Prometeonbitchina

CHAPTERIIIRECENTPOLICYDEVELOPMENTSANDKEYISSUESA.
NATIONALINVESTMENTPOLICIES1.
OveralltrendsMostcountriescontinuedtoactivelyattractFDIin2017,andtheshareofinvestmentliberalizationorpromotionmeasuresincreasedcomparedwith2016.
However,theoverallshareofrestrictiveorregulatoryinvestmentpolicymeasureshassignificantlyincreasedinrecentmonthsandsomecountrieshavebecomemorecriticalofforeigntakeovers.
Also,additionalwaysandmeanstostrengtheninvestmentscreeningmechanismsareunderdiscussion,particularlyinsomedevelopedcountries.
In2017,accordingtoUNCTAD'scount,65economiesadopted126policymeasuresrelatedtoforeigninvestment.
1Thesefiguresconstitutethehighestnumberofcountriesoverthepastdecade,aswellasthehighestnumberofpolicychanges.
Ofatotalof126investmentpolicymeasures,93liberalized,promotedorfacilitatedinvestment,while18introducedrestrictionsorregulations.
Theremaining15wereofaneutralorindeterminatenature(tableIII.
1).
Theshareofinvestmentliberalizationandpromotionamongallmeasuresclimbedto84percent–anincreaseoffivepercentagepointscomparedwith2016(figureIII.
1).
Newinvestmentrestrictionsorregulationsforforeigninvestorsweremainlybasedonconsiderationsofnationalsecurity,localproducers'competitivenessorforeignownershipoflandandnaturalresources.
Byregion,developingcountriesinAsiacontinuedtotaketheleadinadoptinginvestmentpolicymeasures.
CountriesinAfrica,thetransitioneconomiesandEuropealsointroducednumerousmeasures(figureIII.
2).
Incontrasttotheoverallfavourabledevelopmentsforforeigninvestmentin2017,theshareofmoreTableIII.
1.
Changesinnationalinvestmentpolicies,2003–2017(Numberofmeasures)Item200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017Numberofcountriesthatintroducedchanges597977704940465451576041495965Numberofregulatorychanges12516414412679688911686928774100125126Liberalization/promotion1131421181045851617762656352758493Restriction/regulation122025221915243321212112142218Neutral/indeterminatea-21-224636310111915Source:UNCTAD,InvestmentPolicyMonitordatabase.
aInsomecases,theexpectedimpactofthepolicymeasuresontheinvestmentisundetermined.
FigureIII.
1.
Changesinnationalinvestmentpolicies,20032017(Percent)Liberalization/PromotionRestriction/Regulation2003200520072009201120132015201784160255075100Source:UNCTAD,InvestmentPolicyMonitordatabase.
80restrictiveorregulatoryinvestmentpolicymeasuresincreasedsignificantlyinrecentmonths.
FromOctober2017toApril2018,about30percentofnewlyintroducedmeasureswererestrictiveorregulatory.
Somecountriesaretakingamorecriticalstancetowardsforeigntakeovers,inparticularwhentheyrelatetonationalsecurityorthesaleofstrategicdomesticassets.
Inaddition,waysandmeanstofurtherstrengtheninvestmentscreeningmechanismsarebeingdiscussed,particularlyinsomedevelopedcountries(seechapterIV.
C.
2.
d).
a.
Investmentliberalizationprominentin2017Investmentliberalizationwasamongtheprominentfeaturesofpolicymeasuresin2017.
2Aboutonethirdofpolicymeasureswererelatedtopartialorfullinvestmentliberalizationinindustriessuchastransport,energyandmanufacturing.
(i)CountriesinAsiaparticularlyactiveininvestmentliberalizationAsinpreviousyears,emergingeconomiesinAsiawerethemostactive.
Chinareviseditsforeigninvestmentnegativelistfor11freetradezones,liftinginvestmentrestrictionsinanumberofindustries.
