghisstory.
76.
Whenthosefactorsaretakenintoaccount,astheymustbe,theonlyproperconclusionisthatthereiseveryjustificationforthepublication.
Apersonwhohassufferedinthewaythattheappellanthassuffered,andhasstruggledtocopewiththeconsequencesofhissufferinginthewaythathehasstruggled,hastherighttotelltheworldaboutit.
Andthereisacorrespondingpublicinterestinothersbeingabletolistentohislifestoryinallitssearingdetail.
Ofcoursevulnerablechildrenneedtobeprotectedasfarasreasonablypracticablefromexposuretomaterialwhichwouldharmthem,buttherightwayofdoingsoisnottoexpandWilkinsonvDowntontobanthepublicationofaworkofgeneralinterest.
Butinpointingoutthegeneralinterestattachingtothispublication,wedonotmeantosuggestthatthereneedstobesomeidentifiablegeneralinterestinthesubjectmatterofapublicationforittobejustifiedwithinthemeaningofWilkinsonvDownton.
77.
Freedomtoreportthetruthisabasicrighttowhichthelawgivesaveryhighlevelofprotection.
(See,forexample,NapiervPressdramLtd[2009]EWCACiv443,[2010]1WLR934,para42.
)Itisdifficulttoenvisageanycircumstancesinwhichspeechwhichisnotdeceptive,threateningorpossiblyabusive,couldgiverisetoliabilityintortforwilfulinfringementofanother'srighttopersonalsafety.
Therighttoreportthetruthisjustificationinitself.
Thatisnottosaythattherightofdisclosureisabsolute,forapersonmayoweadutytotreatinformationasprivateorconfidential.
Butthereisnogenerallawprohibitingthepublicationoffactswhichwillcausedistresstoanother,evenifthatistheperson'sintention.
Thequestionwhether(and,ifso,inwhatcircumstances)liabilityunderWilkinsonvDowntonmightarisefromwordswhicharenotdeceptiveorthreatening,butareabusive,hasnotsofararisenanddoesnotariseforconsiderationinthiscase.
78.
TheCourtofAppealrecognisedthattheappellanthadarighttotellhisstory,buttheyheldforthepurposesofaninterlocutoryinjunctionthatitwasarguablyunjustifiableforhimtodosoingraphiclanguage.
Theinjunctionpermitspublicationofthebookonlyinabowdlerisedversion.
Thispresentsproblemsbothasamatterofprincipleandintheformoftheinjunction.
Astotheformer,thebook'srevelationofwhatitmeanttotheappellanttoundergohisexperienceofabuseasachild,andhowithascontinuedtoaffecthimthroughouthislife,iscommunicatedthroughthebrutallanguagewhichheuses.
Hiswritingcontainsdarkdescriptionsofemotionalhell,self-hatredandrage,ascanbeseenintheextractswhichwehavesetout.
Thereadergainsaninsightintohispainbutalsohisresilienceandachievements.
Tolightenthedarknesswouldreduceitseffect.
ThecourthastakenPage27editorialcontroloverthemannerinwhichtheappellant'sstoryisexpressed.
Arighttoconveyinformationtothepubliccarrieswithitarighttochoosethelanguageinwhichitisexpressedinordertoconveytheinformationmosteffectively.
(SeeCampbellvMGNLtd[2004]UKHL22,[2004]2AC457,para59,andInreGuardianNewsandMediaLtd[2010]UKSC1,[2010]2AC697,para63)79.
TheproblemwiththeformoftheinjunctionisthatSchedule2definestheinformationwhichitisforbiddentopublishnotonlybyreferencetoitssubstantivecontent,butalsobythedescriptivequalityofbeing"graphic".
Whatissufficiently"graphic"tofallwithinthebanisamatterofimpression.
Theamplificationof"graphic"inthecourt'ssupplementaryjudgmentasmeaning"seriouslyliabletobeingunderstoodbyachildasvividlydescriptivesoastobedisturbing"similarlylackstheclarityandcertaintywhichaninjunctionproperlyrequires.
Anyinjunctionmustbeframedintermssufficientlyspecifictoleavenouncertaintyaboutwhattheaffectedpersonisorisnotallowedtodo.
TheprinciplehasbeenstatedinmanycasesandnowheremoreclearlythanbyLordNichollsinAttorneyGeneralvPunchLtd[2002]UKHL50,[2003]1AC1046atpara35:"Aninterlocutoryinjunction,likeanyotherinjunction,mustbeexpressedintermswhichareclearandcertain.
Theinjunctionmustdefinepreciselywhatactsareprohibited.
Thecourtmustensurethatthelanguageofitsordermakesplainwhatispermittedandwhatisprohibited.
