carryrestart

NUCLEARWEAPONSNNSAHasTakenStepstoPreparetoRestartaProgramtoReplacetheW78WarheadCapabilityAccessibleVersionReporttoCongressionalCommitteesNovember2018GAO-19-84UnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOfficeUnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOfficeHighlightsofGAO-19-84,areporttocongressionalcommitteesNovember2018NUCLEARWEAPONSNNSAHasTakenStepstoPreparetoRestartaProgramtoReplacetheW78WarheadCapabilityWhatGAOFoundTheDepartmentofEnergy'sNationalNuclearSecurityAdministration(NNSA)hastakenstepstopreparetorestartalifeextensionprogram(LEP)toreplacethecapabilitiesoftheAirForce'sW78nuclearwarhead—aprogramwhichwaspreviouslysuspended.
AccordingtoNNSAofficials,thesestepsaretypicallyneededtoconductanyLEP.
Therefore,theycanbeundertakendespitethecurrentuncertaintyaboutwhetherthefinalprogramwilldevelopthewarheadfortheAirForceonlyorforboththeAirForceandtheNavy.
Specifically,NNSAhastakenthestepsdescribedbelow:1.
Programmanagement.
NNSAhasbeguntoestablishtheprogrammanagementfunctionsneededtoexecuteaW78replacementprogram,asrequiredbyNNSA'sprogramexecutioninstruction.
Forexample,NNSAhasstartedtodevelopariskmanagementplantodefinetheprocessforidentifyingandmitigatingrisks.
Inaddition,NNSAhascreatedapreliminaryscheduletorestarttheprograminfiscalyear2019inthefeasibilityanddesignoptionsphasewiththegoalofproducingthefirstunitinfiscalyear2030.
(Seefigure)2.
Technologyassessment.
InMay2018,NNSAcompletedanassessmentof126technologiesforpotentialuseinaW78replacement.
Theseincludedninetechnologiesthatareneededtoreplaceobsoleteornolongeravailabletechnologiesormaterials.
Theseareconsidered"must-do"becausetheyaretheonlytechnologiesormaterialsavailabletomeetminimumwarheadrequirementsestablishedbytheDepartmentofDefenseandNNSA.
NNSAofficialssaidthatinfiscalyear2019theywillusetheassessmenttofurtherevaluatetechnologiesforpotentialuseinthewarhead.
3.
Coordinationwithfacilitiesandcapabilities.
NNSA'sprogrammanagerisidentifyingthefacilitiesandcapabilitiesneededtoprovidecomponentsforthewarhead.
Thisinformationwillbeusedtoproduceareportthatidentifiesaspectsoftheprogram—includingfacilitiesandcapabilitiestosupportit—thatcouldaffecttheprogram'sscheduleandtechnicalrisk.
However,severaloftheneededfacilitiesmustbebuiltorrepaired,andtheseactivitiesareseparatelymanagedandsupportedoutsidetheW78replacementprogram—representingacriticalexternalrisktotheprogram.
Asmitigation,theprogramintendstocoordinatewiththeofficesthatoverseethesefacilitiestodraftagreementsthatdescribetheworktobeperformedandtimeframes,amongotherthings.
PreliminaryW78WarheadReplacementProgramRestartScheduleFiscalYear2019through2032,asofJuly2018ViewGAO-19-84.
Formoreinformation,contactAllisonB.
Bawdenat(202)512-3841orbawdena@gao.
gov.
WhyGAODidThisStudyTheDepartmentofDefenseandNNSAhavesoughtfornearlyadecadetoreplacethecapabilitiesoftheagingW78nuclearwarheadusedbytheU.
S.
AirForce.
NNSAundertakesLEPstorefurbishorreplacethecapabilitiesofnuclearweaponscomponents.
Infiscalyear2014,NNSAwasdirectedtosuspendaprogramthatwasevaluatingacapabilitythatcouldreplacetheW78andalsobeusedbytheU.
S.
Navy.
NNSA'smostrecentestimate—reportedinOctober2018—wasthatthecombinedprogramwouldcostabout$10billionto$15billion.
NNSAhasbeendirectedbythe2018NuclearPostureReviewtorestartaprogramtoreplacetheW78fortheAirForceinfiscalyear2019.
The2018NuclearPostureReviewalsodirectedNNSAandtheNavytofurtherevaluatewhethertheNavycouldalsousethewarhead.
Senatereport115-125includedaprovisionforGAOtoreviewNNSA'sprogressontheprogramtoreplacetheW78.
GAO'sreportdescribesNNSA'sstepsinkeyearlyplanningareas—includingprogrammanagement,technologyassessment,andcoordinationwithfacilitiesandcapabilities—topreparetorestartaprogramtoreplacetheW78.
GAOrevieweddocumentationonareassuchasprogrammanagement,technologies,andfacilitiesneededfortheprogram,andinterviewedNNSAandDODofficials.
WhatGAORecommendsGAOisnotmakingrecommendations.
NNSAandDODprovidedtechnicalcomments,whichGAOincorporatedasappropriate.
PageiGAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementContentsLetter1Background5NNSAHasTakenStepstoPreparetoRestartaProgramtoReplacetheW78NuclearWarheadCapability9AgencyComments23AppendixI:NNSA'sProgramManagementFunctionstoExecuteaW78ReplacementProgram26AppendixII:GAOContactandStaffAcknowledgments29AppendixIII:AccessibleData30DataTables30TablesTable1:NumbersofTechnologiesthattheNationalNuclearSecurityAdministration(NNSA)EvaluatedforInclusioninaW78WarheadReplacement,byFunctionalAreaoftheWarheadandSpecifiedCategories17Table2:StepsNNSAIsTakingorPlanstoTaketoEstablishProgramManagementFunctionsNeededtoExecuteaW78WarheadReplacementProgram26FiguresFigure1:Phase6.
XProcessforManagingWarheadLifeExtensionActivitiesforNuclearWeapons7Figure2:NNSA'sPreliminaryW78WarheadReplacementProgramRestartScheduleunderthePhase6.
XProcessfromFiscalYear2019through2032,asofJuly201812AccessibleDataforPreliminaryW78WarheadReplacementProgramRestartScheduleFiscalYear2019through2032,asofJuly201830AccessibleDataforFigure2:NNSA'sPreliminaryW78WarheadReplacementProgramRestartScheduleunderthePhase6.
XProcessfromFiscalYear2019through2032,asofJuly201830PageiiGAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementPageiiiGAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementAbbreviationsDODDepartmentofDefenseDOEDepartmentofEnergyEVMearnedvaluemanagementICBMintercontinentalballisticmissileIW1InteroperableWarhead1LEPlifeextensionprogramMRLmanufacturingreadinesslevelNNSANationalNuclearSecurityAdministrationNPRNuclearPostureReviewPPDPresidentialPolicyDirectiveSLBMsubmarinelaunchedballisticmissileTRLtechnologyreadinesslevelThisisaworkoftheU.
S.
governmentandisnotsubjecttocopyrightprotectionintheUnitedStates.
ThepublishedproductmaybereproducedanddistributedinitsentiretywithoutfurtherpermissionfromGAO.
However,becausethisworkmaycontaincopyrightedimagesorothermaterial,permissionfromthecopyrightholdermaybenecessaryifyouwishtoreproducethismaterialseparately.
Page1GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacement441GSt.
N.
W.
Washington,DC20548LetterNovember30,2018CongressionalCommitteesFornearlyadecade,theDepartmentofDefense(DOD)andtheDepartmentofEnergy's(DOE)NationalNuclearSecurityAdministration(NNSA)havesoughttoreplacethecapabilitiesoftheW78nuclearwarhead—oneoftwoU.
S.
AirForceintercontinentalballisticmissile(ICBM)warheads.
1CriticalcomponentswithintheW78areaging,andthemilitary'srequirementsfor,amongotherthings,thesafetyandsecurityfeaturesofthiswarheadhavechangedsinceitenteredthestockpilein1979.
NNSAisresponsiblefordeliveringnuclearwarheadstotheU.
S.
AirForceandtheU.
S.
Navy,whichareorganizedunderDOD,foruseintheirweaponsdeliverysystems.
2NNSAandDODundertakelifeextensionprograms(LEPs)torefurbishorreplacenuclearweaponscomponentsto,amongotherthings,extendthelivesoftheseweaponsandenhancethesafetyandsecurityofthestockpile.
TheNuclearWeaponsCouncilisthejointDODandDOEactivityresponsibleformattersrelatedtoexecutive-levelmanagementofthenuclearweaponsstockpile.
TheNuclearWeaponsCouncilservesasthefocalpointforinteragencyanalysesanddecisionstomaintainandmanageU.
S.
nuclearweapons,andreviewsandapprovesproposedLEPs.
WhenundertakinganLEP,DOD,withinputfromNNSA,definestheperformance,safety,andsecurityrequirementsforthewarhead—knownasthemilitarycharacteristics—whichDODrefinesovertimeandfinalizesbeforeNNSAbeginsproduction.
NNSAdevelopswarheaddesignstomeettheserequirementsandisultimatelyresponsibleforproducingthewarheads.
TheNuclearWeaponsCouncilisalsousedtoresolvelargerquestionsregardingdesignandcostsforLEPs.
TheApril2010NuclearPostureReview(NPR)—whichdescribedpresidentialpolicyontheroleofnuclearweaponsinnationalsecurity—1ThesecondICBMwarheadisknownastheW87.