ItalsoissuedanupdatedversionofitsInvestmentIndustryGuidanceCatalogue,whichreducedthenumberofrestrictivemeasuresfortheentryofforeigninvestmentfrom93to63andopenedupmoreactivitiesinservices,manufacturingandmining.
Italsoissuedaguidelinethatlistsbusinessesinwhichoutboundinvestmentisencouraged,limitedorprohibited.
InApril2018,thecountryannouncedatimelinefortheliberalizationoftheautomobileandfinancialindustries.
InJanuary2018,Indialiberalizedrulesoninwardinvestmentinseveralindustriesincludingsingle-brandretailtrading,airlinesandpowerexchanges.
TheLaoPeople'sDemocraticRepublicabolishedtheminimumregisteredcapitalrequirementsforcertainforeigninvestors.
InitsnewlyadoptedCompaniesAct,Myanmarallowedforeigninvestorstoholdupto35percentofsharesinadomesticcompanywithoutthecompanylosingitscategorizationasa"localcompany".
Italsopermittedforeigncompaniestoengageintradingoffertilizers,seeds,pesticides,hospitalequipmentandconstructionmaterials.
Previously,onlylocalcompaniesandjointventuresoflocalandforeigncompanieswereallowedtodoso.
SaudiArabiafullyliberalizedforeigninvestmentinengineeringservicesandassociatedconsultancyservices,providedthattheinvestorcompanyisatleast10yearsoldandoperatesinatleastfourcountries.
VietNamamendedthelistofconditionalbusinesslinesunderwhichdomesticandforeigncompaniesmustsatisfycertain"businessconditions"(e.
g.
technicalandstaffingrequirements).
Although16businesslineswereaddedtothelist,24–outofatotalof267–wereremoved.
Somenoteworthyinvestmentliberalizationmeasureshavebeenundertakeninotherregions.
Forexample,Egyptintroducedanewlawforthesettingupofanaturalgasregulatoryauthoritychargedwithlicensinganddevisingaplantoopenthegasmarkettocompetition.
Mexicoincreasedforeignownershipcapsforthesupplyoffuelsandlubricantsforships,aircraftandrailwayequipment,aswellasforcertainairtransportservices.
TheUnitedRepublicofTanzaniaallowedforeigninvestorstoacquiresharesinthelistedpaid-upcapitalFigureIII.
2.
Regionaldistributionofnationalinvestmentpolicymeasuresin2017(Numberofmeasures)661216181848NorthAmericaOtherdevelopedcountriesLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanAfricaTransitioneconomiesEuropeDevelopingAsia49311512865Source:UNCTAD,InvestmentPolicyMonitordatabase.
81ofatelecommunicationcompany.
Zimbabweremovedthemajority-indigenousthreshold,exceptinthediamondandplatinumindustries.
In2018,Angolapassedanewinvestmentlawabolishingajointventurerequirementforforeigninvestorsandtheminimuminvestmentrequirement.
Thelawdoesnotapplytoinvestmentsinoilandminingexplorationaswellasotheractivitiesrelatedtofinancialinstitutionsgovernedbyspecificlaw.
(ii)OngoingprivatizationinseveralcountriesAnotherimportantinvestmentpolicyfeaturein2017wasprivatization.
Severalcountriesundertookfullorpartialprivatizations,benefitingbothdomesticandforeigninvestors.
Forinstance,BrazilawardedthreeEuropeangroupstherightstooperatefourairports.
TheGovernmentofCted'IvoireapprovedthesaleofStateminingcompanySodemi's30percentstakeintheItygoldproject.
GreecesignedaconcessioncontractwithaGermanconsortiumconcerning14regionalairports.
In2018,thecountryconcludedthesaleofa67percentstakeinThessalonikiPorttoaconsortiumofinvestors.
Montenegrosoldthepublicstakeinoneofthecountry'smajorportoperators(LukaBar)andinarailcargofirm(Montecargo).
PortugalsignedanagreementwithprivateequityfundLoneStartosella75percentstakeinState-rescuedlenderNovoBanco.