Thisisawellestablished,soundly-basedprinciple.
Apersonshouldnotbeputatriskofbeingincontemptofcourtbyanambiguousprohibition,oraprohibitionthescopeofwhichisobviouslyopentodispute.
"80.
Ourconclusionthatthepublicationoftheappellant'sbookisnotwithinthescopeoftheconductelementofthetortisenoughtodecidethiscase.
However,theissueofthementalelementrequiredforthetorthasbeenarguedbeforeusanditisrightthatweshouldaddressit.
TheCourtofAppealfoundthatthenecessaryintentioncouldbeimputedtotheappellant.
Thecourtcannotbecriticisedfordoingso,sinceitwasboundbypreviousdecisionsofthecourtwhichupheldthatapproach(inparticular,JanviervSweeneyandWongvParksideHealthNHSTrust).
81.
Thereisacriticaldifference,notalwaysrecognisedintheauthorities,betweenimputingtheexistenceofanintentionasamatteroflawandinferringtheexistenceofanintentionasamatteroffact.
Imputationofanintentionbyoperationofaruleoflawisavestigeofapreviousageandhasnoproperroleinthemodernlawoftort.
Itisunsoundinprinciple.
Itwasabolishedinthecriminallawnearly50yearsagoanditscontinuedsurvivalinthetortofwilfulinfringementoftherighttopersonalsafetyisunjustifiable.
ItrequiredtheinterventionofParliamenttoexpungeitfromthecriminallaw,butthatwasonlybecauseoftheretrogradedecisioninDPPPage28vSmith.
Thedoctrinewascreatedbythecourtsanditishightimenowforthiscourttodeclareitsdemise.
82.
Theabolitionofimputedintentclearsthewaytoproperconsiderationoftwoimportantquestionsaboutthementalelementofthisparticulartort.
83.
First,wherearecognisedpsychiatricillnessistheproductofseverementaloremotionaldistress,a)isitnecessarythatthedefendantshouldhaveintendedtocauseillnessorb)isitsufficientthatheintendedtocauseseveredistresswhichinfactresultsinrecognisableillnessOptionb)isclosetotheversionstatedbySalmond&HeustonwhichattractedLordWoolfinWainwrightvHomeOffice.
84.
Secondly,isrecklessnesssufficientand,ifso,howisrecklessnesstobedefinedforthispurposeRecklessnessisawordcapableofdifferentshadesofmeaning.
Ineverydayusageitmayincludethoughtlessnessaboutthelikelyconsequencesincircumstanceswherethereisanobvioushighrisk,orinotherwordsgrossnegligence.
InRvG[2003]UKHL50,[2004]1AC1034,theHouseofLordsconstrued"recklessly"intheCriminalDamageAct1971asmeaningthat"Apersonactsrecklessly…withrespectto…aresultwhenheisawareofariskthatitwilloccur;anditis,inthecircumstancesknowntohim,unreasonabletotaketherisk".
TheHouseofLordsbaseditsinterpretationonthedefinitionproposedbytheLawCommissioninclause18(c)oftheCriminalCodeBillannexedtoitsReportonCriminalLaw:ACriminalCodeforEnglandandWalesandDraftCriminalCodeBill,Vol1(LawComNo177,1989).
AsimilardefinitionofrecklessnesswasincludedinadraftBillforreformingthelawofoffencesagainsttheperson,whichtheGovernmentpublishedin1998butdidnottakeforward.
TheLawCommissionhasrepeateditsproposalinascopingconsultationpaperonReformofOffencesagainstthePerson(LCCP217,2015).
Theexactwordingofitsproposeddefinitionis:"Apersonactsrecklesslywithrespecttoaresultifheisawareofariskthatitwilloccuranditisunreasonabletotakethatriskhavingregardtothecircumstancesasheknowsorbelievesthemtobe.
"85.
Inthinkingaboutthesequestionsitispertinenttoconsiderthepracticalimplications.
Supposethatahostagetakerdemandsmoneyfromthefamilyofthehostage(H)forhissaferelease,orthatablackmailerthreatensharmtoapersonunlessthefamilyofthevictim(V)meetshisdemands.
ThewifeorparentofHorVsuffersseveredistresscausingthemtodeveloparecognisedpsychiatricillness.
Wedoubtthatanyonewoulddisputethatinthosecircumstancesthehostagetakerorblackmaileroughttobeheldliablefortheconsequencesofhisevilconduct.
TherewouldbenodifficultyininferringasamatteroffactthatheintendedtocauseseverePage29distresstotheclaimant;itwasthemeansoftryingtoachievehisdemand.