2NNSAisaseparatelyorganizedagencywithinDOEresponsibleforthenation'snuclearweapons,nonproliferation,andnavalreactorprograms.
Amongotherthings,NNSA'smissionistomaintainandenhancethesafety,security,reliability,andperformanceoftheU.
S.
nuclearweaponsstockpile.
LetterPage2GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementdirectedNNSAandDODtostudyoptionstoreplacethecapabilitiesoftheW78nuclearwarheadinanICBMsystem.
TheNPRalsodirectedtheagenciestostudywhethertheresultingwarheadcouldalsobefieldedbytheU.
S.
Navyinitssubmarinelaunchedballisticmissile(SLBM)system,makingtheweaponan"interoperable"warhead.
3InSeptember2010,DODandNNSAbeganassessingconceptsforaninteroperablewarheadtoextendthelifeoftheW78andtheNavy'sW88warhead.
4DODsubsequentlybegandraftingmilitarycharacteristicsthatcapturedasetofjointAirForceandNavyrequirements,includinganinteroperablenuclearexplosivepackage—theexplosivecoreoftheweapon—andadaptablenonnuclearcomponentsfortheAirForce'sICBMandNavy'sSLBMsystems.
5From2011through2014,NNSA,withinputfromDOD,assessedconceptsforthewarheadbasedonthedraftmilitarycharacteristicsandcompletedinitialfeasibilitystudiesanalyzingvariouswarheaddesignoptions.
NNSAconcluded,onthebasisofthesestudies,thattheinitialdesignconceptsthatitproposedcould,inprinciple,befieldedinbothAirForceandNavydeliverysystems.
Duringthisperiod,thewarheadreplacementprogramwasinitiallyreferredtoastheW78LEP,thenastheW78/88-1LEP,6andthensubsequentlyastheInteroperableWarhead3DOD,NuclearPostureReviewReport(Washington,D.
C.
:April2010).
4TheNavyhastwoSLBMwarheads—theW88andtheW76.
NNSAiscurrentlyextendingthelifeoftheW76throughanLEPcalledtheW76-1.
5AballisticmissilenuclearwarheadconsistsofnuclearandnonnuclearcomponentsenclosedwithinanaeroshellsuppliedbyeithertheAirForceortheNavy.
Thenuclearcomponentsconsistofaprimaryandasecondaryenclosedwithinaradiationcase—referredtoasthenuclearexplosivepackage.
Whendetonated,thesenuclearcomponentsproducetheweapon'sexplosiveforce,or"yield.
"Thearrayofnonnuclearcomponentswithintheweaponcontrolandsupportthedetonationsequenceandhelpensureitssafetyandsecurityfromhumantamperingandfromenvironmentaleffects.
6AnAugust2014close-outreportpreparedbyLawrenceLivermoreNationalLaboratory(LawrenceLivermore)statedthatthepotentialcapabilitiesoftheW78/88-1couldincludeacapabilitythatcouldbeanLEPfortheW88,replaceaportionoftheW76-1s,orprovidea"hedge"tomitigaterisksposedbyunforeseentechnicalproblemswiththeW88orW76-1orposedbychangesintheinternationalsecurityenvironment.
Since1994,theUnitedStateshasretainedastockpileofnondeployedweaponstoprovideahedge.
LetterPage3GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacement1(IW1).
7Duringthisfouryearperiod,NNSAexpendedabout$114.
5millionontheprogram,accordingtoinformationprovidedbyNNSA.
Infiscalyear2014,inpartbecauseofbudgetconstraints,theNuclearWeaponsCouncildirectedNNSAtosuspendtheprogramforananticipated5years,withresumptionplannedinfiscalyear2020.
8Atthetimetheprogramwassuspended,NNSAhadselectedthemajorcomponentsofthenuclearexplosivepackagetoreplacethecapabilitiesoftheW78andbriefedtheNuclearWeaponsCouncilonsomeofthosechoices.
9InFebruary2018,DODissuedanewNPRthatrevisednuclearweaponspolicyandprograms.
10Ratherthanendorsingtheinteroperablewarheadconcept,itdirectedNNSAandDODtorestarttheprogramtoreplacetheW78warheadandtocontinuetoinvestigatethefeasibilityoffieldingthenuclearexplosivepackageinaNavySLBMsystem.
ItalsodirectedNNSAtorestarttheW78replacementwarheadprogramayearearly,infiscalyear2019,tobetteralignitsschedulewiththeAirForce'sscheduleformodernizingitsICBMsystem.
11NNSA'smostrecentpreliminarycostestimate—reportedinOctober2018andbasedonaprogramtoprovideawarheadtoboththeAirForceandNavy—wasthattheprogramwould7NNSAcalledthewarheadIW1becauseitwastobethefirstofthree"interoperablewarheads"thattheagencyplannedtodevelopandproducebetweenabout2020and2050.
TheseinteroperablewarheadswerepartoftheNuclearWeaponsCouncil'slong-termplanforthestockpileadoptedinJanuary2013andcalledthe"3+2strategy.
"Inadditiontothethreeinteroperablewarheads,theplanincludeddevelopmentoftwoair-deliveredweapons.
Thisplanaimedtoachievegoalsestablishedbythe2010NPRtoreducethenumberofwarheadtypesandretainthesmallestpossiblenuclearstockpileconsistentwiththeneedtodeteradversaries,reassureallies,andhedgeagainsttechnicalorgeopoliticalsurprise,amongotherthings.
8AccordingtoNNSAofficials,duringfiscalyears2015through2017,NNSAexpendedanadditional$4.
3millionusing"carryover"fundingfrompriorfiscalyearstosupportactivitiestocloseouttheW78/88-1LEPandevaluatetheimpactsoftheprogramsuspensionontheexistingW78andW88warheads.
9TheprogramplanstoreplacetheW78pitwithonebasedontheW87design.
Thepitispartofaweapon'sprimary.
10DOD,NuclearPostureReview(Washington,D.
C.
:February2018).
11Accordingtothe2018NPR,theAirForce'sICBMmodernizationprogram—whichisintendedtoreplacetheoutdatedMinutemanIIIICBMthatcarriestheW78andW87warheads—isreferredtoastheGroundBasedStrategicDeterrent.
The2018NPRspecificallydirectedthattheW78replacementprogrambeadvancedbyoneyeartosupportfieldingitonthenewsystemby2030.
LetterPage4GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementcostabout$10billionto$15billionfromfiscalyear2019throughfiscalyear2041.
12TheSenateArmedServicesCommitteereport115-125accompanyingS.
1519,abillfortheNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2018,includesaprovisionforGAOtoreportonNNSA'sprogressontheIW1.
ThisreportdescribesthestepsthatNNSAhastakentoprepareaW78replacementprogramforrestart.
13TodescribethestepsthatNNSAhastakentoprepareaW78replacementprogramforrestart,wefocusedontheagency'splanningandactivitiesduringfiscalyears2015through2018.
Inparticular,wefocusedonplanningactivitiesrelatedtoprogrammanagementandpersonnel,technologydevelopmentandassessment,andcoordinationwithfacilitiesandcapabilitiesbecausetheyarekeyareasintheearlyplanningphasesofNNSA'sLEPprocess.
WerevieweddocumentationonNNSA'splanningforprogrammanagement,technologies,andfacilitiesforaW78replacementprogram,suchasinternalbriefingdocumentsandatechnologyreadinessassessmentthatNNSAcompletedinMay2018inpreparationtorestarttheprogram.
WeinterviewedNNSAofficialsaswellascontractorsfromLawrenceLivermore,LosAlamosNationalLaboratory(LosAlamos),andSandiaNationalLaboratories(Sandia)toobtaininformationabouttheplanningforprogrammanagementandpersonnel,technology,andfacilitiesneededfortheprogram.
Weinterviewedcontractorsattheselaboratoriesbecausetheyareinvolvedinthedesignofthenuclearwarheadsandwarheadcomponents.
14WealsointerviewedNNSAofficialsintheOfficeofTechnologyMaturationtolearnabouttechnologydevelopmentrelatedtoaW78replacement,andintheOfficeofSystemsEngineeringandIntegrationtolearnabouttheresultsofthe12NNSA,FiscalYear2019StockpileStewardshipManagementPlan-BiennialPlanSummary,ReporttoCongress(Washington,D.
C.
:October2018).
NNSA'splan,updatedannually,istheagency'sformalmeansofcommunicatingtoCongressinformationonNNSA's25-yearprogramofrecordtomaintainthesafety,security,andeffectivenessofthenuclearstockpile.
13Becausetheplanforaninteroperablewarheadisuncertain,forthepurposesofthisreportwerefertotheprogramastheW78replacementprogram.
AccordingtoNNSAofficialswhoreviewedadraftofourreport,inSeptember2018theNuclearWeaponsCouncilendorsedthename"W87-1"fortheprogramwhenitrestartsattheendofNovember2018.
14WeareseparatelyreviewingmanufacturingcapacityplanningatNNSA'sKansasCityNationalSecurityCampuswhichprocuresandproducesnonnuclearcomponentsofnuclearweapons.
LetterPage5GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementtechnologyreadinessassessmentandthepotentialimpactoftheprogramonfacilitieswithinthenuclearsecurityenterprise.
WealsointerviewedofficialsfromDOD'sOfficeoftheDeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforNuclearMatters,theAirForceNuclearWeaponsCenter,theNavyStrategicSystemsPrograms,andtheU.
S.
StrategicCommandtolearnabouttheirrolesinpreparingtorestarttheprogramandinsettingrequirementsforthewarhead.