UzbekistanissuedadecreetosimplifytheproceduresandspeeduptheprocessofsaleofStateproperty,andtoeliminateadministrativebarrierstoprivatization.
VietNamprivatizeda54percentstakeinitslargestbrewer(Sabeco).
ItalsoissuedadecreetofacilitateprivatizationofState-ownedenterprisesby,forinstance,shorteningthelock-inperiodofstrategicpartners.
b.
OngoingeffortsforinvestmentfacilitationandpromotionInvestmentfacilitationandpromotioncontinuedtobeamajorelementofnewinvestmentpolicymeasuresin2017.
(i)NumerouscountriessimplifiedadministrativeproceduresArgentinapublishedadecreewith170measuresaimedateliminatingrulesandregulationsconsideredtoreducethecountry'scompetitiveness.
Australiaintroducedaseriesofchangestoitsforeigninvestmentframeworkbysimplifyingrelatedregulationsandthefeeframework.
Azerbaijanestablishedasingleonlineportalfortheissuanceofbusinesslicensesandpermits.
Beninlaunchedanonlineplatform(iGuide),providinginformationfordomesticandforeigninvestorsonbuildinganddevelopingbusinessplans.
Colombiamodernizeditsforeigninvestmentregistrationscheme,inparticularbyeliminatingregistrationdeadlines.
TheDominicanRepublicestablishedProDominicana,anentitytaskedwiththepromotionandfacilitationofforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)andexports.
EgyptpromulgatedtheIndustrialPermitsActanditsexecutiveregulations,aimingtoeaseproceduresforobtaininglicensesforindustrialestablishments.
ThecountryalsoputintoeffectanewInvestmentLaw,aimingtopromotedomesticandforeigninvestmentbyofferingfurtherincentives,reducingbureaucracyandsimplifyingadministrativeprocesses.
IndiaabolisheditsForeignInvestmentPromotionBoardandissuedstandardoperatingproceduresforhandlingFDIproposals,suchasthedesignationofcompetentauthoritiesandtimeframesforapplications.
Indonesiareplacedthelicenserequirementforestablishingabusinesswithaprocedureforregisteringaninvestment.
Jordansimplifiedregulationstostimulateinvestmentandimprovethebusinessenvironment.
MauritiusintroducedtheBusinessFacilitationAct2017,toeliminateregulatoryandadministrativebottleneckstoinvestment.
ThePhilippineslaunchedadigitalplatformcalledthePhilippineBusinessDataBank,aimingtoshortenthetimeneededforapplyingforandrenewingpermits.
SouthAfricalaunched82the"InvestSAOne-StopShopInitiative"asafocalpointoftheGovernment,coordinatingandfacilitatingregistrationandlicensingproceduresforallinvestors.
(ii)InvestmentincentivesremainanimportantpromotiontoolSomecountriesintroducedfiscalandfinancialincentivestoattractforeigninvestment.
TheRepublicofKorearestructuredtaxincentivesforforeigncompaniesengagedinhigh-techbusinessesandextendedtheirbenefits.
TheLaoPeople'sDemocraticRepublicpromulgatedanewinvestmentpromotionlaw,offeringvariousincentivestoattractinvestmentinbothpromotedindustriesandhardshipareas.
MoroccoenactedanewFinanceLaw,whichprovides,interalia,forcorporateincometaxexemptionsfornewlyestablishedindustrialcompaniesforacertainperiod.
Nigeriagranted"PioneerStatus"tothecreativeindustryandpublishedalistof27newindustriesthatareeligibletoenjoythePioneerStatusincentive.
ThailandintroduceditsnewInvestmentPromotionActtoprovidemoreincentivesforadvancedtechnologyandinnovationactivitiesaswellasresearchanddevelopment(R&D).
Tunisiapassedabillontaxincentives,aimingtostreamlinethatsystembyfocusingontheprioritiesofthenextperiod.
TheUnitedStatesintroducedtheTaxCutsandJobsAct,whichprovidesacorporateincometaxcutandothermeasurestoencourageMNEstobringoverseasfundsbackhome.