Butthewrongdoermaynothavehadtheintentiontocausepsychiatricillness,andhemaywellhavegivennothoughttoitslikelihood.
86.
Comparethatscenariowithanexampleattheotherendofthespectrum.
Thedefendanthasadisputewithhisneighbour.
Tempersbecomeflaredandhemakesadeliberatelyinsultingremark.
Heintendsittobeupsetting,buthedoesnotanticipateorintendthattheneighbourwillsuffersevereemotionaldistress.
Unfortunatelytheepisodeandinparticulartheinsulthavethateffect,andthedistressleadstoarecognisedformofpsychiatricillness.
Itwouldbedisproportionatetoholdthedefendantliablewhenheneverintendedtocausetheneighbourtobeseriouslyupset.
87.
Ouranswertothefirstquestionisthatofoption(b)(para83above).
Ouranswertothesecondquestionisnottoincluderecklessnessinthedefinitionofthementalelement.
Toholdthatthenecessarymentalelementisintentiontocausephysicalharmorseverementaloremotionaldistressstrikesajustbalance.
Itwouldleadtoliabilityintheexamplesinpara85butnotintheexampleinpara86.
Itmeansthatapersonwhoactuallyintendstocauseanothertosufferseverementaloremotionaldistress(whichshouldnotbeunderstated)bearstheriskoflegalliabilityifthedeliberatelyinflictedseveredistresscausestheothertosufferarecognisedpsychiatricillness.
Alooseanalogymaybedrawnwiththe"eggshellskull"doctrine,whichhasanestablishedplaceinthelawoftort.
Thisformulationofthementalelementispreferabletoincludingrecklessnessasanalternativetointention.
RecklessnesswasnotatermusedinWilkinsonvDowntonorJanviervSweeneyanditpresentsproblemsofdefinition.
TheLawCommission'sdefinitionwouldbeclear,butitwouldnotcovertheexampleofthehostagetakerortheblackmailer,becauseitwouldrequireproofofactualforesightoftheriskoftheclaimantsufferingpsychiatricillness.
88.
Itwouldbepossibletolimitliabilityforthetorttocasesinwhichthedefendant'sconductwas"extreme,flagrantoroutrageous",asinCanada.
Butthisargumenthasnotsofarbeenadvancedinthiscountry,and,althoughArdenLJadvertedtoitasapossibility,theappellanthasnotsoughttopursueit.
Weareinclinedtotheview,whichisnecessarilyobiter,thatthetortissufficientlycontainedbythecombinationofa)theconductelementrequiringwordsorconductdirectedattheclaimantforwhichthereisnojustificationorexcuse,b)thementalelementrequiringanintentiontocauseatleastseverementaloremotionaldistress,andc)theconsequenceelementrequiringphysicalharmorrecognisedpsychiatricillness.
89.
Inthepresentcasethereisnobasisforsupposingthattheappellanthasanactualintentiontocausepsychiatricharmorseverementaloremotionaldistresstotheclaimant.
Page3090.
Weconcludethatthereisnoarguablecasethatthepublicationofthebookwouldconstitutetherequisiteconductelementofthetortorthattheappellanthastherequisitementalelement.
OnbothgroundstheappealmustbeallowedandtheorderofBeanJrestored.
LORDNEUBERGER:(withwhomLordWilsonagrees)91.
IagreethatthisappealshouldbeallowedforthereasonsgivenbyLadyHaleandLordToulson.
Becausetheissueinvolvedisofimportanceandcouldraisesomepointsofdifficultyinothercases,Iaddsomeremarksofmyown.
92.
Therearevariousfamiliarcircumstancesinwhichadefendantcanbeliabletoaclaimantasaresultofastatementmadebythedefendant.
Examplesincludeastatementwhichisunlawfulstatutorily,abreachofcontract,defamatory,abreachofdutybecauseofapre-existingrelationship,andastatementwhichamountstomisuseofinformationorabreachoftheclaimant'sconfidence,copyright,orrighttoprivacy.
Thisappealconcernsthecircumstancesinwhichaclaimanthasacauseofactionfordistressorpsychiatricillnesswhichhesuffersasaresultofastatementmadebythedefendant,wherethestatementwouldnototherwisegiverisetoaclaim.
Itisafundamentalissue,and,particularlygiventheimportanceattachedtobothfreedomofexpressionandhumandignity,itcanraisequestionswhicharedifficulttoresolve.
Havingsaidthat,theanswertothequestionwhetherthereisavalidclaiminthepresentcaseappearstometobequiteplain.
93.
ThefactsofthiscasearefullysetoutbyLadyHaleandLordToulsoninparas1-30above.
IagreethattheinterlocutoryinjunctiongrantedbytheCourtofAppealwasflawedfortworeasons.