WeconductedthisperformanceauditfromOctober2017toNovember2018,inaccordancewithgenerallyacceptedgovernmentauditingstandards.
Thosestandardsrequirethatweplanandperformtheaudittoobtainsufficient,appropriateevidencetoprovideareasonablebasisforourfindingsandconclusionsbasedonourauditobjectives.
Webelievethattheevidenceobtainedprovidesareasonablebasisforourfindingsandconclusionsbasedonourauditobjectives.
BackgroundThissectiondescribes(1)NNSA'sweaponsdesignandproductionsites;(2)theframeworkformanagingLEPs,knownasthePhase6.
Xprocess,andNNSA'sprogramexecutioninstruction;and(3)NNSA'stechnologydevelopmentandassessmentprocess.
NNSAWeaponsDesignandProductionSitesNNSAoverseesthreenationalsecuritylaboratories—LawrenceLivermoreinCalifornia,LosAlamosinNewMexico,andSandiainNewMexicoandCalifornia.
LawrenceLivermoreandLosAlamosarethedesignlaboratoriesforthenuclearcomponentsofaweapon,whileSandiaworkswithbothtodesignnonnuclearcomponentsandasthesystemintegrator.
LosAlamosledtheoriginaldesignoftheW78,butLawrenceLivermoreisleadingcurrenteffortstodesignthereplacementwarhead.
NNSAalsooverseesfournuclearweaponsproductionplants—thePantexPlantinTexas,theY-12NationalSecurityComplexinTennessee,theKansasCityNationalSecurityCampusinMissouri,andtheSavannahRiverSiteinSouthCarolina.
15Ingeneral,thePantexPlantassembles,15ThePantexPlantandY-12NationalSecurityComplexaremanagedandoperatedbyasinglecontractor,ConsolidatedNuclearSecurity.
LetterPage6GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementmaintains,anddismantlesnuclearweapons;theY-12NationalSecurityComplexproducesthesecondaryandtheradiationcase;theKansasCityNationalSecurityCampusproducesnonnuclearcomponents;andtheSavannahRiverSitereplenishesacomponentknownasagastransfersystemthattransfersboostgastotheprimaryduringdetonation.
Phase6.
XProcessforManagingLEPsandNNSA'sProgramManagementDirectiveDODandNNSAhaveestablishedaprocess,knownasthePhase6.
Xprocess,tomanagelifeextensionprograms.
16AccordingtoaNuclearWeaponsCouncildocument,NNSA'sOfficeofDefenseProgramswillfollowthisprocesstomanageaW78replacementprogram.
Asshowninfigure1,thisprocessincludeskeyphasesormilestonesthatanuclearweaponLEPmustundertakebeforeproceedingtosubsequentsteps.
16DODandNNSA,ProceduralGuidelineforthePhase6.
XProcess(Washington,D.
C.
:December2015).
LetterPage7GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementFigure1:Phase6.
XProcessforManagingWarheadLifeExtensionActivitiesforNuclearWeaponsInJanuary2017,whiletheprogramwasstillsuspended,NNSAissuedasupplementaldirectivethatdefinesadditionalactivitiesthatNNSAofficesshouldconductinsupportofthePhase6.
Xprocess.
17Forexample,asdiscussedbelow,NNSA'ssupplementaldirectiveestablishedanewrequirementduringPhase6.
1(ConceptAssessment)thatNNSAconductatechnologyreadinessassessmentoftechnologiesproposedforpotentialuseinthewarhead.
Inaddition,NNSA'sOfficeofDefenseProgramsissuedaprogramexecutioninstructionthatdefinesenhancedprogrammanagementfunctionsforanLEPandotherprograms.
18ThisinstructionalsodescribesthelevelofprogrammanagementrigorthattheLEPmustachieveasitadvancesthroughthePhase6.
Xprocess.
17NNSA,Phase6.
XProcess,SupplementalDirective,SD452.
3-2(Jan.
19,2017).
18NNSA,DPProgramExecutionInstruction:NA-10ProgramManagementToolsandProcesses(January2016).
LetterPage8GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementNNSA'sTechnologyDevelopmentandAssessmentProcessAccordingtoNNSA'sFiscalYear2018StockpileStewardshipManagementPlan,NNSAextendsthelifeofexistingU.
S.
nuclearwarheadsbyreplacingagednuclearandnon-nuclearcomponentswithmoderntechnologies.
Inreplacingthesecomponents,NNSAseeksapproachesthatwillincreasesafety,improvesecurity,andaddressdefectsinthewarhead.
Severaltechnologiesarefrequentlydevelopedconcurrentlybeforeoneapproachisselected.
AccordingtoNNSA'sFiscalYear2018StockpileStewardshipManagementPlan,thisapproachallowsselectionoftheoptionwhichbestmeetswarheadrequirementsandreducestherisksandcostsassociatedwithanLEP.
NNSAconductstechnologyreadinessassessmentstoprovideasnapshotintimeofthematurityoftechnologiesandtheirreadinessforinsertionintoaprogram'sdesignandschedule,accordingtoNNSA'sguidance.
19NNSA'sassessmentsalsolookattheabilitytomanufacturethetechnology.
NNSAmeasurestechnologicalmaturityusingtechnologyreadinesslevels(TRLs)onascalefromTRL1(basicprinciplesdeveloped)throughTRL9(actualsystemoperation).
Similarly,NNSAmeasuresmanufacturingreadinessusingmanufacturingreadinesslevels(MRL)onascalefromMRL1(basicmanufacturingimplicationsidentified)throughMRL9(capabilityinplacetobeginfullrateproduction).
AccordingtoNNSA'sguidance,NNSArecommendsbutdoesnotrequirethatanLEP'scriticaltechnologiesreachTRL5(technologycomponentsareintegratedwithrealisticsupportingelements)atthebeginningofPhase6.
3(DevelopmentEngineering).
20AttheendofPhase6.
3,itrecommends19NNSA,DefensePrograms,TechnologyReadinessAssessmentImplementationGuideRevision3(Washington,D.
C.
:January2018).
20WereportedinJanuary2018thatNNSAhasnotestablishedrequirementsforLEPstoensurethattheircriticaltechnologiesmeetTRLbenchmarksatkeyPhase6.
Xdecisionpoints.
WerecommendedthattheAdministratorofNNSAshouldrequireitsprogramstoensurethatLEPcriticaltechnologiesmeetspecificTRLbenchmarksatdecisionpoints,orotherwisedocumentwithprogramexecutiveapprovaltheirrationalefornotmeetingthesebenchmarks.
NNSAstatedthatithasalreadytakenstepstoincludespecificsuggestedbenchmarksatdecisionpoints,butwecontinuetobelievethatwithoutestablishingarequirementtomeetspecificTRLbenchmarksatdecisionpointsortodocumentwithprogramexecutiveapprovaltherationalefornotmeetingthesebenchmarksincaseswhereanLEP'scriticaltechnologydoesnotmeetaspecificTRL,NNSAmaynothaveasufficientlydevelopedprocessforassessingandacceptingtechnicalrisk.
SeeGAO,NuclearWeapons:NNSAShouldAdoptAdditionalBestPracticestoBetterManageRiskforLifeExtensionPrograms,GAO-18-129(Washington,D.
C.
:Jan.
30,2018).
LetterPage9GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementthatatechnologybejudgedtohaveachievedMRL5(capabilitytoproduceprototypecomponentsinaproductionrelevantenvironment).
However,accordingtoNNSAofficials,lowerTRLsandMRLsmaybeacceptedincircumstanceswhereatechnologyisclosetoachievingthedesiredlevelsortheprogramteamjudgesthatthebenefitofthetechnologyishighandworththeincreasedriskthatitmaynotbesufficientlymaturewhentheprogramneedsit.
NNSAHasTakenStepstoPreparetoRestartaProgramtoReplacetheW78NuclearWarheadCapabilityNNSAhastakenstepstopreparetorestartaprogramtoreplacetheW78nuclearwarheadcapability.
AccordingtoNNSAofficials,thesestepsaretypicallyneededtoconductanyLEP.
Therefore,theycanbeundertakendespitetheuncertaintyaboutwhetherthefinalprogramwilldevelopthewarheadfortheAirForceonlyorforboththeAirForceandtheNavy.
Specifically,NNSAhas(1)takeninitialstepstoestablishtheprogrammanagementfunctionsneededtoexecutetheprogramandassemblepersonnelforaprogrammanagementteam;(2)assessedtechnologiesthathavebeenunderdevelopmentwhiletheprogramwassuspendedthatcouldpotentiallybeusedtosupportaW78replacement;and(3)initiatedplansforthefacilitiesandcapabilitiesneededtoprovidethenuclearandnonnuclearcomponentsforthewarhead.
21Atthetimeofourreview,NNSAandDODofficialsstatedthat,inresponsetothe2018NPR,theyplannedtorestartaprogramthatwouldfocusonreplacingthecapabilitiesoftheW78fortheAirForce;however,theextenttowhichtheprogramwouldfocusonprovidinganuclear21AccordingtoNNSAofficials,tocompleteprogramreadinessactivitiessuchasdevelopmentofinitialdraftsofprogramdocumentsinfiscalyear2018andthetechnologyreadinessassessment(discussedbelow),NNSAusedfederalstaffandfederalsupportcontractorstaffpaidwithfundsavailableunderitsfederalsalariesandexpensesappropriation.
AccordingtoNNSAofficials,NNSAhasnothaddirectprogramfundsavailableforaW78replacementorIW1lifeextensionprogramsincetheIW1programwassuspendedinfiscalyear2014.