(iii)EstablishmentofnewSEZsSeveralcountriesestablishedspecialeconomiczones(SEZs)orrevisedpoliciesrelatedtoexistingSEZs.
Forinstance,BangladeshapprovedtheconstructionoffournewSEZs.
CongointroducedtwolawsimplementingthepolicyofdiversificationoftheCongoleseeconomyandcreatingSEZs.
Egyptissuedadecreeestablishingthe"GoldenTriangleEconomicZone".
MexicoestablishedthreenewSEZsinPuertoChiapas,CoatzacoalcosandLázaroCárdenas–LaUnión.
VietNamprovidedsomeincentivesfortheHoaLacHi-TechPark,includingpreferentialtaxtreatment,landuseincentivesandfavourableconditionsforimmigrationofforeignemployees.
ZimbabweexemptedinvestorsoperatinginSEZsfrompayingdutyonimportedcapitalequipment,materialsandproductsontheconditionthattheyareusedinSEZs.
In2018,ThailandenactedtheEasternEconomicCorridor(EEC)Act,whichprovidesincentivesforinvestorsintheEEC,suchastaxgrants,therighttolandownershipandtheissuanceofvisas.
(iv)ReformofdomesticinvestmentdisputeresolutionsystemMeanwhile,acoupleofcountriesreformedtheirdomesticsystemsofinvestmentdisputeresolution.
FijiandQatareachenactednewarbitrationlawsbasedlargelyontheModelLawonInternationalCommercialArbitrationoftheUnitedNationsCommissiononInternationalTradeLaw(UNCITRAL).
SaudiArabiaissuedImplementingRegulationsoftheArbitrationLaw,toenhanceitsbusinessenvironment.
c.
Newinvestmentrestrictionsorregulationsmainlyreflectconcernsaboutnationalsecurityandforeignownershipoflandandnaturalresources(i)IncreasingconcernsaboutimplicationsofforeigninvestmentfornationalsecuritySomecountriesintroducednewinvestmentrestrictionsorregulations,mainlyreflectingconcernsaboutnationalsecurityconsiderationsorforeigninvestmentinstrategicindustries.
Forinstance,ChinarestrictedcertainoutwardinvestmentbyspecificState-83ownedenterprises.
GermanyandJapanintroducedamendmentstotheirforeigninvestmentreviewmechanisms,mainlytoclarifyrulesandaddressshortcomingsthatwereidentifiedintheirapplication.
ItalyextendedtheGovernment'sso-called"goldenpowers"toblocktakeoversinhigh-techindustriesbynon-EUcompaniesthatmayposeaseriousthreattoessentialnationalinterestsorpresentarisktopublicorderandnationalsecurity.
TheRussianFederationintroducedcertainprohibitionsforinwardinvestmentbyoffshorecompanies.
ItnowalsorequirespriorGovernmentapprovalforforeigninvestmentincertaintransactionsinvolvingassetsofstrategicimportancefornationaldefenceandstatesecurity.
TheBolivarianRepublicofVenezuelapublishedthenewConstitutionalLawonForeignProductiveInvestment.
Amongotherchanges,itstatesthatforeigninvestorsmaynotparticipatedirectlyorindirectlyinnationalpoliticaldebates.
In2018,Lithuaniaamendedalawrelatedtoenterprises,mainlyseekingtosafeguardnationalsecurityincertaineconomicsectorsorwheninvestingincertainprotectedzones.
Morerecently,furtherchangestoinvestmentscreeningproceduresrelatedtonationalsecurityhavebeenconsideredorpreparedinseveraldevelopedeconomies.
Forexample,followinganinitiativebyFrance,GermanyandItaly,3theEuropeanCommissionproposedinSeptember2017toestablishanEU-wideFDIscreeningframework,mainlytoprotectlegitimateinterestswithregardtoFDIthatraisesconcernsaboutsecurityorpublicorder.
4InOctober2017,theGovernmentoftheUnitedKingdompublishedaGreenPaper,"NationalSecurityandInfrastructureInvestmentReview",askingforcommentsonproposednewstructuresforreviewingforeigninvestments.