First,thereshouldhavebeennoinjunctionatall,becausetheclaimant'sclaimtorestrainpublicationofthedefendant'sbookhadnoprospectsofsuccess.
Secondly,thetermsoftheinjunctionwereflawedbothconceptuallyandprocedurally.
94.
Theclaimant'sclaimhadnoprospectsofsuccessbecausepublicationofthedefendant'sbookwouldplainlynothavegivenrisetoacauseofactioninhisfavour.
Itistruethattheclaimantisthedefendant'ssonandispsychologicallyvulnerable,anditwasarguedintheCourtofAppealthatthisrelationshipgaverisetoadutyofcareonthepartofthedefendantwhichpublicationofthebookwouldbreach.
However,astheCourtofAppealrightlyheld,thatargumentcannotassisttheclaimantinthiscase–seethereasoningofArdenLJat[2014]EWCACiv1277,paras48-57,upholdingtheconclusionofBeanJatfirstinstanceonthisaspect.
Thereis,rightly,noappealonthatground.
Page3195.
Oncethatgroundisdisposedof,itappearstomethatthebook'scontentssimplyhavenothingtodowiththeclaimant,atleastfromalegalperspective.
Thebookdescribesthedefendant'ssearingexperiencesofsexualabuseasaboyanditsconsequentialeffects.
Itistrue,thatthebookisdedicatedtotheclaimantanditexpressesfearsabouttheclaimantbeingatriskofabuseasachild,butthefurthestthatthatpointcouldgowouldbetonegativetheideathatthedefendantcouldhavebeenunawareofthefactthatthecontentsofthebookwouldcometotheclaimant'sattentionatsomepoint(whichwasunsurprisinglynotinissueanyway).
96.
WhileIagreethatmanypeoplewouldregardthebookasbeinginsomerespectsinthepublicinterest,itisnotnecessarytodecidethisappealonthatground.
Unlessitisnecessarytodoso,Iamunenthusiasticaboutdecidingwhetherabook,oranyotherwork,shouldbepublishedbyreferencetoajudge'sassessmentoftheimportanceofthepublicationtothepublicoreventothewriter.
Inthepresentcase,Idonotconsiderthatitwouldmakeanydifferenceiftheexperienceswhichthedefendantdescribescouldbeshowntohavebeeninvented,orifthebookhadbeenwrittenasanovelbysomeonewhohadnotbeensexuallyabused.
Itistruethatthebookcontainedmaterialwhichsomepeoplemightfindoffensive,intermsofwhatwasdescribedandhowitwasexpressed,but"freespeechincludesnotonlytheinoffensivebuttheirritating,thecontentious,theeccentric,theheretical,theunwelcomeandtheprovocativeprovideditdoesnottendtoprovokeviolence"–seeRedmond-BatevDirectorofPublicProsecutions(1999)7BHRC375,para20,perSedleyLJ.
Ashememorablyadded,"[f]reedomonlytospeakinoffensivelyisnotworthhaving".
97.
Quiteapartfromthis,itwould,Ithink,beaninappropriaterestrictiononfreedomofexpression,anunacceptableformofjudicialcensorship,ifacourtcouldrestrainpublicationofabookwrittenbyadefendant,whosecontentscouldotherwisebefreelypromulgated,onlyreferingeneralandunobjectionabletermstotheclaimant,andareneitherintendednorexpectedbythedefendanttoharmtheclaimant,simplybecausetheclaimantmightsufferpsychologicalharmifhegottoreadit(orextractsfromit).
WhateverthenatureandingredientsofthetortwhoseorigincanbetracedtoWilkinsonvDownton[1897]2QB57,itthereforecannotpossiblyapplyinthiscase.
Andthat,atleastinanarrowsense,isinmyviewthebeginningandtheendofthiscase.
98.
Astothetermsoftheinjunction,theCourtofAppealacceptedthatthedefendantshouldbeentitledtodescribetheordealswhichhehadundergone.
However,theydecidedthathecouldnotpublishcertainspecifiedpassagesinhisbookoranyotheraccountsofhisordealsinsofarasthoseaccountswere"graphic",adescriptionwhichwasexplainedbyArdenLJasmeaning"seriouslyliabletobeingunderstoodbyachildasvividlydescriptivesoastobedisturbing".
Page3299.
Therearetwoproblemswithsuchaformofinjunction.
First,ittreatsthetermsinwhicheventsaredescribedinthebookasdetachablefromtheinclusionoftheeventsthemselves.
Freedomofexpressionextendsnotmerelytowhatissaidbutalsotohowitissaid.