NNSA'sfiscalyear2019budgetjustificationincludedarequestforapproximately$53millionunderitsweaponsactivitiesappropriationtosupportdirectprogramactivitiesinfiscalyear2019.
LetterPage10GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementexplosivepackagefortheNavywasuncertain.
22DODofficialssaidthattheNavyplanstocompleteastudyexaminingthefeasibilityofusingthenuclearexplosivepackagedevelopedfortheW78replacementwarheadinitsSLBMsystembytheendoffiscalyear2019.
23AccordingtoDODofficials,theNuclearWeaponsCouncilwillmakeadecisionaboutdevelopinganinteroperablewarheadfortheAirForceandtheNavybasedontheresultsofthestudybut,asofAugust2018,hadnotestablishedtimeframesformakingthatdecision.
AccordingtoAirForceandNNSAofficials,iftheNuclearWeaponsCouncildecidedthattheNavyshouldparticipateintheprogram,thenNNSAwouldnotneedtoredotheworkplannedforfiscalyear2019.
ProgramManagementandPersonnelNNSAhastakeninitialstepstoestablishtheprogrammanagementfunctionsneededtoexecutetheprogramandassemblepersonnelforaprogrammanagementteam,asfollows:·Programmanagement.
Infiscalyear2018,NNSAstartedtoestablishtheprogrammanagementfunctionsneededtoexecuteaW78replacementprogram,asrequiredintheOfficeofDefensePrograms'programexecutioninstruction.
Inpreparationfortheprogramrestart,NNSAassignedamanagerforaW78replacementprogramwhoistakingorplanstotakestepstoimplementthesefunctions.
Forexample,amongothersteps,theW78replacementprogrammanagertoldusthathehadstarteddevelopingtheriskmanagementplantodefinetheprocessforidentifyingandmitigatingrisksthatmayimpacttheprogram.
TheprogrammanageralsosaidNNSAhadstartedtoadaptastandardizedworkbreakdownstructureforlifeextensionprogramstodefineandorganizetheW7822AccordingtoNNSAofficialswhoreviewedadraftofourreport,NNSAwillnotrestarttheprograminfiscalyear2019untiltheagencydeliversareporttoCongress.
Specifically,theconferencereportaccompanyingthebilltoprovidefiscalyear2019appropriationsforNNSAdirectedNNSAtoprovidetotheappropriationscommitteesanupdatedestimateofthecostandschedulefortheW78replacementwarheaddevelopmentandproduction,amongotherthings.
Thisreportisduenolaterthan60daysafterenactmentandpriortocommencementofPhase6.
2.
H.
R.
Rep.
No.
115-929,at165(2018).
ThebillwasenactedonSeptember21,2018.
Pub.
L.
No.
115-244(2018).
23TheNavy'sfiscalyear2019budgetjustificationincludedarequestfor$48millionforfiscalyear2019tostudythefeasibilityofusingaW78replacementwarheadinitsSLBMsystem.
LetterPage11GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementreplacementprogram'sworkscopeforrestart.
24Aninitialversionofthisworkbreakdownstructurewouldbecompletedbeforetheprogramrestartsinfiscalyear2019,accordingtotheprogrammanager.
Further,asNNSArefinesthescopeofwork,theagencywillrefineandtailortheworkbreakdownstructure.
Atthetimeofourreview,thisworkwasunderdevelopmentandthereforewewerenotabletoreviewtheseplansandtools.
Inaddition,asofJuly2018,NNSAhadcreatedapreliminaryscheduleforaW78replacementprogramunderthePhase6.
Xprocess(seefig.
2).
24Aworkbreakdownstructureisaproduct-orientedbreakdownoftheworkscopeintodiscreteelementsofworktoprovideameansforintegrationofcost,schedule,andscopeofeachelement.
LetterPage12GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementFigure2:NNSA'sPreliminaryW78WarheadReplacementProgramRestartScheduleunderthePhase6.
XProcessfromFiscalYear2019through2032,asofJuly2018Notes:Thenumbers1,2,3,4belowtheyearrefertothequartersofthefiscalyear.
TheDepartmentofDefenseandDepartmentofEnergy'sNationalNuclearSecurityAdministration(NNSA)haveestablishedaprocess,knownasthePhase6.
Xprocess,tomanagelifeextensionprogramssuchastheW78replacementprogram.
NNSAwillrestarttheprograminPhase6.
2(FeasibilityandDesignOptions).
NNSAcompletedPhase6.
1(ConceptAssessment)andinitiallystartedPhase6.
2inJune2012beforetheprogramwassuspendedinfiscalyear2014.
AccordingtoNNSA'spreliminaryschedule,theprogramwill:·RestartinPhase6.
2(FeasibilityandDesignOptions)inthethirdquarteroffiscalyear2019.
NNSApreviouslycompletedPhase6.
1andwasauthorizedbytheNuclearWeaponsCounciltostartPhase6.
2inJune2012.
DuringPhase6.
2,NNSAplansto,amongotherthings,selectdesignoptionsanddevelopcostestimatesoftheselecteddesignoptions.
·ConductPhase6.
2A(DesignDefinitionandCostStudy)foroneyearbeginninginthefourthquarteroffiscalyear2021.
Duringthisphase,forexample,NNSAplanstodevelopapreliminarycostestimatefortheprogram,calledaweaponsdesignandcostreport,andalsoproduceanindependentcostestimate.
·StartPhase6.
3(DevelopmentEngineering)inthefourthquarteroffiscalyear2022andtransitiontoPhase6.
4(ProductionEngineering)inthemid-2020s.
Duringthesephases,NNSAwilldevelopthefinaldesignaswellasbeginproducingselectedacquisitionreports,whichdetailthetotalprogramcost,schedule,andperformance,amongotherthings.
AccordingtotheW78programmanager,themilitarycharacteristicswillbefinalizedinPhase6.
4andbeforethatpointDODwillcontinuetoupdatetherequirements.
LetterPage13GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacement·Achieveproductionofthefirstwarhead—Phase6.
5—bythesecondquarteroffiscalyear2030sothatitcanbefieldedontheAirForce'splannedGroundBasedStrategicDeterrentthatsameyear.
·StartPhase6.
6(FullScaleProduction)bythesecondquarteroffiscalyear2031.
Whentheprogramrestartsinfiscalyear2019,NNSAintendstodeveloporfinalizeinitialversionsofotherplansandtoolssuchasarequirementsmanagementplan,accordingtotheprogrammanager.
25(SeeappendixIforadetaileddescriptionofthestepsNNSAistakingorplanstotaketoestablishtheprogrammanagementfunctionsneededtoexecuteaW78replacementprogram,accordingtothemanagerfortheW78replacementprogram.
)TheprogrammanageralsotoldusthatastheprogramprogressesthroughPhases6.
2(FeasibilityandDesignOptions),6.
2A(DesignDefinitionandCostStudy),and6.
3(DevelopmentEngineering),NNSAwillincreasethematurityoftheprogrammanagementprocessesandtools,consistentwiththeOfficeofDefensePrograms'programexecutioninstruction.
Forexample,inPhases6.
2and6.
2A,NNSAintendstoestablishanearnedvaluemanagementsystem(EVM)—usedtomeasuretheperformanceoflarge,complexprograms.
26InPhase6.
3,NNSAwillfurtherdevelopthesystemtobeconsistentwithDOEandindustrystandards,asspecifiedinthe25Arequirementsmanagementplanisusedtoorganizeandmanagerequirementsrangingfromhigh-level,policyandstrategicdocumentsdowntoproductionrequirementsatthecontractorlevel.
NNSAguidancedirectsthatadatabasebeusedtomanagetherequirements.
26AnEVMsystemisamanagementtoolthatmeasuresthevalueofworkaccomplishedinagivenperiodandcomparesitwiththeplannedvalueofworkscheduledandtheactualcostofworkaccomplished.
EVMisameansofconductingcostandscheduleperformanceanalysis.
Itprovidesanobjectiveviewofprogramstatusandcanalertprogrammanagerstopotentialproblemssoonerthanexpendituresalonecan.
LetterPage14GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementprogramexecutioninstruction.
27NNSAofficialssaidtheywillneedtoachievesufficientprogrammanagementrigorinPhase6.
3toeffectivelyreporttoCongressonthestatusandperformanceoftheprogramasNNSAdevelopscostandschedulebaselines.
·Personnel.
Atthetimeofourreview,NNSAwasreconstitutingaprogrammanagementteam.
Specifically,asmentionedabove,NNSAassignedanewprogrammanagerinMarch2017.
Inthespringof2018,NNSAbeganassigningadditionalfederalstaffandcontractorsupporttohelprampuptheprograminadvanceofthefiscalyear2019restartdate.
Accordingtotheprogrammanager,heexpectedtocompleteaplaninthelatesummerorearlyfallof2018thatNNSAcouldusetohireadditionalfederalstaffneededtomanagetheprograminfiscalyear2019.
TheadvanceddevelopmentandimplementationofstaffingplanspriortoeachphaseofanLEPwasakeylessonlearnedfromanNNSAreviewofanotherLEP—theW76-1.
28TechnologyDevelopmentandAssessmentWhiletheprogramwassuspended,NNSAsupportedotherprogramsthatdevelopedweaponstechnologies—includingmaterialsandmanufacturingprocesses—thatcouldpotentiallybeusedbytheW78replacementprogramandpotentiallybyotherfuturelifeextensionprograms.