5InJanuary2018,theUnitedStatesGovernmentstatedthatitsupportstheCongress'seffortstopassthe"ForeignInvestmentRiskReviewModernizationActof2017".
TheActwouldexpandthescopeoftransactionsreviewablebytheCommitteeonForeignInvestmentintheUnitedStates(CFIUS)tomoreeffectivelyaddressnationalsecurityconcerns.
6(ii)NewregulationsonaccessofforeigninvestorstolandandnaturalresourcesSeveralcountriesadoptednewregulationsonownershipoflandornaturalresourcesbyforeigninvestors.
Australiaintroducedanannualchargeonforeignownersofunderutilizedresidentialpropertyandincreasedfeesthatforeigninvestorsmustpaywhenseekingapprovaltopurchaseresidentialrealestate.
Italsointroducedaquantitativerestrictionontheacquisitionofcertainrealestateassetsbyforeigners.
TerritorialsubdivisionsofCanadaintroducedtheNon-ResidentSpeculationTax,relatingtotheacquisitionofresidentialpropertyinareaswithoverheatedhousingmarkets.
NewZealandtightenedscreeningproceduresforforeignacquisitionsofsensitiveland.
SouthAfricaintroducedanewMiningCharter,whichraisestheminimumthresholdforblackownershipofminingcompanies.
TheUnitedRepublicofTanzaniaadoptednewmininglaws,requiring,amongotherelements,thattheGovernmentobtainatleasta16percentstakeinminingandenergyprojects.
(iii)SomecountriesintroducednewlocalcontentrequirementsSeveralcountriesimposedlocalcontentrequirementsforinvestors.
Forexample,Indonesiaincreasedtheminimumlocalcontentrequirementfordomesticallyproduced4GsmartphonesthataresoldintheIndonesianmarket,from20percentto30percent.
Kenyareinforcedthelocalprocurementrequirementsforexistingmineralrightsholders.
In2018,theUnitedRepublicofTanzaniaadoptedseparate"MiningRegulationsonLocalContent"topromotetheuseoflocalexpertise,goodsandservices,businessesandfinancingintheminingvaluechain.
842.
MergercontrolsaffectingforeigninvestorsIn2017,severalhost-countrygovernmentsraisedobjectionstovariousforeigntakeoverattempts,inparticularwhentheyinvolvedthesaleofcriticalorstrategicdomesticassetstoforeigninvestors.
Amongallcross-borderM&Aswithavalueexceeding$100million,therewereatleast10dealswithdrawnforregulatoryorpoliticalreasons–3morethanin2016(WIR17,p.
105).
Calculatedonthebasisofthenumberofdeals,thisrepresentsapproximately17percentofallcross-borderM&Asexceeding$100millionin2017.
Theapproximategrossvalueofthe10withdrawndealswasroughly$35.
3billion.
Ofthe12M&Asthathadavalueover$50millionandupto$100million,onewaswithdrawnforregulatoryreasons.
ThemainindustriesinwhichM&Aswerewithdrawnforregulatoryorpoliticalreasonswerehigh-techmanufacturing(e.
g.
semiconductorsandelectronics),financialservices,digitalmappingservices,securityservicesandtelecommunication.
Asfarasthehomeeconomiesoftargetedcompaniesareconcerned,theUnitedStatesrankedfirst,followedbyNewZealand.
Onthebuyer'sside,investorsfromChinawerepredominantlyaffected.
Ofthe11withdrawndealsin2017,3wereterminatedinthescreeningprocessbecauseofconcernsrelatedtonationalsecurity.
AllrelatedtoattemptsbyChineseorGermaninvestorstoacquiretheassetsofhigh-techfirms,includinginsemiconductormanufacturing.
FiveM&Aswerewithdrawnin2017becauseofconcernsbycompetitionauthorities,andoneforeigntakeoverwasabortedforprudentialregulatoryreasons.