Whetheracommunicationismadeorallyorinwriting,themannerorstyleinwhichitisexpressedcanhaveaverysubstantialeffectonwhatisactuallyconveyedtothelistenerorreader.
Onecannotrealisticallydetachstylefromcontentinlawanymorethanonecandosoinliteratureorlinguisticphilosophy.
Iagreewithwhatissaidinpara78aboveinthisconnection.
100.
ThesecondproblemwiththeformofinjunctiongrantedbytheCourtofAppealisthatitisinsufficientlyspecific,andinthatconnectionthereisnothingwhichIwishtoaddtowhatissaidinpara79above.
101.
Itwouldnot,however,berighttoleavemattersthere,inthelightofthedecisioninWilkinson(onwhichtheCourtofAppealrelied)andthesubsequentcasesinthisandothercommonlawjurisdictions,discussedbyLadyHaleandLordToulsoninparas51-71above.
InWilkinson,thedefendantwasheldliabletoaplaintiffforseverementaldistresscausedtoherbyanuntruestatement,whichwasmisconceivedlyintendedasacrueljoke,namelythatherhusbandhadsufferedseriousinjuriesinanaccident.
Thewayinwhichthetrialjudge,WrightJ,expressedhimselfinhisjudgmentmust,likeallstatements,beseeninitscontext,andthatcontextisilluminatinglyexplainedinparas34-50above.
Giventhattherewasavalidclaiminthatcaseandthereisnoneinthiscase,itraisesthequestionastothecharacterisationofthetortinquestion,whichcouldperhapsbecharacterisedasthetortofmakingdistressingstatements.
102.
Thetorthasbeenidentifiedas"terrorwrongfullyinducedandinducingphysicalmischief"(seeDulieuvWhite&Sons[1901]2KB669,683andJanviervSweeney[1919]2KB316,322).
However,Iamnothappywiththatcharacterisation,asitlumpstogetherphysicalactionsandstatements,itbegsthequestionbytheuseoftheword"wrongful",anditislimitedto"terror",and,asexplainedbelow,Iwouldleaveopenwhether"physicalmischief"isanecessaryingredient.
103.
WhileIwouldcertainlyacceptthatanactionnototherwisetortiouswhichcausesaclaimantdistresscouldgiverisetoacauseofaction,Iwouldbereluctanttodecidedefinitivelythatliabilityfordistressingactionsanddistressingwordsshouldbesubjecttothesamerules,atthisstageatanyrate.
Thereisofcourseasubstantialoverlapbetweenwordsandactions:afterall,wordscanthreatenorpromiseactions,andfreedomofexpressioncaninsomerespectsextendtoactionsaswellaswords.
And,inthelightofwhatIsaybelow,itmightbethecasethatthetortofmakingdistressingstatementsistobelimitedtostatementswhicharetheverbalequivalentofphysicalassaults.
However,therearerelevantdifferencesbetweenwordsandactions.
ThereasonsforadifferenceinlegaltreatmentbetweenPage33liabilityforactionsandliabilityforwordswereidentifiedbyLordReid,LordDevlinandLordPearceinHedleyByrne&CoLtdvHeller&PartnersLtd[1964]AC465,482-483,516-519and534respectively.
104.
Inordertodecidewhenastatement,whichisnototherwisetortious,andwhichcausesaclaimantdistress,shouldbecapableoffoundingacauseofaction,itisnecessarytobearinmindfivepoints,someofwhichareintension.
First,thattheremustbecircumstancesinwhichsuchacauseofactionshouldexist:thefactsofWilkinsonandJanviermakethatpointgood.
Secondly,giventheimportanceoffreedomofexpression,whichincludestheneedtoavoidconstrainingordinary(evenmuchoffensive)discourse,itisvitalthattheboundariesofthecauseofactionarerelativelynarrow.
Thirdly,becauseoftheimportanceoflegalcertainty,particularlyintheareaofwhatpeoplecansay,thetortshouldbedefinedasclearlyaspossible.
Fourthly,inthelightofthealmostliterallyinfinitepermutationsofpossiblehumaninteractions,itisrealistictoproceedonthebasisthatitmaywellbethatnosetofparameterscanbedevisedwhichwouldcaterforabsolutelyeverypossibility.
Fifthly,givenallthesefactors,therewillalmostinevitablybeaspectsoftheparametersonwhichitwouldbewrongtoexpressaconcludedview,andtoletthelawdevelopinacharacteristiccommonlawway,namelyonacasebycasebasis.
105.
Inotherwords,thetortexists,andshouldbedefinednarrowlyandasclearlyaspossible,butitwouldbedangeroustosaycategoricallythateachingredientofthetortmustalwaysbepresent.