29Specifically,accordingtoNNSAofficials,NNSAsupportedthe27WereportedinJanuary2018thatNNSAhasnotadoptedtwobestpracticesrelatedtotheuseofEVMthatcouldhelptheagencybettermanageriskforitsLEPs,whicharehavinganindependententitybothvalidateEVMsystemsagainsttheEVMnationalstandardandconductsurveillancereviewsonEVMsystems.
WerecommendedthattheAdministratorofNNSAshouldrequireanindependententityto(1)validatethatcontractorEVMsystemsusedforLEPsmeettheEVMnationalstandard,and(2)conductsurveillancereviewsofcontractorEVMsystemsusedforLEPstoensurethattheymaintaincompliancewiththeEVMnationalstandardthroughprogramcompletion.
NNSAstatedthatitagreedwithourrecommendationsbutalsostatedthatithasalreadyaddressedthem,asdiscussedinourJanuary2018report.
Wereportedthatwedisagreeandbelievethatfurtheractionisneededtoaddressthetworecommendations.
SeeGAO,NuclearWeapons:NNSAShouldAdoptAdditionalBestPracticestoBetterManageRiskforLifeExtensionPrograms,GAO-18-129(Washington,D.
C.
:Jan.
30,2018).
28NNSA,DefenseProgramsW76-1LifeExtensionProgramLessonsLearnedStudy,(Washington,D.
C.
:Aug.
3,2017).
29NNSAofficialstoldusthattheycannotdisaggregatethespendingontheseprogramstoquantifyanamountofspendingattributabletobenefitaspecificfuturewarheadprogramsuchasaW78replacementprogram.
LetterPage15GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementdevelopmentoftechnologiesthroughongoingLEPs(suchastheW80-4LEP)andothertechnologymaturationprojects(suchastheJointTechnologyDemonstrator)thatcouldsupportfutureLEPs.
30Forexample,theW80-4programhassupporteddevelopmentatLawrenceLivermoreofcertainnewmaterialsasariskmitigationstrategyincasecertainlegacymaterialsusedinthesecondaryarenotavailable.
AccordingtoNNSAofficials,NNSAwilllikelycontinuetodevelopthesenewmaterialsforuseinfutureweapons,includingtheW78replacement.
Inaddition,contractorsatLawrenceLivermoretoldusthattestdemonstrationsconductedundertheJointTechnologyDemonstratorhavehelpedtomaturepotentialtechnologiesforaW78replacement.
ExamplestheycitedincludedadditivelymanufacturedmountsandcushionsforsecuringandstabilizingthenuclearexplosivepackageinsidetheAirForce'saeroshell.
31InMay2018,inanticipationoftherestartofaW78replacementprogramandtoretroactivelyaddressNNSA'snewsupplementalrequirementtoconductatechnologyreadinessassessmentinPhase6.
1,NNSA'sOfficeofSystemsEngineeringandIntegrationcompletedatechnologyreadinessassessmentthatevaluatedthematurityoftechnologiespotentiallyavailablefortheW78replacementprogram.
32AccordingtoNNSAofficials,theassessmentidentifiedandevaluatedtechnologiesthatNNSAwouldhaveavailableforthenextLEP,irrespectiveofwhetherthefinalprogramwillreplacetheW78warheadinICBMsonlyorwillalsobeusedintheNavy'sSLBMs.
30TheW80-4LEPissupportedbytheOfficeofDefensePrograms'OfficeofMajorModernizationandisfocusedonextendingthelifeoftheW80cruisemissilewarhead.
TheJointTechnologyDemonstratorissupportedbytheOfficeofDefensePrograms'OfficeofTechnologyMaturationunderitsDemonstratorInitiativesprogram.
TheJointTechnologyDemonstratorisastrategiccollaborationbetweentheUnitedStatesandUnitedKingdomdedicatedtothedesignanddevelopmentofaseriesofjointtestsdemonstratingnewsafety,security,andadvancedmanufacturingtechnologies.
TheJointTechnologyDemonstratorisintendedtobuydownriskinpreparationforfuturesystems,suchastheW78replacement,byexercisingthecapabilitytodesign,develop,produce,andcertifynuclearweaponcomponents.
31Additivemanufacturingreferstoadvanced,next-generationmanufacturingprocessesthatfocusontheuseoftechnologythatprintsthree-dimensionalobjects,alsoknownas3Dprinting.
32NNSA'sOfficeofSystemsEngineeringandIntegrationwasdirectedtoconducttheassessmentinMarch2017.
BecausetheassessmentwasinitiatedbeforeDODreleasedthe2018NPR,theassessmentusedthewarheadname,IW1,whichwastheNuclearWeaponsCouncil'snameforthesuspendedprogramofrecordatthetime.
LetterPage16GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementTheassessmentevaluated126technologiesbasedonproposalsfromthelaboratoriesandproductionsites.
Asshownintable1below,theproposalsrelatedtokeyfunctionalareasofthewarhead,includingthenuclearexplosivepackageandthearming,fuzing,andfiringmechanism—whichprovidessignalingthatinitiatesthenuclearexplosivechain.
33FortheW78warheadreplacement,DODdividedthemilitarycharacteristicsintotwocategories:thresholdorminimumrequirements(or"needs")andobjectiveoroptionalrequirements(or"wants").
NNSA'sassessmentgroupedthetechnologiesintooneofthreecategories,asfollows.
34·Mustdo.
Atechnologydeemed"mustdo"meansthatitistheonlytechnologyavailablethatcanmeetaminimumrequirement(or"need")forthewarheadtofunction.
Thetechnologythatpreviouslyfulfilledthisrequirementisgenerallyobsoleteornolongerproduced,andtherearenoalternatives.
·Mustdo(tradespace).
"Mustdo(tradespace)"technologiesfulfillaminimumrequirement(or"need")forthewarhead,buttherearetwoormoretechnologiesthatcouldmeetthisneed.
NNSAmustevaluateandselectwhichtechnologyitwillusetofulfilltheneed.
·Tradespace.
"Tradespace"technologiesarethosethatcanmeetanoptionalrequirement(or"want")forthewarhead.
33Theotherfunctionalareaswerecabling,electronics,andsensors;gastransfersystem;neutrongenerators—whichprovidesneutronsatspecifictimingandratestoinitiateweaponfunction;material,production,andsurveillance;andsurety—whichreferstomanagementofthefourareasofriskinanuclearweapon:(1)safety,(2)security,(3)controlofunauthorizeduseordetonation(i.
e.
,usecontrol),and(4)reliability.
34AccordingtoNNSA'sassessment,futuredecisionsaboutsystemdesigncouldleadNNSAtorecategorizesomeofthetechnologies.
LetterPage17GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementTable1:NumbersofTechnologiesthattheNationalNuclearSecurityAdministration(NNSA)EvaluatedforInclusioninaW78WarheadReplacement,byFunctionalAreaoftheWarheadandSpecifiedCategoriesFunctionalareaMustdoMustdo(tradespace)TradespaceArming,fuzing,andfiring31011Cabling,electronics,andsensors1310Gastransfersystem020Neutrongenerators040Nuclearexplosivepackage1a15a9aMaterial,production,andsurveillance1a13a34aSurety31211aTotal95975Source:NNSA'sTechnologyReadinessAssessmentfortheInteroperableWarhead-1/W78replacement.
May2018.
|GAO-19-84Notes:The"mustdo"categorymeansthetechnologyistheonlytechnologytomeetaminimumrequirement(or"need")forthewarhead;the"mustdo(tradespace)"categorymeansthetechnologyisoneofseveraltechnologiesthatmeetaminimumrequirement(or"need");andthe"tradespace"categorymeansthetechnologyisoneofseveraltechnologiesthatcanmeetanoptionalrequirement(or"want").
aIndicatesoverlapoftechnologiesinfunctionalareas.
NNSAevaluatedatotalof126technologies.
Amongthenine"mustdo"technologiesthatNNSAevaluated,forexample,wasanewmanufacturingprocessbeingdevelopedatSandiatoproduceatypeofmagnesiumoxide—neededforuseinthethermalbatteriesthatpowerthewarhead'sfiringmechanism—thatisnolongeravailablefromavendorandforwhichNNSA'sexistingsuppliesarelimited.
Forthisnewprocess,theassessmentteamestimatedthatithadcompletedTRL1(basicprinciplesdeveloped)buthadnotyetreachedMRL1(basicmanufacturingimplicationsidentified).
ThetechnologyreadinessassessmentnotedthatfortechnologieswithaTRLof3orless,anMRLof1orlessisexpected.
Inaddition,accordingtothereport,Sandiaestimatedthatitmaycostabout$7.
1milliontodevelopthematerialandmanufacturingprocesstoTRL5andMRL4duringfiscalyears2018through2023—whentheprogramisslatedtoreachPhase6.
3—toachievealevelofreadinesswhereitcouldpotentiallybeincludedinthedesignoftheW78replacementwarhead.
Amongthe59"mustdo(tradespace)"technologiesthatNNSAevaluatedwere,forexample,twonewgastransfersystemtechnologiesdevelopedbySandiathatmayofferadvantagescomparedwiththeexistingtechnology.
Agastransfersystemisarequiredcapability(or"mustdo")but,accordingtothetechnologyreadinessassessmentreport,NNSAneedstocomparethecosts,benefits,andrisksofthesenewLetterPage18GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementtechnologieswiththetraditionaltechnology(i.
e.
,evaluatethe"tradespace")andmakeaselectionamongthem.