Withregardtothelatter,theplannedacquisitionwasdeclinedbytheNewZealandauthority,whichwasnotabletodeterminetheownershipstructureoftheacquiringgroup.
Inaddition,oneM&Awaswithdrawnin2017forotherregulatoryreasonsandanotheronebecausethecompaniesinvolveddidnotwanttowaitlongerforhost-countryapproval(tableIII.
2).
Inthefirstfourmonthsof2018,thetrendfrom2017continuedandevenintensified(tableIII.
3).
FromJanuarytoApril2018,sevendealswereabandoned,mostlyintheUnitedStates,whichismorethan60percentofallthedealswithdrawnin2017.
85TableIII.
2.
Foreigntakeoverswithdrawnforregulatoryorpoliticalreasonsin2017(Illustrativelist)FornationalsecurityreasonsInneonTechnologiesAG–CreeInc,WolfspeedaOn16February2017,CreeInc(UnitedStates)announcedthatitwouldterminateitsagreementtosellWolfspeed,whichincludesitssiliconcarbidesubstratebusiness,toInneonTechnologiesAG(Germany).
Itstatedthat"CreeandInneonhavebeenunabletoidentifyalternativeswhichwouldaddressthenationalsecurityconcernsoftheCommitteeonForeignInvestmentintheUnitedStates(CFIUS),andasaresult,theproposedtransactionwillbeterminated.
"CanyonBridgeCapitalPartnersLLC–LatticeSemiconductorCorporationbOn13September2017,thepresidentoftheUnitedStatesissuedanorderprohibitingtheacquisitionofLatticeSemiconductorCorporationbyaChinese-backedprivateequityrm.
ThepresidentfollowedarecommendationoftheCFIUS,whichhadfoundthattheacquisitionbyagroupofinvestors,includingtheState-controlledventurecapitalfund,wouldposeathreattoUnitedStatesnationalsecurity.
AconsortiumledbyNavinfoCo–HEREInternationalBVcOn26September2017,agroupofinvestorsledbythedigitalmapproviderNavInfoCo(China)abandoneditsproposedacquisitionofa10percentminoritystakeinthedigitalmappingserviceandsoftwarecompanyHEREInternationalBV,followingoppositionfromtheCFIUS.
ForcompetitionreasonsBainCapitalFundIVLP–ResiluxNVdOn28March2017,BainCapitalFundIV(UnitedStates)withdrewitsplanstolaunchatenderoffertoacquiretheentiresharecapitalofResiluxNV,aBelgium-basedpackagingcompany,inaleveragedbuyouttransactionbecauseofanantitrustrulinginGermanyfortheintendedcombinedacquisition.
LondonStockExchange–DeutscheBrseAGeOn29March2017,theEuropeanCommissionvetoedtheplannedmergerbetweenDeutscheBrseAGandtheLondonStockExchangeGroup.
TheCommissionfoundthatbycombiningtheactivitiesoftwoofthemajorstockexchangeoperators,adefactomonopolyinthemarketsofbondswouldhavebeencreatedand,inaddition,themergerwouldhaveremovedhorizontalcompetitionforthetradingandclearingofsinglestockequityderivatives.
Thevalueofthisdealwasestimatedtoamounttoroughly$31billion.
ZIMENSPZOO–KonsalnetHoldingSAfZIMENSPZO,aunitofaChinesesecuritycompany,withdrewitsplanstoacquireKonsalnetHoldingSA(Poland),aproviderofsecurityguardandpatrolservices,becauseofconcernsaboutaconcentrationissueraisedbythePolishCompetitionAuthorityinApril2017.
VeroInsuranceNewZealandLtd–TowerLtdgVeroInsuranceNewZealandLtd,ultimatelyownedbySuncorpGroup–anAustraliannancialcompany–withdrewitsoffertoacquiretheremaining80percentshareinTowerLtd,aNewZealand–basedinsurancecompany.
InJuly2017,theCommerceCommissionofNewZealanddeclinedthemergerattemptasitwasnotsatisedthatthemergerwouldnothavetheeffectofsubstantiallylesseningcompetitioninthepersonalinsurancemarket.