Nonetheless,itseemstomethatitisworthidentifyingwhatare,atleastnormally,andhopefullyalmostalways,theessentialingredientsofthetort.
106.
WilkinsonandJanvierwerecaseswherethestatementmadebythedefendantwasuntrue,gratuitous,intendedtodistresstheplaintiff,directedattheplaintiff,andcausedtheplaintiffseriousdistressamountingtopsychiatricillness.
Clearly,wherealltheseingredientsarepresent,thetortwouldbeestablished,butthequestioniswhethertheyareallstrictlyrequired.
107.
First,ifitispossibleatall,itwillbeaveryrarecasewhereastatementwhichisnotuntruecouldgiverisetoaclaim,save,perhapswherethestatementwasathreator(possibly)aninsult.
108.
Sometimes,athreatwillbeunlawfulanyway:forinstanceathreatofimmediateassaultorablackmail.
Insomecasesthereisstatutoryliabilityforanoffensivestatement.
Thus,astatementmaybecoveredbytheProtectionfromHarassmentAct1997(asamended)whichprovidesforbothcivilremedies(section3)andcriminalliability(sections2,2A,4,4A).
SimilarlyPartIVoftheFamilyLawAct1996(asamended)allowsacourttomakeanordertoprotectanindividualfromPage34molestation,andprovidesthatthebreachofsuchanorderisacriminaloffence.
Harassmentrequiresacourseofaction,soIdonotthinkthataone-offstatementcouldbecaughtbythe1997Act.
Section4AofthePublicOrderAct1986(addedbythePublicOrderAct1994)providesthatitisanoffencetouse"threatening,abusiveorinsultingwordsorbehaviour"whichcauses"harassment,alarmordistress"andwhichisintendedtohavethateffect.
However,section4Aonlycreatesacriminaloffence,anditdoesnotapplywherethewordsareused"byapersoninsideadwellingandthepersonwhoisharassed,alarmedordistressedisalsoinsidethatoranotherdwelling".
Further,section1oftheMaliciousCommunicationsAct1988criminalisescommunicationswhichare"grosslyoffensive","athreat"or"known…tobefalse"ifatleastoneofthepurposesisto"causedistressoranxiety",unlessthesenderhad"reasonablegrounds",butitdoesnotappeartogiverisetocivilliability.
Andsection127oftheCommunicationsAct2003criminaliseselectronicsendingof"grosslyoffensive"or"menacing"messages,or"false"messages"forthepurposeofcausingannoyance,inconvenienceorneedlessanxietytoanother",butitislimitedtoelectroniccommunicationsandappearstogiverisetonocivilliability.
109.
IdonotconsiderthatthisisacasewhereitcanbesaidthatParliamenthasintervenedinsuchtermsthatthecommonlawshould,asitwere,keepout.
Afterall,Parliamenthasnotlegislatedsoastocover,ortosuggestdisapprovalof,claimsintortbasedon"one-off"distressingstatementsasinWilkinsonandJanvier.
Onthecontrary,thelast20yearshaveseenlegislationwhichactuallysuggeststhatthelegislatureconsidersitappropriateforthecourtstobeinvolved,albeitinrelativelylimitedandextremecases,wherewordsareusedoffensively.
110.
Thisdoesnot,ofcourse,meanthateveryuntruthfulstatement,threatorinsultcouldgiverisetoaclaim.
Becauseoftheimportanceoffreedomofexpressionandofthelawnotimpedingordinarydiscourse,theremustbeasecondanddemandingrequirementwhichhastobesatisfiedbeforeliabilitycanattachtoanuntruth,aninsultorathreatwhichwasintendedto,anddid,causedistress,butwouldnototherwisebecivillyactionable.
LadyHaleandLordToulsonhavesuggestedatestof"justificationorreasonableexcuse"inparas74-76above,andIhaveusedtheadjective"gratuitous"inpara106above.
Neitherdescriptionisidealasitcanbesaidtobequestion-begging(virtuallyeverythreat,untruthorinsultcanbesaidtobeunjustified,inexcusableandgratuitous),anditinvolvesasubjectiveassessment.
Theremaybesomethingtobesaidfortheadjectives"outrageous","flagrant"or"extreme",whichseemtohavebeenappliedbytheUSandCanadiancourts(discussedinparas69-71above).
Ofcourse,evenwithatestofoutrageousnessasubjectivejudgmentwillbeinvolvedtosomeextent,butthatcannotbeavoided.
111.
Asmentioned,itseemstometobevitalthatthetortdoesnotinterferewiththegiveandtakeofordinaryhumandiscourse(includingunpleasant,heatedarguments,whetherindomestic,social,businessorothercontexts,sometimesPage35involvingthetradingofinsultsorthreats),orwithnormal,includingtrenchant,journalismandotherwriting.