Thefirstnewtechnologywasagastransfersystembottlemadeoutofaluminumthatcouldbecheaper,weighless,andlastlongerthanthegastransfersystemusedintheW78.
Accordingtothetechnologyreadinessassessmentreport,theassessmentteamestimatedthealuminum-basedbottlehadcompletedTRL2butdidnothaveenoughinformationtoestimateanMRL.
Sandiaestimatedthatitwouldcostabout$6.
5milliontoachieveTRL5andMRL4duringfiscalyears2018through2023.
35ThesecondSandiatechnologyinvolvedanadvancedgastransfersystemtechnology.
TheassessmentteamestimatedthatthistechnologyhadcompletedTRL3butdidnothaveenoughinformationtoestimateanMRL.
Sandiaestimatedthatitwouldcostabout$5.
4milliontoachieveTRL5andMRL4duringfiscalyears2018through2023.
36Accordingtothetechnologyreadinessassessmentreport,NNSAwillneedtofurtherevaluatetheseapproachesaswellasthetraditionaltechnologytomakeaselectionforaW78replacementprogram.
The75"tradespace"technologiesthattheassessmentteamevaluatedincluded,forexample,severalproposedbyLawrenceLivermore,LosAlamos,andSandiaforprovidinganadvancedsafetyfeaturetopreventunauthorizeddetonationofthewarhead.
Asmentionedabove,whenNNSAextendsthelifeofexistingU.
S.
nuclearwarheadsitalsoseeksapproachesthatwillincreasethesafetyandimprovesecurityofthewarhead.
37Accordingtothereport,thelaboratoriesproposedsimilarconceptsthatvariedinmaturitylevelsandestimatedcostsforfurtherdevelopment.
Specifically,theassessmentteamestimatedtheLawrenceLivermoreandLosAlamostechnologiestohavecompletedTRL4andSandia'sproposaltohavecompletedTRL3.
RegardingMRLs,the35AccordingtoaSandiarepresentative,Sandiaexpectsthetechnology'sMRLtotransitionfromMRL1toMRL3rapidlyonceNNSA'sproductionsiteshavefundingandstafftopartnerwithSandiaontheW78replacementprogramactivities.
36AccordingtoaSandiarepresentative,theTRLandMRLforthisgastransfersystemtechnologywouldbehigherifthedecisionweremadetonotincludecertaincapability.
37AccordingtoNNSAofficials,PresidentialPolicyDirective(PPD)-35requiresNNSAtoseekapproachestoenhancesafetyandsecurityofthestockpilewhenundertakinganLEP.
AccordingtoNNSA'simplementationguideforPPD-35,thedirective,amongotherthings,establishespoliciesandobjectivesfornuclearweaponsafety,security,incidentresponse,andusecontrolcapabilitiesandactivities.
ItalsosetsagoalforNNSAtoincorporateinternalusecontrolduringweaponrefurbishmentsandexternalusecontroltoreducenear-termrisks.
NNSA,DefenseProgramsPPD-35ImplementationGuide:UseControlRequirements(June2016).
LetterPage19GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementassessmentteamalsoestimatedLawrenceLivermore'stechnologytohavecompletedMRL1,LosAlamos'stechnologytobeatMRL1,anddidnothaveenoughinformationtoestimatetheMRLforSandia'stechnology.
Inaddition,accordingtothereport,LawrenceLivermoreestimatedcostsofabout$31.
2millionto$45.
6milliontofurthermatureitstechnologyduringfiscalyears2018through2023.
LosAlamosestimatedcostsofabout$72.
1millionto$154.
5milliontofurthermatureitstechnologyduringthesameperiod.
Sandiaestimatedcostsofabout$8.
2milliontofurthermatureitstechnologyduringthesameperiod.
Becausethefeatureisnotaminimumrequirement,NNSAofficialstoldusthattheyarecontinuingtoevaluatethecosts,benefits,andrisksofincludingthefeature.
AccordingtoNNSA'smanagerfortheW78replacementprogramandkeystaffinvolvedinpreparingtorestarttheprogram,whentheprogramrestartsinfiscalyear2019theywillusetheassessmenttoidentifyspecifictechnologiesorgroupsoftechnologies(i.
e.
,tradespaces)tofurtherevaluateforpotentialuseinthewarhead.
Theseofficialssaidtheywillcontinueevaluatingtechnologiesandmakeselectionsofpreferredoptionsatthesametimethatthewarhead'sprogramrequirementsandprioritiesarerefinedduringPhases6.
2and6.
2A.
Accordingtotheprogrammanager,NNSAwillproduceatechnologydevelopmentplanfortechnologiesselectedforaW78replacementduringPhase6.
2and6.
2Aandthatwillidentifythecurrentreadinesslevelsofthetechnologies,keyrisks,andestimatedcoststobringthemtoTRL5inPhase6.
3.
Inaddition,thetechnologyreadinessassessmentteammadeseveralrecommendationstotheNNSADeputyAdministratorforDefenseProgramsregardingthedevelopmentoftechnologiesthatcouldprovidebenefitstothenuclearsecurityenterpriseoverall.
Forexample,theassessmentteamobservedthat21oftheproposedtechnologiesforaW78replacementinvolvedtheuseofadditivemanufacturing.
Theassessmentnotedthat,ifsuccessful,thesetechnologiescouldreducecomponentproductioncostsandschedulerisksforfutureLEPscomparedtocurrentmethods.
TheteamrecommendedthattheOfficeofDefenseProgramsconductananalysistovalidatethesecapabilitiesanddevelopanuclearenterprise-wideefforttoaddressadditivemanufacturingforaW78replacement,futureLEPs,andotherapplications.
AccordingtotheNNSAofficialwholedtheassessment,atthetimeofourreview,theassessmentteamwaspreparingtopresentitsenterprise-widerecommendationstotheOfficeofDefenseProgram'sseniorleadership;therefore,specificfollow-onactionshadnotyetbeendecided.
LetterPage20GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementCoordinationwithFacilitiesandCapabilitiesThemanageroftheW78replacementprogramsaidthathehasbeguntoidentifythefacilitiesandcapabilitiesatthelaboratoriesandproductionsitesthatwillbeneededtoprovidethenuclearandnonnuclearcomponentsforaW78replacement,andplanstodraftformalagreementstohelpensurecoordinationwiththem.
Accordingtotheprogrammanager,collectingtheinformationthatidentifiesfacilitiesandcapabilities—includingaroughideaofkeymilestonedatesforwhentheprogramwillneedtousethem—isthefirststepinproducingamajorimpactreport,whichisrequireduponcompletionofPhase6.
2andaccompaniesthefinalPhase6.
2studyreportdeliveredtotheNuclearWeaponsCouncil.
Amongotherthings,amajorimpactreportidentifiesaspectsoftheprogram—includingfacilitiesandcapabilitiestosupportit—thatcouldaffecttheprogram'sscheduleandtechnicalrisk,accordingtothePhase6.
Xguidelines.
AccordingtoanNNSAofficialandcontractorrepresentatives,manyoftheexistingnuclearandnonnuclearcomponentsoftheW78areoutdatedorunusableandaW78replacementwillneedallnewlymanufacturedcomponents.
Asaresult,NNSAwillneedtoexercisenumerousmanufacturingcapabilitiesinsupportofthiseffort,andthefacilitiesandcapabilitiesmustbereadytosupportthework.
However,manyofthefacilitiesthatmaybeneededtoprovidecomponentsforaW78replacementprogramareoutdatedandareundergoingmodernizationtoeitherbuildnewfacilitiesorrepairexistingfacilitiesandcapabilities,whichrepresentsacriticalexternalrisktotheprogram.
AccordingtoNNSA'sFiscalYear2018StockpileStewardshipandManagementPlan,theseplannedmodernizationactivitieswillrequiresustainedandpredictablefundingovermanyyearstoensuretheyareavailabletosupporttheweaponsprograms.
SomeexamplesofNNSAactivitiestobuildorrepairfacilitiesandcapabilitiesthatwillprovidenuclearornonnuclearcomponentsforaW78replacementwarhead—andwhichmayhaveLetterPage21GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementschedule,cost,orcapacityissuesthatcouldimpacttheprogram—include:38·Plutoniumpitproductionfacilities.
NNSAdoesnotcurrentlyhavethecapabilitytomanufacturesufficientquantitiesofplutoniumpitsforaW78replacementprogram.
NNSA'sFiscalYear2018StockpileStewardshipandManagementPlanstatedthattheagencywillincreaseitscapabilitytoproducenewpitsovertime,from10pitsperyearinfiscalyear2024to30pitsperyearinfiscalyear2026,andasmanyas50to80pitsperyearby2030.
39NNSAisrefurbishingitspitproductioncapabilitiesatLosAlamostoproduceatleast30pitsperyear.
Inaddition,inMay2018,NNSAannounceditsintentiontorepurposetheMixedOxideFuelFabricationFacilityattheSavannahRiverSiteinSouthCarolinatoproduceatleastanadditional50pitsperyearby2030.
NNSAofficialstoldusthattheywillneedboththeLosAlamosandSavannahRiverpitproductioncapabilitiestomeetanticipatedpitrequirementsfortheW78replacementprogramandforfuturewarheadprograms.
·Uraniumprocessingfacilities.
NNSA'sconstructionoftheUraniumProcessingFacilityattheY-12NationalSecurityComplexwillhelpensureNNSA'scontinuedabilitytoproduceuraniumcomponentsfortheW78replacementprogram.
NNSAplanstocompletethefacilityfornomorethan$6.