MelitaLtd–VodafoneMaltaLtdhOn8December2017,VodafoneGroupPlcwithdrewitsplantocombineVodafoneMalta(awirelesstelecommunicationcarrier)withMelitaLtd,aimingtocreateafullyintegratedcommunicationscompanyinMalta.
Initsmediarelease,VodafonestatedthatthepartiesdecidedtoterminatethetransactionasithadbecomeclearthattheywereunabletosatisfytheMalteseCompetitionAuthority'srequirements.
ForprudentialreasonsTIP-HNANewZealandHoldingsLtd–UDCFinanceLtdiOn21December2017,theOverseasInvestmentOfce(OIO)ofNewZealanddeclinedTIP-HNANewZealandHoldingsLtd'sapplicationtoacquire100percentofthesharesinUDCFinanceLtd(asubsidiaryofANZBank).
TheOIOemphasizedthattheinformationprovidedaboutownershipandcontrolinterestswasnotsufcient.
HNAGroupisaChinesermfromsouthernChinathatoperatesintheaviationbusiness.
ForotherregulatoryreasonsDolphinFundLtd–FIHGroupPlcjInApril2017,DolphinFundLtd–ownedbyanArgentineinvestor–withdrewitsoffertoacquireFIHGroupPlc(UnitedKingdom),whichplaysanimportantroleintheeconomyoftheFalklandIslands.
ThisfollowedtheFalklandIslandsGovernment'slettertoFIH,statingthatiftheownershipofthecompanychangeditcouldlosethestatusthatallowedittoacquirelandwithoutalicense.
Withdrawnwhilewaitingforhost-countryapprovalCowenGroupInc–CEFCChinaEnergyCoLtdkCEFCChinaEnergyCoagreedtoacquirea19.
9percentminoritystakeinCowenGroupInc(UnitedStates),aninvestmentbank,inaprivatelynegotiatedtransaction.
However,on24November2017,bothpartiesannouncedthattheyhadmutuallyagreedtowithdrawfromthelingwiththeCFIUSandnottopursuethedealowingtodelaysanduncertaintyinsecuringapprovalfromtheCFIUS.
Source:UNCTADbasedoncross-borderM/Adatabase(www.
unctad.
org-fdistatistics).
ahttps://www.
sec.
gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000089541917000021/ex9918k021617.
htm.
bhttps://www.
treasury.
gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0157.
aspx.
chttp://www.
navinfo.
com/news/detail.
aspxid=1217&sort=1.
dhttps://www.
resilux.
com/downloads/press/RESILUX-20170328-EN-Resilux%20-%20Bain%20Capital.
pdf.

ehttp://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-789_en.
htm.
fhttps://www.
uokik.
gov.
pl/koncentracje.
phpnews_id=13094&print=1.
ghttp://www.
comcom.
govt.
nz/the-commission/media-centre/media-releases/2017/commission-declines-vero-insurance-clearance-to-acquire-tower-/.

hhttp://www.
vodafone.
com/content/index/media/vodafone-group-releases/2017/termination-merger-malta-and-melita.
html.

ihttps://www.
linz.
govt.
nz/news/2017-12/overseas-investment-ofce-declines-consent-tip-hna.
jhttp://en.
mercopress.
com/2017/04/14/falklands-dolphin-fund-desists-from-taking-over-h-group-at-this-time.
khttp://www.
cowen.
com/news/cowen-and-cefc-china-announce-mutual-agreement-to-withdrawal-from-ling-with-the-cus.
86TableIII.
3.
Foreigntakeoverswithdrawnforregulatoryorpoliticalreasonsin2018,January–April(Illustrativelist)FornationalsecurityreasonsAntFinancialServicesGroup–MoneyGramInternationalIncaOn2January2018,AntFinancial(China)withdrewitsoffertoacquiretheentiresharecapitalofMoneyGramInternationalInc(UnitedStates),aproviderofnancialtransactionservices.