Inevitably,whetheraparticularstatementisgratuitousmustdependonthecontext.
Anunpromptedstatementmadesimplybecausethedefendantwantedtosayitorbecausehewasinspiredbymalice,asinJanvier,orsomethingveryclosetomalice,asinWilkinson,maybedifferentfromthesamestatementmadeinthecourseofaheatedargument,especiallyifprovokedbyaseriesofwoundingstatementsbythedefendant.
Similarly,itwouldbewrongforthistorttobeinvokedtojustifyreliefagainstapolemicop-ednewspaperarticleorastronglywordedandantipatheticbiography,saveinthemostunusualcircumstances.
Thetortshouldnotsomehowbeusedtoextendorsupplementthelawofdefamation.
112.
Thirdly,Iconsiderthattheremustbeanintentiononthepartofthedefendanttocausetheclaimantdistress.
Thisrequirementmightseematfirstsighttobetoonarrow,notleastbecauseitmightappearthatitwouldnothavecaughtthedefendantinWilkinson:hemerelyintendedhiscruelstatementasajoke.
However,thefactthatastatementisintendedtobeajokeisnotinconsistentwiththenotionthatitwasintendedtoupset.
How,itmightbeaskedrhetorically,couldMrDowntonnothaveintendedtocausetheapparentlyhappilymarriedMrsWilkinsonsignificantdistressbyfalselytellingherthatherhusbandhadbeenveryseriouslyinjuredThatwastheverypurposeoftheso-calledjoke.
Therearestatements(andindeedactions)whoseconsequencesorpotentialconsequencesaresoobviousthattheperpetratorcannotrealisticallysaythatthoseconsequenceswereunintended.
113.
Intentionalitymayseemtobeafairlystrictrequirement,asitexcludesnotmerelynegligentlyharmfulstatements,butalsorecklesslyharmfulstatements.
However,inagreementwithLadyHaleandLordToulson,Iconsiderthatrecklessnessisnotenough.
Intruth,Idoubtitwouldaddmuch.
Further,inpractice,recklessnessisasomewhattrickyconcept.
Quiteapartfromthis,bearinginmindtheimportanceoffreedomofexpressionandofthelawnotstickingitsnoseintohumandiscourseexceptwherenecessary,itappearstomethatthelineshouldbedrawnatintentionality.
114.
Iaminclinedtothinkthatdistressingtheclaimanthastobetheprimarypurpose,butIdonotconsiderthatitneedbethesolepurpose.
Thedegreeofdistresswhichisactuallyintendedmustbesignificant,andnottrivial,anditcanamounttofeelingssuchasdespair,misery,terror,fearorevenseriousworry.
Butitplainlydoesnothavetoamounttoarecognisedpsychiatricdisease(evenifsuchdiseaseisanessentialingredient,astowhichseebelow).
Itis,Ithink,hardtobemorespecificthanthat.
115.
Fourthly,thestatementmust,Ithink,bedirectedattheclaimantinordertobetortious.
Inmostcasesthiswilladdnothingtotherequirementsalreadymentioned.
However,IwouldhavethoughtthatastatementwhichisaimedatPage36upsettingalargegroupofaddressees,withoutanyparticularindividual(orrelativelysmallgroupofindividuals)inmind,shouldnotbecaught.
116.
Thenthereisthequestionastowhetheraclaimantcanonlybringanactionifhesuffersdistresstoasufficientdegreetoamounttoarecognisedillnessorcondition(whetherpsychologicalorphysiological-assumingthatthedistinctionisavalidone).
LikeLordHoffmanninWainwrightvHomeOffice[2003]UKHL53,[2004]2AC406,Iconsiderthatthereismuchtobesaidfortheviewthattheclassofpotentialclaimantsshouldnotbelimitedtothosewhocanestablishthattheysufferedfromarecognisedpsychiatricillnessasaresultoftheactionablestatementofthedefendant.
117.
SuchalimitationseemstohavebeenimposedbyKennedyJatpp672-673inDulieu,whenhereferredto"terror"which"operatesthroughpartsofthephysicalorganismtoproducebodilyillness".
However,thatwasacaseinvolvinganegligentact,and,asalreadyexplained,IamunconvincedthatitinvolvedthesametortasWilkinson,althoughitwasreliedonbyKennedyJ.
ItwouldseemthatthereasoninginDulieuwasconsistentwiththeprinciplethatdamagesfordistressinnegligenceareonlyrecoverablefora"recognisablepsychiatricillness"andnotmerelyfor"griefandsorrow",asLordDenningMRputitinHinzvBerry[1970]2QB40,42-43,anapproachwhichwasfollowedbyLordBridgeofHarwichinMcLoughlinvO'Brian[1983]1AC410,437.