5billionbytheendof2025—approximately4yearsbeforethescheduleddeliveryofthefirstproductionunitofaW78replacementprogramwarhead.
ThiseffortispartofalargerNNSAplantorelocateandmodernizeotherenricheduranium38Wehaverecentlycompletedorplannedworkoneachofthesefacilities.
Forrecentlycompletedwork,see:GAO,ModernizingtheNuclearSecurityEnterprise:ACompleteScopeofWorkIsNeededtoDevelopTimelyCostandScheduleInformationfortheUraniumProgram,GAO-17-577(Washington,D.
C.
:Sept.
8,2017);DOEProjectManagement:NNSANeedstoClarifyRequirementsforItsPlutoniumAnalysisProjectatLosAlamos,GAO-16-585(Washington,D.
C.
:Aug.
9,2016);andDOEProjectManagement:NNSAShouldEnsureEqualConsiderationofAlternativesforLithiumProduction,GAO-15-525(Washington,D.
C:July13,2015).
39TheNuclearWeaponsCouncilaffirmedtoCongressin2014thatitneedsNNSAtodevelopacapabilitytoproduce50to80pitsperyear.
Inaddition,undertheCarlLevinandHowardP.
"Buck"McKeonNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2015,NNSAmustbeabletoproducenotlessthan10warreservepitsduring2024,notlessthan20warreservepitsduring2025,notlessthan30warreservepitsduring2026,anddemonstratetheabilitytoproduce80pitsperyearduring2027fornolessthana90-dayperiod.
TheactalsogavetheSecretariesofEnergyandDefensetheoptionofdelayingthe80-pits-per-yeardemonstrationdateto2029ifDODandDOEjustifythedelayinajointreport.
LetterPage22GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementcapabilitiesperformedinalegacybuildingattheY-12NationalSecurityComplextootherexistingbuildingsorinnewlyconstructedbuildings.
·Lithiumproductionfacility.
NNSAwillrequirelithiumforaW78replacementwarhead.
TheUnitedStatesnolongermaintainsfulllithiumproductioncapabilitiesandreliesonrecyclingastheonlysourceoflithiumfornuclearweaponsystems.
AccordingtotheFiscalYear2018StockpileStewardshipandManagementPlan,NNSAhasanalyzedoptionstoconstructanewlithiumproductionfacility,andaconceptualdesigneffortisnext,withanestimatedcompletiondateoffiscalyear2027forthenewfacility.
Untilthefacilityisavailable,NNSAhasdevelopedabridgingstrategytofilltheinterimsupplygaps.
·Radiation-hardenedmicroelectronicsfacility.
Nuclearwarheads,suchasaW78replacementwarhead,includeelectronicsthatmustfunctionreliablyinarangeofoperationalenvironments.
NNSAhasafacilityatSandiathatproducescustom,strategicradiation-hardenedmicroelectronicsfornuclearweapons.
InAugust2018,NNSAofficialstoldusthatthisfacility,knownasMicrosystemsandEngineeringSciencesApplications,canremainviableuntil2040—butwouldneedadditionalinvestment.
TheW78replacementprogrammanagertoldusthattheneedfornewlymanufacturedcomponentscoupledwiththescaleofNNSA'smodernizationactivitiesmeansthatacomprehensivecoordinationeffortwillbenecessarytoensurethatthefacilitiesandcapabilitiesarereadytoprovidecomponentsforthewarheadbytheendofthe2020s.
BecausetheseactivitiesareseparatelymanagedandsupportedoutsidetheW78replacementprogram,NNSAconsidersprogressonthemtorepresentacriticalexternalrisktotheprogram.
NNSAistakingorplanstotakesomeactiontomitigatethisexternalriskattheprogramandagencylevel.
Onestepthattheprogramplanstotaketoaddressthisriskistodraftformalagreements—calledinterfacerequirementsagreements—withotherNNSAprogramofficesthatoverseethedeliverablesandschedulesforthedesign,production,andtestfacilitiesthatareneededfortheprogram.
Theseagreementsdescribetheworktobeprovidedbytheseexternalprograms,includingmilestonedatesforcompletingthework;funding;andanyriskstocost,schedule,orperformance.
TheW78programmanagerstatedthattheyaregenerallydraftedtowardtheendofPhase6.
2throughPhase6.
2AandlargelyfinalizedinPhase6.
3—thoughsmalladjustmentsmaybemadeintoPhase6.
4(ProductionEngineering).
LetterPage23GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementAttheagencylevel,inresponsetoadirectioninthe2018NPR,NNSAofficialstoldusthattheagencyisalsodevelopinganagency-wideintegratedmasterschedulethatisintendedtoalignNNSA'senterprise-widemodernizationschedulewithmilestonedeliverydatesfornuclearweaponscomponents.
40TheW78programmanagerandotherNNSAofficialstoldusthattheinformationtheyprovideonthefacilitiesandcapabilitiesneeded,aswellasmilestonedates,willbeintegratedintothisscheduleandusedtohelpensurethatthefacilitiesandcapabilitiesarereadytosupporttheprogram.
AgencyCommentsWeprovidedadraftofthisreporttoNNSAandDODforcomment.
NNSAandDODprovidedtechnicalcomments,whichweincorporatedasappropriate.
40Specifically,the2018NPRincludeddirectiontoNNSA,amongotherthings,todevelopanNNSAroadmapthatsizesproductioncapacitytomodernizationandhedgingrequirements.
LetterPage24GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementWearesendingcopiesofthisreporttotheappropriatecongressionalcommittees,theSecretariesofDefenseandEnergy,theAdministratorofNNSA,andotherinterestedparties.
Inaddition,thisreportisavailableatnochargeontheGAOwebsiteathttp://www.
gao.
gov.
Ifyouoryourstaffmembershaveanyquestionsaboutthisreport,pleasecontactmeat(202)512-3841orbawdena@gao.
gov.
ContactpointsforourOfficesofCongressionalRelationsandPublicAffairsmaybefoundonthelastpageofthisreport.
GAOstaffwhomadesignificantcontributionstothereportarelistedinappendixII.
AllisonB.
BawdenDirector,NaturalResourcesandEnvironmentLetterPage25GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementListofCommitteesTheHonorableJamesM.
InhofeChairmanTheHonorableJackReedRankingMemberCommitteeonArmedServicesUnitedStatesSenateTheHonorableLamarAlexanderChairmanTheHonorableDianneFeinsteinRankingMemberSubcommitteeonEnergyandWaterDevelopmentCommitteeonAppropriationsUnitedStatesSenateTheHonorableMacThornberryChairmanTheHonorableAdamSmithRankingMemberCommitteeonArmedServicesHouseofRepresentativesTheHonorableMikeSimpsonChairmanTheHonorableMarcyKapturRankingMemberSubcommitteeonEnergyandWaterDevelopmentCommitteeonAppropriationsHouseofRepresentativesAppendixI:NNSA'sProgramManagementFunctionstoExecuteaW78ReplacementProgramPage26GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementAppendixI:NNSA'sProgramManagementFunctionstoExecuteaW78ReplacementProgramThetablebelowidentifiesthestepsNNSAistakingorplanstotaketoestablishtheprogrammanagementfunctionsneededtoexecuteaW78replacementprogram.
NNSAwasdirectedbytheNuclearWeaponsCounciltosuspendtheprograminfiscalyear2014andthe2018NuclearPostureReviewdirectedNNSAtorestarttheprograminfiscalyear2019.
TheNNSAOfficeofDefenseProgram'sprogramexecutioninstructiondefinesenhancedprogrammanagementfunctionsforawarheadlifeextensionprogram(LEP)suchastheW78replacementprogramandotherprograms.
1TheinstructionalsodescribesthelevelofprogrammanagementrigorthattheLEPmustachieveasitadvancesthroughtheDepartmentofDefenseandNNSAprocessformanaginglifeextensionprogramscalledthePhase6.
Xprocess.
Thisprocessincludeskeyphasesormilestonesthatanuclearweaponlifeextensionprogrammustundertakebeforeproceedingtosubsequentsteps.
NNSAcompletedPhase6.
1(ConceptAssessment)andstartedPhase6.
2(FeasibilityandDesignOptions)activitiesbeforetheprogramwassuspendedinfiscalyear2014.
NNSA,therefore,planstorestarttheprograminPhase6.
2.
Table2:StepsNNSAIsTakingorPlanstoTaketoEstablishProgramManagementFunctionsNeededtoExecuteaW78WarheadReplacementProgramProgrammanagementfunctionNNSA'songoingandplannedstepsProgramplanningTheNationalNuclearSecurityAdministration's(NNSA)manageroftheW78warheadreplacementprogramstatedthataprogramplan—thegoverningdocumentthatestablishesthemeanstodefine,execute,monitor,andcontrolNNSAprojects—iscurrentlyindevelopmentandtheinitialreleasewillbecompletedbyprogramrestartinfiscalyear2019.
1NNSA,DPProgramExecutionInstruction:NA-10ProgramManagementToolsandProcesses(January2016).
AppendixI:NNSA'sProgramManagementFunctionstoExecuteaW78ReplacementProgramPage27GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementProgrammanagementfunctionNNSA'songoingandplannedstepsSystemsengineeringNNSA'sprogrammanagersaidthesystemengineeringplanwasindevelopmentandtheinitialreleasewillbeavailablewhentheprogramrestartsinfiscalyear2019.