AccordingtoastatementbyMoneyGram,thepartieshadbeenadvisedthatCFIUSclearanceofthemergerwouldnotbeforthcomingandbothpartiesagreedtoterminatethedeal.
BlueFocusInternationalLtd–Cogint,IncbOn20February2018,Cogint,Inc(UnitedStates)adatasolutionsprovider,andBlueFocusInternationalLtd(HongKong,China)agreedtoterminatetheirbusinesscombinationagreement.
CogintstatedthattheCFIUShadindicateditsunwillingnesstoapprovethetransaction.
UnicCapitalManagementCoLtd–XcerraCorporationcOn22February2018,Xcerra(UnitedStates),amanufacturerofelectricalsignalsmeasuringandtestinginstruments,terminateditsmergeragreementwithUnicCapitalManagementandtheChinaIntegratedCircuitIndustryInvestmentFund.
XcerrastatedthataftercarefulreviewoffeedbackreceivedfromtheCFIUS,itconsideredthatapprovalofthismergerwouldbehighlyunlikely.
BroadcomLtd–QualcommIncdOn12March2018,thepresidentoftheUnitedStatesprohibitedtheproposedtakeoverofchipmakerQualcomm(UnitedStates)byBroadcom(Singapore)fornationalsecurityreasons.
InFebruary2018,Broadcomhadproposeda$117billionbidforthetakeoverofQualcomm.
ForprudentialreasonsConsortiumledbyChineseinvestors–ChicagoStockExchangeeOn15February2018,theSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC)oftheUnitedStatesrejectedatakeoveroftheChicagoStockExchangebyagroupledbyChinese-basedinvestors.
TheSECsaidinastatementthatthereviewprocesshadraisedquestionsabout"whethertheproposedownershipstructure[would]allowtheCommissiontoexercisesufcientoversightoftheExchange.
"ForotherregulatoryreasonsAeolusTyreCoLtd–PrometeonTyreGroupSrlfAeolusTyreCoLtd(China)withdrewitsoffertoacquiretheremaining90percentstakeinPrometeonTyreGroupSrl(Italy),amanufacturerandwholesaleroftires,fromotherinvestorsinastockswaptransaction.
On4January2018,AeolusreleasedastatementsayingthattheChineseauthoritieshadfailedtograntapprovalfortheoverseasacquisitionbeforethe31December2017deadline.
Therelevantpartieswereunabletoreachaconsensusonanextension,itsaid,sothedealwasterminated.
Withdrawnwhilewaitingforhost-countryapprovalWarburgPincusIndia–TataTechnologiesLtdgInFebruary2018,WarburgPincusIndia,aunitofWarburgPincus(UnitedStates),aprivateequityrm,withdrewitsoffertoacquirea43percentstakeinTataTechnologies,anengineeringserviceanddesignarmofIndia'slargesttruckmaker,TataMotors.
Inamediastatement,TataMotorsstatedthatthedealhasbeenmutuallyterminated"duetodelaysinsecuringregulatoryapprovalsaswellasduetotherecentperformanceofthecompanynotmeetinginternalthresholdsbecauseofmarketchallenges.
"Source:UNCTAD.
ahttps://www.
sec.
gov/Archives/edgar/data/1273931/000119312518000668/d517771d8k.
htm.
bhttps://www.
sec.
gov/Archives/edgar/data/1460329/000129993318000201/htm_55915.
htm.
chttps://www.
sec.
gov/Archives/edgar/data/357020/000119312518054209/d533034d8k.
htm.
dhttps://www.
whitehouse.
gov/presidential-actions/presidential-order-regarding-proposed-takeover-qualcomm-incorporated-broadcom-limited.

ehttps://www.
sec.
gov/rules/sro/chx/2018/34-82727.
pdf.
fhttp://static.
sse.
com.
cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/2018-01-05/600469_20180105_6.
pdf.

ghttps://www.
bloombergquint.
com/business/2018/02/05/warburg-pincus-calls-off-tata-tech-investment.