118.
Thislimitationappearstohavebeenimposedincasesofnegligenceasamatterofpolicy,andithasbeenjustifiedinanumberofcasesonthegroundthatgriefanddistressarepartofnormallife,whereaspsychiatricillnessisnot–seeegMcLoughlinatp431perLordBridgeandWhitevChiefConstableofSouthYorkshirePolice[1999]2AC455,465perLordGriffiths.
TheAustralianHighCourthasjustifiedtherulebyreferencetotheundesirabilityofencouraginglitigation–seeTamevNewSouthWales(2002)211CLR317,para194perGummowandKirbyJJ.
However,insomenegligencecases,itappearsthatdamagesfordistressfallingshortofpsychiatricillnessmayberecoverable–seetheobservationsofBrookeLJinRobinsonvStHelensMetropolitanBoroughCouncil[2002]EWCACiv1099,paras36-37.
And,asispointedoutinMcGregoronDamages(19thed)(2014),paras5-012and5-013,injurytofeelingsistakenintoaccountwhenassessinggeneraldamagesinclaims,bywayofexample,forassault,invasionofprivacy,maliciousprosecutionanddefamation.
119.
AsIseeit,therefore,thereisplainlyapowerfulcaseforsayingthat,inrelationtotheinstanttort,liabilityfordistressingstatements,whereintenttocausedistressisanessentialingredient,itshouldbeenoughfortheclaimanttoestablishthathesufferedsignificantdistressasaresultofthedefendant'sstatement.
Itisnotentirelyeasytoseewhy,ifanintentiontocausetheclaimantsignificantdistressisPage37aningredientofthetortandisenoughtoestablishthetortinprinciple,theclaimantshouldhavetoestablishthathesufferedsomethingmoreseriousthansignificantdistressbeforehecanrecoveranycompensation.
Further,thenarrowrestrictionsonthetortshouldensurethatitisrarelyinvokedanyway.
120.
Inthelightofarticle10oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights,itisappropriatetoconsiderthejurisprudenceoftheStrasbourgcourt.
Thisisacasewhichinvolvesapurelycommonlawissue,butthecommonlawshouldbegenerallyconsistentwiththeConventionanditwouldbearroganttoassumethattheremaybenoassistancetobegainedfromtheStrasbourgjurisprudence–seeLordReed'silluminatinganalysisinR(Osborn)vParoleBoard[2013]UKSC61,[2014]AC1115,paras56-63.
Inthatconnection,therehavebeenanumberofcaseswheretheStrasbourgcourthasbeencalledontoruleonthecompatibilityofarulingofanationalcourtortribunalthatanoffensivestatementwasunlawful.
AnumberofthosedecisionsweresummarisedinR(Gaunt)vOfficeofCommunications[2011]EWCACiv692,[2011]1WLR2355,paras25-30.
Theyallinvolvedstatementsmadeinpublic,butsomeoftheminvolvedstatementswhichhadbeenheldunlawfulbecausetheywerepersonallyinsulting.
Idonotthinkthatthesecasestakemattersmuchfurtherforpresentpurposes,otherthantoconfirmthevitalnatureoffreedomofexpression,theconsequentrequirementto"establish"thatthereisacauseofaction"convincingly",theimportanceoftakingintoaccountthecontext,andtheneedforproportionalitybothindecidingwhetherthereisacauseofactionandindeterminingthesanction.
121.
ThefinalpointIshouldmakeisthatthiscasehasbeenarguedinthiscourtonthebasisthattheissuebetweenthepartieshastoberesolvedaccordingtoEnglishlaw,ratherthanthelawoftheUS,wheretheclaimantresides.
Itmaywellbethatthatisright(astheCourtofAppealheld),orthat,evenifUnitedStateslawisinfactapplicable,itisthesameasourlaw.
122.
Inallthesecircumstances,itseemstomeclear,evenatthisinterlocutorystage,thattheclaimant'scaseplainlyfailsallbutoneoftherequirementsofthetortonwhichitissaidtobebased.
Whilethereissome(disputed)evidencethattheycouldcausetheclaimantseriousdistress,thecontentsofthedefendant'sbookarenotuntrue,threateningorinsulting,theyarenotgratuitousorunjustified,letaloneoutrageous,theyarenotdirectedattheclaimant,andtheyarenotintendedtodistresstheclaimant.
Accordingly,Ihavenohesitationinagreeingthattheappealshouldbeallowed,andtheorderofBeanJstrikingouttheclaimrestored.