InterfacemanagementNNSA'sprogrammanagersaidinterfacerequirementsagreementswillbedevelopedstartinginfiscalyear2019basedontheresultsofthetechnologyreadinessassessmentcompletedinfiscalyear2018.
Theseagreementswillbeupdatedandadditionalagreementsmaybedevelopedasneededthereafter.
RequirementsmanagementNNSA'sprogrammanagersaidarequirementsmanagementplanwasindevelopmentforaninitialreleaseinfiscalyear2019.
Itisintendedtodescribetherequirementsmanagementprocessincludinguseofadatabasemanagementsystem.
WorkbreakdownstructureNNSA'sprogrammanagersaidtheprogramhadstartedtoadaptastandardizedworkbreakdownstructureforlifeextensionprogramstodefineandorganizetheW78replacementprogram'sworkscopeforrestart.
AstheprogramtransitionstoPhase6.
3(DevelopmentEngineering)startingattheendoffiscalyear2022,NNSAplanstomaturethestructuretobecompliantwithDepartmentofEnergy(DOE)andindustrystandardsandusethestructuretodevelopscope,cost,andschedulebaselinesforthewarheadprogram.
DecisionanalysisNNSA'sprogrammanagersaiddecisionanalysis—aboutwarheaddesignandtechnologyoptions—willlikelyoccurinfiscalyear2021through2022aspartofPhase6.
2andPhase6.
2A.
ItistobeconductedjointlywiththeDepartmentofDefense(DOD)throughtheNuclearWeaponsCouncilinaccordancewithPhase6.
Xprocessguidance,aswellasDODandNNSArequirements.
RiskandopportunitymanagementNNSA'sprogrammanagersaidthatariskmanagementplanthatwilldescribetheriskmanagementprocessanduseofadatabasemanagementsystemwasbeingdevelopedandwouldbereleasedwhentheprogramrestartsinfiscalyear2019.
IntegratedscheduleNNSA'sprogrammanagersaidthatanintegratedmasterschedulewillbedevelopedinfiscalyear2019.
AstheprogramcompletesPhases6.
2and6.
2AandtransitionstoPhase6.
3duringfiscalyear2022,NNSAplanstoselectanddefineapreferreddesignoptionforthewarhead.
Atthattime,NNSAplanstomaturetheintegratedmasterscheduleusingatailoredapproachtoDOEandindustrystandardsandusethescheduleasabaselineagainstwhichtomeasureprogramperformance.
CostestimatingNNSA'sprogrammanagersaidthattheprogramwillcreateaWeaponDesignandCostReportattheendofPhase6.
2A.
Inaddition,NNSA'sOfficeofCostEstimatingandProgramEvaluationplanstocompleteanindependentcostestimateafterPhase6.
2Ainlatefiscalyear2022.
NNSAplanstoestablishabaselinecostestimateduringearlyPhase6.
3infiscalyear2023tomeasureperformanceagainst.
AppendixI:NNSA'sProgramManagementFunctionstoExecuteaW78ReplacementProgramPage28GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementProgrammanagementfunctionNNSA'songoingandplannedstepsPerformancemanagementNNSA'sprogrammanagersaidthatNNSAwillcreateaplaninfiscalyear2019todescribeperformancemanagementfortheprogram.
Inparticular,hesaidthatduringPhase6.
2and6.
2A,theprogramwilluseanearnedvaluemanagementsystem,asappropriate.
AstheprogramtransitionstoPhase6.
3startingattheendoffiscalyear2022,NNSAplanstoselectanddefineapreferreddesignoptionforthewarhead.
Atthistime,NNSAplanstomaturetheearnedvaluemanagementsystemusingatailoredapproachtoDOEandindustrystandardsanduseittomeasureperformance.
ChangecontrolandconfigurationmanagementNNSA'sprogrammanagersaidthattheprogramwilldevelopachangecontrolandconfigurationmanagementplaninfiscalyear2019.
Theplanisintendedtodescribetheprocessesthatwillbeusedtoidentify,track,andcontrolchangestotheprogram'sdeliverablesorproductsoncetheprogramhasabaseline.
ReviewsandreportingNNSA'sprogrammanagersaidthat,amongothertypesofreviews,arequirementsreviewisplannedtooccurinfiscalyear2020.
Inaddition,duringPhases6.
2and6.
2A,severalreviewswithNNSAleadershipareplannedtooccurincoordinationwithkeydecisionsandNuclearWeaponsCouncilinteractions.
QuarterlyprogramreviewswithNNSAleadershipareplannedtooccurwhentheprogramentersPhase6.
3.
Lessonslearned/bestpracticesNNSA'sprogrammanagersaidthataPhase6.
2and6.
2Alessonslearnedreportwillbecreatedinfiscalyear2023.
Source:InformationfromNNSA'sfederalprogrammanagerfortheW78replacementprogram.
|GAO-19-84Note:DODandNNSAhaveestablishedaprocess,knownasthePhase6.
Xprocess,tomanagelifeextensionprogramssuchastheW78replacementprogram.
NNSAwillrestarttheprograminPhase6.
2(FeasibilityandDesignOptions).
NNSAcompletedPhase6.
1(ConceptAssessment)andinitiallystartedPhase6.
2inJune2012beforesuspendingtheprograminfiscalyear2014.
AppendixII:GAOContactandStaffAcknowledgmentsPage29GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementAppendixII:GAOContactandStaffAcknowledgmentsGAOContactAllisonB.
Bawden,(202)512-3841orbawdena@gao.
gov.
StaffAcknowledgmentsInadditiontotheindividualnamedabove,WilliamHoehn(AssistantDirector),BrianM.
Friedman(AnalystinCharge),andJuliaT.
Coultermadesignificantcontributionstothisreport.
AlsocontributingtothisreportwereAntoinetteCapaccio,PamelaDavidson,PenneyHarwellCaramia,GregMarchand,DianaMoldafsky,CynthiaNorris,KatrinaPekar-Carpenter,andSaraSullivan.
AppendixIII:AccessibleDataPage30GAO-19-84W78NuclearWarheadReplacementAppendixIII:AccessibleDataDataTablesAccessibleDataforPreliminaryW78WarheadReplacementProgramRestartScheduleFiscalYear2019through2032,asofJuly2018oFeasibilityStudy&DesignOptionsisPhaseoDesignDefinitionandCostStudyisPhaseoDevelopmentEngineeringisPhaseoProductionEngineeringisPhaseoFirstProductionisPhaseoFullProductionisPhaseAccessibleDataforFigure2:NNSA'sPreliminaryW78WarheadReplacementProgramRestartScheduleunderthePhase6.
XProcessfromFiscalYear2019through2032,asofJuly2018oFeasibilityStudy&DesignOptionsisPhase6.
2oDesignDefinitionandCostStudyisPhase6.
2AoDevelopmentEngineeringisPhase6.
3oProductionEngineeringisPhase6.
4oFirstProductionisPhase6.
5oFullProductionisPhase6.
6o(102405)GAO'sMissionTheGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,theaudit,evaluation,andinvestigativearmofCongress,existstosupportCongressinmeetingitsconstitutionalresponsibilitiesandtohelpimprovetheperformanceandaccountabilityofthefederalgovernmentfortheAmericanpeople.
GAOexaminestheuseofpublicfunds;evaluatesfederalprogramsandpolicies;andprovidesanalyses,recommendations,andotherassistancetohelpCongressmakeinformedoversight,policy,andfundingdecisions.
GAO'scommitmenttogoodgovernmentisreflectedinitscorevaluesofaccountability,integrity,andreliability.
ObtainingCopiesofGAOReportsandTestimonyThefastestandeasiestwaytoobtaincopiesofGAOdocumentsatnocostisthroughGAO'swebsite(https://www.
gao.
gov).
Eachweekdayafternoon,GAOpostsonitswebsitenewlyreleasedreports,testimony,andcorrespondence.
TohaveGAOe-mailyoualistofnewlypostedproducts,gotohttps://www.
gao.
govandselect"E-mailUpdates.
"OrderbyPhoneThepriceofeachGAOpublicationreflectsGAO'sactualcostofproductionanddistributionanddependsonthenumberofpagesinthepublicationandwhetherthepublicationisprintedincolororblackandwhite.
PricingandorderinginformationispostedonGAO'swebsite,https://www.
gao.
gov/ordering.
htm.
Placeordersbycalling(202)512-6000,tollfree(866)801-7077,orTDD(202)512-2537.
OrdersmaybepaidforusingAmericanExpress,DiscoverCard,MasterCard,Visa,check,ormoneyorder.
Callforadditionalinformation.
ConnectwithGAOConnectwithGAOonFacebook,Flickr,Twitter,andYouTube.
SubscribetoourRSSFeedsorE-mailUpdates.
ListentoourPodcasts.
VisitGAOonthewebathttps://www.
gao.
gov.
ToReportFraud,Waste,andAbuseinFederalProgramsContact:Website:https://www.
gao.
gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.
htmAutomatedansweringsystem:(800)424-5454or(202)512-7700CongressionalRelationsOriceWilliamsBrown,ManagingDirector,WilliamsO@gao.
gov,(202)512-4400,U.
S.
GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,441GStreetNW,Room7125,Washington,DC20548PublicAffairsChuckYoung,ManagingDirector,youngc1@gao.
gov,(202)512-4800U.
S.
GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,441GStreetNW,Room7149Washington,DC20548StrategicPlanningandExternalLiaisonJames-ChristianBlockwood,ManagingDirector,spel@gao.
gov,(202)512-4707U.
S.
GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,441GStreetNW,Room7814,Washington,DC20548